Improving United Nations Capacity for Rapid Deployment

PROVIDING FOR PEACEKEEPING NO. 8

H. PETER LANGILLE
Cover Photo: Members of the Pakistani-led Quick Reaction Force (QRF) at the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) conduct a rapid-reaction training exercise near Monrovia, Liberia, on January 25, 2013. UN Photo/Staton Winter.

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Providing for Peacekeeping is an independent research project that seeks to help improve the quality of military and police capabilities available for peacekeeping. The project serves as a hub for researchers, governments, and peacekeeping practitioners around the world to deepen their understanding of—and find new solutions to overcome—the capability challenges that imperil the effectiveness of peace operations. The project is implemented in partnership with Griffith University and the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University. IPI owes a debt of gratitude to its partners and to its generous donors whose contributions make projects like this possible.
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## Abbreviations

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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>ACIRC</td>
<td>African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crisis</td>
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<td>ASF</td>
<td>African Standby Force</td>
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<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<td>C-34</td>
<td>United Nations Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations</td>
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<td>DFS</td>
<td>Department of Field Support</td>
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<td>DPA</td>
<td>Department of Political Affairs</td>
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<td>DPKO</td>
<td>Department of Peacekeeping Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>EGF</td>
<td>European Union Gendarmerie Force</td>
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<td>EMHQ</td>
<td>Early Mission Headquarters (proposal)</td>
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<td>ERDC</td>
<td>Enhanced Rapidly Deployable Capacities</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>FPU</td>
<td>Formed Police Unit</td>
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<td>GFSS</td>
<td>Global Field Support Strategy</td>
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<td>IPI</td>
<td>International Peace Institute</td>
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<td>MOU</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
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<td>PCC</td>
<td>Police-Contributing Country</td>
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<td>RDC</td>
<td>Rapid Deployment Capacity</td>
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<td>SPC</td>
<td>Standing Police Capacity</td>
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<tr>
<td>TCC</td>
<td>Troop-Contributing Country</td>
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<td>UNLB</td>
<td>United Nations Logistics Base</td>
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<td>UNSAS</td>
<td>United Nations Standby Arrangements System</td>
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Executive Summary

Rapid deployment of large peace operations into conflict zones worldwide is a demanding process. Within the United Nations system, the process is further complicated and frequently delayed by a long list of tasks, including the need to seek the support of member states for the deployment of their national personnel and resources. Yet, rapid deployment remains an important standard with specified response times and an objective that underpins many related reforms.

This report reviews eight initiatives designed to help UN peace operations to deploy rapidly, providing a list of criteria to assess and improve on each. Progress is evident in the standby arrangements system (UNSAS), the formed police unit standby initiative, the standing police capacity, the new system for reimbursements and premiums, the Global Field Support Strategy, and partnerships for rapid deployment. However, there are inherent limitations, particularly in conditional standby arrangements. For example, UNSAS and regional partnerships such as the European Union Battlegroups and African Union Standby Forces have not yet proven functional. In contrast, although understaffed, the UN standing police capacity has proven to be more rapid, reliable, and cost-effective. As a result of two recent “premiums,” troop and police contributors have a new financial incentive to deploy rapidly. Combined, these initiatives should help, but they are unlikely to be sufficient.

Rather than the earlier recommended response times of thirty days for a traditional peacekeeping operation and ninety days for a complex multidimensional mission, UN officials expect the planning and deployment of new operations to entail six to twelve months. While recent initiatives may reduce UN response times to four to six months, this is neither rapid nor likely to offset the need for larger, longer operations at higher costs and risks.

Among fourteen suggestions for improvement, this report raises the need for an ongoing dialogue in an annual forum on UN rapid deployment, as well as cooperative efforts to revitalize the former Friends of Rapid Deployment group. An earlier proposal for national defense transformation to support UN peace operations also merits wider support.

In concluding, the report notes that attempts to develop better arrangements for rapid deployment have been repeatedly frustrated by austerity and a zero-growth budget. Similarly, the Security Council’s earlier emphasis to develop rapid deployment reforms within the context of existing standby arrangements limited the range of choice to modest, incremental reforms, which have also been insufficient. Aside from slower responses, the modest reforms of the past twenty years have not provided the required UN capability. A different approach is overdue. Realigning UN rapid deployment to the prevention of armed conflict and the protection of civilians may help to generate wider appeal and the broader constituency of support required. There are options. The need to aim higher should now be evident.

Introduction

The need to improve the UN’s capacity to rapidly deploy peace operations is driven by the twin pressures of responding to complex emergencies and organizational reforms. Recent crises in Mali, South Sudan, and the Central African Republic have renewed concerns over the available options for prompt responses. Similar anxieties followed the end of the Cold War and the 1994 Rwandan genocide. The Agenda for Peace report in 1992 sparked an array of related reforms, as did the report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations in 2000 (known as the Brahimi Report).1 Clearly, rapid deployment has been a long-standing challenge for the organization.

In 2004, then under-secretary-general for peacekeeping Jean-Marie Guéhenno elaborated on this recurring problem, with an important note of caution:

Resources, mobilizing the world, deploying quickly, and in a timely manner—these are huge challenges to us. We see that if we dribble into a mission, then we project an image of weakness, and there is nothing more difficult than to recover from an initial perception of weakness. So we are looking for new

solutions. We see that if we just repeat the solutions of the past, it’s not going to work.²

Rapid deployment is a complex, demanding process, even for the most advanced and best prepared member states. Prior preparation and extensive planning are essential. The prerequisites usually include the immediate availability of highly trained, well-equipped personnel and dependable transport with secure supply chains. The absence of one element may frustrate and delay a deployment.

In the United Nations system, rapid deployment is bound to internal processes and systems, as well as to external control over available personnel and resources. As an international organization, the UN represents the sum of its parts, which are often difficult to align and coordinate rapidly. The United Nations does not have its own rapid deployment capability per se. Nor is there a distinct UN system for rapid deployment. When the need arises, additional pressure is applied to the organization’s system for launching peacemaking operations. This relies heavily on the committed individuals within the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the Department of Field Support (DFS), as well as an array of arrangements and working relations with supportive member states. Early in 2012, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations Hervé Ladsous acknowledged that “the overall structure and systems that UN peacekeeping relies on are not always optimal.”³ As with UN peacekeeping more broadly, rapid deployment depends on five levels of authority and effort: political, financial, strategic, operational, and tactical. Problems that arise at one level may have implications for all.

Time is a critical factor in calculations of rapid deployment. Response times are measured in days and months. Progress on related reforms tends to be evaluated over the course of years required to initiate support and implement changes. To illustrate, the General Assembly endorsed the Brahimi Report’s recommended response times of thirty days for a traditional peacekeeping operation and ninety days for a complex multidimensional operation, albeit with the following proviso:

In order to meet these timelines, the Secretariat would need one or a combination of the following: (a) standing reserves of military, civilian police and civilian expertise, materiel and financing; (b) extremely reliable standby capacities to be called upon on short notice; or (c) sufficient lead-time to acquire these resources, which would require the ability to foresee, plan for and initiate spending for potential new missions several months ahead of time.⁴

As progress on (a), (b), and (c) has been elusive, the recommended response times are seldom met and are now considered a notional target. As a long-standing reform process, rapid deployment has been subject to varying degrees of attention and sporadic support. The UN’s progress in this respect tends to be impeded by the limited choices available. In the earlier words of the Brahimi Report:

Many Member States have argued against the establishment of a standing United Nations army or police force, resisted entering into reliable standby arrangements, cautioned against the incursion of financial expenses for building a reserve of equipment or discouraged the Secretariat from undertaking planning for potential operations prior to the Secretary-General having been granted specific, crisis-driven legislative authority to do so. Under these circumstances, the United Nations cannot deploy operations “rapidly and effectively” within the timelines suggested.⁵

The need for a UN rapid deployment capability is not disputed. As Sir Adam Roberts writes, “by almost universal consent, improvement in the international community’s rapid response capability is needed. The nub of the issue is: what is realistically achievable in a world where the demand for UN rapid response forces is likely to be huge, the interest of states in responding to that demand is not unlimited, and the capacity of the Security Council to manage crisis effectively is often questioned?”⁶ The recurring impediments to

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⁵ Ibid., para. 90, p. 15.
progress in this respect tend to be within the overlapping categories of insufficient political will, limited cooperation, inadequate UN funding associated with austerity and a zero-growth budget, and the reliance on slow and unreliable standby arrangements. For the numerous countries that contribute the troops, police, and valuable resources required in UN peacekeeping, rapid deployment may entail a further burden. There are often higher costs in developing and equipping mobile, high-readiness formations, as well as higher risks at the outset of operations. In short, deploying promptly to manage complex emergencies in areas of armed conflict is a demanding, costly endeavor with few tangible benefits.

The absence of specific policy and guidelines to effect rapid deployment also renders it a difficult system to understand and explain. As various aspects continue to confuse analysts and member states alike, this also poses a challenge for efforts to adapt and reform.

In the UN, rapid deployment entails a little of a lot. Aside from being a standard with defined response times, rapid deployment is a process and practice, informed by experience, lessons learned, policies, and frequent improvisation in response to available arrangements and new circumstances. Rapid deployment is also the focus of an ongoing reform process, with a number of supportive efforts underway in DPKO and DFS, various member states, and regional organizations.

Rapid deployment by the UN also presents an array of challenges. Staff must begin planning on a loose template under tight time pressures. As each conflict and each mandate is unique, each mission entails different requirements and challenges. Some aspects may align with recognized process; others must be improvised in haste. Even the short list of related tasks includes planning and organizing a technical assessment mission, the strategic assessment, the concept of operations, the operational plan, recruitment of mission leadership, force generation, identification of expertise in other operations, preparation of budgets, requests for pre-mandate commitment authority for funding, pre-deployment, rapid deployment, mission start-up and mission headquarters start-up, and developing initial and full operating capacity. A fully justified staffing table must be devised. Once identified and approved, national military forces and formed police units must be trained for mission-specific requirements, and prepared for deployment. Equipment has to be found, rented, or purchased, then inspected, loaded, and transported to the mission areas. Every component must be sequenced into a coherent timetable for packing, staging, and deploying. Air-lift has to be arranged for personnel and sea-lift for heavier equipment. Visits are made to troop- and police-contributing countries to determine their readiness; and strategic deployment stocks are mobilized at the UN logistics base in Brindisi, Italy (UNLB). Contingency planning for new operations must account for the risks and threats to security and identify appropriate force levels, as well as options for, reinforcement, including a rapidly deployable strategic reserve. Appropriate memoranda of understanding, rules of engagement, status of mission agreements, status of forces agreements, and letters of assist are negotiated. Land for housing and mission operations must be found, secured, and improved. Contracts for every product and every service, from water to airfield construction, are also negotiated. International staff are attracted and recruited. Local staff must be identified and hired. Aside from ensuring sufficient forces to secure the initial area of operations, critical enablers such as engineers, prefabricated offices, and hospital staff need to arrive early to establish the basic infrastructure.

While rapid deployment is a shared priority within the UN system, it remains a difficult process to streamline or expedite. The long list of essential tasks makes for long response times. Delays are a near-inevitable consequence, particularly when the

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7 Mission start-up is used to describe the earliest phase in the life of a mission. It may be subdivided into three stages: (1) advance team deployment; (2) mission headquarters start-up; (3) functional team start-up. The mission start-up phase is preceded by the pre-deployment period. "Initial operating capability" refers to the point at which a mission has attained a sufficient level of resources and capability to begin limited mandate implementation. The mission also begins to significantly expand and support its field presence within the mission area. Full operating capability is achieved when the following steps have been completed: sufficient resources to implement all mandated tasks are in place (i.e., all key positions are filled and the majority of personnel, equipment, and infrastructure is in place); the mission and UN-wide plans are being continuously reassessed and revised, as necessary; all supporting plans, budgets, structures, and procedures are in place. In general, full operating capability will generally be achieved well after the mission start-up phase. See UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, "Mission Start-up Field Guide," September 2010, pp. 2–8.

UN must negotiate with national governments for the use of national personnel and resources. For these reasons, UN documents now concede that, “the process of planning, mounting and deploying a new operation can take on average, from 6 to 12 months.”

It is noteworthy that previously the UN managed to deploy forces to the Suez via the UNEF I mission in 1956 in seven days, to the Congo in 1960 in three days, and to UNEF II in 1973 within twenty-four hours. Clearly, enthusiasm in the earlier years of UN peacekeeping surmounted the obstacles. How might similar support be encouraged now?

The following eight initiatives—evaluated in the pages that follow—underpin the UN’s current foundation for rapid deployment, and each will influence the organization’s potential in this area:

1) Standby arrangements system
2) Formed police unit standby initiative
3) Standing police capacity
4) Financial premiums and incentives
5) Global Field Support Strategy
6) Enhanced rapidly deployable capacities
7) Early mission headquarters
8) Partnerships for rapid deployment

A number of criteria can be used to assess these initiatives. How likely is each initiative to contribute to the following goals?

- Reduce response times to meet the recommended thirty and ninety day timeframes, for traditional and complex operations
- Provide timely access to sufficient personnel and formations for early mission start-up
- Increase confidence in the UN’s capacity to plan, deploy, manage, and support at short notice
- Alleviate the primary concerns of current and potential troop, police, and financial contributors
- Generate wider political will and adequate financing
- Encourage broad participation among the member states
- Enhance the training, preparation, and overall competence of potential participants
- Instill a unity of purpose and effort among the various participants
- Consolidate effective arrangements within a sound organizational structure
- Promote further cooperation and partnerships

We might also ask whether these efforts are likely to build a solid foundation with a capacity for modernization and expansion as new needs arise. Alternatively, is there a risk in continuing a dependency on conditional arrangements that are unlikely to be rapid or reliable?

1. Standby Arrangements System

In the 1992 Agenda for Peace, then secretary-general Boutros Boutros-Ghali reiterated a 1990 request that member states confirm their support for standby arrangements. In the following year, the General Assembly asked the UN standby arrangements system (UNSAS) to secure the personnel and material resources required for peacekeeping. The standby arrangements management team was established within DPKO in 1994 to identify UN requirements in peacekeeping operations, establish readiness standards, negotiate with potential participants, establish a database of resources, and assist in mission planning.

In February 1995 the UN Security Council responded to the former secretary-general’s “Supplement to An Agenda for Peace,” stipulating that “the first priority in improving the capacity for rapid deployment should be the further enhancement of the existing stand-by arrangements, covering the full spectrum of resources, including arrangements for lift and headquarters capabilities, required to mount and execute peace-keeping operations.” Thereafter, most proposals for rapid

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10 See, Smith and Boutellis, “Rethinking Force Generation,” p. 3.
11 This list of criteria draws on both the Canadian study, Towards A Rapid Reaction Capability For The United Nations (Ottawa: 1995), pp. 8–16, and H. Peter Langille, Bridging the Commitment—Capacity Gap: A Review of Existing Arrangements and Options for Enhancing UN Rapid Deployment (Wayne, N.J.: Center for UN Reform Education, August 2002), p. 21.
12 United Nations Secretary-General, An Agenda for Peace, para. 51.
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14 Pledges fall into the following three categories: operational units (e.g., reconnaissance companies, infantry, marines, naval units, and special forces); support units (e.g., engineers, communications, logistics, health services); and individuals (e.g., military observers; liaison officers; disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration specialists).

15 The initial level is reached by providing the UN with a simple list of potential national capabilities, their size and strength (including the tasks they are capable of performing), and their response times and restrictions. Level two is achieved when participants provide the UN with detailed inventory of pledges listed on a planning data sheet that outlines the particular units, personnel, and equipment (including their level of self-sufficiency, transportation data, and state of organization). Level three includes those member states that have signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the UN to formalize participation specifying capabilities and resources, response times, and conditions. Finally, level four—the rapid deployment level—is to identify resources pledged that may be ready for deployment within thirty days for a traditional peacekeeping mission or ninety days for a complex operation, once authorized by a Security Council mandate.


Office of Internal Oversight Services in 2010 that found, “the low participation of Member States in UNSAS and a lack of commitment for rapid deployment limit the United Nations capability to launch start-up of new missions within mandated timeframes.” While acknowledging rapid deployment could be affected by countless considerations, the IPI report confirmed that UNSAS has not contributed to more rapid deployment of UN peacekeeping resources.

Senior UN officials have expressed concerns over the limitations of UNSAS. In 1995, Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali cautioned that, “a considerable effort has been made to expand and refine standby arrangements, but these provide no guarantee that troops will be provided for a specific operation.” Five years later, his successor Kofi Annan also conceded that

Our system for launching United Nations peace operations has sometimes been compared to a volunteer fire department, but that description is too generous. Every time there is a fire, we must first find fire engines and the funds to run them before we can start dousing any flames. The present system relies almost entirely on last minute, ad hoc arrangements that guarantee delay, with respect to the provision of civilian personnel even more so than military. Although we have understandings for military standby arrangements with Member States, the availability of the designated forces is unpredictable and very few are in a state of high readiness. Resource constraints preclude us even from being able to deploy a mission headquarters rapidly.

Similar appraisals of UNSAS have been provided by member states and observers. In short, UNSAS is a voluntary system. Member states may choose to participate or not. It’s also a conditional arrangement with no binding obligation to respond.

Member states may or may not decide to deploy when asked. As a result, this system has repeatedly proven to be slow and unreliable.

With respect to the criteria outlined in the introduction of this report, UNSAS has yet to demonstrate its potential. UNSAS does not appear to be attracting new participants or additional capacity for UN rapid deployment. Only one member state joined in the past year. The common understanding of a “standby” system is one that can be relied on in emergencies or that is ready and available for immediate use when needed. Yet member states do not keep their armed forces on standby for UNSAS or for UN operations. Nor are there indications of national forces being earmarked for UN operations. Currently, no TCC has indicated a willingness to deploy rapidly through UNSAS. And the UN is not in a position to finance the readiness required for rapid deployment. In turn, TCCs are not keeping units ready for deployment. It would appear that no member state feels obligated to contribute to UNSAS.

On the twentieth anniversary of UNSAS, at least a few questions need to be asked in this regard. What might make UNSAS more appealing to a TCC and its armed forces? Might UNSAS be re-framed to convey relevance and urgency, as well as recognition, to supportive contributors?

RECOMMENDATION

Rename the rapid deployment level as the “emergency providers list.” The designation of a “UN emergency response unit” might also inspire a higher level of commitment. Participation at this level should be regarded as a privilege, to be earned on the basis of merit, professionalism, and service. Proven providers deserve to be accorded recognition for their services. This could be acknowledged.

20 Smith, Boutellis, and Selway, “Evaluation of the UN Force Generation System,” p. 15. In the words of the IPI authors, “For those Member States that understand the need for rapid deployment and the purpose of the RDL however, there are few incentives to participate in that way. Why should a Member State pledge and then prepare and maintain resources for standby arrangements, rather than simply offer its capacities through regular means whenever it wants to? Standby—as opposed to standing—means that Member States are not compensated for capacities pledged to UNSAS while they prepare and train for a potential deployment at short notice from their usual home locations. Nor is an RDL compensated at a higher reimbursement rate if/when it is deployed to a mission. At the political level, as well, there seems to be little recognition for deploying more rapidly than another TCC, or for completing the requirements to be at the RDL.”
21 United Nations Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Supplement to an Agenda for Peace, UN Doc. A/50/60–S/1995/1, para. 43, p. 11.
23 Concerns over the limitations of the UNSAS were among the reasons that led the government of The Netherlands to develop the so-called Netherlands Non-Paper. “A UN Rapid Deployment Brigade: A preliminary study,” April 1995 (revised version). For a sample of the academic contributions raising similar concerns, see Steven Kinloch-Pichat, A UN ‘Legion’: Between Utopia and Reality (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2004), pp. 172–175.
24 Although it is not conveyed in the UNSAS, membership in the United Nations does entail an obligation in this respect. As specified under Article 43 of the Charter, “all members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities.” See Charter of the United Nations, Article 43 (1).
on DPKO’s webpage, in publications, and in service awards.

Finding sufficient forces that can be deployed at short notice is likely to remain a challenge, irrespective of modifications to UNSAS. The available capacity is considered limited. For the UN, generating appropriate forces is a time-consuming process. Clearly, further efforts are needed to broaden the base of contributors, to prepare armed forces that may be new to UN peacekeeping, and to revitalize support from former troop contributors. An earlier UN report elaborated on an aspect of this problem, as well as a potential solution:

At present the total global supply of personnel is constrained by the fact that the armed forces of many countries remain configured for cold war duties, with less than 10 per cent of those in uniform available for active deployment at any given time, and by the fact that few nations have sufficient transport and logistics capabilities to move and supply those who are available. For peacekeeping and in extreme cases peace enforcement, to be an accepted instrument of collective security, the availability of peacekeepers must grow. The developed States have particular responsibilities here, and should do more to transform their existing force capabilities into suitable contingents for peace operations.

RECOMMENDATION 2

The United Nations Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C-34) could be encouraged to call for cooperation in support of defense transformation. A generic plan should be developed both to identify UN requirements, and to help guide the transformation of national armed forces into appropriate elements for rapid deployment. Among the areas of military specialization and niche capabilities that merit inclusion to address recurring capacity gaps are the following:

- engineering, medical and headquarter companies, aviation, signals, airfield maintenance, biohazard teams, and special forces units, as well as air mobile, self-sustainable battalions and battle groups to serve as strategic reserves.

While UNSAS was initially intended to cover military, police, and civilian arrangements, other approaches have since been developed to help identify and deploy civilians and police.

2. Formed Police Unit Standby Initiative

DPKO’s Police Division considers rapid deployment primarily in the context of formed police units and the UN standing police capacity (SPC).

Formed police units (FPUs) are a key component of contemporary peacekeeping, now accounting for half of UN police personnel, with more than fifty FPUs deployed to UN operations worldwide. An FPU consists of 140 police officers. They are deployed as national contingents with their own equipment, including weapons, vehicles, communications, and support.

FPUs have three key functions. First, their primary role is in managing public order. This usually involves work in support of host-state police to maintain law and order, although they can be called upon to serve independently in support of a mission mandate. Second, they protect UN staff and facilities in roles that range from escorting convoys to evacuations. Third, they support police operations that may involve higher risks, such as in high-visibility patrols of camps for internally displaced persons.

An FPU offers the advantage of being a cohesive, self-sustained, mobile, and armed UN presence. Although they seldom have the power to arrest or
enforce, FPUs are equipped to convey a stronger presence than a collection of individual police officers. As such, FPUs are viewed as particularly important in the more demanding mission start-up or surge phases.

Increased demand for FPUs is accompanied by demand for their rapid deployment. Both demands now exceed available capacity. To illustrate, the UN mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) has a requirement for eight FPUs and ten are needed in the rapid deployment system based on the Member Central African Republic (MINUSCA).32

One problem is the time required to develop an FPU. The current system of recruitment, generation, and deployment—from the date a particular police-contributing country (PCC) accepts an offer up to full deployment of the FPU to the mission—entails a minimum of six months. Another problem stems from the substantive investment required. The cost of forming and preparing one FPU is estimated at $12 million and is an expense borne by the contributing country.33 Each FPU must be equipped and trained to UN standards by the PCC, with a minimum of two months pre-deployment training, which is subsequently reviewed by UN testing and training teams.34

Over the past two years, DPKO’s Police Division heard from PCCs expressing interest in contributing to FPUs that had the personnel they needed but not the money required to procure the appropriate equipment. In response, DPKO recently launched the FPU standby initiative to enhance FPUs readiness for selection and deployment.35 In DPKO’s words, “the Stand-by FPU Capacity initiative is designed to establish an FPU rapid deployment system based on the Member State’s ability to create and maintain readiness of certain number of FPUs to be deployed at short notice to any UN peacekeeping mission.”36

Two assumptions underpin this initiative. First, member states are expected to volunteer in creating and maintaining a pool of trained, fully equipped FPUs available for deployment within ninety days or less. Second, this capacity may be developed and maintained through bilateral agreements with other countries or institutional donors, facilitated by the UN. A mechanism of incentives (in recent premiums) is intended to help develop the pool and encourage support from the member states.37

Rather than proposing a fixed system, this is an exploratory initiative intended to survey the member states for ideas, solicit proposals, and encourage bilateral partnerships. The Police Division plans to help PCCs develop FPUs with options for funding, training, and acquiring proper equipment.38 Potential benefits are foreseen for participating law enforcement agencies, PCCs, the UN, and its missions. The benefits will likely have to be substantial.

As the FPU initiative was recently launched, it is difficult to assess its potential to expand the pool of participants. There have been mixed responses from member states.39 With financial incentives, this effort seems likely to improve capacity through a larger pool, and improve on six-month response times. To date, FPUs have only been rapidly deployed within an inter-mission cooperation agreement.40 Once the pool expands, the expectation is that FPUs should be able to deploy after two months of mission-specific training. Additional efforts may be needed to ensure FPUs remain available and are reliably committed to

32 Notably, there are no FPUs from the Global North currently deployed in UN operations.
33 While the actual cost of developing and equipping an FPU may vary from country to country, DPKO’s Police Division estimates the average expense to be $12 million. This figure reflects the expense claims submitted by PCCs for reimbursement from UN contingent-owned equipment. Notably, the Chinese FPUs entail a lower cost of approximately $8 million as their equipment can be purchased from Chinese suppliers.
34 A frequent problem is encountered in meeting UN standards and training requirements as there are different tactics and techniques within different police cultures.
36 Letter from Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Hervé Ladsous to UN member states (announcing DPKO’s FPU standby initiative) dated December 24, 2013.
37 The specific incentives are reviewed in the subsequent section of this paper on premiums.
38 Notably, DPKO’s Police Division maintains a roster of PCCs, and FPUs. The roster is seen to be useful for planning purposes only. Like the UNSAS, the roster is conditional and in no way binding on PCCs, who may say no at any stage of the process. The roster does not list or keep pledges, but provides a short-list of those “interested in contributing” and those who “may be interested.”
39 As of June 2014, DPKO’s Police Division had only received six formal responses from PCCs to their FPU standby initiative. While the responses varied, a recurring concern related to details of funding, assurances on the investment, and financial incentives.
40 The UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) has illustrated several examples of rapid re-deployment of FPUs within inter-mission cooperation agreements. Two FPUs from Bangladesh were sent from the DRC to South Sudan within two weeks. A Nepalese FPU was also deployed from Liberia to UNMISS within four weeks. Other examples are evident in UNOCI (Côte d’Ivoire), MINUSMA (Mali), and UNMIL (Liberia).
UN service. Once trained, police usually have other employment options.

**RECOMMENDATION 3**

If the UN invests in developing FPUs, it should do so with the proviso (in a memorandum of understanding) that the FPU is both earmarked for and available for rapid deployment to UN peace operations.

Three concepts guided the planning of the FPU standby initiative. First and foremost, it was hoped that a PCC might contribute both the personnel and equipment required. Second, a PCC could contribute personnel with a donor partner contributing the equipment. France, Britain, and the United States, among others, have supported such partnerships. Third, if a PCC was willing to contribute personnel and maintain them on standby, the UN might purchase the appropriate equipment and carry the investment required. Notably, a fourth option of standing UN FPUs was also considered to offer numerous advantages in providing reliable and immediate access to FPUs with uniform training and equipment, as well as higher professional standards. Despite the apparent benefits, this option was deemed unlikely to attract member state support. As an official within the police division noted, “the countries providing troops and police are the ones who decide on the UN’s options.”

**RECOMMENDATION 4**

Given the ongoing and urgent demand, the option of standing UN FPUs merits further exploration and elaboration. At a minimum, both the member states and the UN should know whether their requirements might be addressed in a more cost-effective manner.

### 3. Standing Police Capacity

The UN standing policy capacity (SPC) was developed in 2006 following a period of exponential growth in the use of police in peace operations. The immediate demand for well-trained police specialists to assist in the start-up of operations could only be assured within a dedicated UN standing capacity. Members of the SPC are among the first deployed to new operations and are often included in pre-mission planning and technical assessment missions. The SPC is required to maintain the capability to deploy immediately after the adoption of a Security Council Resolution.

The SPC has two core functions. The first is to provide the start-up capability for the police components of new UN peace operations, implementing the strategic direction and organization of the mission’s police component. It provides the early leadership and develops the police section of the headquarters. Second, when not deployed in the start-up phase, the SPC is intended to provide advice and expertise to existing police components or other UN partners.

DPKO policy is explicit on the need for this capacity: “the requirement for a dedicated standing police capacity to support UN peace operations derives from the need to deploy rapidly, to respond to short-term or unforeseen needs for reinforcement and, if required, to participate early in mission planning processes.” This policy also elaborates on the definition of “standing” and its distinction from standby arrangements.

Standing: to be continually engaged at all times in fulfilling core functions, while also maintaining the ability to rapidly redeploy to start up new activities and subsequently return to the respective duty station for follow-on assignments as required. Standing mechanisms are to be distinguished in particular from standby arrangements, which refer more commonly to those bodies that possess an on-call faculty and a pre-determined and/or lengthier reaction and deployment time.

Between deployments, the SPC is based at its duty station in Brindisi, Italy. The SPC now consists of 40 individuals, with 24 seconded, 12 civilians, and 4 support staff. The individuals and teams have core expertise sufficient to advise on fifteen areas, including budgets and finance, community-oriented policing, detentions, gender, human resources, information and communications technology systems, investigations, legal affairs, logistics, planning, police analysis, police

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41 For an overview of this development, see “In Brief: the History of the Standing Police Capacity (SPC),” UN Police Magazine, 11th edition, July 2013, pp. 6–12.


43 Ibid., para. 5, p. 3.

44 Ibid., para. 34, p. 11.
The importance of the SPC is reflected in the words of its chief, General Maritz du Toit:

Since we are a rapidly deployable group of highly skilled police specialists, the SPC guarantees an immediate and specialized response to urgent and complex policing needs. The SPC serves as a mechanism to turn police mandates into concrete action as swiftly as possible. Time is of the essence in every peacekeeping operation of the UN, particularly at the outset of missions. And, through the use of SPC, we save time, reduce costs and gain efficiency during crucial start-up periods.45 The SPC is uniquely rapid. Members strive to deploy within seven days and routinely meet this unofficial target. The SPC has also proven to be very reliable in deployments worldwide.46 Members of the SPC now draw from personal savings to cover their airfare and the initial expenses of a deployment, which are subsequently reimbursed through the “Umoja” system.47

As UN missions struggle with insufficient funds to maintain the SPC throughout the mission start-up phase, the SPC promptly reconstitutes in Brindisi to continue its advisory role via remote assistance support teams. The SPC appears cost-effective as the salaries of its members are the primary expense.48 Recognition of the SPC’s value is shared by the UN and member states.49 The SPC not only addresses most of the criteria outlined, it seems to excel, except in attracting sufficient financial support for new positions. The SPC has provided support to seven UN operations over the past two years.50 Further, it is already engaged in contingency planning for Central Africa and Syria, with concerns that it will soon need additional officers fluent in French and Arabic.

The initial recommendation for such a capacity entailed 50 to 100 personnel.51 Notably, within four years of establishing the SPC, the General Assembly opted to expand on it with an additional 14 police officers. This increase was helpful, although insufficient. The recent demand for the SPC and the high operational tempo of repeat deployments has strained the SPC and its personnel. Many have gone without leave or adequate rest. To prepare for new operations, others are attempting to learn new languages within a month—an unrealistic allotment of time. At 40 officers, the current size of the SPC continues to reflect the “initial operating capacity” approved by the General Assembly. This was to be a first step toward recruiting additional experts to address critical police recruitment and deployment needs. It’s now clear that more posts are needed.

RECOMMENDATION 5

As the SPC represents a rapid, reliable, and cost-effective UN capacity, it should be expanded to the strength required by operational demands. Recruitment staff should be promptly directed to attract ten Arabic-speaking and ten French-speaking police officers. These posts are needed to ensure the SPC can operate effectively in the areas where it is likely to be assigned.

4. Financial Premiums and Incentives

Financial incentives have been identified as a means to facilitate rapid deployment. These stem primarily from recommendations in the Report of the Senior Advisory Group on rates of reimbursement to troop-contributing countries and other

46 Since 2007, the SPC has deployed to Western Sahara (MINURSA), Mali (UNOM/UNUSMA), Guinea-Bissau (UNOGRIS/UNIOGRIS), Libya (UNSMIL), Chad (MINURCAT/UNDP/Chad), Syria (OHCHR), Iraq (UNAMI), Afghanistan (UNAMA), Abyei (UNISFA), Somali (UNPOS), East Timor (UNMIT), the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), Darfur-Sudan (UNAMID), Sudan and South Sudan (UNMIS/UNMISS), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC/MONUSCO), Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI), the Sahel (UNODC/WACI), Liberia (UNMIL), Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL), Haiti (MINUSTAH), and Interpol (CoESPU).
47 There are concerns that the Umoja system remains too slow in delivering the funding required for rapid deployment of the SPC.
48 Further analysis of the SPC’s costs should be included in the forthcoming audit by the Office of Internal Oversight Services. Notably, the SPC appears particularly cost-effective in comparison to the option of hiring consultants to do similar tasks. The latter entails a slow, long process at higher expense and with less prospect of finding those with sufficient familiarity in UN operations and commitment to the assigned tasks.
49 A “friends group” of supportive member states will soon help to raise the profile of the SPC.
related issues, known as the SAG report, which was endorsed by the General Assembly on May 10, 2013.52

Premiums will be paid to national contingents assuming high risks. As of July 2014, the secretary-general is authorized “to award bonuses to individual units that are operating without restrictions or caveats imposed by troop- and police-contributing countries and that have acquitted themselves well despite exceptional levels of risk.”53 Accordingly, this “risk premium” should help to reduce the conditions that have burdened the UN standby arrangements system and repeatedly delayed national decision-making and approval, as well as UN responses.54 This incentive may encourage TCCs and PCCs to deploy more rapidly into areas of high risk.

Countries providing critical enablers promptly will also receive a premium for their contribution. As the General Assembly noted, “the premium for enabling capacity will be awarded for those pre-identified capabilities that can rapidly deploy.”55 This should improve access to the personnel and equipment required for rapid deployment, particularly assets such as helicopters, hospitals, and engineers that are in high demand but often in short supply. It should also improve response times as payments will be determined by how quickly the enablers are provided.56 Further, to receive this premium, TCCs and PCCs will not only need to have units ready and trained to deploy rapidly, they may have to pledge their contribution earlier.

This premium may also help to affect a more capability-based approach to contributions that ensures a better combination of skilled, trained personnel with the equipment and technology required for mandate implementation.57 Notably, if the major equipment specified in the relevant memorandum of understanding (MOU) is absent or dysfunctional, the rate of personnel reimbursement may be reduced proportionately.58 This effectively links payment of personnel to compliance in having the appropriate equipment stipulated as necessary. To strengthen compliance, the SAG report called for systems to ensure effective monitoring of pre-deployment training, operational readiness, and evaluation of mandate delivery. “Immediate and enhanced priority” was also recommended in “the pre-deployment training for troops and police being sent to peacekeeping operations.”59

There are other, mixed implications for rapid deployment in these reforms. The typical troop rotation period is to be extended from six to twelve months. A longer deployment is viewed as beneficial in extending continuity and familiarity with the operation, improving situational awareness and

52 See the Report of Senior Advisory Group on rates of reimbursement to troop-contributing countries and other related issues, UN Doc. A/C.5/67/10, November 15, 2012. The actual new base rate of reimbursement will be determined by data from an empirical review of the additional costs incurred by participation in UN operations through a sampling of ten of the top twenty contributing countries (para. 109, p. 27). For the resolution adopted by the General Assembly, see UN Doc. A/RES/67/261, June 6, 2013. For the subsequent report and further elaboration of the premium, see United Nations General Assembly, “Results of the revised survey to establish the standard rate of reimbursement to troop-contributing countries, as approved by the General Assembly in its resolution 67/261 on the report of the Senior Advisory Group on rates of reimbursement to troop-contributing countries,” UN Doc. A/68/813, March 26, 2014, paras. 58–72.

53 Report of the Senior Advisory Group, para. 111, p. 27.

54 As the final details are still being worked out, it’s unclear whether the “risk premium” may be provided to formations of TCCs or PCCs deploying rapidly into the demanding start-up stage of an operation or to contingents provided rapidly as a strategic reserve to an ongoing operation within an inter-mission cooperation agreement.

55 As noted, “The broad objective of this premium payment is to provide an additional incentive to contributing countries to address critical military and police gaps in United Nations peacekeeping operations. While the amount of the premium is linked to the level of personnel reimbursement, the critical gaps and capabilities required in United Nations missions necessarily involve both personnel and equipment, since in order to meet operational demands, one cannot operate without the other. Gaps identified by the Senior Advisory Group in the report included aviation units and level II and III hospitals. In addition, in paragraph 87 of its report, the Senior Advisory Group highlighted that securing the early provision of enablers at the outset of a mission is critical in developing early capability and allows for quicker deployment of all other components. Ongoing mission reviews of the Departments of Peacekeeping Operations and Field Support support the conclusion that the main operational gap is the absence of enough enablers at mission start up or surge in order to allow for fast deployment. Experience over the past 12 months, in particular in starting a new mission in Mali and, most recently, in moving contingents and formed police units to South Sudan also suggests that inter-mission cooperation is an area of potential capacity gaps where a premium might be helpful to deployment, where troop- and police-contributing countries are asked to move contingents between missions at short notice and with minimal constraints.” United Nations General Assembly, “Results of the revised survey,” p. 19, para. 65.

56 “The amount of the premium to be paid for enabling capacity to the contributing country would be determined on the basis of how fast the capability can be provided starting from the date of United Nations acceptance of the contribution. Troop- and police-contributing countries will be awarded an incremental premium of 25, 15 and 10 per cent of the total annual reimbursement rate — both personnel and equipment — for, respectively, the 30-, 60-, and 90-day deployment of the unit concerned.” Ibid., p. 19, para. 66.

57 See the introductory remarks by Under-Secretary-General for Field Support Ameerah Haq to the UN’s Fifth Committee regarding the Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of the report of the Senior Advisory Group on Rates of Reimbursement to troop contributing countries and related issues (UN Doc. A/67/713), March 8, 2013, p. 6.


59 Ibid., para. 118, p. 28, and para. 120 (f), p. 29.
Longer deployments also reduce costs, particularly in transportation. Yet most rapid deployment units and forces are designed for short deployments of two-to-six months. For example, the European Union Battlegroups are limited to deployments of 120 days. A longer period in a demanding operation also entails a higher risk of personnel suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder. The advanced-capacity member states with experience in Afghanistan may now be either more reluctant to deploy rapidly or may need to negotiate a shorter rotation period prior to a deployment. The UN is open to negotiating shorter deployments, but it will not pay for the costs of rotating troops in a shorter deployment period or pay for the transportation expenses incurred.

Financial incentives should help to encourage prompt contributions of personnel and equipment. Many of the key TCCs and PCCs need financial support both to develop national capacity and to deploy more rapidly. They also understand that the UN’s finances are limited, particularly in a period of austerity, where many have already echoed the secretary-general’s call to “do more with less.” By way of illustration, a premium of $2 million should attract contributions from some member states, but it may not be sufficient to influence others.

The risk premium and the premium for critical enablers now underpin hopes for improving the UNSAS, the formed police unit standby initiative, and the UN’s prospects for rapid deployment. It might appear that a lot is depending on financial incentives. This incentive-based approach appears likely to help in offering support, stimulating interest, and rewarding prompt responses. However, this approach is not open-ended, nor is it likely to lead to additional premiums.

Rapid deployment could also be encouraged through greater recognition of exemplary service. In addition to the risk premium, the secretary-general will now award each member of the unit a special clasp to be affixed to the ribbon of the United Nations medal and a letter of commendation from the under-secretary-general for peacekeeping operations. Awards often serve to prompt higher standards, traditions of service, and virtuous cycles. At a minimum, the relative benefits of a service award appear to outweigh the financial costs. Similarly, billboards and posters expressing appreciation at UN headquarters and in the national capital of a TCC or PCC might appeal to numerous governments.

**RECOMMENDATION 6**

DPKO and DFS should continue to explore ways to acknowledge and reward service for emergency first responders and prompt providers. Contributors meeting or deploying under specified UN response times merit commendation.

**5. Global Field Support Strategy**

Rapid and reliable delivery of equipment, supplies, and services is a constant requirement across all field operations. In recent years, demands pushed the UN’s supply system to its limit, exceeding its capacity to deliver. A long list of critical support jobs led to delays and longer response times. Both highlighted the need to curtail the protracted timeline between when a mission is mandated and when personnel, equipment, and services are fully deployed.

The UN Department of Field Support is making a substantial effort to reduce the time consumed in this process. DFS was created in 2007 to manage the mobilization of all human, material, and support services necessary to ensure field missions are largely self-sufficient, effective, and efficient. Within the space of three years, DFS launched the Global Field Support Strategy (GFSS), described as

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60 See remarks by Ameerah Haq to the Fifth Committee, March 8, 2013, p. 5.
62 The more affluent member states with advanced capabilities are unlikely to be influenced by either premium.
63 Notably, premiums have been awaited by those working on the UNSAS in DPKO’s Force Generation Service and those within the Police Division working on the FPU standby initiative. In both, it was assumed that there were insufficient reasons to develop a new system—that the UN needed something to offer to elicit better contributions.
64 As the Senior Advisory Group had a narrow mandate to focus on a universal and transparent standard rate of reimbursement, the process did not delve into operations or a wider array of options. Having reported, this process concluded with the General Assembly’s endorsement.
65 See United Nations General Assembly, “Results of the revised survey,” p. 18, para. 61.
a “comprehensive, five-year change management initiative that aims to improve the quality, speed and efficiency of the support [DFS] provides to field missions and personnel serving on the ground.”

Responding rapidly and flexibly to diverse demands is central to the new service delivery plan. Acknowledging that the window to effect change is narrow in contemporary operations, the GFSS also clarifies the importance of logistic support and management: “While rapid deployment is fundamental to the achievement of mandates, it is also strongly dependent on the response time of support components, including in terms of the fast procurement of goods and services and the immediate availability of staff, both of which require optimized resource management.”

In short, support functions are recognized as strategic enablers and both are essential for rapid deployment.

The strategy is focused on the following four areas: (1) finance, developing standard approaches to improve forecasting and planning of resource requirements for new operations and the rapid deployment of personnel and equipment; (2) human resources, ensuring the appropriate people are ready to deploy with the right skills; (3) supply chain, revamped to promptly deliver the goods and services required with minimal waste; and (4) service centers, re-tasking global and regional service centers to standardize and streamline support to field missions.

The GFSS model entails specialization within a more coherent division of labor and responsibility in each area. A leaner headquarters is intended to focus on providing strategic direction, coordinating with member states, and improving global oversight and related policy. Mission financing arrangements are modified to provide the secretary-general with the additional spending authority needed to ensure timely deployment of material and human resources.

One global service center (in Brindisi, Italy) is to provide operational support to UN field missions and retain the lead in the global supply chain. Deployment modules are expected to improve response times.

Modularization builds on the existing strategic deployment stocks and mission start-up kits located at the UN logistics base in Brindisi, with predefined service packages for rapid deployment (including materials, supplies, equipment, and services). Enabling capacities are a key component of the service packages. Engineering was specifically identified as a focus.

Response capacities are to be improved with rapidly deployable standby arrangements with contractors and militaries providing support capacity.

One regional service center (in Entebbe, Uganda) is to consolidate the transactions formerly carried out in both UN Headquarters and the field at a nearby safe, secure location. The support component of missions is to be revised to make for a lighter footprint, with resources more focused on mandate implementation. Under “rapid deployment,” the strategy document notes that “a deployable serving staff matched and trained to assume the critical functions that have been identified will be available at the service centres.”

Member states endorsed the GFSS in 2010. In December 2013, the secretary-general provided the fourth progress report on its implementation. The GFSS is due to be complete in 2015.

Understandably, member states want clarity regarding DFS’s envisaged end-state, and the UN’s Advisory Committee of Administrative and Budgetary Questions has requested details on the related costs. As aspects of this strategy continue to prompt numerous projects, the five-year timeframe allocated may prove overly ambitious.

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67 UN Department of Field Support, Global Field Support Strategy, para. 1.
68 See UN Department of Field Support, GFSS fact sheet.
71 UN Department of Field Support, Global Field Support Strategy, para. 27, p. 12.
72 See United Nations Secretary-General, “Fourth annual progress report on the implementation of the global field support strategy,” UN Doc. A/68/637, December 4, 2013.
To cite one example, while the modularization process is both broad and encouraging, it needs to be accompanied by the acquisition and deployment of complete prefabricated camps that are sufficiently durable to be recycled into subsequent operations. Immediate fiscal constraints may suggest an incremental approach that delays modularization and entails greater long-term costs. Human resource management for rapid deployment is another area that appears to merit further attention. At present, there are concerns that the roster for trained mission support teams has not provided sufficiently prompt access to the civilian staff required. DFS may need to either improve the existing roster or develop another that identifies civilian staff available for rapid deployment to commence mission start-up.

The GFSS is a work in progress. Can it be quicker, cheaper, and better? In the words of one official familiar with the GFSS, “If it looks too good to be true, it probably is.” Is it on track to expedite support and help in generating critical enablers, as well as with mission start-up? As much is new and still being implemented, it is difficult to assess how effective this strategy will be in transforming practice. The early indications suggest the GFSS has encouraged results-based management and a more performance-based culture. Similarly, the GFSS has focused people on the need to move and support rapidly. However, most TCCs would report that improvements in field support have not yet been commensurate with the lofty ambitions set out in the GFSS initiative.

RECOMMENDATION 7
An independent evaluation should be commissioned to assess progress on the GFSS, to survey member states, and to identify what further steps are required to ensure rapid deployment.

6. Enhanced Rapidly Deployable Capacities

Within a UN peace operation there are both tactical-level reserves (from designated units or companies) and operational-level reserves (from battalions). In periods of instability, such as mission start-up or escalating violence, internal capacity may need to be augmented by deploying an external strategic-level reserve in the operation. To identify reinforcement options for UN missions that may experience a severe crisis, planners now review capacity within a mission area, as well as armed forces and police, which could be provided externally.

While the UN cannot ensure a guaranteed response to a crisis, with arrangements remaining conditional upon the political will of member states and appropriate capacity being available, the primary objective is to ensure a range of reinforcement options that are more predictable, more reliable, and rapid. If required, the reserve capacity would be asked to deploy under the authority of the Security Council, ideally under UN command and control arrangements, and likely assigned to deter spoilers, safeguard the mandate, ensure protection of personnel, and restore security.

The concept of “enhanced rapidly deployable capacities” (ERDC) stemmed from DPKO’s earlier efforts to develop a strategic reserve, a proposal that attracted insufficient support from the member states at the 2005 World Summit. Instead, states urged “further development of proposals for enhanced rapidly deployable capacities to reinforce peacekeeping operations in crises.” In response, DPKO developed the ERDC policy. It now serves to inform Security Council plans, headquarters decision-making, mission working groups (joint mission analysis cell, joint operations center, joint logistics operations center), and operational risk assessments, as well as the member states and regional organizations from whom support may be requested.

The three ERDC options include (1) the use of regional capabilities from regional organizations; (2) pre-negotiated, detailed arrangements with one or more troop-contributing countries or police-contributing countries for the deployment of additional forces to a specific operation; and (3) the use of UN troops deployed from another nearby UN operation through an inter-mission cooperation agreement.

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73 To date, no substantive, independent review or evaluation of the GFSS has been published or made available. Such a task is beyond the scope of this report.
75 United Nations General Assembly, 2005 World Summit Outcome, UN Doc. A/RES/60/1, para. 92, p. 23.
76 UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, “Reinforcement for Field Missions - Enhanced Rapidly Deployable Capacities,” p. 5.
While it is understood that each option entails strengths and weaknesses, DPKO policy treats the political will of member states to commit reinforcements as most important, particularly to address short notice or unanticipated contingencies. The option of regional capabilities may or may not entail financial reimbursement, although it is likely to require discussions on UN command arrangements, use of force directives, and either individual or collective MOUs. The second option for reinforcement via a detailed prior arrangement with a TCC or PCC that already has a commitment to a UN peacekeeping operation may require a conditional deployment, with assurances of employment flexibility and financial incentives. Inter-mission cooperation, the third option, entails re-deployment of personnel already within an operation to address a serious crisis in a nearby operation. As such, it depends on receiving permission and favorable circumstances permitting the release of critical resources on a temporary basis, although still remaining under UN command arrangements and rules of engagement.

Experience with inter-mission cooperation appears to have increased familiarity with, if not wider support for, the third option. Aside from providing reinforcement support in crisis and temporary surge capacity for mission start-up, this option is seen to offer efficiency gains through sharing or pooling of assets, as well as benefits in joint planning and coordination. As the secretary-general reported, “over the past year, this approach has proven its benefits for UNOCI and UNMIL, which engage in inter-mission cooperation

Inter-mission cooperation and coordination has been encouraged by the Security Council and various member states. In the words of the secretary-general, “inter-mission cooperation is a means of maximizing the utility of existing assets and resources of missions deployed in nearby countries. It is, by definition, a flexible tool and a temporary measure to fill immediate gaps.” Over the past two years, the need for such arrangements has increased, as has experience within missions in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI), Liberia (UNMIL), Mali (MINUSMA), and South Sudan (UNMISS). Formalization of the approach outlined in DPKO policy appears to be underway. Appropriate rules for inter-mission cooperation are to be developed in further documents and strategic guidance.

**RECOMMENDATION 8**

A possible fourth option would expand on the regional hub concept, with one designated highly-mobile UN reserve battalion providing coverage for three surrounding operations within the region. This might provide a cost-effective force multiplier and a more robust deterrent capacity for each operation. A clause would have to be added to the MOU for initial deployment so that the battalion could be shifted at short notice on the UN’s prerogative.

Inter-mission cooperation has already demonstrated the potential for rapid re-deployment under favorable circumstances. Yet recent experience has also demonstrated problems. To illustrate, three FPUs were promptly deployed to UNMISS without their heavier equipment or sufficient support. What was to be a sixty day deployment extended beyond six months. As this mission had no prior experience with FPUs, the arrival of three strained logistic capacity and left personnel under-equipped, to reside in tents, undermining both morale and operational performance.

The extent to which inter-mission cooperation arrangements can be relied upon will likely depend on the terms negotiated in the MOU with a willing TCC or PCC prior to a deployment. In some respects, both the ERDC and inter-mission cooperation appear as short-term, stop-gap approaches to critical capacity gaps, driven partially by a decade of austerity. Is inter-mission cooperation the equivalent of “robbing Peter to pay Paul,” pulling critical resources from one operation to plug severe gaps in another? That may help, but is it adequate or dependable? Even member states supportive of inter-mission cooperation caution that it should

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79 As the secretary-general reported, “over the past year, this approach has proven its benefits for UNOCI and UNMIL, which engage in inter-mission cooperation on a regular basis, including through the shared use of scarce military helicopters and other assets. In the case of Mali, UNOCI provided administrative support to MINUSMA, while UNMIL assisted through the provision of air assets information and communications technology. Both UNOCI and UNMIL deployed personnel on a temporary basis to support the start-up of MINUSMA. In responding to the unfolding crisis in South Sudan, the Security Council swiftly endorsed the Secretary-General’s proposal to strengthen the capabilities of UNMISS, mainly through inter-mission cooperation to meet large scale immediate surge requirements for infantry battalions, formed police units and air assets. The initial phase of the implementation reconfirmed the usefulness and merit of inter-mission cooperation as a means to rapidly fill critical gaps on a temporary basis.” United Nations Secretary-General, “Overview of the financing,” para. 52, p. 21.
not be seen as a substitute for long-term solutions. While crises in the Central African Republic, Mali, and South Sudan may reinforce the urgency for ERDC options, they also point to a risk that these options may be overwhelmed. Then what? In the near term, it seems unlikely that there will be sufficient military and police forces immediately available. Is there a way to institutionalize inter-mission cooperation arrangements with reliable TCCs and PCCs?

**RECOMMENDATION 9**

Identifying a pool of those member states with experience serving as UN strategic reserves might help to offset the improvisation and the rush likely to accompany multiple crises. An ERDC roster of reliable TCCs and PCCs inclined to provide strategic reserve options may be worthy of further consideration.

### 7. Early Mission Headquarters

Over the past twenty years, there have been numerous proposals to develop rosters and standing and standby arrangements to improve planning, command and control, early mission start-up, and headquarters for rapid deployment.

As noted, the organization and deployment of new operations presents an array of time-sensitive challenges. Before engaging in the planning and outreach required, the Secretariat must await a draft Security Council resolution. Once authorized, an array of plans, arrangements, and negotiations with troop and police contributors are expedited. The burden of responsibility for these tasks continues to fall on UN staff in DPKO and DFS with experience and expertise to contribute to the integrated assessment and planning process, the deployment of the operation, and the establishment of a new headquarters.

The integrated assessment and planning process and integrated mission task forces have served to improve coherence, continuity, and the inclusion of lessons learned. Similarly, the UN’s approach to command and control has improved. Although UN command and control satisfies many current contributors, it remains a divisive issue that impedes progress in attracting contributors from the Global North. In particular, there are shared concerns over appropriate forward planning, as well as concerns regarding early mission start-up and rapid deployment. At present, there is seldom time for command-post and tabletop exercises, simulations, and contingency planning. Further, both the process for recruiting civilian staff for new operations and the process of appointing senior mission leadership are recognized as too slow. Might such concerns be addressed with a principled compromise?

**RECOMMENDATION 10**

A UN “early mission headquarters” (EMHQ) merits further consideration. An integrated standing headquarters capacity of sixty personnel, augmented by a roster of experts available on short notice, could be developed to expedite rapid deployment, early mission start-up, and early headquarters start-up. Individuals would serve to complement the integrated mission task force, assist with technical assessment missions, form the nucleus of an operational headquarters, and ensure sound planning and organization through the demanding initial phases of a peacekeeping operation.

An EMHQ would need to be capable of rapid deployment under the authority of the Security Council and at the strategic direction of the

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81 The most prominent in this respect was the seminal “Brahimi report” otherwise known as the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, UN Doc. A/55/365–S/2000/809, para. 110. Another influential study with a focus on improving the operational level with a rapidly deployable mission headquarters was the government of Canada’s, Towards A Rapid Reaction Capability For The United Nations (Ottawa 1995).

82 Frequently, people with heavy responsibilities to two or three operations are assigned a new priority, with an expectation they can jump to promptly refocus elsewhere. As this invariably entails a loss of continuity and coherence, it’s hardly an ideal practice.


secretary-general, functioning as an integral part of the UN Secretariat. Those within the EMHQ should be deployable without further authorization at the national level. An EMHQ would be an early-in, early-out headquarters with an operational planning cell, designed for prompt, effective mission start-up within the initial six months, and then prompt extraction. As such, an EMHQ would function as a bridge, providing experience at the outset, as well as time for selection of appropriate staff and mission leadership.

When not deployed, the EMHQ might be based in New York and tasked with contingency planning and development of contingency packages for diverse types of operations with detailed lists of anticipated requirements and potential sources. It might also train other UN personnel in various headquarters tasks and command and control procedures. An EMHQ could initiate training, exercises, and simulations with regional organizations that partner in UN operations. Two sets of headquarters equipment might be located at the UNLB in Brindisi, with one set available for training and the other pre-packed for immediate deployment.

Among an array of tasks, a UN EMHQ would be required to undertake the following:

- develop contingency plans, detailed contingency packages, and mission-specific plans;
- complement the integrated assessment and planning and integrated mission task forces with skills and expertise;
- translate the concept of operations into tactical sub-plans;
- deploy at short notice for up to six months;
- develop and implement EMHQ preparedness and training activities; providing advice to the head of mission for decision making and coordination purposes;
- form the nucleus of a UN headquarters and establish an administrative infrastructure for the mission;
- provide essential liaison with parties to the conflict during the early stages of an operation;
- work with incoming mission headquarters personnel to ensure that, as the operation grows to its full size and complexity, unity of effort to implement the Security Council mandate is maintained; and,
- conduct training, exercises, and simulations with UN staff and partners.

In short, the long list of tasks involved in planning, deploying, and starting an operation would be more manageable and possible to expedite. An EMHQ might be a cost-effective means to address a frequent gap at the operational level; one with the prospect of corresponding returns at the political, strategic, and tactical levels.

8. Partnerships for Rapid Deployment

Potentially promising partnerships for rapid deployment are underway in the African Union (AU), the European Union (EU), and in Latin America. While they have yet to become dependable arrangements, each may be further developed to enhance regional rapid deployment and to support UN efforts in this respect.

Two EU initiatives merit consideration for their potential to help. In 2004, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom proposed new European Union Battlegroups that would be formed principally in response to UN requests at short notice and capable of being rapidly tailored to specific missions.86 As such, the EU plans were initially welcomed as a contribution to UN rapid deployment.87

The battle groups include troops and equipment from EU member states under a lead nation or framework nation. They were designed as the EU response for its Common Security and Defense Policy, specifically the so-called Petersberg tasks (i.e., military tasks related to conflict prevention, humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping, and

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85 Although the details of this EMHQ are beyond the scope of this paper, for purposes of illustration, the sixty personnel proposed might be co-assigned related planning tasks with twenty officers allocated to the Office of Military Affairs, twenty civilians to the Office of Operations, and twenty to the Department of Field Support.


peacemaking). They are intended for rapid and short deployments in response to international crises, primarily as bridging forces to stabilize a situation in preparation for larger replacements.

Eighteen battle groups have been developed but, to date, none have deployed. While there is some variation in the composition of specific groups, most include an army battalion with command and support services (1,500 troops). All groups are to be deployable within fifteen days and self-sustainable for thirty days in operations not to exceed three months. The structure of each group also varies with differing lead nations assuming operational command within a national headquarters. Some groups are comprised of one member’s armed forces; others entail multinational partnerships between two to seven member states. Every six months, two battle groups rotate into high readiness on standby for deployment. Theoretically, both may be deployed simultaneously or concurrently. Yet the battle groups are not configured with sufficient support for longer deployments beyond that of an initial bridging force (for 120 days). The eighteen battle groups are designed to operate independently. They are not intended to be combined in a formation of two or more for a larger deployment.

The EU Battlegroups became fully operational in January 2007. The UN has repeatedly requested support from the battle groups but without success.\(^88\) Securing the required political consensus of the EU’s twenty-eight member states has proven difficult.\(^89\) Further, the EU stipulation that their battle groups are not to exceed three-month deployments renders them less helpful with UN deployments.\(^90\) Notably, the EU military operation in the Central African Republic (EUFOR RCA) was delayed by insufficient support among EU members, specifically insufficient contributions of troops and logistical support.\(^91\)

Several reforms would be required for the EU Battlegroups to be effective in UN rapid deployment. At the forefront, political approval would have to be streamlined such that the TCC could authorize the deployment of their battle group, prior to securing broader approval from the EU. Second, rather than have eighteen battle groups designed as bridging forces, six to eight might suffice, with ten to twelve reconfigured for deployments of six months, with sufficient logistic support either built in or provided by DFS.

The European Union Gendarmerie Force (EU GENDFOR or EGF) is a pool of integrated police formations designed to improve international crisis management capacity and contribute to the EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy. It is described as “a multinational police force, established by treaty, operational, pre-organized, robust and rapidly deployable, constituted only by elements of police forces with military status.”\(^92\) It stemmed from the multinational initiative of five EU member states—France, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain—which also participate in contributing to the pool of police forces with formed units of gendarmes, carabinieri, or national guards. The EGF became operational in 2006. It may now be deployed in support of the EU, the United Nations, the OSCE, NATO, or within ad hoc coalitions.\(^93\)

Among the attributes of multinational gendarmes are the flexibility and strength of a heavily-equipped, highly trained police formation and its capacity for both rapid planning and rapid deployment. Given its size, composition, and training, it can deploy with military elements at the outset of a crisis and serve under either a military or a civilian headquarters.

The EGF has a permanent headquarters of 36 individuals in Vicenza, Italy, who can be augmented by an additional 50 people when

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\(^{88}\) See Gaelle LeRoux, “Why has the EU’s army never been deployed?,” *France 24*, December 20, 2013.


\(^{90}\) The EU deployment to the Central African Republic did not include an EU battlegroup as military officials indicated they are inappropriate for a deployment that exceeds 120 days. See Adrian Croft, “EU to send military force to Central African Republic,” *Reuters*, January 20, 2014.

\(^{91}\) For an overview of the related issues delaying the EU response, see Agnieszka Nimar, “EUFOR RCA: EU force or farce?,” *Opinion CIDOB* No. 230, Barcelona Center for International Cooperation, March 25, 2014. Despite a pledge among EU leaders attending their December 2013 defense summit to find ways to allow the EU to deploy civilian and military missions “more rapidly and effectively,” Nimar writes that “the EU force generation meeting on March 13th that was supposed to lead to an official launch of the operation failed to generate not only a sufficient number of troops but also the logistic support necessary to initiate the deployment.”

\(^{92}\) See, the website of the EUROGENDFOR, available at www.eurogendfor.org/organization/what-is-eurogendfor .

\(^{93}\) Notably, the EGF has already been deployed to assist in crisis situations in Bosnia, Haiti, Afghanistan, and the Central African Republic.
preparing for a deployment. From the multinational pool of approximately 2,400 officers on standby and a full complement of 800 gendarmes, a deployable field headquarters may be mobilized within thirty days. This includes both operational units, primarily for public security and maintenance of public order, as well as a crime-fighting component with an array of specialists. It is noteworthy that EGF claims the ability to manage every aspect of the various phases in a crisis.  To date, the EGF has deployed to one UN peacekeeping operation—the mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)—with formed police units from Italy and France, as well as a Spanish special operations team.

The African Union has three related initiatives underway. Since 2003, AU member states have cooperated in pooling resources to develop continental capacity for peacekeeping and rapid deployment. The initiative for an African Standby Force (ASF) is an ongoing continental effort to develop five regionally-based standby forces to operate under the auspices of the African Union’s Peace and Security Council. These five standby forces are comprised of a multinational brigade group and civilian and police contingents. Regional headquarters, planning elements, and support arrangements are backstopped by an AU headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, and a continental logistics base in Douala, Cameroon. The ASF initiative was spurred by a series of armed conflicts, particularly the 1994 Rwandan genocide, as well a broader concern to develop “African solutions for African problems.”

Six scenarios are included in the policy framework for the establishment of the ASF, which also guide rapid deployment response times—from ninety days for a complex multidimensional peacekeeping operation involving low-level spoilers (scenario one) to fourteen days for a crisis involving genocide or crimes against humanity (scenario six).

In March 2008, the AU recommended that a rapid deployment capacity (RDC) be an integral part of the regional standby forces, to be deployed as a precursor to a larger multidimensional mission. The initial concept for the RDC entailed 2,500 troops per regional standby force to be capable of responding within fourteen days in cases of genocide and gross human rights abuses under scenario six.

The development of both the ASF and its RDC has been repeatedly delayed. While the ASF was supposed to be operational, its stand-up has been postponed on three occasions, in 2008, 2010, and 2013. An internal AU audit recently noted that the ASF is unlikely to be operational by 2015. The AU encountered similar problems in having the RDC operational by 2012. According to an AU chairperson, the further implementation of the RDC “remains a medium-term objective to be pursued as a priority and in a sustained manner.”

While many AU member states are committed to the ASF process, some participants have also been stretched as contributors to AU and UN peacekeeping operations. Deeper cooperation in pooling resources will be required to develop the full range of enablers, particularly strategic and tactical airlift. The interoperability of the five regional standby forces should develop with further training and exercises. Political and military differences as well as financial constraints have slowed the realization of the five standby forces and the RDC. To date, only three of the five regional brigades are considered operational. Frustration stemming from this delay and from the lack of an AU response to the 2013 crisis in Mali...
spurred African consideration of a third AU option. The African capacity for immediate response to crisis (ACIRC) is to be a temporary multinational standby force for rapid deployment in response to emergencies. The ACIRC is described as a “military tool” that draws from a reservoir of 5,000 troops in three tactical battle groups that can be deployed rapidly (within ten days, with self-sufficiency for thirty days). This capacity is to be modular, designed to operate under the centralized command of a force headquarters, with suitable combat, combat service support, engineers, and air support. Pre-designated units meeting specific training and equipment standards are to be certified and put under a roster system. Each battle group of 1,500 troops may be subsequently pledged by a lead-nation or by a group of AU member states. Interoperability and military effectiveness are cited as key criteria. Member countries contributing troops to the ACIRC are to pledge their support during the initial thirty days of a deployment, “before the AU and/or the United Nations make up for the possible shortages.”

The AU notes that, “the objective is to ensure that Africa contribute in a more active and substantive manner to collective security, as provided for in the United Nations Charter, in a spirit of partnership and burden sharing.” The three roles envisaged for ACIRC include (1) stabilization, peace enforcement, and intervention missions; (2) neutralization of terrorist groups, other cross-border criminal entities, and armed rebellions; and (3) emergency assistance to member states.

Five AU member states are now cooperating to develop the battalions and pool of forces: Algeria, Chad, South Africa, Tanzania, and Uganda. The initial AU report on the ACIRC reflected detailed and professional plans. As proposed, the ACIRC is likely to be a robust military formation, led by a civilian special envoy. With anticipated response times of ten days, this AU capacity should be more rapid. It is unclear whether the AU can maintain the political support required for the development of the ACIRC. Aspects of the ACIRC continue to evolve. Police may still be included. The ACIRC is to be fully functional and operational by 2015. Yet this is an interim measure that is to be phased out once the ASF and RDC reach full operational capability.

Several ACIRC participants and other AU member states will receive a boost. In August 2014, the United States announced the African Peace-
keeping Rapid Response Partnership (APRRP or A-Prep) with an investment of $110 million per year over three to five years.\textsuperscript{110} The stated objective of the APRRP is “to build the capacity of African militaries to rapidly deploy peacekeepers in response to emerging conflict, a concept that holds powerful life-saving potential.”\textsuperscript{111} Six initial AU partners have been identified: Ethiopia, Ghana, Rwanda, Tanzania, Senegal, and Uganda. To develop their rapid response capability, the program will focus on improving training, equipment maintenance and repair, institutional support, and interoperability with other AU-based peacekeeping forces. This partnership is described as a catalyst to establish the ACIRC. In this respect, it will also offer training for headquarters staff and support for key enabling functions, such as engineers. Notably, AU partners within this program “will commit to maintaining forces and equipment ready to rapidly deploy and state their intent to deploy as part of UN or AU mission to respond to emerging crisis.”\textsuperscript{112}

Another regional partnership for peacekeeping is the Cruz del Sur Joint Peace Force developed by Chile and Argentina. Both countries are providing mechanized infantry battalions that are supported by a Chilean engineering company and a mobile hospital from Argentina. Surface naval assets and eight transport helicopters are included. Cruz del Sur was announced in April 2008 with an assurance that it would be ready to serve in UN peace operations within the year.\textsuperscript{113} It was subsequently pledged to the UN standby arrangement system in 2010. To date, Cruz del Sur has not been deployed. Political and financial concerns appear to have temporarily confined this partnership to further training and development. Through joint planning and exercises, the two participants should enhance confidence and prepare capacity for rapid deployment. The Cruz del Sur partnership may yet inspire the UN and many member states to develop capacity for rapid deployment, to ensure common levels of preparedness, to enhance standards, to facilitate training, to provide wider access to equipment, and to establish coherent multinational brigade-size forces of approximately 5,000 troops.\textsuperscript{114} By sharing in both the costs and the burdens, partnerships also encourage multinational cooperation, which the UN and many member states depend upon.

Clearly, the development of battle groups and the EGF in the EU and of the ASF, RDC, and ACIRC in the AU has yet to provide the UN with rapid or reliable options for deployment. The EU has been reluctant to deploy a battle group. The EGF has deployed to the UN operation in Haiti and to the EU military operation in the Central African Republic. Over the past decade, various military units of AU member states have been promptly “re-hatted” into UN operations. Very few AU members have demonstrated they can deploy promptly to UN operations.\textsuperscript{115} In the recent words of Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon,

> We have been talking for some time about the need for the UN and key regional actors to be able to deploy more rapidly, especially in acute emergencies. The EU Battlegroup was created for this purpose, as was the African Standby Force. But despite years of investment, we are still far from having predictable and effective mechanisms for rapid deployment.\textsuperscript{116}

Rapid deployment will remain a challenge for both the EU and the AU. For the UN, there is little assurance of prompt access to EU Battlegroups when EU decisions are likely to be delayed, and when the battle groups are unavailable for more

\textsuperscript{110} The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Fact Sheet: U.S. Support for Peacekeeping in Africa,” August 6, 2014.

\textsuperscript{111} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{112} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{113} “Chile and Argentina launch Cruz del Sur Joint Peace Force,” Merco Press, April 5, 2008. A Cruz del Sur memorandum of understanding was subsequently signed on November 22, 2010, pledging this asset within the UN standby arrangements system.

\textsuperscript{114} For earlier analysis of partnerships in this respect, see H. Peter Langille, “Renewing Partnerships for the Prevention of Armed Conflict: Options to Enhance Rapid Deployment and Initiate a UN Standing Emergency Capability,” Canadian Centre for Foreign Policy Development and the DFAIT, June 2000.

\textsuperscript{115} The two noteworthy examples are in Ethiopia’s prompt deployment to UNISFA (Abyei) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development’s (IGAD) recent deployment of forces from Ethiopia, Kenya, and Rwanda to UNMIS (South Sudan).

than three months. Conversely, many of the AU member states appear willing, yet they also need further time and cooperation to develop sufficient capacity.

Irrespective of any shortcomings, the UN remains committed to improving these partnerships with the AU and the EU.\textsuperscript{117} This may entail modifying cooperation to accommodate another pressing requirement. In laying out DPKO’s 2014–2015 outreach to acquire strategic reserves for short-notice deployments, the secretary-general reported that, “the European Union’s Battlegroups and the African Union’s Standby Force could constitute the departure point for this capacity.”\textsuperscript{118}

The extent to which regional partnerships such as those with the EU and AU are actually committed to UN operations or to UN rapid deployment remains unclear. They may not be confined to their own regions, but that appears to be where they are most likely to help. In short, partnerships have been useful in building a loose multinational pool for regional peacekeeping. To date, they have not proven helpful or adequate for UN rapid deployment.

Peacekeeping works largely because people within the UN are extraordinarily committed and cooperative in making it work. It’s understandable that new circumstances demand new approaches and improvisation, but problems also arise from a lack of continuity and a designated coordinator or focal point for rapid deployment.\textsuperscript{119} For example, while peacekeeping policy guidance and documents have improved markedly over the past decade, there are few, if any, that detail the many different requirements of rapid deployment. DPKO and DFS are engaged in an ongoing effort to streamline the force generation and deployment processes. In the recent words of one senior official, “we are looking at all ways of trying to improve responsiveness.”

**RECOMMENDATION 11**

DPKO, DFS, and DPA could report on the various arrangements, the points of contact, and the sequence of steps required to effect rapid deployment within the UN system. This report should be followed by an annual update on rapid deployment, addressing system-wide progress and problems, as well as further requirements. It should also provide basic information on the deployment response record for new or expanded missions over the previous year. An annual update would be helpful to member states and those within the wider peacekeeping partnership.

A 2012 policy brief on partnerships raised the need for ongoing dialogue between organizations about how to make rapid reaction possible.\textsuperscript{120} A series of planned discussions would definitely help to focus and sustain the work required to make a difference. It might also help to build an informed constituency of support.

**RECOMMENDATION 12**

DPKO and DFS should partner with supportive civil society organizations to host an annual forum on UN rapid deployment. This forum should be open to both assessing and raising options for enhancing rapid deployment. To ensure an inclusive process, the forum must include practitioners, experts, and the network of organizations that work on peacekeeping issues with broad regional representation.

A previous partnership that served to promote and implement useful reforms was the Friends of Rapid Deployment. Although short-lived, this group of twenty-eight member states was an influential network. Within two years it helped to initiate several reforms, such as a better consultative process with the UN Security Council, a permanent rapidly deployable mission headquarters, and the multinational standby high-readiness brigade.\textsuperscript{121}

\textsuperscript{117} Citing the critical role of regional partnerships, the secretary-general reported that “the Departments of Peacekeeping Operations and Field Support will continue to support the African Union’s efforts to accelerate the operationalization of the African Standby Force, including the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises.” United Nations Secretary-General, “Overview of the financing,” para. 60, p. 22.

\textsuperscript{118} Ibid., para. 77, p. 27.

\textsuperscript{119} While rapid deployment has been a long-standing problem, it does not appear as an ongoing priority or one that merits a dedicated office of primary responsibility. Unfortunately, with the combination of field deployments and a high turnover of individuals, people with ideas come and go. The institutional memory, records, and files of “what works, what doesn’t, and what might” appears limited.


\textsuperscript{121} The Friends of Rapid Deployment met between 1996–1997. Its guiding document was the 1995 Canadian study, *Towards A Rapid Reaction Capability For The United Nations.*
RECOMMENDATION 13

The prospect of revitalizing the Friends of Rapid Deployment should be explored by member states, DPKO, DFS, and supportive organizations. Appropriate regional representation of committed member states, including TCCs, PCCs, and the major financial contributors will be critical. A friends group might also expand the constituency of support and initiate further partnerships, as well as discussions at a higher political level.

In the development of UN guidelines for peacekeeping (e.g., doctrine), those serving in UN operations have proven to be a reservoir of expertise. Communities of practice have been developed across a broad spectrum of operational tasks to contribute lessons learned and informed advice. On numerous peacekeeping issues, this online cooperation and feedback from communities of practice has been very helpful in refining approaches and best practices.

RECOMMENDATION 14

DPKO and DFS could encourage the UN’s existing network to host a community of practice focused on rapid deployment. Working groups might be developed to provide a broader perspective not only of operational and tactical requirements but also of political developments that may influence deployments.

Conclusion

Improving UN rapid deployment has proven to be a slow process. Overall, the results from related reforms appear mixed; they are not what they could or should be. UN deployments are now thought to require six to twelve months—a considerable extension on any interpretation of rapid deployment.122

In raising the need for an immediate deployment of troops to the Central African Republic—while en route to address the twentieth anniversary of the Rwandan Genocide—UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon conceded that “we have not made the difference that we promised we would make – to prevent the preventable.”123

After several months of this unfolding crisis, the secretary-general reported on the proposed transition of the AU-led mission (MISCA) into the UN-led mission (MINUSCA), noting that it would “take the United Nations approximately six months to prepare the deployment of its operation.”124 In this case, the slow response isn’t even slower largely because the existing AU force is to be “re-hatted,” with most facilities and services already in place. Clearly, rapid deployment continues to present a pressing challenge for the UN.

Each of the initiatives reviewed may be considered helpful as each addresses a specific aspect of rapid deployment. In some cases, it may be premature to pass judgment on efforts that are still underway. Progress is evident in the Global Field Support Strategy, in the new premiums, and in multinational partnerships. Although understaffed, the UN standing police capacity has demonstrated that it is not only more rapid and reliable but also cost-effective. With these eight initiatives combined, the UN’s prospects should improve. Over the next few years, response times of six to twelve months or more may be scaled back to four to six months. Arguably, these initiatives also combine to provide a better UN foundation for rapid deployment. Further efforts will definitely be needed to build on and beyond this foundation.

Unfortunately, there remains no assurance that any UN deployment will be prompt. As noted, there are inherent limitations in each initiative. These are not optimal or ideal solutions, but efforts to improve on a fragmented, problematic approach. The long list of required tasks and conditional arrangements will continue to impede rapid deployment. For more than fifty years it has been understood that the one way to streamline and expedite this process is to develop a standing UN rapid deployment capability—a development that has been repeatedly proposed and resisted. In the absence of support, the near future appears likely to resemble the past, with the UN coping

122 Notably, in a number of operations over the past decade, the UN was able to “re-hat” forces already deployed nearby. This practice may have offset what would otherwise have been an imminent need, yet it cannot be viewed as more than a temporary solution, facilitated by convenient circumstances.


with limited resources and recurring delays.

Overall, these initiatives also raise five concerns over process and highlight a worrisome contradiction. First, with a few exceptions, reform efforts appear to be sporadic and driven by the demands of pressing crises. Instead of the sustained attention required to address a long-standing challenge, efforts often subside as the political interest dissipates. Notably, several of these arrangements (e.g., the United Nations standby arrangements system, enhanced rapidly deployable capacities, and partnerships) have a history in the UN system. Frequently, it would appear that they follow a pattern of being denied adequate funding by the member states, and then being scaled back into a revised option to be raised as circumstances permit. To have any chance of support in the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C-34), this often prompts reforms tailored to attract the least political resistance and prompts compromises only slightly above the level of the lowest common denominator.

Second, most efforts appear compartmentalized and stove-piped in line with office functions to address one aspect of the problem. Instead of a system-wide focus, this risks a subjective, narrow approach to deal with short-term office and departmental needs. For example, the UN standby arrangements system is largely confined to the force generation service; the standing police capacity and formed police units are within the Police Division; the Global Field Support Strategy is in the Department of Field Support; and partnerships are in the Division of Policy Evaluation and Training. Coherence in unity of effort and purpose is difficult without a recognized focal point.

Third, while the targeted technical reforms are clearly well-intentioned, some are only comprehensible to a small community of experts. This compounds confusion. And, if these initiatives appear convoluted and awkward here, one can only imagine how unimpressive they may seem to a distant national capital. Rather than inspiring wider support, this poses a problem for those advocating for related reforms.

Fourth, most efforts underway reflect the official preference for pragmatic, incremental reforms to existing arrangements. This approach has a mixed record—helpful in increments, but also insufficient. As modest efforts are unlikely to deliver a reliable UN capacity, this preference reinforces prevailing cynicism. Aside from negating vision and idealism, it also narrows the range of choice, effectively foreclosing on more ambitious options for rapid deployment, protection of civilians, and prevention of armed conflict. It’s understandable that peacekeeping would temporarily shift to reflect priorities in post-stabilization and strengthening state capacity. But having raised higher expectations, the UN is now confronted with a credibility gap and a problematic contradiction.

Fifth, austerity—“doing more with less”—continues to delay the development of better arrangements (e.g., the United Nations standby arrangements system, formed police units, enhanced rapidly deployable capacity, early mission headquarters, and partnerships). Austerity is not new as an impediment to progress in this respect. Yet it now limits consideration of any additional expenditure that might raise the UN’s peacekeeping budget over its current ceiling. This results in a paralysis of analysis within the UN and in civil society. There are now few experts who bother to follow this issue and fewer still who are prepared to propose options.

In May, delegates to the Fifth Committee also heard concerns that “peacekeeping on the cheap” jeopardizes operational capacities, fails to achieve the purpose of helping countries stabilize, and generates a need for additional resources.

125 While UN officials have called for rapid deployment in response to Darfur, Syria, Mali, South Sudan, and Central African Republic, the past decade has not been characterized by substantive UN efforts to improve rapid deployment.

126 To illustrate, the UNSAS is now managed by one person with multiple responsibilities in DPKO’s Force Generation Service. Two officials manage the FPU standby initiative in the Police Division. The Division of Policy Evaluation and Training’s partnership team appears to be a more coherent team effort, although it is also criticized for lacking a military perspective in discussions that often include military partners.


Similarly, the search for a rapid and reliable UN capability “on the cheap” within a zero-growth budget has been elusive, and repeatedly frustrated. The prevailing approach hasn’t worked. And, as Jean-Marie Guéhenno warned, “if we just repeat the solutions of the past, it’s not going to work.”

Yet too many conflicts over the past twenty years—from Rwanda to the Central African Republic—have demonstrated that the costs of intervening in a crisis increase dramatically when deployments are delayed. With slow responses, violent conflicts tend to escalate and spread, increasing destruction and suffering, as well as the need for later, larger, longer operations at higher costs.

In short, the contradiction of UN rapid deployment relates partially to unfulfilled aspirations and ideals, as well as to opportunities and lives lost at higher overall costs. For some, this may appear similar to the circle that can’t be squared. In the absence of vision, there are unlikely to be sufficiently coherent plans to attract a supportive constituency. And, without plans or a constituency, this issue is unlikely to attract political leadership or investment. But these impediments are not insurmountable.

Is there a better process? So far, the few alternative approaches attempted have had limited success. If any process is to succeed, it will require forward-thinking options, as well as adaptation at a far faster rate. To initiate a virtuous cycle that attracts corresponding support at the public and political level, rapid deployment may have to be twinned with the UN’s potential in preventing armed conflict and protecting civilians. These wider challenges also suffer from limited UN capacity. As such, they might benefit from a shared effort. And, rather than view each as a distinct, independent issue confined to diverse agencies, rapid deployment, protection, and prevention could be treated as mutually reinforcing components of a more coherent UN system. The broader appeal might generate a broader constituency, with more potential to shift national and international political priorities.

Of course, further resources may also follow from two evident trends. Developed member states with larger military establishments will increasingly undertake a search for relevance, which will lead some to return and request a prominent role in UN peacekeeping. A number of developing member states have also improved their capacity for rapid deployment. But as this potential pool of contributors expands, there is a third and more problematic trend: the UN may be confronted by

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131 Guéhenno, “Challenges in UN Peacekeeping.”
133 Obviously, this approach generates financial benefits for some and unsustainable costs for others. For the TCCs and PCCs that depend on financial reimbursements for rapid deployments are delayed. With slow responses, violent conflicts tend to escalate and spread, increasing destruction and suffering, as well as the need for later, larger, longer operations at higher costs.
134 A shortlist of questions include the following: Are there likely to be benefits in a cumulative development process, with a sequence of building blocks? How might the UN encourage a virtuous cycle of support? Would a goal-oriented plan need to restore vision, present a compelling option, attract a broader constituency of support and generate a wider unity of effort and purpose? How might a broad-based network of supportive organizations improve wider understanding of UN rapid deployment requirements? Could a network of supportive member states help to shift the priorities of the P-5?
135 An Agenda for Peace in 1992 and its supplement in 1995 both offered ambitious options for rapid deployment that attracted broad public support, but they also generated apprehension in national capitals and defense establishments. The 1995 Canadian study Towards A Rapid Reaction Capacity For The United Nations proposed a cumulative development process or building-block approach with reforms at the political, strategic, operational, and tactical levels sequenced over the short, mid, and long term. While the emphasis was on the achievable reforms in the short term, it acknowledged that failure in that respect would necessitate a shift to the more ambitious option of a standing UN Emergency Group. That shift did not attract government support. In turn, the Friends of Rapid Deployment attempted reforms largely directed to the strategic and operational levels, with the expectation that there would be corresponding returns and support at the political level. While helpful in developing support for the SHIRBRIG, a Rapidly Deployable Mission Headquarters, and consultations with the Security Council, the effort was short-lived.
136 Unfortunately, there have been few tangible changes since the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change reported that “the biggest source of inefficiency in our collective security institutions has simply been an unwillingness to get serious about preventing deadly violence. The failure to invest time and resources early in order to prevent the outbreak and escalation of conflicts leads to much larger and deadlier conflagrations that are much costlier to handle later.” A more secure world: our shared responsibility, UN Doc. A/59/565, December 2, 2004, para. 39, p. 23. A less than encouraging appraisal of civilian protection also arose in the recent Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services, "Evaluation of the implementation and results of protection of civilians mandates in United Nations peacekeeping operations," UN Doc. A/68/787, March 7, 2014, cited in Michelle Nichols, “U.N. study finds peacekeepers avoid using force to protect civilians,” Reuters, May 16, 2014.
137 Among those demonstrating substantive improvements in this respect are the IGAD force comprised of troops from Ethiopia, Kenya, and Rwanda and the Force Intervention Brigade provided by South Africa, Tanzania, and Malawi.
increasing demands for resources that are already engaged or even less reliable. Should the future entail an era of overlapping crises—economic recession and austerity, social inequality and desperation, accelerating climate change and environmental shifts, weak states and refugee flows, with a higher incidence of armed conflict—the UN will face a critical challenge. What then?

In this respect, it’s understandable that officials would prepare a paper on the development of a UN standing force as a long-term option. Forward-thinking contingency plans are essential. However, the focus on a UN “force” also risks repeating the mistakes that led to previous failures and a prompt rejection. The earlier national studies (1994–1995) and multinational initiative (1996–1997) to develop a UN rapid deployment capacity prompted a proposal for a standing UN Emergency Peace Service. At the time, it was also deemed a long-term option yet one that would be required if the short- to mid-term reforms failed to provide the required UN capability. Notably, a UN Emergency Peace Service was specifically designed to provide the UN with a rapid, reliable “first responder” to manage mission start-up for demanding operations, to help prevent armed conflict, to protect civilians, and to address human needs in areas where others either cannot or will not. Rather than replace existing arrangements, a UN Emergency Peace Service is intended to complement and support peacekeeping contributors by addressing immediate gaps at the outset of an operation and to ensure prompt augmentation in the event of a crisis. While such a development would require a considerable investment, the overall cost savings would also be significant. And, unlike calls for a UN “army” or “force,” useful emergency services are more widely appealing and far tougher to dismiss.

Despite the prevailing cynicism, it is noteworthy that there have been occasions when much of the necessary support, if not the required consensus, for establishing a UN rapid deployment capacity was close at hand. Such conditions tend to arise briefly and, usually, only in the aftermath of brutal wars and/or genocide. Some powerful governments have understood what’s required for more than fifty years. Preventing the preventable isn’t mission impossible. It would require a plan, a substantive effort, and bold leadership. Aside from the current emphasis on “all means to cut response times,” this is an appropriate time to aim higher.

Recommendations

STANDBY ARRANGEMENTS SYSTEM

1. Rename the rapid deployment level as the “emergency providers list.” The designation of a “UN emergency response unit” might also inspire a higher level of commitment. Participation at this level should be regarded as a privilege, to be earned on basis of merit, professionalism and service. Proven providers deserve to be accorded recognition for their services. This could be acknowledged on

138 Although the proposal initially called for a standing UN Emergency Group, it was subsequently revised and re-labeled as a UN Emergency Service and then, as a UN Emergency Peace Service (UNEPS). For the various background documents, see the webpages of the World Federalist Movement-Canada at www.worldfederalistscanada.org/programs/1uneps.html.

139 On various occasions, representatives of diverse sectors in the Global South and Global North expressed support for the UNEPS concept on grounds that it was deemed more widely appealing, with a more appropriate integrated model and plans that were viewed as more politically feasible. Although the initial objective of the UNEPS initiative was to ensure prior preparation of a compelling plan and to develop a broader constituency of support, it also lingers on the verge of becoming another long-term option. For an overview of this proposal and the lessons learned from related efforts, see H. Peter Langille, “Preparing for a UN Emergency Peace Service,” FES Perspective Paper, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, New York, August 2012.

140 Among the wars that prompted consideration of empowering the UN with its own force were World War II, the Korean War in 1950, the Suez crisis of 1956, and the war in the Congo in 1960. The end of the Cold War was one occasion that attracted high-level support for UN rapid deployment. This was evident as early as August 1992, when US presidential candidate Bill Clinton expressed support for a voluntary UN Rapid Deployment Force. In February 1993, US Secretary of State Warren Christopher informed the UN secretary-general that the US would back proposals for a UN Rapid Deployment Force. On various occasions, Russian statesmen endorsed UN standby forces, negotiation of Article 43 agreements, and even their readiness to commit forces to a UN army. In 1992 French President François Mitterrand called for revitalizing the UN Military Staff Committee and offered to commit 1,000 French soldiers at its disposal within forty-eight hours notice, with another 1,000 ready for UN service within a week. See the sections on “Presidential Support” and “International Support” in Edward I. Dennehy et al., “A Blue Helmet Combat Force,” Policy Analysis Paper 93-01, National Security Program, Harvard University, 1993, pp. 9–10.

141 This was evident as early as 1961, when officials in the US State Department raised both the need for and benefits of a UN Peace Force in a document entitled, “Freedom from War,” US State Department Publication 7277, Disarmament Series 5, September 1961, available at http://dosfan.lib.uiuc.edu/ERC/arms/freedom_war.html.

142 Obviously, there is a need for further consultations and in-depth studies of UN options for rapid deployment. Yet this paper should also raise questions about the inherent limitations in the UN's foundation for rapid deployment. What, if any, are the lessons learned after twenty years of pragmatic attempts to develop a UN rapid deployment capacity within the context of the existing standby arrangements? Response times have not improved. Will modest measures make the substantive difference now required to improve on deployments anticipated to exceed six to nine months?
DPKO’s website, in publications, and in service awards.

2. The United Nations Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C-34) should call for cooperation in support of defense transformation. A generic plan should be developed both to identify UN requirements and to help guide the transformation of national armed forces into appropriate elements for rapid deployment.

FORMED POLICE UNITS

3. If the UN invests in developing formed police units, it should do so with the proviso (in a memorandum of understanding) that the FPU is both earmarked for and available for rapid deployment to UN peace operations.

4. Given an ongoing and urgent demand, the option of standing UN FPUs merits further exploration and elaboration. At a minimum, both the member states and the UN should know whether their requirements might be addressed in a more cost-effective manner.

STANDING POLICE CAPACITY

5. As the SPC represents a rapid, reliable, and cost-effective UN capacity, it should be expanded to the strength required by operational demands. Recruitment staff should be promptly directed to attract ten Arabic-speaking and ten French-speaking police officers. These posts are needed to ensure the SPC can operate effectively in areas where it is likely to be assigned.

FINANCIAL PREMIUMS AND INCENTIVES

6. DPKO and DFS should continue to explore ways to acknowledge and reward service for emergency first responders and prompt providers. Contributors meeting or deploying under specified UN response times merit additional compensation.

GLOBAL FIELD SUPPORT STRATEGY

7. An independent evaluation should be commissioned to assess progress on the GFSS, to survey member states, and to identify what further steps are required to ensure rapid deployment.

ENHANCED RAPIDLY DEPLOYABLE CAPACITIES

8. DPKO should consider expanding on the regional hub concept, with one designated highly-mobile UN reserve battalion providing coverage for three surrounding operations within the region. This might provide a cost-effective force multiplier and a more robust deterrent capacity for each operation. A clause would have to be added to the MOU for initial deployment so that the battalion could be shifted at short notice on the UN’s prerogative.

9. Identifying a pool of those member states with experience as UN strategic reserves might help to offset the improvisation and the rush likely to accompany multiple crises. An ERDC roster of reliable TCCs and PCCs inclined to provide strategic reserve options may be worthy of further consideration.

EARLY MISSION HEADQUARTERS

10. A UN “early mission headquarters” merits further consideration. An integrated standing headquarters capacity of sixty personnel, augmented by a roster of experts available on short notice, could be developed to expedite rapid deployment, early mission start-up, and early headquarters start-up. Individuals would serve to complement the integrated mission task force, assist with technical assessment missions, form the nucleus of an operational headquarters, and ensure sound planning and organization through the demanding initial phases of a peacekeeping operation.

PARTNERSHIPS FOR RAPID DEPLOYMENT

11. DPKO, DFS, and DPA could report on the various arrangements, the points of contact, and the sequence of steps required to effect rapid deployment within the UN system. This report should be followed by an annual update on rapid deployment, addressing progress and problems system-wide, as well as further requirements. An annual update would be helpful to member states and those within the wider peacekeeping partnership.

12. DPKO and DFS should partner with supportive civil society organizations to host
an annual forum on UN rapid deployment. This forum should be open to both assessing and raising options for enhancing rapid deployment. To ensure an inclusive process, the forum must include practitioners, experts, and the network of organizations that work on peacekeeping issues with broad regional representation.

13. The prospect of revitalizing the Friends of Rapid Deployment should be explored by DPKO, DFS, and supportive organizations. Appropriate regional representation of committed member states, including TCCs, PCCs, and the major financial contributors, will be critical. A friends group might also expand the constituency of support and initiate further partnerships, as well as discussions at a higher political level.

14. DPKO and DFS could encourage the UN’s existing network to host a community of practice focused on rapid deployment. Working groups might be developed to provide a broader perspective not only of operational and tactical requirements but also of political developments that may influence deployments.
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