

Negotiating Climate Change: From Bali to Copenhagen

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Cover Photo: Members of the Jordanian battalion of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) carry children through flood waters after a rescue from an orphanage destroyed by hurricane Ike. September 7, 2008, Port-au-Prince, Haiti. ©UN Photo/Marco Dormino.

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Executive Summary

Against the backdrop of both increased attention to the devastating effects of climate change and renewed political momentum to tackle the issue, the permanent missions to the United Nations of Sweden and Pakistan, in cooperation with the International Peace Institute (IPI), convened a two-day retreat on the theme “Climate Change: From Bali to Copenhagen,” on April 17 and 18, 2009, at the Greentree Estate in Manhasset, New York. Representatives of more than thirty UN missions, as well as academic and scientific experts on climate change, convened to examine some of the major threats posed by climate change and existing gaps and inconsistencies in current efforts by individual states and the international community to address them. Participants focused on identifying both possibilities and impediments in the political negotiations surrounding climate change, lessons learned from the Bali negotiations, and what concrete steps are needed in order to achieve a positive outcome at the 2009 UN Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen. The discussions were held under the Chatham House Rule. This meeting report reflects the rapporteurs’ interpretation of the discussions.

Climate Change has emerged as one of the key policy challenges for the international community and the United Nations. With time running out to negotiate a successor agreement to the *Kyoto Protocol*—which expires in 2012—the UN Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen has been seen as a pivotal forum for consensus-building on the future of the climate change regime. However, despite scientific consensus on the need for effective and immediate action to curb the effects of climate change, the prevailing lack of political will, agreement, and trust between the developed and developing worlds presents a major challenge on the road to achieving sustainable environmental practices in the future.

So far, much of the international debate on responding to climate change has focused on the use of market mechanisms to tackle rising carbon emissions, such as carbon-trading systems; however, it is increasingly recognized that market forces alone cannot solve the climate crisis and that a more holistic approach, addressing questions of sustainable development and economic growth in

the context of low-carbon development, is required.

Compared to industrialized countries, the developing nations today face a dual dilemma of responding to ever-increasing demands for energy while simultaneously switching to cleaner and more energy-efficient infrastructures. One way to speed up the switchover to greener energy in the developing world is through the use of “leapfrog” technologies; however, this must be complemented by significant investments in capacity building and support for clean-energy infrastructures.

Recent decades have seen significant growth in the number of international institutional mechanisms dealing with environmental degradation and climate change. While this institutional development has been largely positive, the proliferation of mandates has also led to a diffusion of responsibility and a lack of effective leadership. At this stage there is a need to clarify the division of labor between the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), the *United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change* (UNFCCC), the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), and other existing mechanisms, as well as to review the efficiency of global initiatives for financial support and technology transfers, diffusion, and development.

The international architecture is particularly weak when it comes to funding for climate change. There is today no way to guarantee funding for mitigation and adaptation measures in the areas most vulnerable to the effects of climate change. While the current debate has highlighted the need to completely rethink the global architecture addressing climate change, instant and intermediate measures must focus on creative ways to generate and distribute financial measures for mitigation and adaptation.

Overall, a chief impediment to moving the climate change talks forward is the trust deficit between developed and developing nations. Among the sources of contention is the debate on binding emissions targets and appropriate action for polluters. In order to resolve these and other key differences, climate change negotiators must focus on trust-building measures such as increased transparency and dialogue between countries from the North and the South.

Introduction

UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has declared 2009 “the year of climate change,” and it is certainly a crucial one in the international community’s effort to achieve an effective and ambitious post-Kyoto climate change agenda. The global financial crisis has raised further doubts about the availability of funds to tackle the effects of climate change across the globe, but particularly in the developing world where resources to deal with its consequences are severely strained. At the same time, however, the financial crisis has created an opportunity to rethink contemporary lifestyle patterns and how to make the transition to a global green economy. In proposing a Global Green New Deal, the UN Environment Programme (UNEP) has called for the channeling of 1 percent of global gross domestic product (GDP), or approximately \$750 billion, into environmentally beneficial instruments such as sustainable transportation, energy efficiency, renewable energy, reforestation, sustainable agriculture, and biodiversity programs.¹

While there is now broad scientific consensus that human activity has had a negative impact on the environment, less agreement exists on what policies and institutional innovations are needed to tackle the problem. Some argue that past climate agreements have compartmentalized climate policy and development and that, consequently, important links between the two have gone unnoticed. Likewise, many current mitigation strategies focus too much on the use of market forces and economic incentives to curb emissions, even though, it is clear that the market alone cannot solve the climate crisis. Despite these inconsistencies, important political and institutional advances have been made in past years. The establishment of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in 1988 by the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) and UNEP, created an impartial body to synthesize and evaluate the vast, and often conflicting, body of research on the causes and impacts of climate change. The subsequent negotiation of the 1992 *United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change* (UNFCCC) and the 1997 *Kyoto Protocol* were also

important milestones that have had noteworthy impacts worldwide.

While there has been significant growth in international mechanisms to address climate change and environmental degradation, little attention has been paid to how to coordinate effectively these multiple entities and make sure they do not work at cross purposes. Therefore, a central challenge today is not only to strengthen the international architecture for commitments and action, but to create a clearer division of labor and better-coordinated climate change strategies at the local, regional, and global levels. An equally pressing challenge is to create and foster political will among states to agree on a common road map with effective targets to secure a more sustainable future. The two-day retreat, “Climate Change: From Bali to Copenhagen,” convened by the permanent missions to the United Nations of Sweden and Pakistan, in cooperation with the International Peace Institute (IPI), focused on identifying both impediments and possibilities surrounding the political process on climate change, and participants discussed what steps are needed for a successful UN summit in Copenhagen in December.

Responding to Climate Change: Key Challenges

In order to think concretely about how to strengthen the international architecture for commitments and action on climate change, one must begin by determining what the central challenges are and what tools are needed to address them. In recent years, scientific knowledge of the effects of climate change has both increased and improved, not least because of the work of the IPCC, whose assessment reports have become the major source for analysis by policymakers internationally. What is less clear, however, is how best to use this information to create meaningful policy responses.

One of the major challenges today is promoting sustainable economic growth in the context of low-carbon development, i.e., how best to adopt low-carbon development measures in developing

¹ United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), *Global Green New Deal: Policy Brief* (Geneva: UNEP, March 2009), p. 1, available at www.unep.org/pdf/A_Global_Green_New_Deal_Policy_Brief.pdf.

countries without slowing economic growth. Three key challenges—two physical and one political—were identified at the retreat as central to the debate:

- (1) the dual dilemma of increasing access to energy while, at the same time, building cleaner energy infrastructures;
- (2) the increasingly rapid pace of climate change and the negative economic impacts of environmental degradation;
- (3) the trust deficit between the developed and developing worlds, and how it hinders progress towards what is ultimately a universal goal, successfully managing the effects of climate change.

First, when it comes to enhancing economic growth, developing countries today face an additional challenge: doing so in a sustainable, or “green,” manner. This constitutes, as one participant pointed out, a dual dilemma. The populations of the developing world need more energy; they simply do not have adequate access to energy at present. This means that developing countries need new and improved infrastructure to meet rising demand. At the same time, they need to start transitioning from fossil fuels to cleaner energy, which requires even greater investment in infrastructure and new technologies. And whereas before they might have been able to rely on the cheapest and most efficient sources of energy available, that option is fast becoming unfeasible.

While developing countries are not subject to the same legally binding emissions targets as the industrialized countries that have ratified the *Kyoto Protocol*, it is nonetheless clear that they have to take environmental factors into account in a way that the industrialized countries did not have to do over a century ago, when they were themselves developing. Thus, what the developing world needs are “leapfrog technologies” that will allow them to bypass fossil-fuel technologies and move directly to more energy-efficient and environmentally friendly ones. This is no small task.

This is related to another issue that was at the forefront of discussions during the retreat. The pace of climate change is rapidly increasing with the result that old truths regarding safe emissions levels

are increasingly seen as unreliable and new strategies may now be needed to lower carbon emissions to safe levels. One participant, for example, mentioned that he had been enthused by the idea of per capita emissions as a way to bring development and climate-change mitigation together. However, due to the rapid increase in global emissions, that is no longer a viable option and more restrictive measures must be taken if emissions are to be successfully curbed. In other words, the severity of the crisis is such that developing countries have to play their part—and in order to do that, they have to be properly supported. Additionally, this complex situation is further complicated by the fact that scientists cannot be sure what the end goal needs to be with regard to global emissions.

Furthermore, the credibility of the scientific analysis on climate change is undermined by the fact that developing countries are underrepresented in existing scientific fora. This, *inter alia*, has led to the third major challenge identified at the retreat: the trust deficit. It is widely understood and agreed that those most likely to be affected by climate change are the populations of the world’s poorest countries and poor people in wealthy countries, and yet they did not cause the problem. Thus, it is quite understandable, given the existing vulnerabilities of these populations, that they are reluctant to take restrictive measures that may have adverse effects on them and slow down economic growth. One developing-country participant noted that, in general, developing countries want to substantially reduce emissions, but they haven’t been met in the middle by their developed-country counterparts, both in terms of aid and in terms of reducing their own emissions. This has led to a significant lack of trust among developing countries towards the developed world.

The notion of the historical responsibility of industrialized states as the main generators of anthropogenic climate change is widely accepted among developed and developing countries alike. This, in part, led to the “common but differentiated responsibilities” clause in the *Kyoto Protocol*.² However, the fact that a number of “Annex I states”³ are not on track to meet their emissions targets has led to a great deal of distrust from developing states.

2 See article 10 of the *Kyoto Protocol*, available at http://unfccc.int/essential_background/kyoto_protocol/items/1678.php.

3 States listed in Annex I of the *Kyoto Protocol* are the ones that have specific emissions-reduction targets under the Protocol. These targets are country-specific.

They simply do not believe that the wealthier countries, which will be among the least affected by climate change, will do their part to reduce emissions on a global scale. Consequently, the need to build trust between developing and developed states was emphasized during the retreat and it was said to be crucial that everyone put their weights on the scale in a global attempt to avert a climatic catastrophe.

A compounding problem is that the effects of climate change on development are often ill understood and underappreciated. This is particularly true with respect to strategies for adapting to the negative impacts of climate change, as knowledge is still too limited to identify the best solutions with any certainty. Additionally, there are problems to be found with every type of analysis concerning the effects of climate change anywhere in the world. To give but one example, all the modeling and analysis that has been done on the economic costs and benefits of various efforts to combat climate change has ignored the question of intergenerational benefits. It seems obvious that different generations will reap varying benefits from current actions to curb anthropogenic climate change, yet no one is attempting these kinds of calculations, in large part because they are extremely difficult to do. However, it is of vital importance that this kind of analysis be undertaken, due to the enormous impact such calculations could have on policy. This may be particularly true for voters and policymakers in developed countries who are, understandably, reluctant to endorse expensive policies that could lead to a decrease in both national wealth and disposable income for individuals.

The scope of the challenge that climate change poses is vast, and no solution will be easy. However, there is now wide consensus that drastic and immediate measures need to be taken in order to avoid the catastrophic impacts of a two, or even four, degree Celsius increase in global average temperatures in the next fifty years.⁴ Yet, despite political agreement on the end goal, the problem

for both states and international institutions remains of how to define a common methodology and strategy for achieving it. The sheer number of international organizations and entities dealing with climate change poses an additional complication. Although all perform important work—implementing projects, informing policymakers and the general public by debating the issues and trying to find solutions—having so many entities vying for a piece of the climate change pie can lead (and has led, according to many) to significant coordination problems. Thus, there is a need for greater institutional coordination and support for combating climate change. This is particularly true with regard to financial support and technology transfers, diffusion, and development.

Despite the scale of the problem, the opportunities are numerous. Low-cost clean-energy technologies could be developed that would encourage sustainable economic growth and enhance energy access for the world's poor. This could change the way land is farmed by increasing the sustainable production of food and fuel, enhance development, and improve health and wellbeing. For example, as the McKinsey Global Institute mentioned in its report, *Promoting Energy Efficiency in the Developing World*, by investing \$90 billion a year over the next twelve years, developing countries could slow the growth of their energy demand to such an extent that savings from decreased consumption would total up to \$600 billion a year by 2020, thereby freeing up valuable resources for other needs.⁵

In order to be successful, a set of targets for joint action that is meaningful for both sides needs to be defined. Decisive and agreed-upon emissions targets are needed to move forward. In that respect, one participant noted, the shadow of the future looms large. In fact, it is not today's but tomorrow's consumption that should determine our emissions targets. The oft-mentioned historical responsibilities aren't only a thing of the past: our actions today will determine the responsibilities of future generations.

4 BBC News, "Four Degrees of Warming 'Likely,'" September 28, 2009, available at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/8279654.stm>.

5 Diana Farrell and Jaana Remes, "Promoting Energy Efficiency in the Developing World," *The McKinsey Quarterly*, February 2009, pp. 2-3.

Existing Institutional Mechanisms to Address Climate Change

The roles that international organizations play in coping with the adverse impacts of climate change are both varied and multifaceted. They range from the IPCC's research analysis, to OCHA's coordination of humanitarian relief in the face of a natural disaster; from UNEP's Global Green New Deal, to the Global Environment Facility's role in financing environmental agreements. Some argue that there are too many international organizations and entities working on climate change. Others point out that many of these instruments and programs—e.g., those dealing with agriculture, food security, environmental management, and ecosystems—have been implemented successfully and that the question should rather be whether the international community is willing to support these programs and enhance their application and development to make them truly effective.

A few international instruments stand out as either currently having roles of particular importance, or potentially having them in the future. The first, UNEP, is often mentioned as a potential *global leader* on environmental issues, a body that could supervise and coordinate all other international environmental bodies. The second, the UNFCCC, mainly serves as a *negotiating platform* for governments. Annual Conferences of Parties have led to major developments in climate change negotiations, most significantly the *Kyoto Protocol*. The third, the GEF, is one of the central *sources of funding* for climate change mitigation and adaptation. The fourth, the IPCC, provides significant *research analysis* and reports on the various scientific findings and conclusions that are considered to affect climate change—a particularly important endeavor given the variance among scientific research internationally. These four instruments are discussed in greater detail below.

Considerable discussion has taken place in recent years about the role that UNEP should play with

respect to climate change.⁶ Many regard it as the preeminent entity within the UN system capable of coordinating the environmental activities of others, and see it as the potential leader of a new global environmental governance structure. Others believe that such a structure requires a new institution at its helm—a World Environment Organization, akin to the World Health Organization or the World Trade Organization.

One of UNEP's major new activities includes the Green Economy Initiative, a comprehensive program aimed at accelerating states' transition to a green economy. It rests on three pillars: (1) taking nature's services into greater consideration in national and international accounts; (2) generating employment through green jobs; and (3) laying out policies, instruments, and market signals that can accelerate a transition to a Green Economy.⁷ UNEP has urged G20 countries to spend \$750 billion, or roughly 1 percent of global GDP, of the proposed stimulus packages to fund a Global Green New Deal “for reviving the global economy and boosting employment, while simultaneously accelerating the fight against climate change, environmental degradation, and poverty.”⁸ However, one participant noted that funding for a Global Green New Deal should not all come from public money—those kinds of funds are simply not available, especially given the current economic and financial situation—and that the private sector needs to be engaged. It was furthermore highlighted that an important role that UNEP can play is to clarify and simplify rules and procedures so that the private sector is more likely to become engaged.

In many ways, the question of whether UNEP will play a leading role in future economic governance remains a question of political will. UNEP was indeed envisioned as the anchor organization for global environmental issues but has, to date, not been able to fully take on that role, in part due to a lack of political will. It is certain, however, that no system-wide restructuring or overhaul of the global environmental system can ignore the question of what to do with UNEP.

⁶ See generally, Elizabeth R. DeSombre, *Global Environmental Institutions* (London: Routledge, 2006).

⁷ United Nations Environment Programme, (October 22, 2008), “Global Green New Deal” - Environmentally-Focused Investment Historic Opportunity for 21st Century Prosperity and Job Generation: UNEP Launches Green Economy Initiative to Get the Global Markets Back to Work, Press Release, available at www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp?DocumentID=548&ArticleID=5957&l=en.

⁸ United Nations Environment Programme, “Green Economy Initiative: Global Green New Deal,” 2009, available at www.unep.org/greeneconomy/GlobalGreenNewDeal/tabid/1371/language/en-US/Default.aspx.

Another central piece of the governance puzzle is the UNFCCC. Its negotiation and entry into force constitutes one of the major developments in global environmental governance in the last two decades. A great deal of the international negotiations currently taking place on climate change occur under the auspices of the UNFCCC, such as the Ad-hoc Working Groups on the *Kyoto Protocol* (AWG-KP) and Long-term Cooperative Action (AWG-LCA). During the retreat, the notion of historical responsibility embodied in the UNFCCC was emphasized as a key concern for the developing world by giving it an ethical and equitable approach to negotiations.

The *Kyoto Protocol* is a major initiative developed under the auspices of the UNFCCC that has set the standard for emissions reduction targets and negotiations since its entry into force in 2005. The *Kyoto Protocol* is set to expire in 2012 and there is now significant emphasis placed on the need to agree on a successor protocol as soon as possible. Throughout much of 2009, the Fifteenth Conference of Parties (COP15) of the UNFCCC in Copenhagen was seen as the time and the place to develop an international agreement on such a successor protocol. However, prior to the conference, climate change negotiators scaled back their expectations considerably and it is seen as increasingly unlikely that a successor treaty will be agreed upon in 2009. Hopes remain that such a treaty may be developed in 2010.

One of the most important roles that international institutions play with regard to climate change adaptation and mitigation is that of funders. As the financial mechanism of the UNFCCC, the Global Environmental Facility (GEF) is crucial for combating climate change in the developing world. Every year, the GEF allocates approximately \$250 million to projects on energy efficiency, renewable energies, and sustainable transportation.⁹ There are some doubts, however, that the current architecture for financing is sufficient. One participant noted that the current infrastructure of the adaptation fund was insufficient, in part because it failed to deal with the social costs involved for affected

populations. The same participant saw the need for a complete overhaul of the global financial architecture, as currently the World Bank is not structured in a way that allows it to deal effectively with the most vulnerable countries. Such countries are engaged in battles on several fronts: they not only have environmental issues to deal with but also a high level of indebtedness, and could very well miss out on the opportunity to integrate adaptation and development.

The important role of the IPCC was highlighted on a number of occasions throughout the retreat. The science behind estimates of various indicators, such as the severity of climate change, which emissions targets are most effective, and how much sea levels are expected to rise, is often quite complex and difficult to understand for policymakers who have not specifically studied environmental affairs. It is, therefore, crucial to have an objective body that analyzes and assesses technical data to come to authoritative conclusions on the scope and effects of climate change. As one participant commented, climate change continues apace, and irrespective of what type of international agreement states come to in their discussions, the science simply will not bend to political will.

Efforts are under way to improve the way the international community works on climate change. Since 2007, the UN System Chief Executives Board for Coordination (CEB) has been working to enhance coordination within the UN system on the issue of climate change and to strengthen delivery mechanisms. Still, it is clear that much more needs to be done. The fragmentation is immense, and as one participant noted, there are over 500 agreed-upon instruments dealing with climate change in existence, so one must wonder how it is possible to coordinate among all of them. However, the time for action is now—the international community can no longer afford to wait and see what happens. The question then remains, how to effectively and expeditiously strengthen and modify the international architecture to be more responsive to the problem.

9 Global Environment Facility, "Climate Change," 2007, available at www.gefweb.org/interior_right.aspx?id=232.

Bridging the Gap: Strengthening the Inter- national Architecture for Commitments and Action

In the words of one participant, a transformation, both in culture and in consciousness, is needed if we are to successfully tackle this issue. While intergovernmental discussions on climate change are important and should continue, something far more transformative is needed in order to move away from the business-as-usual approach—a crucial next step. There is a need for revolutionary leadership on climate change and, as has often been the case in the past, that kind of leadership may come from the most unlikely quarters. In the case of climate change, the small-island developing states have been at the forefront in taking the initiative—understandably so, given the severity of the threat that they are facing—and they should be supported in their endeavors.

First of all, a centralization of responsibility and a coordination of efforts are sorely needed: if everyone is responsible, nobody is responsible. A part of the problem with dealing with climate change is that it isn't a purely environmental concern. The real problem is sustainable development and good governance, including its environmental and social dimensions, which creates a complex picture with often competing objectives. Thus, when dealing with climate change, it is imperative that it not be divorced from broader thinking on governance structures. The question of whether the current UN system is best suited for properly dealing with climate change remains. At the moment, it does not seem that it is. It is therefore crucial to better streamline the functions of the international system with regard to climate change. On the one hand, there is often enormous frustration among developing countries because they do not know what resources are available to them, the system is not responsive, and climate change initiatives are not adequately funded. On the other hand, donors are frustrated by a lack of information about performance measures, the functioning of delivery systems, and the cost-efficiency of programs. Despite these problems, it is clear that any reform effort must take place alongside concrete action to tackle climate change.

There simply isn't enough time to engage in a system-wide reform effort before acting.

To that end, several participants pointed to some central issues and concerns with regard to the global architecture for climate change and identified ways to think about dealing with them. Two major flaws in the UN system were highlighted: the dysfunctional form of governance and the dysfunctional form of funding. It was noted that the World Bank has become a central vehicle of funding for responses to climate change, not because it is in some way an inherently more logical place to house this activity, but simply because it has better delivery mechanisms. One solution on the governance side might be to develop a framework for climate change governance that follows the negotiating framework: mitigation, adaptation, financing, technology, and capacity-building.

Another central issue that clearly needs to be addressed is that of the trust deficit. Reaching agreements on binding emissions targets has been a central concern in recent years, and these are frequently the subject of great debate among countries. Current regimes have focused on three target types: mandatory, conditional, and joint. The mandatory targets are mostly in place for developed countries, in particular the Annex I countries of the *Kyoto Protocol*. Conditional targets are based on the notion of common but differentiated responsibilities and emphasize the different capacities of different states, in particular in the developing world, where efforts are made to meet goals through capacity building and technological support. Joint targets are ones where both developing and developed countries agree on specific targets that they all seek to attain. In this context, one participant highlighted the need to prioritize trust-building in order to establish successful joint programs of action.

In order to build trust, it is necessary to enhance transparency. It is highly questionable that policies, in particular joint ones, could be successfully negotiated without a certain level of trust among the various actors. Clearly, "measurable, reportable, and verifiable" emissions reductions are indicative of efforts to enhance transparency and trust; however, to paraphrase one participant, there is a need for some kind of a climate change review mechanism that incorporates assessment tools with the aim of guaranteeing compliance. In order to do

so, a careful look must be given to overall compliance mechanisms, e.g., National Communications under the UNFCCC, to see if that system is really responding to current concerns.

Furthermore, a realistic balance must be struck between commitments and action, because it is detrimental to the entire process if they do not go hand in hand. In that regard, each country's commitments must be individually evaluated. What is considered nationally appropriate and internationally verifiable differs between developed and developing countries, as well as within each group. Additionally, it is necessary to assess the global implications of having common but differentiated responsibilities. While the notion of differentiated responsibilities, based on both history and capabilities, is valuable, time is also critical and we may soon be faced with the fact that it is no longer feasible to maintain these differentiated responsibilities due to the severity of the climate change crisis.

Conclusion: Copenhagen and Beyond

There was general agreement among conference participants that the Conference of Parties (COP) in Copenhagen in December would need to be momentum-building. Given that the *Kyoto Protocol* is set to expire in 2012, it is of the utmost importance that significant progress on a successor agreement is made. Many participants highlighted the need for any deal in Copenhagen to include an institutional arrangement supporting both mitigation and adaptation, as well as the means to deal with both measures. Others emphasized that any agreement in Copenhagen has to be science-based, ambitious, comprehensive, forward-looking, and, crucially, realistic: it must set achievable goals. Such an agreement should be structured along the four pillars of the Bali Road Map, as negotiated in 2007 during COP13.¹⁰ Yet others pointed to the need for a second commitment period along the lines of the *Kyoto Protocol* as well as for a set of COP-decisions that include measurement, reporting, and verification mechanisms (MRVs) and nationally appropriate mitigation actions

(NAMAs) for developing countries.

Some participants saw two possible options for an outcome from Copenhagen: a bold option and a cautious or pragmatic option. The bold option would include comprehensive and legally binding agreements, as detailed as possible, reached on the basis of the AWG-KP and the AWG-LCA. The cautious/pragmatic option would consist of a two-to-four page framework agreement, which would be more detailed than the Bali Road Map and would form the basis for further work at the next Conference of Parties. A final, and sobering, thought from one participant was on the need to consider a world in which Copenhagen fails. The fact of the matter, he stated, is that the constituency has not yet been created that will convince the majority of the world's population of the need for action. It is thus evident that the international community has its work cut out for it. International cooperation is urgently needed to tackle this complex problem of global proportions and a major step in that direction could be taken at the December COP15 negotiations in Copenhagen.

Recommendations

A number of specific recommendations were made by participants at the retreat on how to strengthen the international architecture to better deal with the effects of climate change:

1. **Mobilize beyond Copenhagen:** As climate change negotiators scale down their expectations for a legally binding outcome at the 2009 UN Climate Change Conference, states and intergovernmental institutions must invest in political strategies that reach beyond Copenhagen. Particularly, such strategies must include dedicated political efforts and support by world leaders to narrow the trust deficit between countries in the North and the South.
2. **Develop mechanism to improve the targeting of adaptation measures:** The retreat highlighted the importance of carefully targeting adaptation measures to the specific needs of each country. In some countries, the best way to adapt to climate change is simply through improved economic and human development.

¹⁰ The four pillars of the Bali Road Map are mitigation, adaptation, technology development and transfers, and financing, 2009, see <http://imers.org/bali/outcomes>, and <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2007/cop13/eng/06a01.pdf#page=3>.

For example, enhanced access to assets and wealth, improved education, and better governance would all help people to be in the position to adjust their lives to a changed environment. In other countries, specific adaptation measures, such as improving water conservation methods or creating water walls (i.e., measures that would not be needed if it weren't for climate change), is the best way to adapt. One way to better evaluate the specific needs of each country would be to conduct a number of case studies, taking into account both various development indicators and what adaptive measures have been taken and considered successful. Such case studies could then be used as points of reference when assessing the needs of other countries. Doing this would enhance the quality and accuracy of cross-country comparisons and enhance the understanding of what might work best in any particular country.

3. **Focus on capacity building:** Related to the development of adaptive capacity, some participants emphasized the need for governance and financing mechanisms to place greater focus on capacity building than on technology transfers. While access to technology is certainly integral to development and good governance, in order to be successfully utilized, technology transfers have to build on a certain level of local capacity.
4. **Establish a climate change monitoring center and bank:** Sources of funding for both mitigation and adaptation measures, as well as other activities, need to be enhanced and guaranteed. One possible way to do this would be to establish a climate change monitoring center and bank that would enable some fundamental work on these very important issues.
5. **Provide incentives for action in developing countries:** Rather than try to emulate the target-prescriptions method encapsulated in Annex I to the *Kyoto Protocol* and adapt it for developing countries, it might be more beneficial to try to set up a system that provides incentives for concrete actions and helps further sustainable development. This would better enable developing states to foster and

build up new technologies and infrastructures that, while perhaps more expensive at the outset, would lay the necessary foundations for long-term, sustained growth in a low-carbon context. An increasing number of developing countries, such as China, India, Brazil, and South Africa have come up with these types of plans, which highlights that they are positively viewed in countries faced with very different challenges related to climate change.

6. **Study geoengineering options:** Another alternative, still considered rather taboo by many in the climate change debate, is geoengineering, i.e., the deliberate manipulation of the earth's climate to counteract the negative effects of global warming. However, it is necessary to engage—at the global level—in further research on and examination of the prospects and perils of geoengineering and to enhance our understanding of how it might really make a difference and add value. Research on geoengineering is already taking place and countries need to come to an agreement about how to manage the risks involved. This is particularly imperative because geoengineering is something a single country could unilaterally engage in at a national level, while still effecting decidedly global consequences.
7. **Engage the private sector:** Another point that was frequently highlighted was the importance of better engaging the private sector, which is seen as a crucial vehicle for generating and mobilizing financing for projects across the globe. Public-private partnerships have proved highly successful in a number of scenarios, and private-sector investment can significantly boost the development of infrastructure in developing countries. However, one participant noted, engaging the private sector can be a double-edged sword. Traditionally, the private sector is in the business of selling goods and services to make a profit, and not in solving global problems. The international community must therefore carefully evaluate the potential costs and benefits of engaging the private sector in sustainable-development efforts.

ANNEX I: Agenda

Friday, April 17, 2009

13:00 Buffet Lunch at IPI

14:00 Group Departure for Greentree Estate

15:00 Check-in at Greentree Estate

15:30 **Welcome and Introduction**

Mr. Warren Hoge, *Vice President for External Relations, International Peace Institute (IPI)*
 H.E. Mr. Farukh Amil, *Deputy Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the United Nations*
 Mr. Jakob Ström, *Counselor, Permanent Mission of Sweden to the United Nations*

15:45 – 17:15 **Session 1: Sustainable Economic Growth and Climate Change—What Are the Challenges?**

How can we address the dual challenge of long-term economic growth in the context of sustainable development? What impacts will the global economic crisis have for sustainable development and our opportunities to effectively address climate change? What current initiatives and opportunities for low carbon development exist? What are the costs and benefits of such initiatives? What role can multilateral institutions play?

Chair

Mr. Warren Hoge

Speakers

Mr. Reid Detchon, *Executive Director, Energy and Climate, United Nations Foundation*
 Mr. Tariq Banuri, *Director, Division for Sustainable Development, United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs*

17:15 – 17:30 Coffee Break

17:30 – 19:00 **Session 2: Coping with Adverse Impacts of Climate Change: The Role of International Organizations**

What are some of the key adverse impacts of climate change? Which areas and groups are most vulnerable to these challenges, today and tomorrow? What instruments do we have to prevent, mitigate, and manage adverse impacts of climate change? What role should the international community play? What should be the division of labor between governments, regional and subregional organizations, and multilateral institutions such as the UN?

Chair

Mr. Fredrick Lusambili Matwang'a, *First Secretary, Permanent Mission of Kenya to the United Nations*

Speakers

Ms. Margareta Wahlström, *Assistant Secretary-General for Disaster Risk Reduction*
 Mr. Angus Friday, *Consultant on Social Dimensions of Climate Change, World Bank*

19:30 Dinner

Saturday, April 18, 2009

08:00 – 09:00 Buffet Breakfast

09:00 – 10:30 **Session 3: Strengthening the International Architecture for Commitments and Action**

How can we strengthen global commitments to combat climate change? What is nationally appropriate, and what is internationally verifiable? What are the implications of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities? How can we strike a realistic balance between commitments and actions?

Chair

Mrs. Dewi Savitri Wahab, *Counselor, Permanent Mission of the Republic of Indonesia to the United Nations*

Speakers

Mr. Xu Huaqing, *Director of Energy, Environment, and Climate Change Center, Energy Research Institute*
 Ms. Maria Ivanova, *Director, Global Environmental Governance Project, Yale Center for Environmental Law and Policy*

10:30 – 10:45 Coffee Break

10:45 – 12:15 **Session 4: Need for Institutional Arrangements to Support Developing Countries: Win-Win Approaches to Build Capacity and Transfer Technology**

How can we strengthen capacity-building mechanisms and technology transfer systems for an effective global architecture? What are the strengths and weaknesses in current institutional mechanisms? What type of institutional arrangements do we need? What role should the international community play, including international financial institutions?

Chair

Mr. Selwin Hart, *First Secretary, Permanent Mission of Barbados to the United Nations*

Speakers

Mr. Johan Schaar, *Director, Commission for Climate Change and Development*
 Mr. Adnan Amin, *Director, United Nations System Chief Executives Board for Coordination, Former Director, United Nations Environment Program New York Office*

12:15 – 13:30 Lunch

13:30 – 14:45 **Workshops to Think Creatively and Draw Conclusions**

- 14:45 – 15:00 Coffee Break
- 15:00 – 15:45 Reports from Workshops and Discussion
- 15:45 – 16:00 **Wrap-up and Farewell by Co-hosts**

Mr. Warren Hoge

Mr. Asad Majeed Khan, *Minister, Permanent Mission of Pakistan to the United Nations*

Mr. Jakob Ström

ANNEX II: List of Participants

State and UN Representatives

Mr. Jeremy Adler

Permanent Mission of Canada to the United Nations

Mr. Tariq K. Al-Fayez

Permanent Mission of Saudi Arabia to the United Nations

Mr. Md. Abdul Alim

Permanent Mission of Bangladesh to the United Nations

Mr. Damphey Bediako Asare

Permanent Mission of Ghana to the United Nations

Mr. Paulo José Chiarelli Vicente de Azevedo

Permanent Mission of Brazil to the United Nations

Mr. Denis Baresch

Delegation of the European Commission to the United Nations

Ms. Baya Bensmail

Permanent Mission of Algeria to the United Nations

Ms. Ana Bianchi

Permanent Mission of Argentina to the United Nations

H.E. Mr. Lumumba Stanislaus-Kaw Di-Aping

Permanent Mission of the Republic of the Sudan to the United Nations

Mr. Selwin Hart

Permanent Mission of Barbados to the United Nations

Ms. Barbara Hendrie

Permanent Mission of the United Kingdom to the United Nations

Mr. Erik Høeg

Permanent Mission of Denmark to the United Nations

Ms. Freya Jackson

Permanent Mission of the United Kingdom to the United Nations

Mr. Benito Jimenez

Permanent Mission of Mexico to the United Nations

Mr. Asad Majeed Khan

Permanent Mission of Pakistan to the United Nations

Mr. Sergey B. Kononuchenko

Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations

Mr. Li Kexin

Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the United Nations

Mr. Fredrick Lusambili Matwang'a

Permanent Mission of Kenya to the United Nations

Mr. Kazuya Otsuka

Permanent Mission of Japan to the United Nations

H.E. Mr. Manjeev S. Puri

Permanent Mission of India to the United Nations

Mr. Robert Rohde

Permanent Mission of Germany to the United Nations

Mr. Danilo Rosales Diaz

Permanent Mission of Nicaragua to the United Nations

Mr. Kai-Uwe Schmidt

Secretary General's Climate Change Support Team

Mr. Michael Snowden
United States Mission to the United Nations

Mr. Jakob Ström
Permanent Mission of Sweden to the
United Nations

Ms. Claire Thuaudet
Permanent Mission of France to the
United Nations

Mrs. Dewi Savitri Wahab
Permanent Mission of the Republic of Indonesia
to the United Nations

Ms. Suhayfa Zia
Permanent Mission of the Republic of
South Africa to the United Nations

Speakers

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Director, United Nations System Chief Executives
Board for Coordination

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Director, Division for Sustainable Development,
United Nations Department of Economic and
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Development

Ms. Margareta Wahlström
Assistant Secretary-General for Disaster Risk
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IPI Staff

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Vice President for External Relations

Ms. Svanhildur Thorvaldsdottir
Senior Program Officer

Ms. Pim Valdre
Director of External Relations

The **INTERNATIONAL PEACE INSTITUTE (IPI)** is an independent, international not-for-profit think tank with a staff representing more than twenty nationalities, located in New York across from United Nations headquarters. IPI is dedicated to promoting the prevention and settlement of conflicts between and within states by strengthening international peace and security institutions. To achieve its purpose, IPI employs a mix of policy research, convening, publishing, and outreach.



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