Police in UN Peacekeeping:
Improving Selection, Recruitment, and Deployment

PROVIDING FOR PEACEKEEPING NO. 6

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<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tr>
<td>ACABQ</td>
<td>Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions</td>
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<td>C-34</td>
<td>General Assembly Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations</td>
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<td>CIVCAP</td>
<td>Civilian Capacities Initiative</td>
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<td>DFS</td>
<td>Department of Field Support</td>
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<td>DPKO</td>
<td>Department of Peacekeeping Operations</td>
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<td>FPAT</td>
<td>Formed Police Assessment Team</td>
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<td>FPU</td>
<td>Formed Police Unit</td>
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<td>FRY</td>
<td>Federal Republic of Yugoslavia</td>
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<td>GFSS</td>
<td>Global Field Support Strategy</td>
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<td>GFP</td>
<td>Global Focal Point</td>
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<td>HNP</td>
<td>Haitian National Police</td>
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<td>IDG</td>
<td>International Deployment Group</td>
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<td>Interpol</td>
<td>International Criminal Police Organization</td>
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<td>IOT</td>
<td>Integrated Operational Team</td>
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<td>IPTF</td>
<td>International Police Task Force</td>
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<td>IPO</td>
<td>Individual Police Officer</td>
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<td>JMAC</td>
<td>Joint Mission Analysis Center</td>
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<td>MINUSTAH</td>
<td>United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti</td>
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<td>MONUC</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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<td>MONUSCO</td>
<td>United Nations Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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<td>MOU</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
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<td>OIOS</td>
<td>Office of Internal Oversight Services</td>
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<td>ONUMOZ</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in Mozambique</td>
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<td>OROLSI</td>
<td>Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions</td>
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<td>PCC</td>
<td>Police-Contributing Country</td>
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<td>POP</td>
<td>Public Order Police</td>
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<td>PNTL</td>
<td>Policia Nacional de Timor-Leste</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAAT</td>
<td>Selection Assessment and Assistance Team</td>
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<td>SPC</td>
<td>Standing Police Capacity</td>
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<td>SWAPOL</td>
<td>Southwest African Police</td>
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<td>UNAMID</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Darfur</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>UNIOGBIS</td>
<td>United Nations Integrated Peace-Building Office for Guinea-Bissau</td>
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<td>UNIPSIL</td>
<td>United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone</td>
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<td>UNISFA</td>
<td>United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei</td>
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<td>UNMIK</td>
<td>United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo</td>
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<td>UNMIL</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Liberia</td>
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<td>UNMIS</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Sudan</td>
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<td>UNMISS</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in South Sudan</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNMIT</td>
<td>United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNOCI</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire</td>
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<td>UNODC</td>
<td>United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime</td>
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<td>UNPOL</td>
<td>United Nations Police</td>
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<td>WACI</td>
<td>West Africa Coast Initiative</td>
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Executive Summary

In the past two decades, United Nations police (UNPOL) have become an increasingly visible and important part of UN peacekeeping. Second only to military peacekeepers in numbers, about 12,600 UN police served in UN peace operations in mid-2013. Their roles have evolved over the decades from observing and reporting to mentoring, training, reforming, operating alongside, and occasionally standing in for local police as a post-war government is re-established with international help.

Authorized numbers of UN police increased by at least 25 percent per year from 2003 through 2007, outpacing the UN Secretariat’s capacities for supportive strategic planning and doctrine, selection, and recruitment, while vacancy rates for UN police in missions rose above 30 percent. In this paper, we discuss selection, recruitment, and deployment issues for UN police that are being addressed but are not fully resolved.

KEY CHALLENGES

Achieving more rapid and adaptive deployment of UN police requires finding enough of the right sorts of expertise, with attention to gender balance; adapting police from partly democratic or autocratic states to the needs of democratic policing; and maintaining quality control in selection and recruitment.

Challenges to performance once UN police are deployed include retaining institutional memory and both the trust and respect of local counterparts despite frequent rotations of personnel; developing intelligence-led policing; dispelling the notion that police are substitutes for troops in unstable settings; and ensuring discipline within UNPOL ranks.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Ending Recruitment Shortfalls

While continuing its efforts to broaden the base of police-contributing countries (PCCs), the Police Division in the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) should develop a volunteer roster of personnel who have work experience in a policing environment, either as sworn officers or as civilians, but are not in active government service. The Department of Field Support (DFS) could maintain such a roster of individuals, who should be pre-cleared for direct hire when needed, as a supplement to the secondment by member states of active duty police and other “government provided” personnel. Direct-hire specialists would need staff posts in the police component of the mission plan, for which precedents have already been set by the missions in Timor-Leste and Liberia.

Since 2007, an affiliated Standing Police Capacity (SPC) based in Brindisi, Italy, has roughly mirrored the Police Division. First operational in 2007, the SPC has provided valuable service to missions but perhaps not with the intensity or frequency initially anticipated. Some may consider that it has not done enough with the forty or so personnel available to it, but we argue that the SPC remains too small to be effective at large or diverse tasks, including its primary function of standing up new police components. Its problems are traceable in part to the lack of an overall strategic concept for utilizing the SPC that the Police Division and its parent Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions (OROLSI) can readily embrace, and in part due to insufficient integration with the rest of the Police Division.

Building on earlier Stimson Center work in this area, we therefore propose a new approach to standing capacity for police, justice, and corrections that would fully integrate such capacity into OROLSI—in effect making all non-seconded personnel in the office part of DPKO’s standing capacity in police, justice, and corrections. The concept would lead to a higher net proportion of Headquarters staff with recent field experience and a higher proportion of field staff with exposure to both mission and Headquarters environments.

Reinforcing a Gender Perspective in Recruitment and Training

As recently as June 2013 the UN Security Council reiterated the need for UN field missions to deal more effectively with vulnerable conflict populations, including women and children, and to impress upon their host counterparts the seriousness of the UN’s intent to address and curb sexual

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1 The caveat for seconded personnel assumes that the sending state agreed only to specific assignments or duty stations for their personnel. It may prove feasible to negotiate secondments with more flexible terms.
violence. Mission police components should, in turn, build it into operational strategy, take the particular needs and views of women specifically into account, and maintain a gender perspective in their work, including awareness of the disproportionate personal and social damage inflicted upon women in a climate of pervasive sexual violence, whether as a weapon of war or as a proclivity within violence-infused local culture. Such cultural awareness is one of the priority areas of knowledge for UN police to better develop, as laid out in the DPKO/DFS 2012–2013 Training Needs Assessment.²

Negotiating Terms for Good Behavior

DPKO should adopt a memorandum of understanding with individual UN police heading to UN missions that places more emphasis on the importance of abiding by local laws and does more to include contractual penalties for violating local laws or mission policies. Such terms could give UNPOL senior leadership greater leeway in devising disciplinary measures. One possible additional approach to discipline would be to establish, in collaboration with the host state, a model host-state court staffed jointly by host-state jurists and mission personnel, to whose jurisdiction mission personnel would be answerable.³

Minding and Mending Gaps in Handovers

Given the importance of maintaining continuity and momentum in rebuilding or reforming host-state institutions critical to public safety and security, such as the police, missions should be able to count on at least a two-week overlap between incoming and outgoing personnel in key posts and positions. At present it is very difficult to arrange for such overlaps, but without them, personal working knowledge is difficult to transfer to successors and those leaving the mission have no opportunity to introduce their successors to host-state counterparts, potentially undermining continuity of trust. This is a case, perhaps, where staff regulations (set by the General Assembly) and/or staff rules (set by the secretary-general to interpret and implement the regulations) that are intended to promote economy and efficiency in a Headquarters setting work against the ability of a field mission to meet its objectives. If so, and if they cannot be changed in recognition of such operational necessity, consideration should be given to the appointment of successors as consultants to the person already holding the post or position, beginning a few weeks before the latter’s term expires and ending when the successor assumes his or her duties in the given post or position.

Regardless of the approach taken to the timing of handovers, a standard handover kit should be given at mission induction training to every UN police employee in a management post or position; who is to serve as a trainer, mentor, or adviser to national police; or who is in a position of leadership in a formed unit, down to the section (ten-person team) level. The kit should include notes from his or her predecessor, summarizing his or her understanding of the duties involved, how he or she carried out the assignment, and recommendations for moving it forward. The value of such notes should be self-evident but should be stressed in mission induction training. A refresher workshop on completing a handover kit should be conducted at least six weeks before the post or position holder’s scheduled rotation out of mission.

Using a Few High-Function FPUs and Building Local Alternatives to the Rest

DPKO should negotiate with select PCCs to make available for UN operations a relatively small number of professional, well-trained, and well-equipped formed police units (FPUs) to serve as first-responding units for public security in new UN missions. They should be replaced after about a year by locally recruited and UN-commanded “public order police” (UNPOP) units that become part of the UN mission’s public security capacity. UNPOP candidates should be UN vetted, trained to a standard UN curriculum, and funded and equipped from the mission budget, with embedded leadership down to the section level by UN police with experience in their country’s gendarmerie. As regular host-state police services are trained and developed,


Introduction

In the past two decades, United Nations police (UNPOL) have become an increasingly visible and important part of UN peacekeeping. Second only to military peacekeepers in numbers, about 12,600 UN police served in UN peace operations in mid-2013. Their roles have evolved over the decades from observing and reporting to mentoring, training, reforming, operating alongside, and occasionally standing in for local police as a postconflict government is reestablished with international help.

Authorized numbers of UN police increased by at least 25 percent per year from 2003 through 2007. Average vacancy rates in the police components of UN field operations hovered around 30 percent by 2008. Selection and recruitment for international police peacekeeping became both a critical problem for UN peace operations and a topic of intense interest amongst all concerned with UN policing and peacebuilding.

The UN Secretariat and, in particular, the Police Division within the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) recognize that good police are a valued and much-utilized domestic resource for police-contributing countries (PCCs). Being scarce, they take time to find, and PCCs may be reluctant to send officers where they are needed most—in complex and risky operations—or to part with them for very long. This increases the recruitment problem, and frequent rotation of police personnel in turn inhibits the development of critical local knowledge and relationships that are key to effective mentoring and building the capacity of local police.

In short, this paper discusses critical issues for UN police that have been recognized and are being addressed, but are not yet fully resolved. It begins with a brief review of how UNPOL tasking has evolved in the 21st century and how two relatively new tools for police peacekeeping—formed police units (FPUs) and the Standing Police Capacity (SPC)—have evolved along with it. We then introduce the institutions at UN Headquarters that are responsible for UN police planning and recruitment; outline the process of recruitment and selection; and identify some of the challenges to more rapid or adaptive deployment of UN police, including:

- finding enough of the right expertise, with attention to gender balance;
- advancing democratic policing with UN police from partly democratic or autocratic states; and
- maintaining quality control in selection and recruitment.
Once UN police are deployed, challenges to their performance include developing a rapid, common understanding of UNPOL policies and procedures, and sufficient local knowledge and trust to be useful to the mission and its hosts. Challenges for police components at large, on the other hand, include promoting intelligence-led policing; dispelling the notion that police are substitutes for troops in unstable settings; and ensuring discipline within the ranks.

The study reviews how the UN might broaden the available base of PCCs and looks at different national models for making police-related expertise rapidly available internationally. It closes with a number of recommendations intended to enhance the effectiveness of selection and recruitment of future police peacekeepers—from larger reserve cadres and better knowledge transfer—inmission to a consistent gender perspective in strategy and planning, and locally built alternatives to most FPU's.

**Evolution of Policing Roles**

UN police peacekeeping has become a standard feature of UN peace operations in the 21st century, but it is also growing in size and in complexity of tasks. As police mandates have become more complex and new tools have been introduced to meet these evolving demands, the UN Police Division has also linked up with like-minded institutions outside the UN system to gain traction in international law enforcement matters beyond specific Security Council mandates.

**Growing Complexity of Police Mandates**

The evolution of UN police peacekeeping can be described in terms of three categories of missions: traditional, transformational, and interim law enforcement. This typology is helpful for understanding the different roles assigned to UNPOL. It also demonstrates the evolution of UN police from passive monitors of local police to active reformers and, occasionally, law enforcers in host countries.

**Traditional Police Peacekeeping**

In traditional police peacekeeping operations, unarmed individual police officers monitor the behavior of domestic law enforcement officers and report on human rights violations. They are intended as a confidence-building measure, offering some reassurance to a traumatized population that abuses by domestic police will be reduced. These operations are the least intrusive of the three operational types and are typified by UN operations in the early 1990s, such as those in Namibia and Mozambique, where police components monitored local counterparts.

The UN’s first complex operation since the early 1960s was its Transition Assistance Group deployed to monitor the separation of Namibia from South Africa and to supervise the election of a constituent assembly. Mission leaders soon realized that the primary threat to a free and fair vote was the colonial Southwest African Police (SWAPOL) and its hulking, mine-resistant patrol vehicles. They asked for and got an increase in UN police from 360 to 1,500 and acquired comparable vehicles. With that mobility, UN police could follow SWAPOL and reduce the intimidation value of their patrols.

The ONUMOZ mission in Mozambique (1992–1994) typified a traditional UN policing mandate but it, too, rapidly increased its police presence from the initial 128 to 1,144 in response to rising crime rates, complaints of human rights violations by the national police, and accusations that demobilized government soldiers were being funneled illegally into the national police. Yet UN police were only mandated to “monitor and verify.”

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6 The UN deployed police in three peacekeeping missions prior to 1989: the UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC) from 1960 to 1964, the oft-forgotten United Nations Security Force in West New Guinea (UNSF) from 1962 to 1963, and the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) created in 1964 and still operational. While these missions established the precedent of a police role in UN peacekeeping, the police responsibilities were unique and did not follow a standard model or “type” of policing mandate.

7 Virginia Page Fortna, "United Nations Transition Assistance Group," in The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping, edited by William J. Durch (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993), pp. 360–371, and UN DPKO, "Namibia – UNTAG – Background," available at www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/past/untagFT.htm . On the long-recognized failure of “UN planners” to update UNTAG operational plans drawn up a decade earlier, it is useful to recall that at that time, peacekeeping in the UN system was divorced from and often did not consult operational offices before making or accepting proposals with operational consequences. DPKO had not yet been created, and the existing Office of Special Political Affairs relied on a handful of UN staff and seconded military officers for mission planning and management. Police presence at UN Headquarters was almost altogether absent (see William J. Durch, "Running the Show: Planning and Implementation,” in Durch, The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping, pp. 59–60).

that police activities were “fully consistent with the general peace agreement” and respectful of the “rights and civil liberties of Mozambican citizens throughout the country.” Their only recourse upon witnessing abuse was to file a report with the National Police Affairs Commission. Still, crime rates rose dramatically following ONUMoz’s departure after the elections in December 1994. Sometimes urgent operational realities showed the inadequacy of traditional mandates. In El Salvador (1992–1994), some UN police were forced to assume limited law enforcement duties in rural areas lacking police, despite being limited by mandate to monitoring local police. In Cambodia (1992–1994), the 3,600-strong UN police component was authorized to “supervise and control” the activities of some 50,000 Cambodian government police, but was never up to the task and was plagued by serious deficiencies in recruitment, mission planning, training, and guidance. That the Security Council would authorize such a large international police contingent without the most basic planning support at UN Headquarters suggests that council members viewed policing as a simpler, less arduous, version of military operations. That UN Headquarters police personnel were situated under the UN military adviser’s office until 2001 suggests the UN Secretariat shared that view, to the extent that it was considered at all.

**Transformational Police Peacekeeping**

Transformational mandates involve three roles for police: reforming, restructuring, and rebuilding indigenous law enforcement capacity. Reform seeks to modify local police practice but may have difficulty doing so without also seeking to change police culture and higher management practice—

for example, at the ministry of justice level. Reform is invariably in the direction of UN Charter principles and international human rights law, as those embody or reflect the founding precepts of the United Nations. But the charter is also a vehicle for promoting and sustaining national sovereignty, and both mission mandates and development assistance stress the (inevitable) need for national or local ownership of programs and their outcomes. The stage is therefore set for an ongoing clash not just with the UN mission and local police culture but also with the wider political culture of the state.

Restructuring aims to depoliticize local police, purge them of human rights violators, recruit new police, and establish effective and accountable chains of authority, ideally establishing some sort of external community oversight as well. Such a program might require downsizing services bloated by war or enlarging forces decimated by war; finding police recruits among segments of the population excluded from or victimized by earlier law enforcement agencies; and vetting those recruits for past abuses. Such vetting can sometimes preclude rehiring a majority of the old police force. In the early years of the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), for example, only one in four members of the old force passed vetting and thus only one in four members of the new Liberian National Police actually had experience as police.

Rebuilding focuses on local police effectiveness. A police service that respects human rights will be of little use to the public if it cannot also deter and investigate crime. Moreover, “if authorities cannot counter persistently high crime rates, they will be tempted to use repressive measures, undermining reform and democratization efforts.” During the

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10 This was not an artifact of greater crime reporting. As UN oversight of Mozambique’s police stopped, 90,000 demobilized fighters sought a living in a society awash with small arms, and the police were among the principal gun-runners. Then, and for years afterward, the police had a reputation for human rights abuse that did not encourage crime victims to step forward. See Amnesty International, “Mozambique: Human Rights and the Police,” Rpt. AFR 41/001/1998, March 31, 1998, and Bruce Baker, “Policing and the Rule of Law in Mozambique,” *Policing and Society* 13, No. 2 (2003): 139–158.


1990s, UN police undertook a number of transformational missions, including those in Haiti and the Balkans. In Haiti, the Security Council authorized 900 UN police to assist in the creation of a separate police force. The old police had been instrumental in ousting Haitian President Jean-Bertrand Aristide and abetting an environment of abuse, impunity, and corruption. The UN mission collaborated closely with the US Department of Justice to assist in the recruitment, vetting, and training of the new Haitian National Police (HNP)—the first time the United Nations was involved in police capacity building. The field training officers of the UN Mission in Haiti accompanied HNP officers on patrol, carried weapons, and had powers of arrest. UN police in the 1990s also ran all but one of Haiti’s prisons—although this task was not in their mandate—because no other actor was doing this work. In the absence of parallel reforms in the rest of the Haitian criminal justice system, however, the police reform efforts in Haiti in the 1990s ultimately failed.15

Starting in 1996, UN police deployed in Bosnia and Herzegovina for what became the most expansive UN-led police transformation exercise up to that time. Initially a police monitoring mission, the International Police Task Force (IPTF) was subsequently instructed to restructure local police. It reduced local police forces from 44,000 in December 1995 to 17,000 in 2004. IPTF also gained the authority to remove local police officers and other officials “from all public security services employment.”16

Every complex peace operation launched by the UN since 2003 has included police components with transformational mandates, some with authority for direct support to local police in maintaining law and order. When UN peacekeepers returned to Haiti in 2004, for example, the Security Council authorized operational support to the Haitian National Police as well as assistance in reforming the organization. Once again, individual UN police officers were authorized to wear sidearms. The peacekeepers were augmented by constabulary forces, called formed police units (FPUs) by the United Nations (which are discussed further in following sections).17 The move toward limited law enforcement roles within transformational mandates was an important development with implications for future UN police peacekeeping needs.

**Interim Law Enforcement**

Twice, the Security Council has created UN transitional administrations for an anarchic state or territory. Under an executive mandate, UN police bear arms and have authority to enforce the law. Returning authority to local police is a primary mission goal, so reform, restructuring, and rebuilding are key.

In 1999, a military technical agreement stipulated total withdrawal of the then Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) police, of Serb ethnicity, from the FRY’s mostly ethnic Albanian province of Kosovo. UN Security Council Resolution 1244 then authorized 4,700 police to deploy as part of the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, mandated to “maintain civil law and order.”18 UN police collaborated with the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe in the creation of a Kosovo Police Service. The international police support role was handed over to the European Union in late 2008.

In East Timor (now known as Timor-Leste), 1,600 UN police were deployed to serve with the UN’s Transitional Administration, which was authorized by UN Security Council Resolution 1272 in October 1999 to “provide security and maintain law and order throughout the territory.”19 The mission also set out to build the Policia Nacional de Timor-Leste (PNTL), with 2,800 officers. The UN relinquished its policing authority in 2005, only to take it up again in 2006 following

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18 UN Security Council, Resolution 1244 (June 10, 1999), UN Doc. S/RES/1244.
19 UN Security Council, Resolution 1272 (October 25, 1999), UN Doc. S/RES/1272.
violent clashes and a breakdown in the national police. At the end of March 2011, the UN completed the return of law enforcement responsibility to PNTL once again and dropped back to an advisory role. The mission withdrew from Timor-Leste at the end of 2012.

INCREASING RELIANCE ON FORMED POLICE UNITS

While some police organized into units were deployed with the UN’s transitional administrations in Kosovo and East Timor, use of FPUs on a broad scale began in 2003, with three FPUs recruited for the mission in Liberia. Between 2003 and 2010, the UN dramatically increased its reliance on such units, often borrowed from paramilitary police. By 2010, the number of units authorized for deployment was approaching seventy, due in part to the UN’s response to public order needs arising in the aftermath of the January 2010 earthquake in Haiti; presently about fifty are deployed. FPUs accounted for a majority of all police deployed in UN peace operations from 2010 onward (see table 2 and figure 2, below), substantially altering the character of UN police activities.

FPUs typically have 120 to 140 well-armed officers who specialize in meeting law and order threats that require a more robust approach than the average patrol officer can muster, such as crowd control and close protection of UN personnel and facilities. FPUs are often able to perform these tasks with more precision than the military. Each FPU is intended to be self-sustaining, with its own engineering, medical, and administrative support staff, in addition to its own equipment, including vehicles, generators, water treatment plants, and weapons. PCCs in turn receive monthly per capita UN reimbursements for officers serving in FPUs that are equivalent to reimbursements for personnel serving in military peacekeeping units (averaging about $1,100 per month). PCCs also receive payments to defray wear and tear on equipment. They receive no comparable reimbursements for sending individual police to UN missions. The greater financial incentive to contribute formed units—coupled with the relative efficiency from the UN’s perspective of recruiting 120 to 140 officers at once—may help account for the prevalence of FPUs in UN missions. While recourse to FPUs may have helped meet rising authorization levels for UN police in the 2000s, their variable performance in missions has also been one of the challenges to UN police peacekeeping (discussed further in that section below).

CREATION OF A UN STANDING POLICE CAPACITY

An enduring challenge to UN peacekeeping has been the ability to identify and rapidly deploy personnel, in particular those with specialized expertise. This deficiency is especially critical during the start-up phase of new operations and during periods of crisis or expansion in ongoing missions.

From the 1990s through the mid-2000s, at least six months were required to find and deploy half of authorized UN police to a new mission. Member states largely failed to respond to a DPKO attempt in 2001 and 2002 to build an on-call roster of police personnel. A handful of states offered to fill certain specialties but few were willing to name qualified officers in advance. Thereafter, as police authorizations climbed, deployment rates for newly authorized police officers fell below those of the 1990s, and in the latter part of the decade far below: twelve months or more elapsed, on average, before new missions received even half of their authorized individual UN police.

In 2006, the UN General Assembly authorized the creation of the UN Standing Police Capacity (SPC) with twenty-seven personnel. The SPC’s job is to assist the start-up of police components in new missions and provide support to ongoing UN police activities in peace operations. It was a significant step toward a greater UN ability to rapidly deploy experienced police personnel to new peacekeeping missions or respond to specific requests for assistance from ongoing missions.

Owing in part to the UN’s slow staff recruitment procedures, the SPC only reached its initial operating capacity at the end of October 2007 and its full strength in May 2008. It was relocated from New York Headquarters to the UN Logistics Base in Brindisi, Italy, in mid-2009, bringing it closer to the majority of UN field operations but at the cost of being less in touch with the Headquarters establishment for police planning and mission management. In 2011, the General Assembly agreed to expand the SPC, adding fourteen posts (a more than 50 percent increase—unusual for so new a unit). A complementary Justice and Corrections Standing Capacity with five professional posts was also established in 2011.

The SPC has deployed to support diverse missions. Its first two deployments (to Chad from November 2007 to August 2008 and to Timor-Leste from May to August 2008) were fairly successful proofs-of-concept, but they also highlighted some challenges to its effectiveness. In Chad, the SPC team provided initial UNPOL leadership, but its personnel were not experienced with mission start-up processes and outpaced most mission support, mission leadership, and a European Union (EU) security force, leaving them short on logistics, security, and status to negotiate with the Chadian government.

In Timor-Leste, the SPC helped to implement recommendations from an earlier mission of police experts, which included restructuring the UN mission’s process for advising the national police and drafting detailed guidance for the handover of law enforcement responsibilities to the national police.

Subsequently, the SPC supported the start-up of UNIOGBIS (Guinea Bissau), the administration of the police component in UNAMID (Darfur), and UN police work in MONUC/MONUSCO (Democratic Republic of the Congo) and MINUSTAH (Haiti, especially after the January 2010 earthquake). In 2011, the SPC assisted the setup of new missions in South Sudan (UNMISS) and the disputed territory of Abyei (UNISFA). Beyond its core functions of providing mission start-up capability and mission assistance, the SPC has lent its expertise to UN agencies and programs and participated in assessments and evaluations of police components when requested.

A December 2008 review panel on the SPC concluded that it was “too small to be consistently effective” in providing start-up capability for new police components. “Based on recent experiences in the field…achieving minimum initial functionality in most of the police headquarters’ elements of a new mission requires 60 to 75 personnel. Comparable minimum functionality for the police component of a smaller mission…would involve 20 to 30 personnel.” Although the 14 additional posts authorized in 2010 brought the SPC’s authorized strength to 41 professionals, the SPC remains both underused and too small to fully meet potential demand for its services. For example, it is not used as well as it might be to reduce the heavy burden of pre-deployment country visits for UNPOL selection and candidate training.

**EXPANSION OF FOCUS BEYOND MANDATED MISSIONS**

In 2006, the UN secretary-general issued a decision to give DPKO the lead role in all matters relating to UN work with police and law enforcement agencies globally—that is, not confined to mandated peace operations. (The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime retained the lead role for organized and

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28 Stimson, “UN Police.”


31 Arguments and proposals for a much larger UN standing capacity for rule of law functions can be found in Durch and England, *Enhancing United Nations Capacity*, ch. 6.
transnational crime, trafficking, drugs, and anti-corruption.) This decision led to a degree of expansion in the Police Division’s policy and planning focus, as it engaged other UN agencies and the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) on issues ranging from guidelines for international police peacekeeping to transnational crime.

The UN-Interpol Action Plan for International Police Peacekeeping

Formal cooperation between the UN and Interpol dates back to 1997, when the two organizations signed a cooperation agreement in the field of crime prevention and criminal justice. The UN Police Division has worked with UN field missions to enhance their host state’s Interpol National Central Bureau in order to boost the host state’s access to Interpol information and to other international and regional policing communities.

In 2009, in the context of Interpol’s annual General Assembly, UN officials and Interpol members discussed how best to enhance support for international police peacekeeping. A resulting “outcome declaration” from the assembly requested an action plan for international police peacekeeping to be delivered the following year. Interpol’s New York office and the UN Police Division’s Strategic Policy and Development Section invited input from UN and Interpol member states at two New York consultative sessions. They also cooperated in managing development of the document, with support from the Stimson Center. The resulting action plan was adopted by the Interpol General Assembly in November 2010. It aimed to strengthen cooperation between the UN, Interpol, and member states, and specified concrete steps that member states could take to meet needs for skilled and professional police officers and other police support capacities in international peace operations. As of June 2013, however, the action plan had not been formally distributed to member states’ permanent missions in New York.

Addressing Transnational Crime

Cooperation within the UN as well as between the UN and Interpol on international policing has become increasingly important in recent years as recognition has grown regarding the extent of transnational crime’s presence in and use of many countries where peace operations are deployed.

An example of growing formal cooperation is the West Africa Coast Initiative (WACI). The initiative is intended to coordinate West Africa’s battle against a surging drug transit trade that has left growing numbers of drug users in its wake as well. As part of WACI, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the UN missions in Sierra Leone, Liberia, Côte d’Ivoire, and Guinea Bissau worked with local counterparts to build Transnational Crime Units within each police establishment that were designed to coordinate with the other participating states and to make use of the information-sharing facilities of Interpol. Sierra Leone’s early development of a joint anti-drug task force gave it a head start in implementing the initiative. In the case of Guinea Bissau, the effort came too late, as the country had already become a de facto narcostate. Involvement in such efforts clearly requires that the Police Division be cognizant of intelligence trends and able to process them, liaise with its agency partners and the missions in the region, and be able to find appropriate personnel to staff UN missions.

The question of generating timely field intelligence might be addressed by closer cooperation between UN field missions and UN Security Council panels of experts that monitor UN sanctions enforcement. Many of the countries where UN missions deploy are subject to travel and trade sanctions on select persons and commodities, and the council now routinely appoints short-lived, independent panels or groups of experts to assess their implementation. The panels’ public reports on a half-dozen countries over the past decade, though likely sanitized to a degree, are still packed with the sorts of information that tends to be airbrushed out of standard UN reporting.

panels take note of their surroundings and interpret their task rather broadly, vacuuming and analyzing data that can be very useful to UN police operations and especially helpful to setting up intelligence-driven policing in a new or upgraded UN field mission.35

Structures for Selection, Recruitment, and Deployment

UN Police planning, recruiting, and training are not what they used to be, and that is a good thing. As the demands placed on police peacekeepers have evolved in the past decade, so too have the structures for creating policies for police in the field and for recruiting field personnel. This section sketches the development of the UN Police Division in DPKO; the process of building a mission police component; the DPKO/DFS Global Field Support Strategy’s implications for UN police; and the potential impact of the new Global Focal Point for Police, Justice and Corrections established at UN Headquarters.

BUILDING A CAPABLE POLICE DIVISION

In 1999, as the United Nations began to assume responsibility for public security and law enforcement in Kosovo and East Timor, the only police support capacity in the entire institution was a civilian police unit of seven individuals (six professional and one support staff) within the Military Advisor’s Office in DPKO (see table 1). It was their job to find and deploy nearly 6,400 police for these two missions. By June 2000 there were eleven professionals in the unit. The Brahim Report of August 2000 helped bring the police out from under military management by recommending the creation of a police division coequal with the Military Adviser’s Office that would report directly to the under-secretary-general.36 By late 2001, the Police Division had fourteen professional personnel—mostly police officers seconded for two years by their home services—and not more than two dozen through 2009 (as summarized in figure 1) as the number of UNPOL deployed passed 10,000 and authorized numbers exceeded 15,000 (see figure 2).

Figure 1: UN police: Headquarters personnel and rapidly deployable capacity, 1999–2012.

Table 1: UN police: Headquarters personnel and rapidly deployable capacity, 1999–2012.

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<tr>
<th>Police Division&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
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<td>Professional level</td>
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**Police in Integrated Operational Teams at Headquarters**<sup>b</sup>

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**Standing Police Capacity**

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<td>Total</td>
<td>27</td>
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**UN Police Deployed in Field Missions**

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<td>4,071</td>
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<td>5,998</td>
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<td>HQ as percentage of field</td>
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<td>0.3%</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
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<sup>a</sup> Director is the highest UN rank not requiring confirmation by the General Assembly. From 2002 to 2004, one judicial adviser and one corrections adviser were billeted in the Police Division and are not counted in Police Division totals here.

<sup>b</sup> In 2007, the General Assembly approved seven professional-level police posts for the IOTs being formed in DPKO's Office of Operations, and a further three in 2008. From 2009, these IOT "police specialists" were counted as part of the Police Division, but they are counted separately here for continuity and simplicity of presentation. This is also done for the Standing Police Capacity, which can provide “surge” capacity to the Police Division and direct support to field missions.
Two thousand nine was a watershed year for the Police Division. The General Assembly authorized four new police planners for DPKO, establishing for the first time a designated planning capacity in the Police Division’s Strategic and Policy Development Section. The General Assembly also brought the SPC into the Police Division budget, added nine recruitment officers to the division, and moved into the division’s budget the ten “police specialists” serving in the Integrated Operational Teams (IOTs) of DPKO’s Office of Operations.

A Dedicated Recruitment Team

What became the Selection and Recruitment Section of the Police Division grew out of an August 2008 audit of the division by the UN Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) and a follow-up Police Division internal strategic review. OIOS was especially hard on the division’s harried and disorganized recruitment procedures: “Desk officers representing different missions competed for the recruitment of the same nominee and contacted the PCCs individually. It would be more efficient to streamline the process of recruitment for all missions by creating a single recruitment unit.”

The nine-person selection and recruitment team created in 2009 initially formed part of the division’s Mission Management and Support Section. After a year, a separate Selection and Recruitment Section was created with these nine and five other recruitment officers from the mission management section. The General Assembly approved the change, which took effect in July 2011 and left the mission management section with just ten officers and the section chief to give technical advice and support to six large and four small police components in the field.

Raising the Ratio of Headquarters to Field Personnel

Between 2001 and 2009, the number of UN police deployed rose from 6,800 to about 15,000. UN Headquarters personnel as a percentage of those deployed started at 0.2 percent of deployments in 2001 and briefly reaching 0.8 percent in 2010 (see table 1 and figure 2), but only if the entire Standing Police Capacity currently based in Brindisi, Italy, is included as a Headquarters resource.

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Figure 2: UN police deployments to major operations, with field to HQ staff ratio.
This very low Headquarters-to-field police support ratio contrasts badly with ratios maintained by UN member states with internationally deployable police capacities. These are discussed further below, but on average their non-deployed support teams are closer to 25 or 30 percent of the number of police they deploy to the field, and are thus able to offer roughly twenty-five times more support to their people than UN Headquarters can offer to UN police. The Police Division can and does call upon the UN Department of Field Support (DFS) for logistical, communications, and procurement services, and the missions themselves, once up and running, have their own support structures and logistics contractors that provide services for UNPOL. Still, UN Headquarters has responsibilities for policy support, technical support, and recruitment support for its field operations, and its ability to meet these responsibilities remains remarkably thin.

**SETTING UP A MISSION POLICE COMPONENT**

When it looks like the United Nations may be asked to establish a peace operation with a police component, the Strategic Policy and Development Section in the Police Division may begin initial planning and a multi-agency technical assessment mission may be assembled (recently with support from the Standing Police Capacity) for several weeks of scouting the potential mission area. The field assessment feeds into an Integrated Assessment and Planning Process anchored by the responsible IOT and forms the basis of a report by the secretary-general to the Security Council recommending parameters for the new mission, and occasionally warning against it.

**Obtaining and Using Pre-Commitment Authority**

For imminent missions, DPKO may seek pre-mandate commitment authority (funds to contract for long-lead procurement items and permission to contact potential troop and police contributors). Such authority can derive from a letter of approval from the president of the Security Council and a request by the UN controller to the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ) of the UN General Assembly’s Fifth (financial) Committee. With ACABQ concurrence, the secretary-general may access up to $100 million from the Peacekeeping Reserve Fund, to be reimbursed from the mission budget, once that budget has been approved by the General Assembly.

With pre-commitment authority, the Police Division’s Selection and Recruitment Section may alert member states’ permanent missions in New York via notes verbales, advising of pending needs for police in a new mission and canvassing general availability of personnel. Knowing what specific numbers and specialties to seek depends in part on the evolution of the mandate and the initial police concept of operations. Once these are known, the Selection and Recruitment Section can develop detailed job descriptions for each category of police personnel needed and seek the required numbers. Job descriptions are “posted” for a maximum of ninety days for response by permanent missions to the UN, at which point the nomination window closes and the Selection and Recruitment Section sifts through nominations received to find needed specialists; schedules selection assessment and assistance teams (SAATs) to test the qualifications of nominees; and arranges formed police assessment teams (FPATs) to test nominated FPU s.

DPKO, DFS, and the UN Department of Management have been working since early 2012 to streamline the secondment process so that newly-seconded individual officers may begin arriving in missions within six months of the initial job posting. The Police Division has also developed more rigorous standard operating procedures for assessing the readiness of FPU s and individual police and “has made significant inroads in its progressive effort to acquire police expertise with French and Arabic language skills.”

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38 The Peacekeeping Reserve Fund is a $150 million revolving fund reimbursed by the missions that it supports. The ACABQ is the sixteen-state “appropriations sub-committee” of the Fifth (financial) Committee of the UN General Assembly. Its recommendations on budget requests from the Secretariat are usually accepted by the Fifth Committee, with some significant exceptions. In 2009, for example, the Fifth Committee overruled the ACABQ in authorizing relocation of the Standing Police Capacity to Brindisi. In 2010, it authorized the creation of a six-person Standing Justice and Corrections Capacity, also to be based at Brindisi. See UN documents A/63/894, July 10, 2009, and A/64/820, June 18, 2010. See also A/67/723, January 31, 2013, section VI - Status of the Peacekeeping Reserve Fund as at 30 June 2012.

The SPC may be tapped to set up the new police component and, depending on how the search goes for police leadership, may provide that leadership for the first several months of the mission.

**Leveraging the Global Field Support Strategy**

Early deployment of the SPC and other new mission elements will be facilitated by the Global Field Support Strategy (GFSS) launched in January 2010 by DPKO and DFS as a five-year initiative to improve the timeliness and cost-effectiveness of UN mission support. The existing UN base at Brindisi has become the Global Service Center for the initiative. The base at Entebbe, Uganda, has become the first Regional Service Center, supporting several complex operations and political missions in Africa. GFSS envisions a modularized and interoperable approach to mission logistics and support. Its packages can be tailored to specialties like UN police but will be standardized to the extent possible across missions, saving time and costs in planning, contracting, and acquisition while promoting common operating skills and greater ease of maintenance. UNPOL should benefit from the GFSS’ embrace of police and military pattern equipment in strategic deployment stocks, something DFS had before been reluctant to do, although major rolling stock (e.g., armored personnel carriers) and lethal weaponry will likely still need to come from PCCs themselves or from supporting donor countries.

**COLLABORATIVE MISSION SUPPORT: THE GLOBAL FOCAL POINT FOR POLICE, JUSTICE AND CORRECTIONS**

UN Headquarters supports missions’ search for the funds that UN police need to meet their mandates but are not part of mission budgets, such as infrastructure or equipment support for host-state police. The new Global Focal Point (GFP) for Police, Justice and Corrections at UN Headquarters is intended to facilitate that search while promoting collaboration between DPKO, the UN Development Programme (UNDP), and other UN agencies, funds, and programs.

The GFP grew out of an initiative by member states interested in bettering UN field performance in these three areas, a desire that was echoed by the Secretariat’s Civilian Capacity Steering Committee in June 2012. There was, it noted, “a broad perception that the existing arrangements have failed to bring the necessary clarity, capacity and accountability to the delivery of support” to UN field programming for police, justice, and corrections. Continuing capacity shortfalls in these areas and only thin evidence to suggest long-term programming impact led the steering committee to revisit Headquarters’ division of labor for police, justice, and corrections field support. The steering committee recommended that “DPKO and UNDP should assume joint responsibility as Global Focal Point (GFP) for justice, police and corrections in post-conflict and other crisis situations.” In September 2012, the secretary-general’s Policy Committee endorsed his decision to create the GFP at UN Headquarters in New York.

Technically involving all staff in DPKO and the UNDP, the GFP will directly involve co-location of more than seventy staff in New York, including contributions from the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, UNODC, UN Women, and other UN entities. Staff co-located will include the Police Division’s Strategic Policy and Development Section, OROLSI’s Criminal and Judicial Advisory Service, and the Rule of Law, Justice and Security Team from UNDP.

The GFP has no single manager and, indeed, was to involve no new structural elements or reporting chains. Thus the justice element from DPKO reports directly to the assistant secretary-general of OROLSI, while the police element reports through the police adviser and the UNDP elements have their own reporting chain. The decision to go with a collegial “management team” concept may prove correct if it forces the co-locating entities to collab-

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42 See, for example, Durch et al., *Understanding Impact*.

43 United Nations Secretary-General, *Decision No. 2012/13,* Annex 1, para. 2.

orate, with each element contributing capacity that the others lack. For example, UNDP is geared to receive voluntary funds for local infrastructure development or equipment, but it lacks the strength on the ground to manage and execute large projects. DPKO can design its missions to help manage large projects, but its mission budgets—based on “assessed contributions”—are constrained from including funds for local development.45

The GFP is to facilitate high-level engagement with potential major project donors via demarches and coalition building more easily mounted from New York, although some missions approach donors directly. In UNMIL, for example, the Donor Aid Coordination Team has emphasized the complementary capacities of UNPOL, donors, and the UNDP country team to the benefit of Liberian National Police infrastructure development. In principle, such collaborative funding and support strategies could be more effectively developed by and directed through the GFP in collaboration with missions, rather than by individual nationals within missions reaching out to personal contacts in their respective national aid agencies. The GFP may facilitate better, earlier coordinated program funding that is ultimately more sustainable by means of demarches to potential coalitions of funders through member states’ New York missions to capitals. Better-coordinated program planning for police, justice, and corrections at Headquarters may also facilitate recruitment of appropriate people to manage and shape the implementation of police, justice, and corrections development programs.46

Although the GFP was tasked to bring “clarity, capacity and accountability” to its focal areas, its initial posture toward the field has been more cautious than activist, looking for ways to demonstrate utility without irritating its field counterparts.47 Such deference is somewhat understandable given the power and responsibility delegated to field missions for mandate implementation. But the same delegation would make the missions responsible for impact in police, justice, and corrections work—or the lack of it—and thus the parties who would seem best positioned to benefit from the additional assistance.

Challenges in Selection, Recruitment, and Deployment

Among the many challenges in building effective mission police components are finding sufficient personnel with the right talents and experience; achieving and maintaining gender balance; building “democratic” police services with UN police from less democratic countries; and maintaining quality control in recruitment and in the field.

FINDING SUFFICIENT PERSONNEL

As the authorization ceilings for UN police continued to climb from 2003 through 2010, so did aggregate police vacancy rates in missions, which peaked at 32 percent in the 2008–2009 budgetary year (see table 2). Since the advent of a dedicated selection and recruitment team in the Police Division, beginning in earnest in early 2010, police vacancy rates in UN peace operations began to drop. The average decline in vacancies was faster for formed units than for individual officers and is summarized in figure 3a.

Nonetheless, vacancy rates for individuals remained stubbornly high in UNAMID (deployed in the Darfur region of Sudan) and in UNMISS (deployed in South Sudan). In July 2012, UNAMID was directed by Security Council Resolution 2063 to reduce its UN police contingent over twelve to

45 An assessed contribution reflects a mandatory obligation to pay an apportioned share of UN costs for specific undertakings, among them the regular UN budget and the peacekeeping budget. Aid donors tend to resist having “development” funds included in assessed contributions, as official development assistance (ODA) is considered a national prerogative, and only part of what peacekeeping does counts toward the long-standing objective of the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) that ODA amount to 0.7 percent of a member’s gross national income. Spending that isn’t ODA (that is not “DACable”) doesn’t contribute to that goal. Donors can receive ODA credit for funds used in peacekeeping operations in support of “human rights, election monitoring, rehabilitation of demobilised soldiers and of national infrastructure, monitoring and training of administrators, including customs and police officers, advice on economic stabilisation, repatriation and demobilisation of soldiers, weapons disposal and mine removal,” but not to supply “military equipment and services,” training for paramilitary police services, for control of civil disobedience, or “mine clearance to allow military training.” Once funds are committed to the pool of assessed contributions for a mission, their “DACability” is essentially impossible to sort out, hence the incentive for donors to contribute voluntary funds outside mission budgets even to DACable peacekeeping ends, such as training of (non-paramilitary) police and the limited to nil program funding built into mission budgets. See OECD, “Is It ODA?” Factsheet, November 2008, available at www.oecd.org/dac/stats/the07odagnitarget-ahistory.htm.

46 Author interviews with GFP managers and staff, September 2012 and March 2013, New York.

47 Ibid.
Table 2: UN missions’ police recruitment authorizations and vacancy rates, 2008–2009 to 2012–2013.

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<td>Auth’n</td>
<td>Rates</td>
<td>Auth’n</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINUSTAH</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FR Officers</td>
<td>2,091</td>
<td>2,050</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>4,291</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPUs</td>
<td>951</td>
<td></td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>1,351</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MONUC</td>
<td>1,441</td>
<td>1,078</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>1,441</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FR Officers</td>
<td>391</td>
<td></td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>391</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPUs</td>
<td>1,050</td>
<td></td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>1,050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MONUSCO</td>
<td>6,432</td>
<td>2,959</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>6,432</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FR Officers</td>
<td>3,772</td>
<td></td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>3,772</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPUs</td>
<td>2,660</td>
<td></td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>2,660</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMID</td>
<td>1,068</td>
<td>1,205</td>
<td>-13%</td>
<td>-7%</td>
<td>1,315</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officers</td>
<td>463</td>
<td></td>
<td>-13%</td>
<td>-7%</td>
<td>470</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPUs</td>
<td>605</td>
<td></td>
<td>-13%</td>
<td>-7%</td>
<td>845</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIS</td>
<td>715</td>
<td>647</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>715</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMISS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIT</td>
<td>1,605</td>
<td>1,559</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>1,451</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officers</td>
<td>1,045</td>
<td></td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>938</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPUs</td>
<td>560</td>
<td></td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>513</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOCI</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>1,174</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>1,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FR Officers</td>
<td>450</td>
<td></td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPUs</td>
<td>750</td>
<td></td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes and sources for table 2 are listed in Annex 1.
eighteen months to 2,310 individual police officers (IPOs) and to seventeen FPUs with 140 officers each (2,380 officers).48 These are roughly the levels that UNAMID has been able to maintain over the past five years. Thus UNAMID’s vacancy rates should drop in 2013 and 2014 from 33 percent for individual officers and 16 percent for FPUs to about 2 percent each. That change will drive down overall police vacancies to very low levels. Figure 3b applies the reduced ceilings for UNAMID to the 2012–2013 data.

UNAMID has been subject to more and varied obstacles to its deployment on the part of the host state than has any other complex UN operation. The government of Sudan mounted an ongoing and multipronged campaign to obstruct or otherwise delay UN peacekeeping activities in Darfur, from initial plans to extend the writ of UNMIS (the original UN Mission in Sudan) into Darfur, to delivery of UN support packages for the subsequent African Union mission in Darfur, to restrictions on the nationalities of UN contingents in UNAMID, long delays in clearing equipment through customs, and equally long delays in the issuance of visas to UN personnel. The mission’s experiences demonstrate the difficulty that UN operations have in just showing up as planned, let alone implementing their mandates, when the strategic consent of the host state is absent or at best grudging.49

Because several other missions were drawing down uniformed personnel in 2012 (MINUSTAH in Haiti, UNMIL in Liberia, and UNMIT in Timor-Leste, which closed at the end of that year), and UNAMID’s authorization ceiling was sharply reduced, it is not clear whether diminishing demand or a more effective selection and recruitment team at Headquarters has contributed more to the reduction in police vacancies (in all missions but UNMISS).

FINDING THE RIGHT PERSONNEL

Although improving the recruitment of rank and file officers—individually or in units—has been a major preoccupation for the Police Division in recent years, the departmental focus in DPKO, since at least the start of the New Horizon initiative in 2009, has been to find ways to increase peacekeeping productivity. This means doing more with fewer people possessing greater relevant skills and talent, bringing more concentrated expertise to bear on postconflict stability and security problems. DPKO calls this a “capability-driven” approach to mission planning and staffing.

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Capability-Driven Recruitment

Along with the realization that many recent efforts to build local police capacity have generated shallow results has come the realization that the historical approach to police recruitment—inducing governments to second sworn police to serve tours in UN missions—is being rendered obsolete in many functional areas of police peacekeeping. These include planning and managing police support operations, designing academy curricula, and building local capacities for criminal investigation and record-keeping. Police and courts need the latter capacities in particular to reduce reliance on confessions and to increase prospects of institutional respect for the human rights of the public at large, as well as detainees. All of these areas require not only substantive knowledge but the skills needed to impart knowledge and skills to others.

Missions with substantial institutional development mandates have therefore turned to the civilian market to hire the specialists that they cannot obtain in a timely fashion or at all from PCCs. Missions in Timor-Leste, Liberia, and Haiti all used this strategy, hoping to gain more in effectiveness than they incurred in added burdens of salary and support costs for specialist civilian staff.50 UNMIT in Timor-Leste took about eighteen months to fill eighteen of nineteen specialist posts authorized in its 2010–2011 budget, but once in place these specialists became project managers for a joint UNMIT-UNDP-PNTL police development program designed to continue after the closure of UNMIT at the end of 2012.

Finding competent, field-experienced leadership for mission police components has also proven a difficult task. As domestically oriented institutions, police services do not by nature spend much time looking outward. Even domestically, reform-minded chiefs of police who possess the organizational and political skills to manage major reforms are a rarity.51 UN operations address postconflict settings with unique historical underpinnings that an officer from even the most dynamic and tumultuous of urban beats must devote time and effort to learn, and to which he or she must adapt quickly in order to be an effective police trainer, adviser, or mentor.

Finally, because the many police services from which the UN recruits have a variety of personnel ranking systems, the Police Division favors “rankless” assignment of police personnel according to their backgrounds and abilities. This may occasionally mean that someone who is a general officer back home may be assigned to work for someone who, in his or her home service, is a sergeant, lieutenant, or detective inspector. Since UN police wear their home uniforms and insignia topped only by an UNPOL brassard, such differences are highlighted daily. A recommendation that UN operations adopt a common police uniform with UN rank insignia related to mission-specific responsibilities was considered by the expert panel reviewing the first year of operations of the SPC, but it did not survive the final edit.52

Gender-Sensitive Recruitment and Training

Since at least the adoption of Security Council Resolution 1325 in October 2000 on women, peace, and security, the United Nations has recognized the importance of gender sensitivity in planning and implementing peace operations. Women are not only victims of war but also bystanders and participants and, in any case, make up roughly half the population of any conflict zone, nearly half of all refugee populations, and more than half of internally displaced populations. It stands to right and reason that women not only should have the opportunity to participate in rebuilding the peace, but that women in the mission area should both see the potential in women’s empowerment and have culturally appropriate interlocutors to whom they may more readily report instances of sexual or other criminal violence in such vulnerable situations as displaced persons camps.53

DPKO has had some success in increasing the

52 One of the authors served on the SPC Expert Panel and recalls vigorous discussion of the merits of police uniforms as a means of building UNPOL identity and group cohesion as well as a way to push the home rank issue out of sight.
numbers of female civilian staff in missions to about 30 percent, but it has had less success in increasing the percentage of female uniformed personnel. Military units, for example, still average just 2 to 3 percent female participation.54

In August 2009, the UN launched the “Global Effort” to increase participation of female police officers in UN peacekeeping. Since November 2009, DPKO has published gender statistics for military and police deployments online and the Police Division has set an overall goal of 20 percent female representation in UN police peacekeeping by 2014.55 Table 3a compares gender-differentiated deployment statistics for missions in November 2009 and April 2013. Female representation among individual officers rose over that time period from 8 to 15 percent. With regard to FPUs, however, despite some success deploying all-female units, representation rose only slightly, from 5 to 6 percent.56

PCCs with above-average representation of female officers are listed in table 3b. The contribu-
tions of three countries (Bangladesh, India, and Nigeria) exceed the FPU average of 6 percent female by a substantial margin. These countries contribute 43 percent of all FPU personnel but 84 percent of female FPU personnel.

Twenty-five PCCs are above average in representation of female IPOs. Among all contribution levels in this group, average female representation was 31 to 33 percent. The group contributes 30 percent of all IPOs to UN missions but 63 percent of the female officers. Just six African states within the group (Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Burkina Faso, Ghana, and Zimbabwe) contribute 46 percent of the UN’s individual female police officers.

In short, contributions of female police officers to UN peace operations is at least as concentrated, in terms of PCCs, as the contribution of military personnel, where the top six TCCs contribute 46 percent of the troops. Moreover, four of those six (Pakistan, India, Nigeria, and Rwanda) also appear in table 3b, hence the need for incentives to broaden the base of UN peacekeeping, as discussed below.

**TEACHING DEMOCRATIC POLICING WITH SEMI-DEMOCRATIC POLICE**

Given the liberal objectives of UN peacebuilding, international efforts to build up domestic police capacities aspire to leave behind police institutions with standards and procedures that would be acceptable in democratic states that respect human rights. The concept of “democratic policing” in the context of UN operations was first fleshed out in 1996 in the UN International Police Task Force’s “Commissioner’s Guidance for Democratic Policing in the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina,” which formed the basis of subsequent training programs for the Bosnian police.57 Since then, UN peace operations have been given transformational mandates to reform, restructure, and rebuild indigenous law enforcement capacity, “in accordance with international standards of democratic policing” (UNMIK, 1999), or “consistent with democratic policing standards” (MINUSTAH, 2004). Beyond general principles,
however, what precisely “democratic policing” should entail remains unclear.\textsuperscript{58}

Until there is UN strategic guidance for international policing to underpin mission training, UN police are likely to fall back on national perspectives and experiences.\textsuperscript{59} It is problematic, then, that countries not necessarily associated with strong traditions of democratic, human-rights-based policing provide many of the police personnel deployed to UN operations.

Figure 4 shows the composition of UN police components since 2001, parsed according to the political and civil rights evaluations of states done annually by Freedom House. During the 2000s, the percentage of UN police from states considered “free” diminished from 60 to 25 percent of total deployments, a level that has been holding steady for the past three or four years. “Partly free” states have contributed a large proportion of UN police—more than half in this decade—while the proportion of UNPOL from countries rated “not free” has grown from 9 to 24 percent since 2001.

Efforts to develop the UN Strategic Guidance Framework for international police peacekeeping (discussed earlier) and its associated norms and standards, together with new training curricula for prospective UN police, offer some promise for UN police personnel gaining a common understanding of the accountable, protective role that police should have in society under “democratic policing.”\textsuperscript{58} Given the length of time required to produce cultural change in the institutions on which UN missions focus their energies, however, it seems unlikely that a few days or even weeks of training will result in UN police contingents that “deliver as one” in terms of message and by example to host-state counterparts. Nonetheless, more training would help, and those trained may more consistently internalize democratic policing principles, if their stint with a UN mission

\textbf{Figure 4: Deployed UN police categorized by PCCs’ Freedom House ranking in 2001, 2006, 2010, and 2013.}\textsuperscript{61}

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure4}
\caption{Deployed UN police categorized by PCCs’ Freedom House ranking in 2001, 2006, 2010, and 2013.\textsuperscript{61}}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{58} The “Commissioner’s Guidance for Democratic Policing in the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina” set out seven basic principles of policing in a democracy: (1) orientation to democratic principles; (2) adherence to a code of conduct worthy of the public trust; (3) protection of life; (4) public service; (5) a central focus on crimes against people and property; (6) respect for human dignity; and (7) nondiscrimination. Christopher Stone and Heather Ward, “Democratic Policing: A Framework for Action,” \textit{Policing and Society} 10, No. 1 (2000): 11–46. International criminologist David Bayley, who played a key role in drafting the commissioner’s guidance, has identified four key criteria that qualify a police force as committed to democratic policing: accountability to the law, rather than to the government; protection of human rights, especially those associated with exercising political freedoms; accountability to people outside the police organization who are empowered to provide effective oversight; and an operational priority to secure groups and individuals. David Bayley, \textit{Changing the Guard: Developing Democratic Police Abroad} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).


demonstrates the value of these principles. This would have a beneficial impact in missions and at home as more of these personnel’s colleagues cycle through UN deployments.

QUALITY CONTROL IN RECRUITMENT AND OPERATIONS

Quality control efforts in the recruitment of UN police date at least to the mid-1990s and the development of selection assessment teams to evaluate UNPOL candidates. Teams looked for citizenship in a UN member state, mental and physical health, and personal integrity (including assurances by the PCC of no disciplinary issues). Other qualifying characteristics include five years’ experience as a sworn police officer, proficiency in the mission language (most often English or French, the latter candidates being in shorter supply), ability to operate a four-wheel-drive vehicle, and proficiency in firearms (for missions where UNPOL carry arms). In 2011 upgraded UN selection assessment and assistance teams (SAATs) reviewed 16,644 UNPOL candidates in “29 visits covering 45 countries.” Each visit thus processed an average of 574 candidates. The high-level skills that UN police need in missions cannot reliably be ascertained by such a mass winnowing process, which must be repeated on a continuing basis to meet new recruitment and rotation needs. Despite the relatively low qualification thresholds, 70 percent of candidates in 2011 still failed the SAATs. Since that time, the implementation of revised procedures for assessing UNPOL candidates and the inauguration of a tracking system to reject candidates who have failed qualifications testing previously and to record passing marks for current or possible future deployment, have contributed to the “streamlining” of recruitment noted earlier.

With respect to FPU’s, a comprehensive review by the UN Police Division in 2008 found that just 37 percent of deployed units were proficient in their duties. In response to these findings, the Police Division set up mobile training teams with volunteer help from member states to bring each deployed FPU up to minimum proficiency. The review also prompted the convening of a doctrine development group composed of UN policing practitioners and member state representatives to revamp UN policy for FPUs and establish rigorous standards for training, equipment, and command and control. The new policy’s requirements included proficiency in the mission language down to the section leader level and prohibitions on decomposition of FPUs below section level to prevent FPU personnel being pressed into duties more suited to individual officers and for which they possessed inadequate training. The new FPU policy was signed into effect in March 2010.

Performance issues that led to proficiency testing of FPUs have not gone away, in part because the voluntarily funded mobile training team program that was to have enhanced the competence of deployed units was not fully funded until late 2011, and it is a stopgap measure in any case. The Police Division has since implemented a regional “train the trainer” course that aims to make pre-deployment training of FPUs more consistent and supportive of UN field requirements. By mid-2013, two regional courses had certified roughly 100 persons from fifty countries as FPU instructors.

The new FPU policy’s stipulation that a unit be in existence for at least six months before UN deployment has not had the intended effect of ensuring the deployment of seasoned and cohesive units. Since an FPU’s preparation may take at least six months or more from the time that a PCC signs a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the United Nations, units still can be constituted specifically for UN operations.

Table 4 depicts the severe shortage of francophone FPUs for francophone UN missions as of June 2013 (just one of fourteen units in Haiti is francophone; two of eight in the Democratic Republic of the Congo; and zero of eight in Côte d’Ivoire). In the UN’s one mission area where Arabic-speaking FPUs would be valuable (Darfur), only three of eleven PCCs and four of eighteen deployed units are from Arabic-speaking countries.

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63 Email communication with UN Police Division, July 2013.
65 Phone interview with staff member of UN Police Division, July 2013.
Yet four of the scarce francophone units are deployed to UNAMID, while nine of the Arabic-speaking units are deployed in francophone or English-speaking missions. PCCs may wish to spread their risk by not deploying all of their units in one mission area, but the result is a less effective use of available resources than might otherwise be the case.

FPU contributors concentrate 79 percent of their police contributions in FPUs, on average. Rwanda and Burkina Faso are exceptions, contributing more individual officers than they send in FPUs. All current FPU contributors are developing countries, and most need assistance from “triangular” support arrangements—that is, third party donor support for equipment and/or training and logistics for their units.66

Challenges to Police Performance in the Field

Aside from recruiting talented, qualified, and committed people, the biggest challenges in police peacekeeping may be (1) developing a common understanding of UN police practice and procedure within a multinational body of police; (2) developing enough local knowledge to be useful and enough local respect to put that knowledge to good use; (3) promoting intelligence-led police peacekeeping; (4) managing police-military relations; and (5) ensuring discipline within the ranks.

Table 4: Contributors of formed police units, June 2013.67

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FPU PCCs</th>
<th>FPU contributions by mission (personnel)</th>
<th>FPU personnel as percentage of all police sent to UN missions by PCC</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UNAMID</td>
<td>MINUSTAH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>542</td>
<td>318</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>278</td>
<td>320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>458</td>
<td>269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>280</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>138</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>140</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>140</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>140</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>140</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By mission and overall</td>
<td>2,358</td>
<td>1,676</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: *Italics* indicate francophone UN missions, host states, and PCCs. *Underline* indicates Arabic speaking PCCs and missions where Arabic is an official national language. Use of both indicates PCCs with both as official languages.

A COMMON UNDERSTANDING OF UNPOL POLICY AND PROCEDURE

UN police received some early high-level guidance in a “UN Blue Book” issued in 1994, followed by an operational handbook in 2005 and a 2009 UN Blue Book update, called “United Nations Criminal Justice Standards for United Nations Police,” co-authored by DPKO and UNODC. But the standards handbook, while an important reference tool, is not a mission statement or set of strategic goals for international police peacekeeping, and the 2005 operational handbook devotes fifteen pages to safe driving but just one page each to training and mentoring, interim law enforcement, and electoral assistance. As UN policing mandates grew more complex and numerous in the mid-2000s, DPKO began to generate more elements of policy (for which compliance is mandatory) and guidelines (suggested good practice) for various aspects of police operations. Between 2006 and 2008, policies were developed for conduct of a law enforcement census, for police certification, and for the reform, restructuring, or rebuilding of postconflict police services. Guidelines were issued to give new officers a grasp of process and procedure in UN operations and to mainstream gender perspectives into UN police work. The first policy on FPUs was issued in late 2006—about six years after the first of these units had deployed under UN control—but the serious functional deficiencies in FPUs discovered in 2008 (and discussed in the section on challenges, below) led to issuance of new policy in March 2010 and new training guidelines for FPUs in 2011.

The 2008 OIOS report that had called for consolidated police selection and recruitment also noted a critical need for overarching guidance (a “strategic doctrinal framework”) for UN police peacekeeping. A multitiered effort to develop such a framework began in 2009 and included several advisory meetings at the expert and practitioner level, as well as consultations at international meetings of national peacekeeping training centers and at Interpol’s annual General Assemblies in 2009 and 2010.

The logistics of international conferences and a number of other factors, from internal politics and personnel changes to the Arab Spring and the need to plan for the role of UN police in new UN missions in South Sudan and Libya, delayed the development effort. But regional consultations on a “strategic guidance framework” for UN police began in June 2012 and continued through June 2013, with meetings in Indonesia, Argentina, Ukraine, Jordan, and Ethiopia (co-hosted with the African Union). When done, the framework will provide a basis for UN operations and PCCs to harmonize their approaches to police peacekeeping, from training to operational support and capacity building, and will better define the range of skills and experience that UN police operations need in the 21st century.

ENOUGH LOCAL KNOWLEDGE TO BE USEFUL

The second challenge arises from the terms of service for most UN police in the field. Unfortunately, the only elements of police capacity that can be built relatively quickly—for example, from basic training programs—cannot be sustained without enveloping institutional support (leadership, facilities, equipment, planning, pay, and performance evaluation) embedded in an appropriate legal framework.69

UN field missions tend to lack rigorous policies for routine knowledge capture and management, and the same is the case for handover procedures, which would seem critically important given high personnel turnover.70 This vacuum can leave new personnel to climb the same learning curve as their predecessors and repeat the same activities and projects. Every week spent learning how not to create a social or diplomatic incident while on duty and getting to know and gain the respect of colleagues and of local counterparts is a week not spent advancing the mandate.

Where deployment overlap has been implemented, it has cut the time needed by incoming officers to become effective in their jobs from months to weeks. Overlaps in the arrival and

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69 Without such institutional support, even well-trained individuals can do very little and may lose the incentive to do what they can, as pay comes up short, colleagues ignore anti-corruption rules, and good performance reviews and promotions depend more on whom you know (and pay off) than on who you are and what you’ve done.72 Unless otherwise noted, the rest of this section draws from Durch et al., Understanding Impact, pp. 33–34.
70 Unless otherwise noted, the rest of this section draws from Durch et al., Understanding Impact, pp. 33–34.
departure of UN police are increasingly seen as critical for senior UNPOL officers but also important for officers doing more technical work at lower levels. Overlaps permit sharing knowledge on strategy, progress, and obstacles that is difficult to convey effectively on paper and allows personal introductions to be made to host-state counterparts by the incumbent. Since UN police’s work on developing national police capacity is based heavily on personal relationships, setting the right tone and extending professional courtesy are essential enablers. In longer-running missions, the fact that local counterparts may be breaking in their sixth or seventh foreign “mentor,” each with a different take on his or her duties, makes new officers’ jobs difficult, regardless.

Solutions to the broader knowledge management problem in missions need to address how information is routinely routed, shared, and stored by discrete police units, by the police component at large, by other mission components and by the mission as a whole. Sharing of information should become expected and enforced. If systems are in place to make sharing routine and user-friendly, and if inputs feed into an analytic process that produces useful and actionable products, UN police will be more likely to embrace the system as a valuable part of their job and want to keep it up to date.

Finally, in non-English-speaking mission areas, UN operations will continue to be hampered, especially in public order management, by lack of local language capacity on the part of UN personnel, especially FPUs (recall table 4). Units that cannot communicate easily and effectively with potentially unruly crowds have less hope of diffusing a situation peacefully.

INTELLIGENCE-LED POLICE PEACEKEEPING

Any police operation that lacks situational awareness lacks the ability to do its job effectively. Yet the intelligence capacities that underlie situational awareness have been painfully hard to build within UN structures. The UN is a “glass house” into which its member states peer at the (relatively small) levers of power available to the UN Secretariat. Less powerful members may assume these levers are pulled at the direction or at least to the benefit of the more powerful members, who may in turn be reluctant to share what they know because they, too, see the UN as a glass house. Thus, among the few recommendations of the Brahimi Report to be rejected outright by the General Assembly was its proposal to create an “information and analysis secretariat” for peace and security, and among the last posts to be funded in the Police Division expansion of 2009–2011 was a criminal information analysis officer. Even without the word “intelligence” in the job title, the post was approved only after the Secretariat appealed directly to the Fifth (financial) Committee of the General Assembly.

Mission-focused intelligence capabilities tend to fare better but are a relatively recent development. In 2005, some UN missions began to improve their ability to take in and to analyze information from their surroundings. The first joint mission analysis centers (JMAs) were developed in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Haiti. By 2006, the Haiti mission was engaged in serious intelligence-led policing, as it worked to combat the criminal gangs that dominated the slums of the capital, Port au Prince, and other Haitian cities. Without good intelligence, these operations would not have been possible, or at least not as successful, and would likely have generated much higher civilian casualties.

A good intelligence capability that includes the police component is essential to any UN operation. Essential to such work, in turn, is an appropriate legal framework, appropriate resources (people, funds, and equipment), and the capability to fuse multiple streams of information into a

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71 Security, legal, and ethical considerations will of course always limit the degree to which raw criminal intelligence or materials related to criminal investigation are shared, but this should not be an obstacle to creation and use of systems that inform colleagues about the police component’s work with programming partners, for example.

72 Security Council–mandated undertakings with intelligence functions, such as the UN Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM, charged with inspecting and/or destroying weapons of mass destruction in Iraq) and its successor, the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission, tend to be special creations that are separate from the Secretariat. UNSCOM’s executive chairman reported directly to the Security Council, the commission’s members represented twenty UN member states, and its roughly 200 field personnel were seconded to the commission by member states. See the UNSCOM website, available at https://www.un.org/Depts/unscom/General/basicfacts.html.

73 A/64/820, June 18 2010, p. 19.

74 Boucher, UN Panels of Experts, p. 12.

coherent operational picture.

**POLICE-MILITARY DYNAMICS**

A fourth challenge relates to perceptions in the Security Council and elsewhere that infantry units and police FPU’s are more or less interchangeable. Police do not have the training, the equipment, or the numbers to substitute for the military in unstable settings. Consider that the strength of all FPU’s deployed to UN operations worldwide in mid-2013 (about 7,000) was substantially less than the military contingent deployed by the UN operation in Côte d’Ivoire (8,500), which was in turn just 11 percent of all deployed UN peacekeeping troops. Matching such UN global military efforts one for one with FPU’s would require ten times the peak global deployment of UN FPU’s to date. Then again, the UN Security Council appears to believe that military-company-sized FPU’s can do the work of whole battalions of troops: It has directed that a drawdown of 4,200 troops from the UN operation in Liberia be complemented by a 420-person increase in FPU strength—replacing 10 troops with 1 cop.76 Such an approach sets UN police up to fail unless the security environment has improved so much that the case for expanded FPU deployment is actually a weak one.

Police-military relations have many other, operational facets—joint patrolling, common understanding of respective rules on the use of force, agreement on who commands and who supports in what sorts of situations, and on when and how command is relinquished or transferred as those situations escalate or ease. Each is an important topic but beyond the scope of the present paper.

**DISCIPLINE WITHIN THE RANKS**

The final factor that hinders the UN’s ability to glean greater performance from its field personnel, and police in particular, is the great difficulty that it has in disciplining personnel. Military personnel are covered by national military codes of justice, and contributors of formed military units sign MOUs with the United Nations. The conduct of UN police, who have the functional immunity of UN experts on mission, is considered by the UN to be the sole responsibility of the states that second them to UN service, whether or not the PCC has extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction over the officers that it sends.77 According to UN data, from 2007 through 2012 there have been seventy-eight allegations of sexual exploitation or abuse against UN police.78

The UN has a number of training and preventive programs in place, and reported allegations have in general been on the decline across all categories of UN personnel. Still, any criminal misconduct by UN police puts a dent in UNPOL credibility and legitimacy with local counterparts and the population they serve, especially with respect to the value and importance of the rule of law.79

**Broadening the Base of Police-Contributing Countries**

Contributors to UN peace operations are largely divided into those that pay for peace operations and those that staff them, and contributions of personnel are nearly as concentrated as contributions of money. There were seventy-seven PCCs in April 2013, but just ten of them contributed nearly 70 percent of UN police personnel.80 Out of the 193 UN member states that contribute to the peacekeeping budget, just ten of them contribute over 80 percent of total peacekeeping funds.

The 2009 DPKO-DFS New Horizon non-paper called for more equal burden-sharing through

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77 Durch et al., Improving Criminal Accountability.
78 This amount to an overall rate of 1 allegation per 1,000 UN police over the six year period, substantially less than the 5 per 1,000 allegations against civilian mission personnel in the same period. Making sense of the reported data is difficult because reported numbers include substantiated, unsubstantiated, and open allegations; some data are per incident and some per individual; investigations end when individuals leave the mission; and the UN has no authority to detain them while investigating. See United Nations Secretary-General, Practice of the Secretary-General in Disciplinary Matters and Possible Criminal Behaviour, 1 July 2011 to 30 June 2012, UN Doc. A/67/171, July 24, 2012, and UN Conduct and Discipline Unit, “Statistics. June 2013,” available at cdu.unh.org/Statistics/AllegationsbyCategoryofPersonnelSexualExploitationandAbuse/AllegationsforAllCategoriesofPersonnelPerYearSexualExploitationandAbuse.aspx.
79 For further discussion, see Durch et al., Improving Criminal Accountability.
“expanding the base of troop- and police-contributing countries.” This was echoed by the Special Committee on Peacekeeping (C-34) in 2010. Beyond strengthening the legitimacy and flexibility of UN peacekeeping, a strong argument for broadening the base of PCCs is the acute need for specialized police contributions and qualified personnel. Both the New Horizon initiative and the C-34 noted the importance of “undertaking forward-looking analyses of the willingness and readiness of countries to contribute,” taking into account the political, legal, social, and economic environment in which the decision to contribute to UN peacekeeping is made. DPKO’s “capacity to build deeper contacts and longer-term relationships with current or potential contributing countries is sorely limited,” however, as it has no regional representation outside mission areas, unlike many other UN agencies or departments.81 The recently created Office for the Peacekeeping Strategic Partnership, which is to report directly and jointly to the undersecretaries-general of DPKO and DFS, may help to correct that limitation, though it will be New York–based and resembles in structure an IOT for partnerships. With assigned police personnel, it appears to overlap somewhat with the resource-generating functions of the Global Focal Point that was set up just a few months previously.82

MAJOR POLICE-CONTRIBUTING COUNTRIES OVER THE YEARS

Among PCCs from developing countries, South Asian contributions have been a reliable constant. The increase in African contributions to UN police peacekeeping since 2001 is particularly striking, however. In December 2001, five of the top ten PCCs were members of the Development Assistance Committee in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD-DAC).83 At the same time, 81 percent of UNPOL were deployed to missions in Europe (mostly Bosnia and Kosovo), only 1 percent were deployed in Sub-Saharan Africa, and only one of the top ten PCCs was African (see table 5). In 2013, twelve of the top twenty contributors are African and 78 percent of UNPOL are deployed on that continent. No DAC member makes the top twenty. (Canada, with ninety-nine officers in the field, presently leads DAC members in UN police contributions.) Turkey, which is a member of the OECD but not the DAC, has ranked among the top twenty PCCs throughout the period. The number of officers contributed by the United States, on the other hand, has fallen by 90 percent since 2001, when the US was the second-highest police contributor. Many US police, who are privately contracted, served with the UN Mission in Kosovo. Most police development resources of the United States and other NATO countries were redirected in the 2000s to Iraq and Afghanistan.

The bulk of UN peacekeepers are deployed in sub-Saharan Africa, and African PCCs are prominent in African missions. They may be more likely to share cultural or linguistic affinity with local populations than police drawn from further abroad but may lack the specialized policing capabilities and personnel that missions need most. Some PCCs’ police services may also be caught up in national politics and protests (e.g., Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, Nigeria, and Egypt). Table 6 profiles the top ten PCCs.

POTENTIAL TO BROADEN OR DEEPEN CONTRIBUTIONS

Tables 7a through 7d take a level-of-effort approach to the potential for further (or initial) contributions of police to UN peacekeeping. While these tables highlight proportionality of potential contributions relative to domestic police resources, they do not address the issue of skill sets that missions need to meet their mandates, nor do they address in any detail the nature of the domestic policing environment (e.g., crime rates, levels of civil unrest). We are thus approaching the question

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83 As a principal indicator of “developed” status, we use membership in the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC)—that is, countries with sufficient surplus to provide development aid to others. The DAC is open to countries that have appropriate strategies, policies, and frameworks for development cooperation; an accepted measure of effort (e.g., ratio of ODA to gross national income over 0.2 percent or ODA above $100 million); and a system of performance monitoring and evaluation. See the OECD DAC, “Joining the Development Assistance Committee,” available at www.oecd.org/dac/JoiningtheDevelopmentAssistanceCommittee.htm .
of potential ability to contribute personnel to peacekeeping very broadly, but, as a rule of thumb, it is not unreasonable to assume that countries with higher police density (the number of police per 100,000 population) and low current UNPOL contributions may be better able to spare police for peacekeeping than countries with low police density and high current contributions.

Tables 7a and 7b list PCCs as of April 2013 for which police services data could be located, with higher and lower domestic police density, respectively. We use the number of UN police contributed per 100,000 domestic police as a rough gauge of national level of effort with respect to UN police peacekeeping. A working assumption is that above average police density (about 300 police per 100,000 population in this group of countries) and/or proportionally low deployment to UN missions may indicate room for some deepening of effort.

We only include in table 7a PCCs who presently contribute fewer than 100 UN police per 100,000 domestic police (one tenth of a percent of the total) and in table 7b PCCs who contribute fewer than 50 UN police per 100,000 domestic police (one twentieth of a percent of the total).

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Table 7c lists rough police data for UN troop-contributing countries that were not also PCCs in April 2013. We judge that among this group, potential police contributors might be found among those countries with higher police densities and police services of 10,000 or more (even a higher-density service is unlikely to contribute to UN police if its total numbers are in the four-digit range). Only countries rated at least “partly free” by Freedom House are found in the table.

Finally, table 7d lists UN member states that were neither police nor troop contributors in April 2013, but that have higher police density, at least 10,000 police, and are ranked by Freedom House as at least partly free. Possible contributors from this group include Singapore, Kuwait, Dominican Republic,

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>National police strength</th>
<th>Total population</th>
<th>Police per 100,000 population</th>
<th>Police force structure</th>
<th>Observations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>7 mil.</td>
<td>571</td>
<td>Public Security Directorate (25,000) Gendarmerie (15,000)</td>
<td>Services generally considered professional and well trained (OSAC, 2013). Gendarmerie conducts training programs for police organizations in the region (FIEP 2011).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>135,000</td>
<td>164 mil.</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>National Police (124,000–155,000)</td>
<td>Police “are a source of instability and fear”; “human rights abuses are endemic” (ICG 2009). Excessive use of lethal force against protesters in a series of clashes (HRW 2013).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>1,585,117</td>
<td>1.2 bil.</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>Civil Police Services and State Armed Police Forces. 2,124,600 police authorized.</td>
<td>Significant personnel shortages. India has one of the lowest police per capita rates in the world at 130 police per 100,000 people (NYT 2013).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>10,700</td>
<td>13 mil.</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>National Gendarmerie (5,700) and National Police (5,000) under Ministry of Interior</td>
<td>Senegal enjoys relative stability. Public surveys suggest public confidence in the police, but impunity and corruption among police remain pervasive problems (USAID 2013).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepal</td>
<td>102,000</td>
<td>30 mil.</td>
<td>340</td>
<td>Nepal National Police (62,000) Armed Police (40,000)</td>
<td>Performance, accountability, and responsiveness rated fairly highly, but future contributions likely diminished by continuing instability &amp; violence (Small Arms Survey 2013).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>377,000</td>
<td>175 mil.</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>National Police</td>
<td>A 2008 presidential commission cited Nigerian police for “unlawful arrest and detention, extortion, torture, rape, extrajudicial killings and other forms of brutality,...and a failure to carry out genuine police functions” (OSF 2010).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>575,000</td>
<td>180 mil.</td>
<td>319</td>
<td>Federal Police Provincial Police</td>
<td>Significant domestic security challenges, including insurgency in the northwest. National consensus that police are “failing to combat crime effectively, uphold the law, provide basic security to citizens, and fight growing militancy” (USIP 2011).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>12 mil.</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>National Police</td>
<td>Postconflict Rwanda’s “popular justice model supplemented by a small but disciplined state police force” has “proved an effective system of crime prevention ...although it has proved problematic in terms of civil liberties” (Baker 2007).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>500,000</td>
<td>85 mil.</td>
<td>586</td>
<td>Public Security, Special Police, and Mukhabarat report to the Ministry of Interior</td>
<td>Police abuse was a core grievance of protesters in 2011. Still “no effort to account for past abuses,” and police continue to use “excessive and sometimes lethal force” (HRW 2013).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>10,426</td>
<td>18 mil.</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>National Police (6,226; ca. 5% women); Gendarmerie (4,200), Ministry of Security.</td>
<td>Police joined popular unrest in 2011, expressing discontent over low salaries and poor leadership (DCAF 2010).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

85 Sources for table 6 are listed in Annex II.
Table 7a: UN PCCs with higher domestic police density that contribute fewer than 100 UNPOL per 100,000 domestic police.\textsuperscript{86}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>No. of police</th>
<th>Year of source</th>
<th>Police per 100,000 population</th>
<th>UNPOL contributed April 2013</th>
<th>UNPOL per 100,000 domestic police</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>89,000</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>438</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>27,000</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>813</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>341,770</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>484</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>466</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>55,000</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>328</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>45,000</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>631</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>102,000</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>370</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>220,000</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>356</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>205,902</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>558</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>150,000</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>323</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>156,489</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>317</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>39,861</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>373</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>231,801</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>511</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>1,106,472</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>773</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>33,487</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>333</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>245,152</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>417</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Tables 7a and 7b include PCCs meeting the selection criteria for which domestic police numbers were found.

Table 7b: UN PCCs with lower domestic police density that contribute 50 or fewer UNPOL per 100,000 domestic police.\textsuperscript{87}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>No. of police</th>
<th>Year of source</th>
<th>Police per 100,000 population</th>
<th>UNPOL contributed April 2013</th>
<th>UNPOL per 100,000 domestic police</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>30,300</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>17,058</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>579,000</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>243</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>794,300</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>245,752</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>298</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>478,001</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>282</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>1,600,000</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>261</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{86} Sources: as for figure 4, table 6; see also "List of Countries by Number of Police Officers," available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_number_of_police_officers.

\textsuperscript{87} Sources: as for table 7a.
Costa Rica, Panama, and Lithuania.

A better understanding of how domestic police services benefit from involvement in international policing could create positive incentives for increasing the number and contributions of PCCs. Studies conducted in Canada to assess the benefits of participation in international policing for domestic police services found that police officers deployed abroad strengthened professional competencies, such as their ability to deal with diverse cultural and ethnic communities and manage emergency situations. Among provincial police services in Canada, however, participation in international police peacekeeping operations is still perceived, even by some higher-ranking officers, as “a career killer.”

Attracting quality police for international police peacekeeping, particularly those with specialized skills, requires that domestic police services see international policing experience as useful at home (e.g., learning how to function in a “joined up” manner in complex and stressful environments). It requires that they recognize it in their career paths and make use of the newly acquired competencies of officers returning to domestic duty. Better outreach from the UN Police Division and from higher political levels of the United Nations to member states, and from member states to their police services, on the professional benefits of experience in UN policing may be a good place to start.

**NATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR INTERNATIONAL POLICING**

In 2000, the Brahimi Report identified the need for standby arrangements for the recruitment of civilian police personnel and called upon member states to create national pools of pre-qualified police officers for deployment to UN peace operations. For the most part, however, member states have not been able or willing to create these national standby arrangements. Such a capacity can be difficult to realize in countries without a national policing structure or where international policing is considered to be of little national strategic importance.

For some countries, however, international police peacekeeping does have direct strategic relevance. In response to several civil disorder crises in its neighborhood, the Australian government established the International Deployment Group (IDG) within its Federal Police in 2004, becoming the first member state to create a standing force of domestic police resourced and prepared for international deployment at short notice. IDG developed in a unique regional context, however. Few countries are in the position

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**Table 7c: TCCs that are not police contributors and have above-average domestic police density.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>No. of police</th>
<th>Year of source</th>
<th>Police per 100,000 people</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>49,152</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>462</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>50,798</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>452</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>30,807</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>403</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>40,500</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>385</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>104,000</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>352</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>230,000</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>344</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>27,500</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>326</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>167,318</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>307</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

**Table 7d: Current non-contributors with above-average domestic police density.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>No. of police</th>
<th>Year of source</th>
<th>Police per 100,000 people</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>40,000</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>752</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>18,000</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>504</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>32,000</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>376</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>393,084</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>366</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>14,500</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>337</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panama</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>10,957</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>325</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

90 Sources: as for table 7a. Only countries that are considered “free” or “partly free” by Freedom House and those that have at least 10,000 domestic police are included here.
91 Sources: ibid. Only countries that are considered “free” or “partly free” by Freedom House and those that have at least 10,000 domestic police are included here.
of needing, and being able, “to provide the bulk, or at least, the core, of operational and developmental policing capacity to failed or failing states in their neighborhood.”  

IDG has a maximum authorized strength of 1,200 staff, with a ratio of support staff to deployed staff of roughly 1 to 3. It includes an operational response group with the capacity to deploy up to 40 members within 24 hours, a further 40 members within 72 hours and the remainder (upward of 200 members) within seven days, to provide stabilization. Funding requirements are substantial: the IDG’s budget for the financial year 2012–2013 was AU$311 million (US$286 million) and was only slightly less for the financial year 2013–2014. It not only pays the salaries and benefits of the personnel it borrows from Australian state police services, it also pays for replacement personnel. Nonetheless, the federal money cannot come with replacement police experience attached.

Canada, through the International Peace Operations Branch of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, has developed a standby capacity to deploy police overseas; it has built a pool of 600 pre-trained and equipped police officers who remain with their home services until called to deploy. The branch manages and supports pre-deployment recruitment, selection, and training, and provides operational support to Canadian police deployed overseas at a ratio of 1 to 3. Norway employs a similar model. Norwegian police contributions to international operations are drawn from the Civilian Police Pool, managed by the National Police Directorate; the directorate can deploy up to 1 percent of the police service for international assignments (around 85 officers) and maintains a ratio of support to deployed staff of 1 to 14.

In recent years, an increasing number of governmental (Australian, Canadian, Danish, Finnish, German, Norwegian, Slovenian, Swedish, Swiss, British, and American) and nongovernmental (though often government-financed) initiatives have created rosters to facilitate the identification and recruitment of specialist civilian personnel for peace operations. With over 10,000 members, CANADEM (a nonprofit organization funded by the Canadian Ministry of Foreign Affairs at $500,000 a year) maintains one of the largest national rosters. To maintain a pool of reliable, high-quality civilian experts, some organizations (ZIF and NORDEM, for instance, in Germany and Norway, respectively) emphasize training and pre-screening of all members on their rosters.

If a standing police group is to be a permanent fixture in a country’s foreign operations capacity, it would seem cheaper to hire its members directly than to borrow them from other services. The main issue would be finding experienced personnel short of retirement age, or having taken early retirement. A standing group might offer appointments to mid-career personnel that include carry-over provisions for pensions and other emoluments, while offering a one-time bounty to the services from which officers are recruited, to defray the costs of recruiting and training a replacement. Since personnel cycle through organizations all the time and standing groups like IDG are small relative to national totals for police, such an approach would allow all parties better opportunities for personnel planning and replacement hires. Local, state, or provincial police might require notice of intent to apply to the international service group and a specified transition period once selected.

93 Ibid, p. 20.
Recommendations for Improving Selection, Recruitment, and Deployment

Most of the timing and skills acquisition issues that plague police peacekeeping could be fixed at relatively modest additional cost. We begin with two options for recruitment and staffing shortfalls, and then look at reinforcing a gender perspective, adjusting terms of service to better deal with misconduct, improving knowledge management, and building local alternatives to most FPU deployments. We close the section with a note on what member states can do to support police peacekeeping and to better utilize the experience of those who serve abroad.

ENDING RECRUITMENT SHORTFALLS

The broad diversity of UN member states tends to ensure that change in organizational structure and practice takes time and is likely to occur incrementally. Such was the case with the modest build-up of the Police Division over the past five years and the parallel build-up of the SPC. Regarding future changes, particularly in police selection, recruitment, and deployment, we have three suggestions.

Pre-Cleared Rosters of Experienced Individuals

While continuing its efforts to broaden the base of active PCCs, especially among states highlighted in tables 7a through 7d, the Police Division should build and maintain, in collaboration with DFS and the UN Office of Human Resources Management, a roster of pre-cleared and pre-tested personnel from which to directly recruit for missions, supplementing secondments of active duty personnel by member states. These would be personnel with work experience in a police environment, but who are not in active government service. The roster should have on the order of 200 to 300 names for adequate thematic coverage and redundancy.

Plans for missions with police development mandates should in turn routinely include specialist posts within the mission’s police component organization and budget, not only “thematic police experts” (e.g., in forensics, organized crime, electoral security, criminal investigations, crowd control, entry and customs control, and police intelligence) but also experts in the less visible, backbone requirements of police planning, budgeting, project management, and curriculum development. Precedents for direct-hire specialists have already been set by the missions in Timor-Leste, Liberia, and Haiti. Each one should have a skill to contribute that is otherwise difficult to acquire via secondment and should be able to commit to at least two years of mission deployment (with normal leave arrangements) in order to build and sustain relationships with local counterparts.

Since only a quarter of UN PCCs have full-time police advisers in their permanent missions in New York, communications with capitals regarding police peacekeeping needs can be complicated. In order to access a greater range of the skills required and other support expeditiously, the Police Division should be able to access capitals—not only police services but related ministries and agencies that may have skills that complement uniformed services. The Global Focal Point in New York may be a useful vehicle for coordinating such outreach to member states with other UN actors, and the relevant permanent missions should be fully informed of all contacts in a timely manner. Building networks to capitals could remove a processing burden from many permanent missions while not reducing their ability to weigh in on policy-related discussions in New York.

98 Many of the recommendations in this section draw upon the conclusions of Dusch et al., Understanding Impact, pp. 6–10.
100 Among the police-related recommendations of the Brahimi Report that proved difficult to realize (which would be most of them, from the need for a “doctrinal shift,” to creation of a 100-person UN standby roster for police, to regional police training consortia, or national “pools” of officers pre-cleared for UN service), the one that raised the sharpest responses called for member states to “designate a single point of contact within their governmental structures to be responsible for coordinating and managing the provision of police personnel to United Nations peace operations.” This statement was read by some permanent missions as a call to bypass them in favor of direct Police Division dealings with capitals. The secretary-general interpreted this recommendation as applying to conversations among member states, stressing that the permanent missions would remain the Secretariat’s point of contact with member states. United Nations Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, UN Doc. A/55/502, October 20, 2000, para. 100.
A Larger, Integrated Standing Capacity

Since it became operational in 2007, the SPC has provided valuable service to missions but perhaps not with the intensity or frequency initially anticipated. Some may consider that it has not done enough with the forty or so personnel available to it, but we argue that the SPC remains too small to be effective at large or diverse tasks, including its primary function of standing up new police components. Its problems are traceable in part to the lack of an overall strategic (as opposed to tactical or operational) concept for utilizing the SPC that the Police Division and its parent Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions (OROLSI) can readily embrace. Its capabilities are also insufficiently integrated with those of the rest of the Police Division.

Building on earlier work by the Stimson Center, we propose an approach to standing capacity for police, justice, and corrections that would fully integrate it into OROLSI, in effect making all non-seconded personnel in the office part of DPKO standing capacity for these three substantive areas. Some proportion of OROLSI personnel would be available for mission duty at any given time, the actual proportion varying according to the requirements in the field. When new missions require an immediate surge, staff could be made available to meet police and other rule of law components’ start-up needs. When total mission staffing requirements fall, a greater proportion of mission posts could be filled from the standing Headquarters “pool,” reducing the fraction of the pool working at Headquarters and shifting its costs from the Peacekeeping Support Account (which funds most DPKO Headquarters staff) to mission budgets. The ability to shift personnel from Headquarters to the field would enable OROLSI to stabilize total staff size and retain expertise while meeting mission requirements quickly and flexibly. The concept would lead to a higher net proportion of staff with recent field experience and a higher proportion of field staff with exposure to both mission and Headquarters environments.

Details regarding the costs of greater UN standing and standby police, justice, and corrections capacity may be found in a 2010 Stimson Center study. That study envisaged a standing capacity much larger than the one that currently exists, projecting a need for about 200 personnel in the field at any one time at a deployment tempo of 50 percent. Some mission functions could be staffed continuously by standing capacity personnel (i.e., through several rotations) if necessary to the continued smooth functioning of the mission or to maintaining consistency in mentoring or advisory roles at critical junctures.

An individual would spend twelve months in the field and then twelve months recuperating, planning, being trained, and training others on short-term (several week) field assignments. In contrast, the initial proposal for the UN Standing Police Capacity envisaged a 66 percent operating tempo, but no organization can maintain a 66 percent operating tempo for very long before burning out. The Police Reserve from which the bulk of UNPOL would be drawn under this concept would have an operating tempo not greater than 33 percent (e.g., twelve months of UN duty followed by at least twenty-four months of domestic duty).

REINFORCING A GENDER PERSPECTIVE IN RECRUITMENT AND TRAINING

As recently as June 2013, the UN Security Council reiterated the need for UN field missions to deal more effectively with vulnerable conflict populations, including women and children, and to impress upon their host-state counterparts the seriousness of the UN’s intent to address and suppress sexual violence. Mission police

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101 The caveat for seconded personnel assumes that the sending state agreed only to specific assignments or duty stations for their personnel. It may prove feasible to negotiate secondments with more flexible terms.


103 A RAND Corporation study of US Army deployment tempo from 1997 through October 2000 (now somewhat wistfully referred to as the army’s "peacekeeping phase") and its impact on military readiness for combat found that the average pre-9/11 deployment tempo for 1,400 deployable army units was about 23 percent. This was segmented as 17 percent for training away from barracks (about sixty days per year) and 6 percent for operations. In 1998, US Army Forces Command set a standard of 120 days—33 percent—"as the maximum desirable level of annual DEPTEMPO (deployment tempo) for its units." Ronald E. Sortor and J. Michael Polich, "Deployments and Army Personnel Tempo," Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2001, pp. xii, 11, 60, 71. Post-9/11, the regular army’s average deployment tempo has increased to roughly 50 percent and Army Special Forces commanders have been struggling to bring their troops’ rate down to 50 percent. Carl Conetta, "Fighting on Borrowed Time: The Effect on US Military Readiness of America’s Post-9/11 Wars," Briefing Report No.19, Cambridge, MA: Project on Defense Alternatives, 2006, p. 10.
components should, in turn, take this council instruction to heart and build it into operational strategy, taking the particular needs and views of women specifically into account. They should maintain that gender perspective in their work, which includes awareness of the disproportionate personal and social damage inflicted upon women in a climate of pervasive sexual violence, whether as a weapon of war or as a proclivity in violence-infused local culture. Such cultural awareness is one of the priority areas of knowledge that UN police need to develop, as laid out in the DPKO/DFS 2012–2013 Training Needs Assessment.104

NEGOTIATING TERMS FOR GOOD BEHAVIOR

DPKO should upgrade the “understanding” signed by individual UN police heading for UN missions to a memorandum of understanding that continues to emphasize the importance of abiding by local laws but does more to include contractual penalties for violating local laws or mission policies in exchange for enjoying UN “expert on mission” status. Such terms could give UNPOL senior leadership greater leeway in devising disciplinary measures in cases of serious misconduct. One possible additional approach to discipline would be to establish, within the status of mission agreement with the host state, a provision for a host-state model court, staffed jointly by host-state jurists and mission personnel, whose jurisdiction would extend to police and civilian mission personnel. It should be supported by strengthened arrangements for the investigation and disposition of allegations of serious misconduct by mission personnel.105

MINDING AND MENDING GAPS IN HANDOVERS

Given the importance of maintaining continuity and momentum in rebuilding or reforming host-state institutions critical to public safety and security, such as the police, missions should be able to count on at least a two-week overlap between incoming and outgoing personnel in key posts and positions. At present, it is very difficult to arrange for such overlaps. This is perhaps a case where staff rules intended to promote economy and efficiency work against the ability of a mission to meet its objectives efficiently and effectively. Without overlaps, personal working knowledge is difficult to transfer and those leaving the mission have no opportunity to introduce their successors to host-state counterparts, potentially undermining continuity of trust.

Creative approaches to facilitate overlapping handovers are needed both for posts (which are identified and salaried in the mission budget) and for positions in the police component filled by member state secondees. Especially important to include are component leadership and management posts/positions and those that directly engage in capacity building of national police services. If the relevant Staff Regulations (set by the General Assembly) or Staff Rules (promulgated by the secretary-general to interpret and implement the regulations) cannot themselves be changed in recognition of such operational necessity, consideration should be given to the appointment of successors as consultants to the person already holding the post or position, beginning a few weeks before the latter’s term expires and ending when the successor assumes his or her duties in the given post or position.106

Regardless of the approach taken to the timing of post or position handovers, a standard handover kit should be developed and provided upon arrival in the mission area to every UNPOL employee in a management position; serving as a trainer, mentor, or adviser; or in a leadership position in an FPU, down to section level. The kit should include notes from his or her predecessor summarizing the duties involved, how he or she carried out the assignment, and recommendations for moving it forward. The value of such notes is self-evident but should also be stressed in mission induction training. A refresher workshop on handover kits should be conducted at least six weeks before an individual’s scheduled rotation out of mission.

105 For detailed analysis, see Durch et al., Improving Criminal Accountability, especially pp. 39–65.
106 See United Nations Secretary-General, Staff Rules and Staff Regulations of the United Nations: Secretary-General’s Bulletin, UN Doc. ST/SGB/2013/3, June 26, 2013.
Using a Few High-Function FPUs and Building Local Alternatives to the Rest

Formed police units should continue to be used by DPKO, but they should be used early in the mission cycle and only to fill security gaps in a mission’s first year. All of the FPUs deployed should be capable, well-equipped, and available for rapid deployment, with excellent mission language capacity and, ideally, some local language capacity. Because these units would not be expected to remain in a mission for more than a year, rotational issues would be minimized and units on call (e.g., upon four to six weeks’ notice of activation for deployment) might number twenty-five to thirty globally, so that twelve to fifteen could be available for a twelve-month deployment at any given time. (This assumes the establishment of not more than one new mission per year requiring FPUs, or two missions in one year and no new missions in the two years following. Otherwise, more ready units would be needed to keep deployment tempo below 50 percent.)

DPKO should negotiate with select PCCs to make available the requisite number of units that meet the above criteria to be first-responding units for public security in new UN missions. They should begin to be replaced after a year by locally recruited “public order police” units. These locally recruited units should be UN vetted and trained by instructors certified by the UN’s own regional train-the-trainer program using a standard FPU curriculum. They should be funded, equipped to FPU policy standards, and commanded by the mission. In other words, these would be UN public order police (UNPOP). Training and operating costs as well as equipment for the units should be part of the mission budget, as is equipment for mission security service personnel. The proposal can also use to its advantage the planned availability of military- and police-pattern equipment through the Global Field Support Strategy. Since donor support to civil order police is not “DACable” (does not count as official development assistance, see footnote 46), donors may be reluctant to provide timely and adequate voluntary support to UNPOP development, whereas that development will be critical to early public security capacity in the mission area.

UNPOP unit members should have status as national mission staff within the police component. Appropriately experienced UN police should be embedded in these units down to the section (ten-person) level—initially as leaders, and transitioning to advisors as leadership potential is recognized and promoted among host country personnel.

UNPOP units should be able to replace rapidly deployed UN FPUs at the end of those FPUs’ twelve-month deployment cycles, subject to safeguards and incentives to ensure good performance. UN public order police, it should be stressed again, are envisaged as solely UN units, not host-state police under UN control.

If no qualified outside FPUs are available for rapid deployment to the mission area, the UN should deploy certified instructors seconded by member states (or from its own standing capacity, should it be established) to accelerate development of UNPOP units, as outlined above, while UN military units provide temporary public security. This approach would be preferable, in our view, to falling back on marginally capable foreign FPUs for public security functions, both because the mission would have greater control over units that it forms and because the investments in people and equipment would stay in the host country and not be lost repeatedly as foreign FPUs rotate back home.

We assume that mission plans would use rapidly deployable FPUs and build UNPOP units only if indigenous police capacity was so damaged by conflict or disorder as to be largely absent or itself a threat to the public. Unfortunately, this has often been the finding of missions launched in the last decade and more.

107 As mission national staff, UNPOP unit members would likely be paid a good deal more than they could earn in comparable host-state police positions, which could cause some turbulence in transitioning to local police work at the end of their tenure with the UN mission, but that is the conundrum faced by essentially all UN national staff in weak post-war economies and therefore not an argument that has special import for the UNPOP concept. More pertinent would be questions regarding their authority, as UN-led police, to arrest or detain people or to use lethal force. These issues could be worked out in the mission MOU or status of mission agreement with the host state; UN police in other missions lacking executive authority (MINUSTAH, for example) have had authority to detain, on the understanding that detainees would be remanded expeditiously to the custody of national/local police. United Nations Secretary-General, UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti, UN Doc. S/2006/60, February 2, 2006, para. 20.
As the host state’s police services are trained and developed, UNPOP units should be able to stand down. To give their members incentives to perform well, each should be accorded priority eligibility with the host state’s rising police services. This should be stipulated in the status of mission agreement or MOU signed by the UN with host-state authorities.

Disciplinary issues and processes would need to be addressed, but inasmuch as the UN at present has relatively few options regarding discipline of its police personnel and inasmuch as UNPOP units would be, as proposed here, UN national staff and not experts on mission, accountability measures for misconduct could more readily be written into an MOU with the host state and tied to the development of the sort of model court envisaged in Stimson’s previous work on mission-related accountability measures, as noted above.

WHAT UN MEMBER STATES CAN DO

UN member states can first take to heart the C-34’s call for common terminology and contribute to its development with respect to international police peacekeeping, as they have been contributing, regionally, to the development of the Strategic Guidance Framework managed by the Police Division.

Member states can take a more active role in delivering pre-deployment training to their personnel, based on UN guidelines and training opportunities. Upon officers’ return from mission, their police services could more consistently draw from and apply returning officers’ experience in conflict-affected areas to police work at home. Member states should, as noted earlier, encourage police services to recognize that international service builds experience with “joined up” operations in challenging operational environments. And they can guarantee employment upon return, with seniority intact.

Donor countries that support police development should work more closely with UN missions and the Global Focal Point to coordinate and optimize support relationships with PCCs that need such support, in return for their consistent use of standardized pre-deployment training and consent to rigorous operational testing of police units nominated for UN deployment.

Donors can also work more closely with missions and the GFP to coordinate police development programming in conflict-affected states, from developing standards for infrastructure development and equipment to designing programs to reduce corruption and increase routine maintenance for all structures and equipment provided. Both are perennial problems that rapidly drain the value from foreign assistance.

In the end, everyone expects peacekeeping and peacebuilding to be done well, but no one does it full time and no post-war situation fully replicates any other. Still, every human being needs air, water, food, shelter, a caring microenvironment, a secure macroenvironment, economic opportunity, and education. Above and around them, elites struggle for control and criminal enterprises consolidate their power, as slow-moving international aid—including law enforcement assistance—tries to catch up.

How should police peacekeeping respond? It needs to be able to move fast and stay long, with a consistent cast, especially in leadership positions, not a new face in the window every six to twelve months. The movement to fill some critical police-support functions with capable civilian personnel should help, but in the end, experienced and capable leadership is irreplaceable.

Annex I

Notes to Table 2.


MINUSTAH (Haiti); MONUC, MONUSCO (Democratic Republic of the Congo); UNAMID (Darfur, Sudan); UNMIL (Liberia); UNMIS (Sudan); UNMISS (South Sudan); UNMIT (Timor-Leste); UNOCI (Côte d’Ivoire). “FR” = Francophone mission. “Peak Auth.” is the highest authorized strength for that budgetary year. Instances where the Security Council raised the authorization during the year are noted in bold. Italics indicate drawdown planning goals rather than peak authorized strength. Annual average vacancy rates are drawn from UN mission budget performance reports. Negative vacancy percentages indicate more personnel on hand than planned or initially authorized. All numbers have been rounded to the nearest percentage, except for those near half a percentage.

a Until November 2009, when DPKO online factsheets began to give separate monthly counts of deployed individual officers and FPUs, only mission budget documents offered separate deployment accounting, and then only for budgetary year average deployments, not year-end (June) deployments.

b UN police in Haiti were fully deployed in December 2009 under prevailing authorizations. After the January 12, 2010, earthquake, Security Council Resolution 1908 raised the ceiling of UN police to 3,711 and Resolution 1927 authorized a further 680 officers. Of these, 100 were recruited as corrections officers and so are not counted here.

c UNMIL began downsizing police in spring 2008. It halted and was authorized two new FPUs in September 2008 by Security Council Resolution 1836. Resolution 2066, of September 2012, cut UNMIL’s military strength by 4,200 troops and raised its FPU numbers by 420. Police advocates have objected in principle to swapping military and police one-for-one, as police are generally less heavily equipped; one suspects they did not have ten-for-one in mind as a better ratio.

d UNMIS was replaced by UNMISS on July 9, 2011, deployed only in South Sudan. UNMIS plans did not include drawdown of police, but numbers dwindled somewhat as end-of-mission approached.

e Security Council Resolution 1996 of July 2011 authorized “up to 900 civilian police personnel, including as appropriate formed units” for UNMISS, without further specifications.

f The total reflects a planned 10 percent reduction in UNMIT individual police by June 2010. Because the Timor-Leste National Police (PNTL) were not meeting proficiency goals as quickly as hoped, staffing goals for 2010–2011 rose a bit.

g Authorizations dropped substantially for 2011–2012, as PNTL assumed all policing authority in March 2011. Thus deployed numbers in June 2011, while far short of the original goal for 2010–2011, reflected this changed reality and conformed to the anticipated lower ceiling set for 2011–2012. As a result, we do not calculate vacancy rates for UNMIT in 2010–2011 or include it in the summary statistics for the year.

h Planned for 2010–2011 as a decrease from the temporary bump-up to address the post-election crisis in Côte d’Ivoire, December 2010–April 2011. The Security Council allowed two more FPUs (210 personnel), and the ACABQ agreed to a request by the UN controller for $85.3 million to fund contingency operations. (See UN Doc. A/66/616, December 16, 2011.)

i Summary statistics count negative vacancies as authorized level met (zero vacancy). Recruiters should not be credited for “extra” personnel who are in the process of transitioning out under a drawdown program and generally cannot be used to make up personnel deficits in any other missions. But not counting these missions in the summary would exaggerate the vacancy rate. To avoid either bias, we counted a mission category with negative vacancy as having met its authorized level of personnel (zero vacancy).
Sources for Table 2.

|----------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
Annex II

Sources for Table 6.

Police service profiles of top ten police-contributing countries.

Jordan


Bangladesh


India


Senegal


Nepal


Nigeria

Pakistan
Interpol, “Pakistan,” available at www.interpol.int/Member-countries/Asia-South-Pacific/Pakistan (ca. 325,000 provincial officers and 3,500 in the federal investigative agency; no numbers for Pakistan Rangers; Frontier Corps; Coast Guard; National Police Bureau; National Highways and Motorways Police; or Anti-Narcotics Force); Hassan Abbas, “Reforming Pakistan’s Police and Law Enforcement Infrastructure,” United States Institute of Peace, February 2011, available at www.usip.org/files/resources/sr266.pdf (figure of 575,000 officers).

Rwanda

Egypt

Burkina Faso
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