### Cover Image

New AU-UN Deputy Joint Special Representative Arrives in North Darfur. Aïchatou Mindaoudou Souleymane (left), Deputy Joint Special Representative for Political Affairs in the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), arrives at El Fasher, North Darfur, Sudan. June 30, 2011. UN Photo/Olivier Chassot.

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# Abbreviations

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACOTA</td>
<td>Africa Contingency Operations Training Assistance</td>
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<td>AFISMA</td>
<td>African-led International Support Mission in Mali</td>
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<td>AMIB</td>
<td>African Mission in Burundi</td>
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<td>AMIS</td>
<td>African Mission in Sudan</td>
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<td>AMISEC</td>
<td>African Union Mission for Support to the Elections in the Comoros</td>
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<td>AMISOM</td>
<td>African Union Mission in Somalia</td>
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<td>AMU</td>
<td>Arab Maghreb Union</td>
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<td>APSA</td>
<td>African Peace and Security Architecture</td>
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<td>ASF</td>
<td>African Standby Force</td>
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<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAR</td>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
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<td>CEN-SAD</td>
<td>Community of Sahel-Saharan States</td>
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<td>CEWS</td>
<td>Continental Early Warning System</td>
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<td>COMESA</td>
<td>Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa</td>
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<td>DFS</td>
<td>UN Department of Field Support</td>
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<td>DPA</td>
<td>UN Department of Political Affairs</td>
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<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of the Congo</td>
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<td>EAC</td>
<td>East African Community</td>
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<td>ECCAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of Central African States</td>
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<tr>
<td>DPKO</td>
<td>UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOMOG</td>
<td>ECOWAS Monitoring Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>EUFOR</td>
<td>EU Force</td>
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<td>FOMUC</td>
<td>Multinational Force in the CAR</td>
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<td>GPOI</td>
<td>G8 Global Peace Operations Initiative</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>IGAD</td>
<td>Intergovernmental Authority on Development</td>
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<td>JTF</td>
<td>UN-AU Joint Task Force on Peace and Security</td>
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<td>LRA</td>
<td>Lord's Resistance Army</td>
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<td>MAES</td>
<td>AU Electoral and Security Assistance Mission to the Comoros</td>
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<td>MICOPAX</td>
<td>Mission for the Consolidation of Peace in the CAR</td>
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<td>MIOC</td>
<td>AU Military Observer Mission in the Comoros</td>
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<td>PCC</td>
<td>Police-Contributing Country</td>
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<td>PSC</td>
<td>Peace and Security Council of the African Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>RCI-LRA</td>
<td>Regional Cooperation Initiative for the Elimination of the LRA</td>
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<td>REC</td>
<td>African Regional Economic Community</td>
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<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
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<td>TCC</td>
<td>Troop-Contributing Country</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNAMID</td>
<td>AU-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur</td>
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<td>UNOAU</td>
<td>UN Office to the African Union</td>
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<td>UNPOS</td>
<td>UN Political Office for Somalia</td>
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<td>UNSOA</td>
<td>UN Support Office for AMISOM</td>
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Executive Summary

Both the United Nations (UN) Security Council and the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African Union (AU) have a vested interest in conducting more effective peace operations in Africa. Both councils want to build on the various UN-AU peace and security coordination mechanisms that have been established since 2006 and support the implementation of the AU’s principle of “non-indifference.” In many respects, considerable progress has been made with the UN and AU enjoying a deep, multidimensional and maturing relationship. Yet disagreements remain over how best to respond to particular peace and security challenges in Africa, and the AU still suffers from important capability gaps with respect to peace operations.

This paper analyzes the evolution of collaboration between the two councils on peace operations and asks how the institutions can cooperate more effectively in this area. After providing an overview of UN-AU collaboration on peace and security issues in general and peace operations in particular, we analyze the AU Mission in Somalia as a crucial case that exemplifies some of the positive and negative aspects of the UN-AU relationship. The paper then summarizes some of the ongoing challenges that will need to be overcome if the two councils are to optimize their collaboration and deploy legitimate and effective peace operations. It concludes by offering some practical recommendations for enhancing UN-AU relations in this area.

The central challenges blocking more effective AU-UN collaboration on peace operations can be identified across three dimensions: the strategic, political relationship between the two councils; the bureaucratic and organizational interaction between the two councils; and intra-AU dynamics, namely, relations among the AU Commission, the Peace and Security Council, and AU member states.

We offer practical recommendations designed to address each of these dimensions by the following:

- harmonizing the decision-making processes of the two councils;
- filling some of the key capability gaps in the AU’s representation in New York; and
- developing more efficient communication mechanisms between the elected African members of the UN Security Council and the AU’s Peace and Security Council in Addis Ababa.

Introduction

This paper analyzes the recent history of relations between the United Nations (UN) Security Council and the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the African Union (AU) with respect to peace operations. Collaboration in this area was born out of the comparative advantages of both institutions, but it has suffered from several problems, including the AU’s weak bureaucratic, logistical, and financial capabilities. This has resulted in an unequal partnership where the AU’s major peace operations remain dependent on the UN and other partners for support.

Nevertheless, peace operations in Africa are once again in high demand with possible new deployments in the Central African Republic (CAR), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Mali, and Sudan. UN deployments in Africa remain steady with approximately 80 percent of all blue helmets deployed on the continent, although the UN is currently debating whether to deploy another large UN multidimensional peace operation to Mali. AU deployments have also increased to an all-time high, largely due to AU-UN collaboration in the Somalia and Mali theaters.

Nevertheless, in an important statement of its position on the relationship with the UN, in January 2012 the AU lamented that “while consultations [between the two councils] represent a significant step in the right direction, they are yet to translate into a common understanding of the foundation of the cooperation between these two organs.” But this may be changing. Both councils want to move forward and build on the various

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1 We use “peace operations” as a generic term for UN and AU field missions. The UN generally uses the terms “peacekeeping operations” (PKOs) and “special political missions” (SPMs), while the AU refers to its missions as “peace support operations” (PSOs).


UN-AU peace and security coordination mechanisms that have been established since 2006 (see Annex) and support the implementation of the AU’s principle of “non-indifference.” Of particular importance, in February 2012, the UN Security Council endorsed the expansion of the UN support package for the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and an increase of its uniformed personnel from 12,000 to 17,731. This decision followed a joint AU-UN planning process, which both organizations praised. In late 2012 and early 2013, the UN and AU both conducted strategic reviews of their engagement with Somalia and in March 2013, UN Security Council Resolution 2093 extended AMISOM’s mandate for another year with the same UN logistical support package, but in tandem with a new expanded UN special political mission.

The Security Council’s endorsement of an African-led Regional Cooperation Initiative against the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in June 2012 was also the result of a collaborative approach that included joint UN-AU assessment missions. A similar collaborative AU-UN approach has since been replicated in responding to the crisis in Mali, together with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). This led to the UN Security Council authorizing an African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA) in December 2012.

These cases of improved UN-AU collaboration have been sensitive to the challenges of the specific contexts in question and are the fruit of years of technical support and partnerships forged since the

Figure 1: Uniformed Personnel Deployed by African Union Member States in UN and AU Missions (July 31st annual)

<table>
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<th>AMIB (2003-04), the first AU mission, with 3,250 troops, was absorbed by ONUB in June 2004.</th>
<th>AMIS (2004-07) went from 150 troops initially, up to 2,800 in 2005 and 7,000 in 2006, before being absorbed into UNAMID from January 2008.</th>
<th>AMISOM (2007-present) had an initial authorized strength of 8,000 but only reached 6,000 troops deployed in 2010. It grew to 9,000 troops in 2011, before the 2012 surge to 17,731.</th>
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<td>African troops in UN missions</td>
<td>African troops in AU missions</td>
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creation of the AU. But this has not always been the case. During their May 2011 annual consultative meeting, for instance, members of the two councils exhibited major differences over how best to respond to the crises in Libya and Côte d’Ivoire and over the financing of the AU Mission in Somalia. Cases of successful UN-AU collaboration on peace operations have thus remained largely context specific, resulting from the convergence of the political agendas of the UN Security Council and the AU’s Peace and Security Council.

The current crisis in Mali also exposed different perspectives of the two organizations, this time over financial rather than political issues: although the UN Security Council authorized AFISMA, it did not follow the AU’s request to create a UN-funded support package for the mission as it had done in the case of AMISOM. As it turned out, France’s “Operation Serval,” launched on January 11, 2013, dramatically altered both the dynamics on the ground and the terms of the international response. Following a request from the Malian authorities to counter the advance of Islamist militants, some 4,000 French troops conducted a rapid series of operations, which by the end of January had retaken all the major population centers in northern Mali and displaced the rebels. This rapid success prompted an acceleration of AFISMA’s deployment timetable. Originally planned for September 2013, African states began deploying troops immediately with the help of various Western donors and pledged approximately 6,000 soldiers. In the absence of a UN support package, however, the AU organized an emergency donor conference on January 29th in Addis Ababa where donors pledged an initial $450 million in support of AFISMA. The AU also decided to allocate $50 million to AFISMA, which is the first time in the history of the organization that its budget has been used to support a non-UN peace operation. By March 2013 AFISMA’s concept of operations was adopted, which set the mission strength at just under 9,450 uniformed personnel, as Council discussions of a re-hatting into a UN peacekeeping mission also began.

Despite the proliferation of UN-AU coordination mechanisms and a growing mutual recognition that each institution has its comparative advantages, there is still significant scope for enhancing collaboration between the two councils. Moreover, several factors suggest that the time is now ripe to do so. First, the relatively cooperative joint planning processes that have occurred with regard to peace operations in Somalia (since late 2011) and Mali (since mid-2012) and their subsequent endorsement by the Security Council may signal growing convergence in how the UN and AU design peace operations. Moreover, the mutual dependence we describe in this paper is encouraging the two organizations to put aside some of their major differences for practical reasons in at least some contexts. Second, the recent UN and AU strategic reviews of their activities in Somalia also provide an opportunity to reflect on common lessons learned and how shared analysis might enhance collaboration in this difficult theater. Third, the appointment of the new chairperson of the AU Commission in 2012 may provide an opportunity to strengthen the AU politically, while encouraging its member states to be more engaged financially and to deploy more peacekeepers. Fourth, the election to the UN Security Council of Rwanda and Togo, both of which have made major contributions to peace operations in recent years, presents an opportunity for the further bridging of gaps between the two councils and ensuring high-level follow-up, in spite of the continental powers South Africa and Nigeria no longer being on the council. (Nevertheless, neither Rwanda nor Togo is currently a member of the AU Peace and Security Council or a major continental power.)

This paper analyzes these issues in five parts. The first section provides an overview of UN-AU collaboration on peace and security issues, while the second section focuses on UN-AU collaboration with respect to peace operations. In the third

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4 Prior to this the Organization of African Unity, the AU’s predecessor, had signed a cooperation agreement with the UN on November 15, 1965, which was updated on October 9, 1990 by the two Secretaries-General of the two organizations. Further UN-OAU cooperation with regard to peacekeeping was called for in a variety of UN Security Council and General Assembly resolutions, perhaps most notably Security Council Resolution 1197 (September 18, 1998). This trend has continued with the new AU, including through UN Security Council Resolutions 1809 (April 16, 2008) and 2033 (January 12, 2012).


6 As of March 31, 2013, Rwanda was the 6th largest contributor of uniformed personnel to UN peacekeeping contributions, deploying 4,695, while Togo stood in 32nd place with 710.
section, we provide a brief overview of the AMISOM experience. This has been important not only because it is the largest AU peace operation ever conducted but because it stimulated a variety of unprecedented mechanisms between the two councils. The fourth section elaborates on some of the ongoing challenges that will need to be overcome if the two councils are to optimize their collaboration and deploy legitimate and effective peace operations. The fifth section sets out practical recommendations for addressing these challenges.

**UN-AU Collaboration on Peace and Security**

Collaboration between the UN Security Council and the AU on the specific issues arising from peace operations does not take place in a political vacuum. Rather, it occurs within the broader context of the two institutions’ efforts to address a wide range of peace and security challenges.

The basis for such collaboration is mutual recognition of several important facts. The first is that over the last decade, the majority of the UN Security Council’s agenda has been occupied by peace and security challenges in Africa. Second, both institutions recognize that the UN Security Council has the primary—but not exclusive—responsibility for maintaining international peace and security, including in Africa. But, third, both institutions also acknowledge that no single organization alone can cope with the multitude of peace and security challenges on the African continent. In addition, both institutions recognize that while the AU is an important source of political authority for addressing peace and security challenges in Africa, it lacks the necessary material and financial capabilities to take decisive action alone to resolve these problems.

It was the mutual recognition of these basic facts that influenced the evolution of pragmatic and context-specific forms of collaboration between the two institutions. To date, this collaboration has grown to encompass a variety of mechanisms that are illustrated in the Annex. The first step was the African Union’s decision to create a new peace and security architecture (APSA) for the continent: this would establish a variety of institutions in order to address the entire spectrum of conflict management challenges from early warning and preventive diplomacy to peace operations and post-war peacebuilding initiatives. Shortly thereafter, the UN agreed to assist in that endeavor through its ten-year capacity-building program for the AU. Individual members of the UN Security Council have also helped with the development of the APSA through various mechanisms, perhaps most notably the G8++ Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) and the European Union’s (EU) African Peace Facility, both of which started in 2004.

Since 2007, there have also been periodic meetings between members of the UN Security Council and the AU’s Peace and Security Council. These meetings have discussed a variety of thematic and country-specific items. Considerable tensions arose when discussions turned to the strategic relationship between the two councils, but they were generally more cordial when discussing specific policy questions, with the notable exceptions of the early period of AMISOM and the Libyan crisis of 2011. These meetings naturally placed the African non-permanent members of the UN Security Council in a particularly important position, especially if they were also simultaneously members of the AU Peace and Security Council (see table 1).

The UN has also provided a variety of training packages to the AU designed to improve the performance of the PSC Secretariat and facilitate more effective collaboration between the two councils. The partnership underwent a series of further important reforms in mid-2010 when three important developments took place. First, on July 1, 2010, the UN established a new Office to the

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7 In 2011, for example, Africa accounted for 68 percent of the UN Security Council’s meetings dealing with country-specific/regional situations. 2011 Highlights of Security Council Practice (New York: UN Department of Political Affairs, June 2012), pp.2-3.

8 This is noted, for example, in Article 17(1) of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union (2002). Article 52 of the UN Charter encourages regional arrangements to undertake peaceful resolution of local disputes, including peacekeeping missions, but Article 53 precludes the use of force without prior Security Council authorization.

9 The main institutions of the APSA are the Peace and Security Council, the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), the African Standby Force (ASF), the Panel of the Wise, the Peace Fund, and the Military Staff Committee.
African Union (UNOAU) in Addis Ababa.\footnote{While UNOAU was officially established on July 1, 2010, it did not become effectively operational until late 2011. UNOAU effectively replaced various UN entities that were previously entrusted with supporting AU peace operations. These included the AU Peace Support Team (PST) established in 2007 in DPKO; the Strategic Planning and Management Unit (SPMU) established as a predecessor to the AU PSOD to launch and manage AMISOM, which also included UN planners; and the Darfur Integrated Task Force (DITF) also in Addis Ababa, which included seconded staff from both the UN and EU in support of the AU mission in Darfur (AMIS) and was disbanded when UNAMID was created.} Later that same month the two councils also agreed to undertake “collaborative field missions,” such as the joint AU-UN multidisciplinary mission to the Sahel in December 2011. These were intended to help “enhance synergy in monitoring, assessment of results and response strategies” to peace and security challenges on the continent.\footnote{AU Doc. PSC/PR/2.(CCCVII), January 9, 2012, p.11.} And, third, the UN and AU established the Joint Task Force on Peace and Security (JTF). Meeting for the first time in September 2010, the JTF is jointly chaired by the Under-Secretaries-General of the UN Departments of Political Affairs (DPA), Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), and Field Support (DFS), as well as the AU Commissioners (for peace and security, and for political affairs), and reviews specific issues and countries of common interest to the two organizations.\footnote{In January 2012, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon said the UN-AU Joint Task Force “has proven to be an effective mechanism for consultations on an array of issues including Côte d’Ivoire, Libya, Somalia, and Sudan.” Remarks to the UN Security Council, January 12, 2012, available at \url{http://www.un.org/apps/news/infocus/sgspeeches/statements_full.asp?staffID=14258&LID=10}. At its sixth consultative meeting held in Addis Ababa in January 2013, the JTF reviewed the situations in Mali, Somalia, eastern DRC, Central African Republic, Guinea Bissau as well as the AU-led Regional Cooperation Initiative against the LRA, and the activities of the AU’s Panel of the Wise on election-related issues in Africa.}

Despite the proliferation of mechanisms, the evolving relationship between the two councils and UN-AU collaboration more broadly continues to confront four major (and one potential) challenges. PRINCIPLE AND PRAGMATISM

The first challenge is generic to all efforts to develop cooperative frameworks between multifaceted institutions, namely, that the existence of such general frameworks does not automatically generate consensus on how to act in particular crises. Moreover, attempts to perfect and institutionalize collaborative mechanisms between the two councils runs the risk of creating inflexible structures that can become redundant when powerful actors feel too constrained by such mechanisms and work around them to create facts on the ground. While most members of both councils appear to support the idea that UN-AU cooperation would be enhanced by moving from context-specific to more predictable mechanisms, such initiatives also run into the perennial problem of how to operationalize the spirit of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter of 1945, which was designed in a very different era of global-regional security collaboration and preceded the creation of most of today’s regional organizations. Here, two questions
must be addressed: (1) what should a strategic partnership between the UN Security Council and a regional arrangement entail in practice; and (2) to what extent can the UN Security Council forge a special relationship with the AU without setting a precedent for other regions of the world? Given the large proportion of time the UN Security Council spends addressing peace and security challenges in Africa, a good case can be made that business-as-usual is not the correct response.

WHAT DOES THE AU WANT?

A second issue is figuring out how to interpret the AU’s position “that its requests should, at a minimum, be duly considered by the UN Security Council.” At the UN Security Council, this has stimulated significant political differences between some African and non-African members. On the African side, some states feel the UN Security Council does not always respect the AU’s views. For example, at the January 2012 UN Security Council debate on cooperation between the UN and regional organizations in maintaining international peace and security, Kenya’s then foreign minister, Moses Wetangula, argued that “The practice in the past two years seems to indicate an undesirable trend that appears to be selective on the part of the Security Council and that seems to disregard full consideration of the position and/or recommendations of the AU or its organs.” At the other end of the spectrum, US Ambassador Susan Rice, emphasized that,

... some Security Council members feel that African Union member States have not always provided unified or consistent views on key issues, and that the African Union has on occasion been slow to act on urgent matters. Beneath those perceptions and frustrations, however, is a deeper issue, that is who is on first?... The Security Council is not subordinate to other bodies, or to the schedules or capacities of regional or subregional groups.... [UN-regional] cooperation cannot be on the basis that the regional organization independently decides the policy and that the United Nations Member States simply bless it and pay for it. There can be no blank check, either politically or financially.

UN RELATIONS WITH AFRICA’S SUB-REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS

A third challenge is the unresolved question of the UN Security Council’s relationship with the African regional economic communities (RECs), which also stems, in part, from the vague nature of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. In practice, the AU has tried to establish a subsidiarity principle to harmonize and coordinate its relations with the continent’s RECs and relevant peace and security coordinating mechanisms. In theory, therefore, if the UN Security Council could coordinate its position with the AU, it should, by default, also be coordinated with the relevant REC (or RECs). However, Chapter VIII of the UN Charter does not distinguish between regional and sub-regional arrangements, thus the AU and the RECs all constitute regional arrangements and they do not necessarily exist in a hierarchical relationship.

This opens the door for several potential issues to arise. First, there is the question of which regional arrangement the UN Security Council should coordinate with when different arrangements take different positions on particular peace and security challenges on the African continent. This question was posed most sharply by the crisis in Libya in early 2011 where the AU and the League of Arab States took very different positions on how to respond (and the UN endorsed the Arab League’s position rather than the AU’s).

A second challenge could emerge when the relationship between the AU and the relevant REC (or RECs) is unclear and their policy responses to a particular crisis diverge, as occurred between the AU and ECOWAS during the crisis in Côte d’Ivoire during late 2010 and 2011 or in the initial international response to the crisis in Mali in 2012. According to Article 16.1(a) of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the PSC (2002), the PSC shall “harmonize and coordinate the activities of Regional Mechanisms in the field of peace, security and stability to ensure that these activities are consistent with the objectives and principles of the Union.

16 The AU has signed a memorandum of understanding on peace and security issues with eight RECs (AMU, CEN-SAD, COMESA, EAC, ECCAS, ECOWAS, IGAD, and SADC) and two coordinating mechanisms (EASBRIGCOM and NARC). See Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in the Area of Peace and Security Between the African Union, the Regional Economic Communities and the Coordinating Mechanisms of the Regional Standby Brigades of Eastern Africa and Northern Africa (Signed in Algiers, June 2008).
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as follows. The UN’s peacekeeping philosophy

about peace operations can be summarized quickly

contours of their philosophical disagreements

operations evident at the UN and AU. The basic

A fourth challenge is the divergent views on peace

A third complicating factor stems from the

overlapping but distinct memberships apparent in

how the AU’s “regions” are defined for peace and

security purposes. Most notable are the different

but sometimes overlapping memberships apparent in

the eight RECs (see map 1), the five regional

standby forces, and the five regions that are used as

the basis for membership of the AU’s Peace and

Security Council.

Finally, difficulties can also arise when the

available REC frameworks do not map neatly onto

the policy challenge at hand. As the recent case of

Mali demonstrates, ECOWAS mechanisms alone

were not optimally configured for responding to

the crisis, which required instruments that involved

Algeria, Chad, and other non-ECOWAS states.

DIVEROEGENT vieWS oF PEACe OPERATIONS

A fourth challenge is the divergent views on peace

operations evident at the UN and AU. The basic

contours of their philosophical disagreements about peace operations can be summarized quickly as follows. The UN’s peacekeeping philosophy derives from the lessons learned over the past six decades and nearly seventy missions. These are that

peacekeeping is unlikely to succeed where one or more of the following conditions are not in place: (1) a peace to keep, where the signing of a ceasefire or peace agreement is one (but not the only) important indicator of when parties are genuinely seeking peace; (2) positive regional engagement; (3) the full backing of a United Security Council; and (4) a clear and achievable mandate with resources to match.\(^\text{17}\) UN peacekeeping also continues to operate based on three core principles: 1) consent of the parties, particularly of the host country government; 2) impartiality; and 3) non-use of force except in self-defense and defense of the mandate. These principles come under intense scrutiny in some conflict zones and have at times limited the efficacy of the UN’s peacekeepers. This has also led some African states to criticize the UN for failing to provide an adequate response to the changing nature of peace and security challenges on the continent, which may require different responses (such as Somalia and eastern DRC), and for lacking consistency in the application of UN principles when providing logistical and financial support to the AU’s enforcement mission in Somalia (AMISOM) but not in Mali (AFISMA). Certain African troop contributors have also displayed a greater willingness to engage in peace enforcement activities on the continent, whether within the framework of an AU mission (AMISOM and AFISMA) or a UN mission (the intervention brigade within MONUSCO).\(^\text{18}\)

The AU’s philosophy, of what it calls peace support operations, is significantly different, in part because they are intended to address the entire spectrum of conflict management challenges. As articulated in its major report on UN-AU cooperation released in January 2012, the AU argued that the UN’s peacekeeping doctrine renders it unable to “deploy a peace mission ... in a situation like Somalia ... even though significant advances have been made on the ground” [in this case by AMISOM]. Unlike the UN, the AU has therefore developed “a different peacekeeping doctrine;

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\(^{18}\) The UN Security Council passed Resolution 2098 on March 29, 2013, calling for the deployment of an “intervention brigade” that can use offensive combat operations to “neutralize and disarm” Congolese rebel groups, in particular the M23 rebels responsible for temporarily taking over the city of Goma in the eastern DRC at the end of last year. The brigade would be composed of 3,069 troops from Southern African Development Community (SADC) countries notably South Africa, Tanzania, and Malawi, and will deploy for one year within MONUSCO and under the command of the MONUSCO force commander. Some MONUSCO troop contributors have expressed concerns that such enforcement operations may threaten the safety of the entire peacekeeping force. Others have argued that this is not that new since MONUSCO is already authorized to conduct offensive operations under its Chapter VII mandate, under which the Rules of Engagement (ROE) authorize the use of force beyond self-defense.
Map 1

REGIONAL ECONOMIC COMMUNITIES RECOGNIZED BY THE AFRICAN UNION

PROPOSED AFRICAN STANDBY FORCE ARRANGEMENT REGIONS

AFRICAN REGIONAL ECONOMIC COMMUNITIES
- Arab Maghreb Union (UMA)
- Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS)
- Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)
- Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD)
- Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)
- East African Community (EAC)
- Southern African Development Community (SADC)
- Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA)

AFRICAN STANDBY FORCES
- North African Standby Force (NASF)
- Central African Standby Force (CASF)
- Eastern African Standby Force (EASF)
- SADC Standby Force (SASF)
- ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF)

Source: Natural Earth and African Union Documents | Chris Perry
instead of waiting for a peace to keep, the AU views peacekeeping as an opportunity to establish peace before keeping it.”

These different views can give rise to significantly divergent notions of the purpose, configuration, and force requirements for peace operations within the UN and AU. Arguably the most pertinent example of such divergence is the AMISOM operation where in December 2006 the UN and AU disagreed on whether the deployment of a peace operation was the appropriate response to the situation in Mogadishu. This crucial case is discussed in more detail in Section 3 (below).

**A POTENTIAL CHALLENGE: AU HUMANITARIAN MILITARY INTERVENTION**

A fifth potential challenge revolves around the issue of “humanitarian military intervention”: which entity can authorize the use of military force for humanitarian purposes on the African continent? Here, the source of tension is Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act of the AU, which the Assembly claims gives it the right to intervene in its member states in “grave circumstances,” namely, genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. Under the terms of the UN Charter, however, it seems clear that the use of military force against a sovereign government can only be used in self-defense or with the express authorization of the UN Security Council. To date this issue has not posed significant problems because the AU has not invoked Article 4(h) to justify a humanitarian military intervention, although it has invoked it in relation to the trial of Hissène Habré, the former president of Chad.

**Dynamic Partnerships in Peace Operations**

Collaboration between the UN and the AU on peace and security issues in Africa has arguably been most dynamic in the area of peace operations. During the 1990s, most of the large peace operations in Africa were conducted by the UN or by African regional arrangements, particularly by ECOWAS, which deployed troops in several civil wars in West Africa, only receiving the UN Security Council’s blessing post facto (see table 2). During the 2000s, however, there was a dramatic increase in UN peacekeeping, especially in Africa where the

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Duration</th>
<th>Size (approx. max)</th>
<th>Main Task(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ECOMOG 1</td>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>1990-9</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>Enforcement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOMOG 2</td>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>1997-2000</td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>Enforcement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MISAB</td>
<td>CAR</td>
<td>1997-8</td>
<td>1,100</td>
<td>Peacebuilding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOMOG 3</td>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>1998-9</td>
<td>c.750</td>
<td>Peacebuilding/ Enforcement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation Boleas (SADC)</td>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>1998-9</td>
<td>3,850</td>
<td>Enforcement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation Sovereign</td>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>1998-2002</td>
<td>15,500</td>
<td>Enforcement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legitimacy (SADC)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEN-SAD operation</td>
<td>CAR</td>
<td>2001-2</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>Peacebuilding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOMUC</td>
<td>CAR</td>
<td>2002-Present</td>
<td>380</td>
<td>Peacebuilding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(became MICOPAX)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGAD Verification</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>2003-5</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>Observation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monitoring Team</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOFORCE</td>
<td>Côte d'Ivoire</td>
<td>2003-4</td>
<td>c.1,500</td>
<td>Peacebuilding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(became ECOMICI)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOMIL</td>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>2003-4</td>
<td>3,600</td>
<td>Peacebuilding</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

20 We define humanitarian military intervention as the use of military force by external actors without host state consent aimed at preventing or ending genocide and mass atrocities.
21 Article 53 of the UN Charter states: “no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council.”
majority of UN “blue helmets” were deployed to some of the organization’s largest missions in the two Sudans and the DRC (see table 3).

The creation of the African Union in 2002 opened a new era in African-led peace operations, with three major missions in Burundi (AMIB, 2003), Darfur (AMIS, 2004), and Somalia (AMISOM, 2007), as well as a number of smaller monitoring and electoral support and security missions, principally in the Comoros (see table 4). While the missions in Burundi, Sudan, and Somalia were initially conceived as interim “bridging” missions in preparation for a larger and longer-term multidimensional UN presence, they actually evolved into different forms of longer-term partnerships between the UN and AU rather than simple takeovers.

It is also notable that during this period the ability of African states to field considerable numbers of uniformed peacekeepers increased significantly. This is in large part due to the support provided in various train and equip programs, perhaps most notably by the US Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program. Since 2009, African states have contributed some 35,000 UN peacekeepers (see figure 1) in addition to those deployed on the AU’s missions. Nevertheless, it is notable that the majority of these uniformed peacekeepers are coming from less than 20 percent of the AU’s members (see figure 2).

These UN-AU partnerships were, however, the result of particular political and security circumstances that motivated the two organizations to develop pragmatic solutions. They did not result from a joint AU-UN assessment of the situation and shared vision of how to address it. Indeed, the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) was set up in large part because the UN Security Council would not authorize a peacekeeping operation in the absence of a comprehensive ceasefire agreement. AMIB thereafter usefully prepared the ground for

Figure 2: Origin of UN Uniformed Peacekeepers, 2000-2012 (December 31st annual)

23 The top seven African Union TCC/PCCs to UN peacekeeping operations have varied since 2000, but as of January 2013 they were Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, and South Africa.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Duration</th>
<th>Size (approx. max)</th>
<th>Main Task(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MINURSO</td>
<td>Western Sahara</td>
<td>1991-</td>
<td>237</td>
<td>Peacekeeping</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINURCA</td>
<td>CAR</td>
<td>1998-00</td>
<td>1,350</td>
<td>Peacebuilding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMSIL</td>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>1999-05</td>
<td>17,670</td>
<td>Peacebuilding / Enforcement / Civilian protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MONUC</td>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>1999-2010</td>
<td>c.18,600</td>
<td>Peacebuilding / Enforcement / Civilian protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMEE</td>
<td>Ethiopia-Eritrea</td>
<td>2000-08</td>
<td>4,200</td>
<td>Peacekeeping</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINUCI</td>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>2003-04</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>Observation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIL</td>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>2003-</td>
<td>c.16,100</td>
<td>Peacebuilding / Civilian protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOCI</td>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>2004-</td>
<td>c.9,200</td>
<td>Peacebuilding / Enforcement / Civilian protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONUB</td>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>2004-06</td>
<td>6,100</td>
<td>Peacebuilding / Civilian protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIS</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>2005-11</td>
<td>c.10,100</td>
<td>Peacebuilding / Civilian protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINURCAT</td>
<td>CAR and Chad</td>
<td>2007-10</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>Civilian protection / Humanitarian assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMID</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>2008-</td>
<td>16,400</td>
<td>Peacebuilding / Civilian protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MONUSCO</td>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>2010-</td>
<td>c.19,100</td>
<td>Peacebuilding / Enforcement / Civilian protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMISS</td>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>2011-</td>
<td>c.7,100</td>
<td>Peacebuilding / Civilian protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNISFA</td>
<td>Abyei (Sudan / South Sudan)</td>
<td>2011-</td>
<td>c.4,000</td>
<td>Demilitarize Abyei / Civilian protection</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: African Union Peace Operations, 2003-2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Duration</th>
<th>Size (approx. max)</th>
<th>Finance Method</th>
<th>Key TCCs/ PCCs</th>
<th>Main Task(s)</th>
<th>Main Achievements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AU Mission in Burundi (AMIB)</td>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>2003-4</td>
<td>3,250</td>
<td>TCCs + donors</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>Peacebuilding</td>
<td>Enforcement; DDR; facilitated humanitarian assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AU Military Observer Mission in the Comoros (MIOC)</td>
<td>Comoros</td>
<td>2004</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>TCCs</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>Observation</td>
<td>Facilitated and secured the electoral process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS) [re-hatted into UNAMID]</td>
<td>Darfur</td>
<td>2004-7</td>
<td>c. 7,700</td>
<td>TCCs + EU + UN support packages</td>
<td>Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa, Senegal, Ghana</td>
<td>Peacekeeping / Civilian protection</td>
<td>Protected (some) civilians, facilitated humanitarian assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Task Force Burundi</td>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>2006-9</td>
<td>c. 750</td>
<td>TCC</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>VIP protection</td>
<td>VIP protection for negotiating rebel leaders; DDR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AU Mission for Support to the Elections in the Comoros (AMISEC)</td>
<td>Comoros</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>1,260</td>
<td>TCCs + EU support</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>Election Monitor</td>
<td>Monitored elections; keep security forces out of elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>2007-</td>
<td>17,731</td>
<td>a) TCCs + donors  b) UN + donors</td>
<td>Uganda, Burundi, later Kenya</td>
<td>Protection of government, counter-insurgency</td>
<td>Protected TFG; degraded insurgents; facilitated humanitarian relief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AU Electoral and Security Assistance Mission to the Comoros (MAES)</td>
<td>Comoros</td>
<td>2007-8</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>TCCs + EU + Arab League</td>
<td>South Africa, Tanzania</td>
<td>Election support</td>
<td>Failed to facilitate restoration of constitutional authorities in Anjouan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation Democracy in Comoros</td>
<td>Comoros</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>1,350 + 450</td>
<td>TCCs + donors</td>
<td>Tanzania, Sudan</td>
<td>Enforcement</td>
<td>Removed incumbent illegitimate regime</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
the deployment of a UN peacekeeping mission (ONUB) twelve months later, and most of its approximately 3,000 troops “re-hatted” into the UN mission. While AMIB faced considerable logistical and funding challenges, it contributed to stabilizing the country and demonstrated a willingness and ability of the AU and some of its African member states, to take on peace enforcement mandates. When the Government of Burundi asked for the departure of UN peacekeepers in 2006, it agreed to the AU maintaining one battalion in Burundi, which proved crucial in supporting the follow-on UN peacebuilding presence (BINUB) as it carried out the remaining tasks of the peace process.

Similarly, in 2006, the UN and AU had agreed to replace the African Mission in Sudan (AMIS) with a larger and better equipped UN peacekeeping operation. After the Sudanese government opposed the deployment of such a UN force and insisted on the mission retaining its predominantly African character, AMIS was eventually replaced by a first-of-its-kind UN-AU Hybrid Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) at the end of 2007. In the interim period, AMIS was assisted by an EU support package as well as the UN’s so-called “light” and “heavy” assistance packages, which helped with planning functions and logistics. In the lead up to the creation of UNAMID, the UN assistance mission to the AU in Addis Ababa, as well as the two joint AU-UN technical missions carried out in Darfur and the joint reports to the two councils, all contributed to starting technical cooperation between the two organizations, which would later reappear in relation to AMISOM. As discussed in section 3 of this paper, in late 2006, the AU had also initially envisaged a UN operation taking over from its mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and requested the UN to support the planning and preparation for AMISOM’s deployment.

These three experiences helped both organizations agree that no single actor can effectively address the entire peacekeeping burden in Africa. They also shed light on the comparative advantages of the AU over the UN in certain African contexts. First, the AU (and regional organizations) can deploy troops from neighboring countries quicker and cheaper than the UN, which tends to deploy larger and more costly multidimensional operations. Second, AU-mandated troops can carry out peace enforcement tasks in contexts where the absence of a comprehensive ceasefire agreement or political settlement may prevent the UN from deploying a peacekeeping operation, and/or where UN troop-contributing countries (TCCs) would be more reluctant to send troops. Third, the AU and African troops can sometimes add political legitimacy and leverage to a peace operation, especially in contexts where the host government and/or sub-region may not welcome a UN presence.

In sum, where the political agendas of the two councils coincided, a division of labor evolved whereby the AU provided troops and the UN and other partners provided increasingly comprehensive logistical and financial support packages.

These support models were ad hoc and authorized by the UN Security Council on a case-by-case basis. Under AMIB, bilateral donors provided minimal support to the TCCs through a trust fund but the bulk of the operation was self-financed by the lead state: South Africa. AMIS was largely paid for through direct donor support (primarily the EU) but TCCs also benefited from in-kind enabling support from a number of bilateral partners as well as UN “light” then “heavy” support packages. The re-hatting of the AU mission into the AU-UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) gave it access to the UN-peacekeeping/assessed budget in addition to other forms of UN support. AMISOM went from a direct donor support model similar to that used in AMIS, to one where the UN-peacekeeping/assessed budget supported certain aspects of the AU mission (through UNSOA) while the EU paid for the peacekeepers’ allowances, and other partners provided in-kind support in the form of training and equipment (see section 3 below).

In late 2012, the AU also asked the UN Security Council to adopt this model for the African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA). However, in his report to the Security Council, the UN Secretary-General cautioned that “funda-

24 It should be noted that the case of UNISFA (2011), where the UN rapidly deployed troops from neighboring Ethiopia, would temper this argument.
motional questions on how the force would be led, sustained, trained, equipped and financed remain unanswered.” Based on lessons from the AMISOM experience, the report also emphasized that “the Council play an active role in ensuring that African-led forces and Malian forces engaged in any offensive military operations in the north are held fully accountable for their actions” and that the AU’s “request to the Security Council to authorize a UN support package for an offensive military operation raises serious questions” in terms of the UN’s image, and hence its ability to play other humanitarian and peacekeeping roles. The fact that the Security Council ultimately authorized AFISMA in December 2012, but subsequently denied it the same kind of logistical and financial UN support package as AMISOM, created friction between African TCCs and the AU, and the UN. It also meant that the limited logistical and financial capabilities of some of the African TCCs ensured that AFISMA’s initial deployment timetable suggested a target date of September 2013. As it turned out, France’s Operation Serval launched in January 2013 accelerated the process significantly, but African troops deployed to Mali remained dependent on voluntary contributions to an AU trust fund and support from bilateral donors— which represented a return to the AMIB/AMIS collaborative model. In March 2013, the UN Security Council started discussing the creation of a UN peacekeeping operation in Mali, which would likely absorb troops from AFISMA.

In addition, the counter-LRA Regional Task Force provides a potential fifth model, which consists of a coalition of the willing (four national armies) authorized by the AU and benefiting from in-kind support from bilateral donors (primarily the US), as well as UN peacekeeping operations present in those countries.

While there is no optimal, one-size-fits-all support model for AU operations, the AU’s inability to finance and sustain its own peace operations has made UN-AU partnerships on peace operations highly unequal. The AU has consistently voiced its concerns about the subsequent ad hoc approach and the resulting unequal division of labor. While the AU has deployed—with significant assistance from external actors—into high-risk peace enforcement operations, it has not been able to sustain these operations without external financial and logistical support from donors and the UN. This mutual dependence has pushed the two organizations to set aside some of their major differences for practical and political reasons in some cases (e.g., AMISOM) but not others (e.g., AFISMA). Indeed, the AU has noted that this “major gap between the PSC’s willingness to authorize such missions and the AU’s ability to implement them” risks undermining the credibility of the AU Peace and Security Council.

In this context, the challenges for moving toward more “balanced” and institutionalized collaboration, and ultimately more effective AU-UN strategic partnerships on peace operations occur at three levels: (1) at the political level between the two councils; (2) at the organizational level between the organizations’ bureaucracies; but also (3) intra-AU dynamics, namely, relations among the AU Commission, the PSC, and AU member states.

At the political level, the two organizations must overcome their sometimes divergent interpretations of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter so that they can throw their respective political clout and legitimacy behind peace operations in Africa. On the positive side, the UN and the AU have increasingly recognized their comparative advantages and the need to collaborate. The UN has also had to deal with growing distrust toward its activities displayed by several African host governments, notably Sudan, Chad, and DRC. It is also clear that the current international financial climate is pushing the UN (and the EU) to look for ways to cut costs, including by utilizing special political missions and operations with “lighter footprints.” This makes the AU’s ability to conduct less expensive peace operations considerably more attractive. On the other hand, while the two councils agree on the need “to enhance the

27 In November 2011, the AU Peace and Security Council authorized the Regional Cooperation Initiative for the Elimination of the LRA (RCI-LRA). The Initiative is made up of three components: (1) The Joint Coordination Mechanism located in Bangui, Central African Republic is chaired by the AU Commissioner for Peace and Security and composed of the defense ministers of the affected countries. (2) The Regional Task Force (RTF) comprises some 5,000 troops from the affected countries with a headquarters in Yambio, Republic of South Sudan. (3) The Joint Intelligence and Operations Centre, based in Dungu, Democratic Republic of the Congo, which provides planning and monitoring functions for the RTF.
predictability, sustainability and flexibility of financing of the African Union’s peace and security capability … [and] to enhance the capacity of the African Union in undertaking peacekeeping operations,” there is not always consistency and consensus on how to do this. As noted above, this was made clear during the January 2012 meeting of the UN Security Council on the UN-AU partnership on peace and security when the AU said the UN Security Council must “afford due consideration to our [the AU’s] legitimate requests and address, in a more systematic manner, the funding of AU-led peace support operations undertaken with the consent of the UN.”

The second challenge is for the UN and AU bureaucracies to become more effective partners. Although DPKO was only established in early 1992, the UN has more than sixty years of peacekeeping experience, and currently fields about 95,000 uniformed personnel deployed in field missions costing approximately $8 billion per year. In contrast, the AU is only ten years old, has virtually no dedicated peace operations budget, and therefore has limited headquarters, planning, and logistics capacities. The UN’s ten-year capacity-building program for the AU (2006-2016) and the opening of the UN Office to the AU (UNOAU) in Addis Ababa in 2010 have clearly helped fill some of these gaps. But it is often forgotten that the AU has been expected to build its new capacities while conducting major fire-fighting operations in response to multiple, simultaneous, and ongoing crises across the continent. This has made for a hugely unequal relationship between the two organizations’ bureaucracies, not only in terms of human and financial resources but also in terms of operating procedures. For example, UNOAU has more personnel designated to support the capacity-building of the AU’s Peace Support Operations Division than the AU has for planning and running its peace operations. The unequal personnel levels were also evident in the joint UN-AU assessment missions and reviews where the UN has contributed the large majority of staff and financial and logistical resources. In such circumstances, external assistance packages run the risk of engaging in “capacity-substitution” (where external actors perform tasks for the AU) rather than genuine “capacity-building” (where external actors work with the AU while leaving behind enhanced local capacities). The unequal relationship is also reflected in the UN’s greater ability than the AU to maintain institutional knowledge and information management tools. These inequities make it difficult to consistently replicate successful processes such as the 2012 AMISOM surge.

The third and final challenge relates to what we label intra-AU relations, namely, dynamics between the AU Commission, the PSC, and the AU’s own member states. Here, the AU Commission is working to increase the political and financial commitment of the AU’s member states to the organization’s peace operations. This is essential if the AU wants to become less dependent on external actors. To date, the AU’s peace operations have relied heavily on a handful of troop- and police-contributing states, which also bore the majority of the costs. While there are positive signs that the pool of African TCCs/PCCs is increasing, most of them continue to favor UN-led operations over AU operations, at least in part due to the superior logistical support package and troop and contingent-owned equipment reimbursement rates. For this to change, the AU will have to provide better bureaucratic, logistical, and financial support packages to its operations. On the other hand, it is important to recall that the major TCCs that have worked in AU peace enforcement operations have displayed few caveats, greater willingness to shoulder risks, and brought valuable cultural and language traits to their respective theaters of operation.

A similar commitment gap has emerged in the AU’s financial sector with some AU states failing to pay their annual dues and the Union’s Peace Fund struggling to get deposits from most member states. In theory, as stated in Article 21 of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace

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32 This was exemplified by the transition from AMIS to UNAMID in Darfur when many more African TCCs/PCCs offered to join the mission. Overall, African TCCs increased their share of contribution to UN operations from 29 percent in 2008 to 38 percent in 2011, making about 50 percent of UN troops deployed on the African continent.
33 AU member states will apparently pay only $122,866,637 or 44 percent of the Union’s 2013 budget of $278,226,622.
and Security Council (2002), in relation to peace operations, member state TCCs/PCCs should bear the costs of such operations during the first three months while the AU will reimburse them within a maximum period of six months and then proceed to finance the operation. In reality, however, this system has not worked. A further problem is that the long-term financial repercussions of the domestic turmoil in two of the AU’s largest contributors—Libya and Egypt—remain unclear. Two high-level panels were formed to analyze the financial dimensions of African peace operations: one chaired by former Italian Prime Minister Romano Prodi34 (2008) looked at the issue of peace operations specifically; and one chaired by former Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo (2011) examined alternative sources of financing for the AU more generally. So far, however, neither has produced major changes. Most recently, the two councils have emphasized that “regional organizations have the responsibility to secure human, financial, logistical and other resources for their organizations, including through contributions by their members and support from partners.”35

The AMISOM Experience

The experiences of the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) have exemplified both positive and negative aspects of the UN-AU relationship. AMISOM has been a particularly important test case for the evolution of collaboration between the two councils for several reasons.

1) It is in the laboratory of big missions, like AMISOM, that the UN-AU relationship has been forced to develop.

2) As the only peace operation launched under AU command and control between 2007 and late 2012, AMISOM has been the central focus of subsequent debates about UN-regional cooperation with respect to peace operations.

3) Over the last three years AMISOM became the biggest and most complex peace operation the AU has ever conducted. As such, it starkly exposed the limits of the AU’s capabilities (material, financial, and bureaucratic) and reiterated the importance of finding workable partnerships with various external actors, including the UN.

4) AMISOM was never an “ordinary” peacekeeping operation but was rather tasked with a combination of objectives that revolved around VIP protection, war-fighting, counter-insurgency, and facilitating humanitarian assistance. This has complicated efforts to support it through mechanisms designed for more traditional UN peacekeeping missions.

5) Debates about how to sustain AMISOM led to the creation of an unprecedented UN-AU collaborative mechanism: the UN Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA), which provides logistical support to AMISOM using UN assessed contributions and the AMISOM Trust Fund.36

6) Especially in AMISOM’s early years, the mission exposed some important differences in the UN and AU approaches to peace operations. Most notably, in spite of repeated AU calls for a transition of AMISOM into a “blue helmet” mission, the UN repeatedly refused to deploy a UN force to Mogadishu arguing that the circumstances on the ground were not appropriate for such a blue helmet mission.

7) And, finally, AMISOM has involved more institutional partnerships than arguably any other peace operation in the post-Cold War era.

34 The Prodi Panel noted that while African missions have been able to stabilize certain situations and provide a first response, their capacity to sustain a long-term commitment has been limited. It made a number of recommendations to strengthen the relationship between the AU and UN. These focused primarily on assuring reliable and sustainable funding for AU peace support operations.


36 Established in January 2009 by UN Security Council Resolution 1863, UNSOA provides logistical support in the functional areas of supply (rations, fuel, and general supply); engineering, including construction, power generation and water supply; medical support; aviation; transportation; strategic movement support; equipment repair and maintenance; public information; strategic and tactical communications; and information and technology support. It represents the first time the UN funded a regional peace operation through UN assessed contributions. It was recommended by the Prodi Panel (2008) and was consistent with the UN’s ten-year plan to strengthen the AU’s capacity in peacekeeping. The main problems have been that UNSOA was authorized to provide logistical support to AMISOM as if it were an “ordinary” UN peacekeeping operation, which it was not, and that the UNSOA package focused on the mission’s military component, which caused problems as AMISOM became more multidimensional.
As a consequence, it has involved a more complicated mix of parties than just the UN and AU.

AMISOM was initially established as an exit strategy for the Ethiopian military, which had occupied Mogadishu in order to support Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government (TFG). Its initial deployment was controversial for two main reasons. First, when launching the mission, the Ethiopian delegation broke the Peace and Security Council’s internal rules of procedure, and the AU Commissioner called for the UN Security Council to take over the mission without securing the agreement of the relevant authorities in New York. The net result was that AMISOM did not transition into a UN operation as initially envisaged. Second, most AU states voted with their feet and refused to deploy troops to Mogadishu, in some cases after conducting their own technical assessment missions to the city. Until late 2011, Uganda and Burundi were the only troop-contributing countries: they provided soldiers on a similar model to the donor-support approach used during the AMIB operation in Burundi (2003-04).

Between March 2007 and mid-2011, AMISOM was essentially embroiled in a bloody struggle; caught between various anti-Transitional Federal Government forces—most notably al-Shabaab—fighting for control of the city of Mogadishu. To that end, it received unprecedented UN logistical support from 2009; unprecedented financial support from a range of donors but most importantly the EU, which used its African Peace Facility to pay allowances to AMISOM uniformed personnel; as well as various in-kind (training and equipment) bilateral support packages to its troop-contributing countries (Uganda and Burundi), most notably from the United States.

AMISOM’s major breakthroughs came in August 2011, when al-Shabaab forces withdrew from central Mogadishu, and in late 2011, when Kenyan and Ethiopian forces launched major military operations against al-Shabaab. These operations promoted a major rethink of AMISOM operations. During December 2011, the UN, AU, and a variety of other partners worked together on a Joint Technical Assessment Mission that subsequently produced new strategic and military concepts of operations for AMISOM. The new concepts of operations were endorsed by the AU Peace and Security Council and the UN Security Council on January 5, and February 22, 2012, respectively.38 In January 2012, the UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Somalia moved his office back to Mogadishu after an absence of seventeen years.

It is important to recall that the UN Security Council’s decision to endorse the new concept of operations in February 2012 came nearly eighteen months after it had rejected the AU’s previous request—in late 2010—that it fund an increase in AMISOM’s troop strength to 20,000 personnel. At that stage, the UN’s Military Staff Committee had assessed the AU’s request to be too high. Consequently, UN Security Council Resolution 1964 (December 22, 2010) endorsed a troop increase for AMISOM from 8,000 to only 12,000. The Security Council’s fundamental problem was apparently the lack of clarity about how the AU generated the figure of 20,000, and hence it remained unwilling to finance these extra troops if the AU could not provide the detailed operational military analysis to demonstrate why they were required.

These two very different outcomes suggest that the collaborative process of conducting a Joint Technical Assessment Mission involving AU officials and personnel from the newly established UNOAU (as well as other key partners) was the principal difference that produced the positive result, namely, a mission assessment and a new concept of operations that both councils were prepared to endorse. The establishment of the UNOAU has therefore already delivered important dividends: it has provided the AU with technical and political support, nurtured a more trusting

37 Despite being a key party to the conflict under discussion, the Ethiopian representative played a crucial role in the debate to establish AMISOM. Under Article 8.9 of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union (2002) Ethiopia’s representative should have withdrawn from the deliberations after the briefing session. Article 8.9 states: “Any Member of the Peace and Security Council which is party to a conflict under consideration by the Peace and Security Council shall not participate either in the discussion or the decision making process relating to that conflict or situation. Such Member shall be invited to present its case to the Peace and Security Council as appropriate, and shall, thereafter, withdraw from proceedings.” Instead, the Ethiopian representative even sought to chair the meeting, arguing that her country was not a party to the conflict.

relationship, and helped bring the UN to the AU’s doorstep in Addis Ababa. For its part, it seems clear that the AU also began to view the UNOAU as a valuable partner. This joint approach has since been replicated in devising operational responses to the crisis in Mali (since November 2012).

After AMISOM’s expansion during 2012, the mission made considerable progress: it helped facilitate an end to Somalia’s transitional government; it put al-Shabaab on the back foot; it received pledges of additional troop- and police-contributing countries; it expanded operations across four land sectors covering most of south-central Somalia and a maritime sector (although it lacked significant maritime assets); it established a new force headquarters staffed by personnel from over a dozen African countries, and started moving its mission command to Mogadishu complete with multidimensional components. These advances generated greater confidence within the AU about its own abilities and the once incessant calls for the UN to re-hat AMISOM into a blue helmet mission subsided.

However, with the selection of the new Federal Government of Somalia in August-September 2012 both the AU and the UN decided to re-assess their engagement with the country and both institutions engaged in strategic reviews.

The AU’s review team was formed in mid-December 2012 under the chairmanship of veteran diplomat, Ibrahim Gambari. It had two key tasks: decide how best to engage with the new Federal Government and support its priorities, and find a sustainable solution to AMISOM’s chronic funding problems. In mid-January 2013, the review team announced their conclusion that AMISOM should be transitioned into a new hybrid arrangement with the UN: parallel AU and UN missions joined at the strategic level by a joint special representative. The AU mission, the review team concluded, should remain a large, multi-dimensional force, dedicated to continued peace enforcement activities, like AMISOM but probably with some reconfiguration of the balance between its component parts. It called on the UN to authorize a new peacebuilding office to focus on supporting the Federal Government’s priorities, including the empowerment and restructuring of the Somali security sector. At the heart of this new joint arrangement would be a more predictable source of financial support for the AU mission, which would come via the UN’s assessed contribution peacekeeping budget.

The UN review team, however, reached different conclusions. It quickly ruled out the deployment of a UN peacekeeping operation and instead deliberated among four forms of UN mission configurations short of a blue-helmet operation:

- a UN assistance mission parallel to AMISOM and a UN country team;
- a UN peacebuilding mission parallel to AMISOM and UNSOA;
- an integrated UN peacebuilding mission encompassing UNSOA and the UN’s Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS); and
- a joint AU-UN mission along the lines of UNAMID (The UN/AU hybrid operation in Darfur), with a separate UN country team.

In late January 2013, the UN Secretary-General subsequently recommended the Council establish a new UN Assistance Mission—with additional UNSOA—which would deliver political and peacebuilding support with a presence across Somalia. Probably in light of this decision, the AU moved toward adopting option 2 in its strategic review, i.e., an enhanced AMISOM as an interim prelude to its preferred option of a new joint arrangement.

After a subsequent period of consultations between the UN, the AU, and the Federal Government of Somalia, a new way forward for AMISOM was agreed to in Security Council Resolution 2093 (March 6, 2013). The resolution welcomed “the Strategic Reviews of both the United Nations and the African Union on their presence and engagement in Somalia, and the decisions taken by both organizations to enhance collaboration on the basis of comparative advantage and a clear division of labour, and underlining the importance

39 The funding of maritime assets was a controversial issue during the negotiations of Resolution 2036. While some Council members (India, South Africa, and the US) supported the AU request for an additional expansion of the support package to also cover some maritime assets, this was not included in the resolution. When the issue was reconsidered by the UN in early 2013, however, the Somali government expressed opposition to such an AMISOM maritime component. See the comments by Fawzia Yusuf Adan, Somalia’s Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, in UN Doc. S/PV.6921, February 14, 2013, p.5.

of both organizations improving their coordination with one another.” In this spirit, it authorized a new UN Special Political Mission to work in tandem with an enhanced AMISOM force (at the same level of 17,731 uniformed personnel and with the same UN logistical support package) to, among other things, reduce the threat posed by al-Shabaab and other armed opposition groups, support reconciliation processes, assist in the implementation of Somalia’s new national security plans, to extend the new government’s authority across the country, and to facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance and civilian protection tasks.

**Ongoing Challenges**

Despite the significant progress described above, some major ongoing challenges continue to hamper collaboration between the UN Security Council and the AU Peace and Security Council with respect to peace operations. Our subsequent recommendations are intended to overcome these obstacles and deliver more effective partnerships for peace operations in Africa.

**BUILDING TRUST**

The overarching challenge continues to be a lack of deep trust between the two councils. Building trust takes time and must be earned but this process can be accelerated through repeated collaborative practices on concrete issues, such as through joint planning initiatives and joint assessments missions. This was demonstrated in the last two annual consultations between members of the two councils. These were widely regarded as positive in large part because they purposely avoided discussing the issue of Chapter VIII and focused on specific policy issues rather than broad themes about the relationship between the two councils. The UN Security Council continues to view the AU’s ambitions with some suspicion and for this reason has presented these annual meetings as taking place between individual members of the Security Council—not the council itself as an entity—and the AU Peace and Security Council.

Nevertheless, this issue is unlikely to completely disappear and could resurface the next time the two councils disagree on a specific issue, i.e., the next time the UN Security Council does not endorse a “first call” proposal made by the AU or a REC, or endorses such a proposal but does not provide the expected logistical and financial UN support package, as in the case of the UN-authorized AFISMA in Mali. There is currently no established working procedure for the meetings between the two councils, nor any form of dispute resolution mechanism should the two councils disagree on a specific African peace and security challenge. Moreover, while previous annual consultations have ended in communiqués they have not resulted in concrete actions or action points for the following year.

**CULTURE CLASH?**

Beyond the annual consultations, different bureaucratic cultures have further impeded collaboration between the two councils. Key issues include following:

- the lack of coordination between the monthly agendas of the two councils (while the UN Security Council has a formal public agenda, the AU Peace and Security Council does not) and the agenda for their annual meeting;
- different working methods, including over how the councils adopt communiqués/resolutions; and
- the absence of regular communication between the respective presidents of the two councils.

Timing is also an issue inasmuch as the AU Peace and Security Council rarely meets far enough in advance to feed its positions/decisions into the UN Security Council’s work agenda—for instance, on mandate renewal issues. This can significantly limit the Security Council’s ability to give “due consideration” to the AU Peace and Security Council’s requests. Nor are there currently any standard operating procedures for the AU to submit a request to the Security Council for consideration—whether for financial or diplomatic support.

**JOINT ASSESSMENTS AND AVOIDING CAPACITY SUBSTITUTION**

Despite the establishment of a number of UN-AU peace and security coordination mechanisms since 2007, these have not always resulted in a shared

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41 The AU Commission has a greater role in drafting such documents than the UN Secretariat. In the UN, permanent members of the UN Security Council have the monopoly over “pen holding,” i.e., leading the drafting process, although in coordination and with support from the UN Secretariat’s relevant departments.
vision of how to tackle crises in Africa. Joint assessments and planning between the UN and the AU have been occurring more frequently lately, including in the joint Sahel mission, AMISOM’s surge, and over Mali. But such assessments remain context-specific rather than on the basis of a shared strategic vision. This is not necessarily a problem but it does illustrate that while improved cooperation may exist between the two bureaucracies at the technical level this does not automatically generate a successful partnership at the political level between the two councils. In each case, the UN has provided most capacities, which runs the risk of providing “capacity substitution” rather than genuine collaboration and capacity-building. The AU’s limited human and financial resources and its limited ability to maintain institutional knowledge and information management tools also make it difficult to consistently replicate successful processes when they do occur.

While the newly created UNOAU in Addis Ababa has played an important operational role in supporting these joint planning exercises and helping to prepare the annual consultations between the two councils (by producing briefing papers and background notes), it has had a more limited impact at the political level in part due to the relatively low level of its special representative. The political role UNOAU could or should play in between annual meetings of the councils has yet to be clarified. There is also currently no mechanism for facilitating regular meetings between the UN Secretary-General and the Chairperson of the AU Commission.

A UNIFIED AU VOICE IN NEW YORK

The AU should have a much stronger voice in New York: the AU representation lacks both a strong mandate and capacities and therefore cannot play an effective bridging role between the AU Peace and Security Council and the African member states in New York. Unlike the UN’s new institutional presence in Addis Ababa (the UNOAU), which has dedicated specialists and subject matter experts, the AU’s representation in New York does not have peace and security experts such as planners for peace operations or military advisers. Such personnel could liaise with the UN DPKO/DFS and DPA at a working level and provide expert advice to the AU ambassador.

While an African member of the Security Council traditionally presides over the New York-based “Ad Hoc Working Group on Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa,” this forum has not been sufficiently utilized to convey common AU positions on pressing issues. The “Africa Group” is also hamstrung by the fact that it includes a non-AU member, Morocco. Some of these problems might be remedied if the AU Peace and Security Council had an explicit presence in New York, but its fifteen members do not currently exist as a caucus there, and elected African members on the UN Security Council do not necessarily hold concurrent seats on the Peace and Security Council in Addis Ababa. Consequently, Africa’s representatives on the UN Security Council may not always be informed of AU Peace and Security Council positions and decisions in a timely manner. An additional political issue is that even when a clear AU position is articulated, African members of the UN Security Council may not automatically represent this official AU position in New York and vote in accordance with it.42

Recommendations

The following recommendations are intended to help overcome these challenges to enhanced collaboration. It is important to recall, however, that the essence of the relationship between the two councils and their members is political. Consequently, no amount of institutional reconfiguration will completely dispel the political frictions that are bound to occur when controversial issues and crises are discussed. There is an unavoidable trade-off between creating new mechanisms, enhancing the capabilities of existing institutional structures, and providing flexible arrangements which are nimble enough to adapt to unforeseen and rapidly evolving peace and security challenges. Nevertheless, we recommend that both organizations could usefully take the following steps:

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42 This occurred in the vote over UN Security Council Resolution 1973 (2011) imposing a “no-fly zone” over Libya and authorizing civilian protection measures. All three elected African members of the Security Council (Gabon, Nigeria, and South Africa) voted in favor in spite of an earlier AU communiqué rejecting “any military intervention, whatever its form.”
FOR THE TWO COUNCILS

- Ensure greater levels of coordination between the monthly agendas of the two councils, especially in relation to African country/regional issues and related thematic discussions, including protection of civilians; women, peace and security; and children and armed conflict. This would be significantly improved if the AU Peace and Security Council adopted a formal public agenda in a similar fashion to the UN Security Council.

- Develop agreed working procedures for the AU to submit a request to the UN Security Council for consideration—whether for financial or diplomatic support.

- Develop agreed working procedures for drafting and adopting the communiqués that emerge from the annual consultations between the members of the two councils. These communiqués should include a list of concrete actions or action points for the following year.

- Increase the frequency of communication between (1) the UN Secretary-General and the Chairperson of the AU Commission; and (2) the respective presidents of the two councils, including through greater use of video teleconferences (VTCs).

FOR THE AFRICAN UNION

- The AU’s representation in New York should be enhanced to include a cadre of peace and security experts such as planners for peace operations and military advisers. Such personnel should liaise with the UN DPKO/DFS and DPA at a working level and provide expert advice to the AU ambassador.

- The AU Peace and Security Council should establish a dedicated representation in New York. Its principal tasks could include facilitating timely communication between the two councils and helping to disseminate the PSC’s positions throughout the New York-based UN Africa Group and newly created African Caucus.

- Develop a mechanism through which elected African members on the UN Security Council that do not hold concurrent seats on the AU Peace and Security Council in Addis Ababa can obtain some kind of special “observer” or participant status in the PSC.

- Enhance the ability of the AU Commission to maintain institutional knowledge/memory and develop relevant information management tools for tasks related to peace operations. Such tasks should include lessons-learned analysis, performance evaluation, and the drafting of official mission histories.

FOR THE UNITED NATIONS

- Clarify the role the UNOAU in Addis Ababa should play in the periods between the annual consultations between members of the two councils.

- Ensure that the UN-AU capacity-building programs, as well as joint assessment missions and joint planning exercises, avoid capacity-substitution.
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