

# IPI

INTERNATIONAL  
PEACE  
INSTITUTE

BEING  
A  
PEACE  
KEEPER  
REGIONAL ROUNDTABLE

On December 2-3, 2013, in Buenos Aires, Argentina, twenty-four representatives from eleven Latin American countries gathered with senior officials from the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the Department of Field Support (DFS) to discuss the current state and future of Latin American military and police contributions to UN peacekeeping operations. On February 6, 2014, a follow-up roundtable was held in New York with sixteen representatives from eight Latin American countries and the Assistant Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Mr. Edmond Mulet, to continue the discussions started in Buenos Aires.

The Latin America roundtables comprised the fourth regional meeting of the *Being a Peacekeeper* series. The goal of the *Being a Peacekeeper* series is to increase the quantity and improve the quality of available contributions to UN peacekeeping operations. It seeks to facilitate an exchange of information, analysis, and viewpoints among troop- and police-contributing countries of the region and UN senior leadership. The Latin American roundtables were conducted under the Chatham House rule of nonattribution.

This meeting note was drafted by Bianca Selway, a research assistant at IPI. The note reflects the rapporteur's interpretation of the meetings and does not necessarily represent the views of all other participants.

## Beyond Haiti: Enhancing Latin American Military and Police Contributions to UN Peacekeeping


APRIL 2014

With fifteen UN peacekeeping missions already in operation and another in the Central African Republic on the horizon, UN peacekeeping continues to be in high demand. Today, DPKO deploys more than 83,000 troops, 13,000 police, and 2,000 observers, contributed voluntarily by member states. A majority of these are provided by African and South Asian member states, which together provide 74 percent of the UN's uniformed personnel. Latin America has a longstanding history of participating in UN peacekeeping, stretching back more than fifty years to some of the earliest peacekeeping operations. At present, Latin America contributes almost 7 percent of all UN troops and nearly 2 percent of UN police. Two Latin American states occupy spots in the group of top twenty uniformed contributors: Uruguay with a total of 2,164 uniformed personnel and Brazil with 1,755. Latin American contributions are predominantly military contributions (as opposed to police) to the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), with support to missions in sub-Saharan Africa amounting to less than 2 percent of the total uniformed deployments to the region.

Capability gaps are a consistent feature of UN peacekeeping operations. In many of its largest and most challenging operations, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, UN peacekeeping still lacks an array of critical enablers, which significantly limit operational capabilities and mandate implementation. At the same time, personnel may lack the specialized skills required to effectively implement complex mandates. For example, the role of UN police has moved far beyond the monitoring of host-state police toward more specialized functions, such as restructuring police organizations or mentoring host-state police. The UN continues to rely on member states, including Latin American countries, to identify, prepare, and deploy personnel with the appropriate skills and expertise to deliver on diverse mandates. Thus, the need for specialized military and police contributions to UN peace operations and skilled personnel is a pressing concern. At the same time, the demands that contemporary peace operations place on contributing countries have become increasingly challenging. Existing contributors and the UN Secretariat have assembled an impressive inventory of lessons learned, guidance, and best practices, yet the need for continued dialogue, reflection, and improvement remains.

The impacts of conflicts extend far beyond the immediate vicinity of where they occur, and a diverse peacekeeping force reflects a shared global burden and adds legitimacy and credibility to a peacekeeping mission. In its most recent reports, the UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations has continued to emphasize the need to broaden the base of troop- and police-contributing countries. The International Peace Institute's *Being a*

Figure 1. Latin American uniformed personnel contributions to UN peacekeeping operations (1990-2014).



*Peacekeeper* series seeks to facilitate networking at a regional level among experienced contributors and countries considering more active engagement in peacekeeping. It also provides a forum for interaction among peacekeeping contributors and other key elements in the UN peacekeeping system, such as DPKO, DFS, interested member states, and the policy research community.


## Strategic Context

Latin American countries largely enjoy domestic political support for deploying their troops to UN peacekeeping missions, including, at times, to missions in countries beyond their immediate political and economic interests. Latin American countries exhibit a clear desire and commitment to contribute to global peace and security through UN peacekeeping, with political and operational benefits as key driving factors for contributing. During the discussions, participants frequently referred to the international prestige derived from being a contributor to UN peacekeeping missions. Other benefits included broader training opportunities for personnel, real military and police operational experience in diverse and challenging

environments, enhanced interoperability with other countries, financial offsets by way of reimbursements, and the chance to procure and use new military equipment. The question at present for Latin America is not *whether* to continue contributing to UN peacekeeping mission, but rather, *how* to participate in UN peacekeeping to maximize the effectiveness of contributions.

There is presently an opportunity to harness experienced and willing Latin American contributors for expanding and under-contributed missions, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa. More than two-thirds of overall Latin American contributions to UN peacekeeping are presently deployed in MINUSTAH, making up approximately 70 percent of the mission's military strength. In 2012, MINUSTAH developed a conditions-based Consolidation Plan that provided key objectives over a three-year period to strengthen security, rule of law, and elections administration, and modernize institutions. The Plan includes a reduction in the uniformed strength of the mission and envisages a critical role for UN police to consolidate peace in Haiti, in the form of individual police and teams of

Figure 2. Latin American contributions to UN peacekeeping missions by percentage.



police with specialized skills, as well as in regards to the training of a Haitian national police force. A clear challenge for Latin American countries wanting to maintain the same level of support for Haiti will be their ability to reconfigure and adjust their engagement to support the changing needs of the mission going forward. For Latin American governments wishing to continue the same level of military contributions to UN peacekeeping, it will be necessary to commence planning on where such contributions could be most usefully deployed, and on what preparations will be necessary. Clear and ongoing dialogue and engagement among Latin American contributions, DPKO/DFS, and MINUSTAH will be critical to clarify expectations and planning for the planned transition.

### PARTNERSHIPS

Latin America has been a leader in the provision of joined-up, binational contributions to UN peacekeeping, using creative approaches to meet the needs of UN peacekeeping missions and also as a cost- and risk-sharing mechanism. Chile and Ecuador, for example, provide a combined engineering company to MINUSTAH. In 2008, Peru and Argentina created a binational company

of engineers known as “Libertador Don Jose de San Martin,” although it has never deployed. Expanding on such practical partnerships could provide another potential avenue to fill critical gaps in UN peacekeeping missions. With particular capability gaps, such as standby or rapidly deployable capacities for mission start-up and mission reinforcement, transport, engineering, logistics, and medical capabilities—which are in high demand for all UN peacekeeping missions—there is a need to expand on these practical partnerships. Specific assistance from the UN or additional equipment provided by donor countries could help to make this possible. Further exploration of the lessons learned in providing joint contributions could also be applied to other regions.

Partnerships also enable countries to form closer bilateral defense and diplomatic ties. The Cruz del Sur initiative is seen as an attempt to foster this kind of cooperation between Argentina and Chile. Envisaged as a standby capability for the UN, fully deployable within ninety days, the Cruz del Sur force is the product of six years of collaboration between the two states to develop the structure and procedures of the force. It is composed of two mechanized battalions, an air component of eight helicopters, and a naval component. The higher cost associated with committing standby forces for peacekeeping use is acceptable, in part, because the Cruz del Sur is also a diplomatic exercise between the two nations. One participant at the roundtable reported that there is potential interest from other Latin American nations to join the initiative. While the Cruz del Sur has yet to deploy to a peacekeeping operation, given the critical demand for rapidly deployable capacities, expanding and operationalizing the Cruz del Sur partnership warrants further exploration by Latin American governments.

Another opportunity to develop partnerships for UN peacekeeping is through the new Directorate for Peacekeeping Strategic Partnership. Established in 2013, the directorate is intended to strengthen the peacekeeping partnership through working closely with troop- and police-contributing countries, UN senior leadership in the field, and headquarters. This new office offers an opportunity for the UN Secretariat to better engage with Latin American governments and regional training institutions to identify knowledge, training, and information gaps.

## Challenges

### RESOURCE CONSTRAINTS

An obvious challenge faced by many member states in the current global financial climate is resource constraints. Even though most UN peacekeeping missions are located in Africa, Latin American contributions to UN peacekeeping missions in Africa are the exception rather than the rule. Only Uruguay and Guatemala have significant numbers of uniformed personnel deployed there. Participants attributed this fact, in part, to the remote locations of the UN peacekeeping missions in Africa, which makes the provision of equipment and logistics support more costly. (The hesitation is compounded by the perception of African missions being a higher safety risk to personnel than a mission such as MINUSTAH.) There could be lessons from other member states experiencing similar logistical challenges but able to make relatively larger contributions in Africa, such as key Asian contributors, including Bangladesh, China, Nepal, Pakistan, and India. Similarly, Uruguay, the largest Latin American contributor to African missions with a significant troop contingent deployed to the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), may also be able to provide further lessons on how other Latin American member states could minimize the costs associated with deployment of troops over vast distances, or how they might reconcile these costs with relevant stakeholders.

### KNOWLEDGE AND TRAINING

In addition to providing personnel and equipment, member states are also responsible for ensuring that their troops arrive in the field with adequate training. Latin American personnel are trained by several institutions, including the Argentine Joint Training Centre for Peacekeeping Operations (CAECOPAZ) and the Joint Peace Operations Training Centre of Peru (CECOPAZ), as well as through bilateral support from member states, such as the United States, through the Global Peace Operations Initiative. Participants expressed their desire to see further efforts from the UN Secretariat to standardize training curricula and certify

Table 1. Top twenty major deployments to UN peacekeeping operations ranked by deployment distance\*

	Country	Mission	Personnel	Distance from TCC Capital to Host Capital (mi)
1	Fiji	UNDOF	509	9912
2	Sri Lanka	MINUSTAH	869	9864
3	India	MINUSTAH	429	8606
4	China	UNMIL	724	7812
5	China	MINUSMA	402	7305
6	Bangladesh	UNMIL	541	6754
7	Jordan	MINUSTAH	542	6555
8	Nepal	UNMIL	416	6395
9	Bangladesh	UNOCI	2361	6359
10	Pakistan	UNMIL	2010	5637
11	Indonesia	UNIFIL	1188	5415
12	Bangladesh	MONUSCO	2732	5410
13	Mongolia	UNMISS	861	5297
14	Pakistan	UNOCI	1550	5285
15	Nepal	MONUSCO	1047	5156
16	Uruguay	MONUSCO	1204	5007
17	Malaysia	UNIFIL	830	4754
18	India	MONUSCO	4038	4697
19	Pakistan	MONUSCO	3789	4595
20	Bangladesh	UNAMID	869	4288

\*Major deployment is defined here as a minimum uniformed personnel contribution of 400.

training institutes by the UN Secretariat's Integrated Training Service, which is responsible for setting standards and developing and providing guidance to assist with training UN peacekeepers.

Language barriers are also cited as an obstacle. In its most recent reports, the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations has stressed the need for UN guidance to be made available in all the official languages of the United Nations to provide "the peacekeeping community with timely access to relevant training standards, material and tools, as well as relevant guidance documents."<sup>1</sup> Language differences also were identified as a barrier to the

1 United Nations, 2012 Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, UN Doc. A/66/19, para 247, September 11, 2012.

deployment of more Latin American police, as individual police have more need to engage directly with host communities, host country police forces, and government institutions.

Inadequate or inconsistent communication between training institutions and the UN Secretariat also was raised as a frustration among participants. Without insight into the mission-specific conditions of various UN peacekeeping missions, Latin American troops claimed they could not adequately prepare for the living conditions and the situation on the ground. Establishing communication and dissemination channels among the contributing country, regional training centers, and a UN peacekeeping mission's integrated training center is one solution. This would enable the Latin American training centers to receive and disseminate mission-specific information prior to a country's first deployment to a theater. Roundtable participants from the UN Secretariat also agreed to develop closer relationships with Latin American training centers, including through regular video conferencing.

## POLICE

High-quality police capabilities continue to be in demand for UN peacekeeping missions, particularly in regard to urgent operational priorities, such as specialized expert policing teams and well-trained formed police units. As organized crime is increasingly a challenge that UN peacekeeping missions face, the demand for specialized and experienced policing capabilities in this respect also has risen. Latin American police are highly skilled and experienced in working in areas with organized crime, yet their global contribution of police to UN peacekeeping is only 2 percent—a relatively low regional contribution. According to the participants, a fundamental obstacle preventing the deployment of more Latin American police to UN peacekeeping is continued concerns of domestic crime and violence, which leads to a lack of domestic political support for sending police overseas. While combating domestic criminal activity has been identified as a high priority for Latin American governments and a key preoccupation of domestic constituencies, as one participant pointed out, “criminal networks are global and therefore Latin American strategic interests must widen to other regions with organized criminal

connections to Latin America, such as the Sahel.” Sending police on international missions also leads directly to the sharing of intelligence and lessons that Latin American police can bring back and employ in their domestic roles following a deployment. It was suggested that Latin America should test the domestic political waters by first contributing small numbers of specialized police to international missions or perhaps contributing to a multinational police unit deployed to Haiti.

## Conclusion

The three overarching issues related to Latin American contributions to UN peacekeeping were MINUSTAH's future, operational partnerships, and training. In this light, recommendations emerged that centered on enhancing strategic planning and improving dialogue. If, going forward, the UN and Latin America are interested in greater collaboration, then the recommendations below suggest this should start relatively quickly, in light of the consolidation of MINUSTAH, and be sustained through efforts by both sides.

Haiti remains a clear top priority for the region and the needs of MINUSTAH are shifting away from military contributions and toward police. Despite a generally shared understanding of MINUSTAH's Consolidation Plan, there are challenges affecting the degree to which Latin American contributors will be able to reconfigure and adjust their engagement, particularly with regard to police contributions where domestic political support for contributions is described as a fundamental obstacle. Going forward, further clarity and consultation between MINUSTAH, DPKO/DFS, and Latin American governments will enable adequate preparation for the end of the planned transition, as well as for long-term force generation planning.

A key takeaway from the roundtable is that Latin America has been a leader in partnerships for UN peacekeeping through the provision of joint contributions. Some of the present and future capability gaps in UN peacekeeping missions could potentially be filled through joined-up binational contributions. At best, expanding on these practical partnerships could further increase contributions from Latin American countries, be it in the context

of Cruz del Sur or other regional initiatives. At a minimum, Latin American partnerships could provide lessons learned for other joint contributions or from other regions.

While Latin American peacekeepers are well-trained and experienced, there is a clear desire for more efforts to better prepare peacekeepers for the situation on the ground. As such, the interaction between the UN and Latin American training centers could be increased to provide more detailed insights into the mission-specific needs and conditions of various UN peacekeeping missions. One way to improve this communication would be to establish communication and dissemination channels among the troop-contributing countries (TCCs), regional training centers, and the integrated mission training centers of particular missions. Training centers within UN missions could then disseminate mission-specific information prior to a country's first deployment to a theater.

## Recommendations

### STRATEGIC

1. DPKO/DFS should develop an outreach policy that aligns with MINUSTAH's Consolidation Plan and targets Latin American contributions as part of a longer-term force generation strategy.
2. Latin American countries should continue to hold national, bilateral, and regional discussions on their role in UN peacekeeping beyond Haiti. Contributions of specific enablers, such as engineering and medical units, or specialized police units, etc., could also be done through partnerships.
3. The UN and Latin American governments must develop stronger arguments for Latin American engagement in Africa. The reasons cannot only be value-based; they need to be interest-based as well.

### PARTNERSHIPS

4. DPKO must build stronger political and personal connections with Latin American capitals to improve force generation planning for both military and police.
5. A "group of friends" of some sort should be established among Latin American TCCs and police-contributing countries to enhance the dialogue and the collaboration between UN leadership and Latin American capitals on peacekeeping.
6. Latin American governments should engage in further dialogue, reflection, and activities such as joint training exercises to develop more peacekeeping partnerships, including joint deployments, as well as to draw out lessons learned from existing partnerships.

### TRAINING

7. DPKO must regularize its communication with Latin American training institutions to improve pre-deployment training and standards, including through more in-country visits and video teleconferences.
8. The creation of the Directorate for Peacekeeping Strategic Partnership should be supported politically by Latin American governments and used as a tool for strengthening standards, guidance, and training.

## Programa (Agenda)

**Fortaleciendo la Participación Latinoamericana  
en el Mantenimiento de la Paz de Naciones Unidas**  
(Enhancing Latin American Participation in UN Peacekeeping)

**Buenos Aires, Argentina**

Lunes, 2 de diciembre de 2013

9:15 **Bienvenida (Welcome)**

Gen. Jose Luis Figueroa, *Chief of Operations of the Argentinean Armed Forces Joint Staff*  
Carl Alexandre, *Deputy Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General, MINUSTAH*  
Adam C. Smith, *Manager, Peace Operations Program, International Peace Institute*

9:45 **Discurso de Apertura: “Estado Actual de las Operaciones de Mantenimiento de la Paz de las Naciones Unidas: Últimos Avances y Oportunidades para Latinoamérica”**  
(Opening Remarks: “State of UN Peacekeeping: Recent Developments and Opportunities for Latin America”)

**Speaker**

David Haeri, *Director, Division for Policy, Evaluation and Training, UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations*

10:15 **Receso y Foto del Grupo (Coffee Break and Group Photo)**

10:45 **Módulo 1: Oportunidades y Desafíos de la Participación en Operaciones de Mantenimiento de Paz**  
(Session 1: Being a Peacekeeper: Opportunities and Challenges)

*¿Por qué y de qué manera los países latinoamericanos contribuyen a las Operaciones de Mantenimiento de Paz de las Naciones Unidas? ¿Cómo beneficia a los países su participación en las operaciones de Mantenimiento de la Paz? ¿Qué áreas de conocimiento especializado ofrece Latinoamérica? ¿Qué consideraciones estratégicas y factores políticos y operacionales intervienen en las deliberaciones de los países de la región al momento de determinar su nivel de participación en misiones de paz? ¿Cuáles son los principales desafíos políticos, jurídicos u operacionales que encuentran los países que aportan tropas y/o policía?*

*(Why and how are Latin American countries contributing to UN peacekeeping? How do countries benefit from their participation in peacekeeping operations? What specialized areas of expertise does Latin America offer? What strategic considerations and political and operational factors are impacting Latin American countries' deliberations on whether to invest more in UN peacekeeping? What are the key political, legal, or operational challenges troop-contributing countries/police-contributing countries (TCCs/PCCs) face?)*

**Speakers**

Fernando de Oliveira Sena, *Head of International Peace and Security Division, Ministry of External Relations, Brazil*

Col. Gustavo Sosa, *Chief, Peacekeeping Operations Coordination Center of the Army, Uruguay*  
 Librado Augusto Orozco Zapata, *Director of Multilateral Affairs, Ministry of Defense, Peru*

**Chair**

Adam C. Smith, *Manager, Peace Operations Program, International Peace Institute*

12:30 Almuerzo (Lunch)

13:30 **Módulo 2: El Futuro de MINUSTAH**  
 (Session 2: The Future of MINUSTAH)

*¿Cuál es el plan a corto plazo para la MINUSTAH y cómo podría compararse con transiciones en otras Misiones de Paz? ¿Cómo afectará esta transición en MINUSTAH a los países latinoamericanos que contribuyen tropas y/o policía? ¿Cómo cambiarán los requerimientos de capacidades durante esta transición (ej: unidades de infantería a unidades policiales constituidas)? ¿Cómo pueden los TCCs/PCCs contribuir al plan de consolidación de la paz de la Misión?*

*(What is the near-term plan for MINUSTAH? How does this compare to other peacekeeping transitions? How will the expected transition in MINUSTAH affect Latin American contributors? Will the capability needs change during the transition (e.g., infantry to Formed Police Units)? How can TCCs/PCCs in Haiti and beyond contribute to the peacebuilding support plan of the mission?)*

**Speakers**

Carl Alexandre, *Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General, MINUSTAH*

Comodoro Víctor Núñez, *Argentina*

Carlos Ponce de Leon Mendieta, *Director of the Peacekeeping Department, Bolivia Defense Forces*

Douglas Alejandro Restrepo Murillo, *Subdirectora General, Policía Nacional de Colombia*

**Chair**

Luiz Baganha, *Ministry of Defense, Brazil*

15:00 Receso (Coffee Break)

15:15 **Módulo 3: La Doctrina y la Práctica del Mantenimiento de la Paz en Proceso de Desarrollo**  
 (Session 3: Evolving Peacekeeping Practice and Doctrine)

*¿Cómo difiere la participación en MINUSTAH de aquella en Mali y la República Democrática del Congo? ¿Qué lecciones aprendidas en MINUSTAH pueden aplicar los países de la región que aportan tropas y/o policía en otras Misiones de Paz de la ONU? ¿Cómo afectan a los TCCs/PCCs los mandatos más robustos en relación al uso de la fuerza? ¿Qué desafíos y oportunidades surgen de nuevas y/o potenciales misiones (Mali, República Centroafricana, Siria)?*

*(How does the MINUSTAH experience differ from other peacekeeping missions, in Mali and the DRC for instance? What lessons learned by MINUSTAH TCCs/PCCs can be applied in other UN peacekeeping missions? How are TCCs/PCCs affected by more robust use of force mandates? What challenges and opportunities could new and possible future missions (Mali, CAR, Syria, etc.) bring?)*

**Speakers**

David Haeri, *Director, Division for Policy, Evaluation and Training, UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations*

Col. Victor Ricardo Ocampos Caceres, *Cnel. DEM – Director OMP, Ministry of Defense, Paraguay*

Col. Juan Antonio Montoya-Flores, *Director of Peacekeeping Operations, Defense Department, Guatemala*

**Chair**

José Miguel Capdevila, *Subdirector de Defensa, Asuntos Estratégicos y Operaciones de Paz, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Chile*

20:30 Cena (Group Dinner)

Martes, 3 de diciembre de 2013

9:30 **Módulo 4: Fortalecimiento de las Capacidades Militares y Policiales**  
(Session 4: Strengthening Military and Police Capacities)

*¿Cómo pueden el DPKO/DFS identificar y generar capacidades militares? ¿Cuáles son las capacidades ausentes y cómo pueden los Estados Miembros apoyar al DPKO/DFS para disminuir esta brecha? ¿Cuáles son los requerimientos de cara al futuro? ¿Cuál es la situación (cantidad, funciones, etc.) del personal militar y policial femenino en misiones de paz? ¿Qué incentivos ofrecen los países para alentar la participación de mujeres en el mantenimiento de la paz? El rol de UN police en las operaciones de paz se ha expandido notablemente, abarcando funciones más especializadas, tales como la reestructuración de un cuerpo de policía o el desarrollo de competencias e instituciones policiales en el país anfitrión. ¿Cómo pueden los países latinoamericanos contribuir en la reducción de la brecha entre las capacidades existentes y las requeridas? Al mismo tiempo, es probable que reforzar las capacidades de unidades especializadas, tales como las unidades de policía constituidas, continúe representando un desafío. ¿Qué lecciones han aprendido los países latinoamericanos de la provisión, reclutamiento y despliegue de unidades policiales especializadas y en qué puede beneficiar al mantenimiento de la paz de la ONU? ¿Cómo pueden los TCCs/PCCs contribuir al desarrollo de los estándares de capacidad?*

*(How does DPKO/DFS identify and generate military capabilities? What are the missing capabilities, and how can member states support DPKO/DFS in bridging the capabilities gap? What may be required in the near future? What is the status (number, functions, etc.) of women military and police in peacekeeping? What incentives are offered by your country to encourage women to participate in peacekeeping? The role of UN police in peace operations has changed and grown noticeably, moving toward more specialized functions, such as restructuring a police organization or developing host-state police skills and institutions. What can Latin American countries do to bridge the gap between requirements and existing capabilities? At the same time, the enhancement of the capability of specialized units, such as formed police units, is likely to continue to be a challenge. What lessons have Latin America countries learned in the provision, selection/recruitment, and deployment of specialized policing skills, and how can these lessons benefit UN peacekeeping? How can TCCs/PCCs help contribute to the development of capability standards?)*

**Speakers**

Col. Reyes Munguia, *Honduras Defense Forces*

Carlos Borja, *Special Assistant to the Deputy Military Adviser, Office of Military Affairs, UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations*

Andrew Carpenter, *Chief, Strategic Policy and Development Section, Police Division, Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions, UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations*

**Chair**

Col. Jose Santos Salvatierra Chirinos, *Peru Defense Forces*

11:00      Receso (Coffee Break)

11:15      **Módulo 5: Necesidades y Oportunidades de Entrenamiento**  
(Session 5: Training Needs and Opportunities)

*¿Qué obstáculos encuentran los países contribuyentes o que desean contribuir? ¿Cuáles son las oportunidades para el desarrollo de capacidades y de entrenamiento en América Latina y el resto del mundo? ¿Es este entrenamiento adecuado para el desempeño efectivo en el terreno y una exitosa implementación de los mandatos? Una vez finalizado el despliegue, ¿qué evaluaciones se realizan con el fin de identificar lecciones aprendidas/buenas prácticas/brechas en el entrenamiento previo al despliegue y durante el mismo? ¿Cómo pueden el DPKO/DFS mejorar la capacidad de entrenamiento previo al despliegue de la región? El entrenamiento previo al despliegue, ¿está basado en el escenario específico de la misión? En pos de una responsabilidad conjunta en el área de entrenamiento, ¿puede el sistema de Naciones Unidas apoyar la preparación de los TCCs/PCCs mediante la provisión de este material de entrenamiento específico?*

*(What are the capacity obstacles faced by countries contributing or wanting to contribute? What are the training or capacity-building opportunities in Latin America and beyond? Is this training sufficient for what peacekeepers face in the field and for successful mandate implementation? Have any assessments been done upon repatriation to identify lessons learned/best practices/gaps in terms of pre-deployment/in-mission training? How can DPKO/DFS enhance the UN pre-deployment training capacity in the region? Do TCCs/PCCs use mission-specific scenario-based pre-deployment training; can the UN system better support TCC/PCC preparation by providing these as a shared responsibility for training?)*

**Speakers**

Col Gustavo Javier Perez Ziolo, *Director, CAECOPAZ*

Dr. Raffi Gregorian, *Director, Office of Peace Operations, United States Department of State*

Col. Orlando Berru Marreros, *Director, Centro de Entrenamiento de Operaciones de Paz, Peru*

**Chair**

Col. Edgar Salinas, *Ministry of Interior, National Police, Paraguay*

12:45      Almuerzo (Lunch)

14:00      **Módulo 6: Contribuir a través de Acuerdos y Colaboraciones Regionales**  
(Session 6: Contributing through Enhanced Regional Collaboration and Arrangements)

*Con el crecimiento de la comunidad de países que contribuyen tropas y policía, ha aumentado la necesidad de construir/generar capacidades. Los “nuevos” países contribuyentes, con menor experiencia en el campo de las operaciones de paz, pero deseosos de participar, a menudo necesitan asistencia en forma de entrenamiento, equipamiento o la provisión de capacidad de carga, etc. Por*

*esta razón, cada vez más a menudo, los países ven ventajas en desplegar conjuntamente con otros. ¿Cuáles son las distintas modalidades de asociación que actualmente tienen lugar entre su país y otros estados miembros para generar capacidades, entrenar o equipar? ¿Cuáles son los beneficios de los distintos tipos de acuerdos? ¿Cómo pueden el DPKO/DFS facilitar la colaboración/asociación entre los países que contribuyen tropas/policía, específicamente entre países desarrollados y aquellos en vías de desarrollo? ¿Cuál es la situación actual de la Fuerza de Paz Cruz del Sur? Actualmente, ¿cuáles son las iniciativas en marcha entre los estados miembros para desarrollar lazos bilaterales estrechos y construir capacidades? ¿Cómo pueden los países latinoamericanos que contribuyen tropas/policía compartir lecciones aprendidas y asistir a los nuevos países contribuyentes de la región?*

*(As the community of troop- and police-contributing countries expands, the need for capacity building has grown. “Emerging” contributors with less experience in peacekeeping are eager to contribute but often require assistance in the form of training, equipment, or the provision of lift and other enabling support. Some countries increasingly see value in deploying jointly with others. What are the various forms of partnership taking place among member states to build capacity, train, or equip? What are the benefits of the various arrangements? How can DPKO/DFS help facilitate greater partnership among TCCs/PCCs, especially between developed and developing countries? What is the status of the Cruz del Sur? What are the current partnerships taking place among member states to develop closer bilateral ties and build capacity? How can experienced Latin American TCCs/PCCs share lessons learned and assist “emerging” Latin American TCCs/PCCs?)*

#### **Speakers**

Col. Justo Treviranus, *Argentina*

Alvaro Gonzalez Otero, *Director of Special Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Uruguay*

Sergio Larrain Barth, *Defense Adviser, Ministry of Defense, Chile*

#### **Chair**

Xavier Devaulx de Chambord, *Director, Operational Support, United Nations Department of Field Support*

#### **15:30 Conclusión: Reflexión Final y Pasos a Seguir (Conclusion: Wrap Up and Next Steps)**

*¿Qué necesitan los TCCs/PCCs del DPKO/DFS? ¿Cómo pueden el DPKO/DFS y los TCCs/PCCs relacionarse efectivamente para el planeamiento estratégico de cara al futuro? ¿Cómo pueden los países transitar de una contribución regional hacia una más global? ¿Qué mecanismos pueden establecer para facilitar la comunicación entre los participantes luego del evento?*

*(What do TCCs/PCCs need from DPKO/DFS, and how can DPKO/DFS better engage with TCCs/PCCs to plan strategically for the future? How can countries move from regional contributions to more global contributions? Can we establish a mechanism to facilitate communication among participants post-event?)*

#### **Speakers**

Dr. Roberto De Luise, *Under Secretary of International Affairs, Argentina Ministry of Defense*

David Haeri, *Director, Division for Policy, Evaluation and Training, UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations*

Adam C. Smith, *Manager, Peace Operations Program, International Peace Institute*

## Programa (Agenda)

**Promoviendo la Participación de América Latina  
en el Mantenimiento de la Paz de las Naciones Unidas**  
(Promoting Latin American Participation in UN Peacekeeping)

New York

Jueves, 6 de febrero de 2014

- 15:00 **Bienvenida y Discurso de Apertura**  
(Welcome and Introductory Remarks)
- 15:15 **Tema de Discusión 1: Los Próximos Pasos en Haití**  
(Discussion Topic 1: Next Steps in Haiti)
- 15:45 **Tema de Discusión 2: Contribuir Más Allá de Haití: Desafíos y Oportunidades**  
(Discussion Topic 2: Contributing Beyond Haiti: Challenges and Opportunities)
- 16:15 **Consideraciones Finales**  
(Concluding Remarks)



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