



# NEPAD Five Years Later: Critical Institutional and Civil Society Perspectives

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On 27-29 April 2006, the International Peace Academy (IPA), New York, together with the Centre for Policy Studies (CPS), Johannesburg, and the Africa Peace Forum (APF), Nairobi, convened a major international conference in Nairobi to assess the progress of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) five years after its establishment. The meeting brought together over 50 delegates from across the continent, Europe, and North America and included representatives of national NEPAD offices, the NEPAD Secretariat, the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), the African Development Bank (ADB), the United Nations and World Bank, and academic and civil society institutions.

The meeting sought to take stock of NEPAD's progress at the five-year mark and initiate a critical exchange of views about NEPAD between national and regional policy makers and African non-state actors, including civil society organizations. A central purpose was also to create an opportunity to engage NEPAD's institutional and donor partners on challenges of implementation and to provide a forum for forging relationships between the various actors—governmental, non-governmental, African, international—relevant to the NEPAD process. An important point of departure was a sequence of upcoming continental events, including the 6th African Governance Forum on the APRM in Kigali in May 2006; the NEPAD Secretariat's Steering Committee meeting in May 2006 in Maputo; the brainstorming session on the future of NEPAD in June, 2006 in Dakar; and the African Union Summit in Banjul in June and July 2006.

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## Executive Summary

While the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) has made some progress in its first five years, it also faces considerable challenges. These include most prominently the balancing of its broad vision with the need for practical results; the development of viable strategies to ensure that goals can be implemented; the need to clarify its institutional identity and priorities, especially in relation to the African Union (AU); increasing visibility among and engagement with civil society actors; and most fundamentally, making sure that it is genuinely relevant to African populations and societies beyond elites. Conference participants expressed particular concern that

- NEPAD's development policies are harmonized with the strategies of individual African states;
- greater attention be paid to the capacity and legitimacy of the African nation-state actor as the primary actor for its own security and development;
- NEPAD's provisions on peace and security and good governance be considerably strengthened;
- African popular awareness of NEPAD, which is now generally minimal, be a focus of a serious strategy to build broader knowledge and support;
- entry points into NEPAD and the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) process be devised to insure the meaningful inclusion of civil society and non-state actors in both agenda-setting and implementation;
- and that NEPAD's institutional role within (and in relation to) the AU be clarified.

Further specific ideas included the following recommendations:

- develop a communications strategy that reinforces the aim of engaging civil society, including by incorporating NEPAD into civic education curricula and mobilizing traditional leaders, especially in rural areas;
- strengthen implementation by putting NEPAD initiatives in the context of a strategy for continent-wide investment and more effective utilization of Official Development Assistance (ODA) and of remittances;
- incorporate into the APRM continental standards for "demilitarizing" African politics and democratizing security institutions (ensuring democratic control of armed forces);

- increase civil society and non-state participation in the APRM by implementing a “shadow review” process concurrent with the peer review process;
- enhance coordination between NEPAD and the AU and regional security entities to provide an interface between development initiatives and peace and security goals; and
- catalyze strategic thinking and practical measures to invest in the long term development of African state capacities.

Significant developments related to NEPAD and the APRM have occurred in the past year. An update is provided in Annex I below.

## I. Introduction<sup>1</sup>

The IPA-CPS-APF conference took place at an important stage for the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), five years after it was adopted in 2001 in an effort to devise a new vision and strategic framework for Africa’s socioeconomic development and transformation.<sup>2</sup> Since then, NEPAD has alternately become a rallying point for a new era in Africa’s development, and an object of criticism for being too focused on elite constituencies and/or too slow to implement its major plans. The objective of this conference was to take stock of NEPAD’s first five years to assess how effective an instrument it has been in accelerating economic growth, promoting “good governance,” and generally addressing major challenges on the continent, including the critical linkages between poverty and underdevelopment on the one hand, and conflict and instability on the other. A further focus was the evolving relationship of NEPAD to other African institutions, notably the African Union and the Regional Economic Communities (RECs), and to related initiatives such as the African Peer Review Mechanism.

In its first five years, NEPAD has articulated a broad set of priorities seen as conducive to economic growth and sustainable development. It has, in

principle, further committed African states to investing in and cooperating with Africa’s multiple regional institutions as part of the NEPAD process. In this context, NEPAD has espoused policy reforms and called for increased investment across a wide range of priority sectors, including agriculture, energy, transportation, water and sanitation, and improved regional infrastructure. It has also highlighted cross-sectoral developmental issues related to improved access to markets and capital; human resource development (especially in health, education, science and technology); economic and corporate governance; political governance and democratization; environmental protection; and conflict prevention and management.<sup>3</sup> In all of these areas, NEPAD has emphasized the development of specific “Action Plans,” though how far these have actually been implemented remains a matter for concrete assessment and some debate.<sup>4</sup>

From the beginning, NEPAD has placed a heavy emphasis on external partnerships, including mobilization of capital and other forms of support from international donors and financial institutions. For its supporters, this emphasis on international actors is central to NEPAD’s idea of a “new” partnership to underpin African development. To its critics, this approach is at odds with a parallel trend to focus less on external aid and more on African capacities and solutions (for example, the stress on “self-reliance” in the Lagos Plan of Action).

At a basic level, there is also real debate about the scope and ambitions of the young institution of NEPAD: Is it a philosophy? A vision? A strategic framework? A call to action? A collection of projects? NEPAD is generally seen to be at a crossroads in which resolving these existential questions in relation to specific commitments and expectations will be critical to its success.

## II. NEPAD and National Development Strategies

NEPAD aims to be continent-wide in its scope and vision, which raises immediately the question of how

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<sup>1</sup> The meeting was held off-the-record. The following note represents the rapporteurs’ interpretation of themes discussed at the meeting but does not necessarily represent the views of all participants.

<sup>2</sup> NEPAD was adopted by five initiating Heads of State (Algeria, Egypt, Nigeria, Senegal, and South Africa) and other African partners and derived from an Organization of African Unity (OAU) mandate formally adopted at the 37th OAU Summit in July 2001. See *Declaration on the Implementation of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD)*, Assembly/AU/Decl.1 [1] 2002.

<sup>3</sup> See *NEPAD Progress Report and NEPAD Initial Action Plan*, (AHG/235 (xxxv111), 2002.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid.

well its strategy is aligned with the development plans of individual countries.<sup>5</sup> This is widely seen as among the most critical challenges for NEPAD as a relatively young institution, which is reflected in resolutions by the NEPAD Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee and calls for action by the NEPAD Secretariat and other involved stakeholders. All African governments have been encouraged to put in place structures at the national level to coordinate with NEPAD and facilitate harmonization with domestic policies. Yet, progress has been slow and, to date, the development plans of most African countries—if these exist—are not substantially consistent with NEPAD’s objectives, and in the absence of greater coordination, the degree to which NEPAD is seen as relevant to and “owned” by national actors remains limited.

An added complication arises from confusion about the relationship between NEPAD and externally driven processes such as the World Bank’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) or the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). African states are swamped with such development initiatives and are not always sure which ones to prioritize. For example, the AU and NEPAD fully endorse the MDGs and call for African states to subscribe to them, but what does this mean in practical terms? Quite apart from the need to align NEPAD with domestic imperatives, there is thus also the challenge of harmonization with the policy frameworks related to achieving the MDGs. Equally, with PRSPs. Many African institutions, including the AU, the RECs, and some states, lack the capacity to devote time and resources to harmonizing what appear to be competing development plans and imperatives.

### The Role of NEPAD National Offices

There is also significant variation in the role of NEPAD national offices, some of which have yet to be established or adequately resourced. This suggests that for some countries, the “domestication” and institutionalization of NEPAD is not a priority and has, overall, hampered NEPAD’s effectiveness.

Some participants called for renewed emphasis on this issue, asking for the forthcoming Banjul meeting to set deadlines by which all states would have to

establish national NEPAD offices. Some argued further that governments should be required to fund these offices through national budgets, which would better engage African legislators in the NEPAD agenda, ensure adequate resources, and contribute to institutionalizing NEPAD at the national level.

There is a related need to more clearly define the role of the NEPAD Secretariat in relation to national offices and to develop a strategy for more effective communication and coordination with them. Additionally, the NEPAD Secretariat needs to develop a clearer relationship with the RECs—which are generally treated by the AU and NEPAD as the building blocs of an emerging continentalism—and a more coherent framework for how these should relate to the effort to decentralize NEPAD through national offices.

### NEPAD and Non-State Actors

If NEPAD’s goals of promoting “good” and democratic governance are to be realized, then it will have to tackle more prominently the issue of state-civil society relations on the continent. While many NEPAD documents stress the importance of African civil society for democratic governance, the irony is that for much of that civil society, NEPAD remains relatively obscure.<sup>6</sup> Many civil society actors also express serious concern that NEPAD, having been designed by elites, is out of touch with what is relevant to broader African constituencies.

The limited popular awareness of NEPAD was a particular problem seen to derive, in part, from a failure of governments to create greater awareness of NEPAD or to mobilize their citizens around its objectives, especially at the grassroots level. Instead, NEPAD tended to be seen by governments more as a vehicle for galvanizing international assistance than for investing in the crucial partnership with their own populations. This was a balance that needed to be re-struck.

Those favoring a NEPAD more sensitive to grassroots concerns argued that the failure to involve African citizens and civil society groups in its policy formation processes created a serious legitimacy and credibility problem. It made NEPAD vulnerable to the charge of being externally driven and merely an

<sup>5</sup> For an example of how countries go about the task of integrating NEPAD into domestic development plans, see South African Department of Foreign Affairs, *Guidelines for the design of the NEPAD implementation strategy of South Africa* (NISSA), NEPAD National Strategy Workshop, 19–21 April 2006, Sandton, South Africa.

<sup>6</sup> See for example Amboka Wameyo, “The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD): The Role of Civil Society,” in Ebenezer Obadare and Dapo Oyewole, eds., *The New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD): Challenges and Developments* (Lagos: Centre for Democracy and Development, 2003), pp. 84–92.

African variant of structural adjustment. To some critics, NEPAD will only succeed if it attracts greater popular support, which will require more public participation in its processes. Indeed, to some, greater public participation is a *sine qua non* for development generally.

### Engaging Civil Society

African civil society constituencies need to be convinced that NEPAD is relevant to their concerns and interests. There is much that could be done to increase civil society awareness of, and involvement in, NEPAD: NEPAD's leadership could reach out more proactively to civil society actors; the number and strength of NEPAD focal points could be increased, and their work could focus more on engaging civil society; greater awareness of Africa's important institutional innovations, including NEPAD (but also including the African Union, the APRM, and others), could be incorporated more systematically into civic education curricula; traditional leaders could be mobilized to engage citizens, especially in rural areas; and NEPAD could devise a more clear communication strategy at subnational, national, regional, and continental levels.

However, for increased civil society participation to truly enhance NEPAD's legitimacy, it has to reflect a real opportunity for civil society to influence NEPAD processes and not only at the stage of implementing projects but also at the stage of setting agendas and developing policy. More fundamentally, it should reflect a greater mutual willingness between state and non-state actors to share both power and responsibility for African development.

A related broader question was that of the general strength and strategies of civil society actors and their relationship to one another. To the extent that civil society actors were weak, their impact on NEPAD and related processes would be limited. One participant suggested the establishment of better intra-country and cross-border networks for sharing information and encouraging joint strategizing. Civil society actors also could engage print and electronic media more effectively, both to participate more actively in debates about the AU, NEPAD, and the APRM, and to keep publics better informed. Government and civil society groups have a shared responsibility to create space for mutual engagement, and civil society could learn to

engage governments more forthrightly, whether by participating in parliamentary processes or through other mechanisms. They could, for example, engage the APRM by embarking on "shadow peer review" processes.

### NEPAD and the Private Sector

The question today is no longer *whether* African states favor a market economy, but rather how African states and the market should optimally interact. Many African states have achieved major strides in macro-economic stability, and some have even made progress with regard to regulatory frameworks. In this context, African states are also working to increase investments in their private sector, and many are committed to removing bottlenecks to attract such investments.

There is little doubt that the private sector has an important role to play in the realization of NEPAD's objectives. Both NEPAD's Steering Committee Business Initiative and its Action Plan for Business are designed to promote a more engaged role for the African private sector.<sup>7</sup> However, to date, NEPAD's engagement with or mobilization of the business community has been limited and, according to many observers, the development of the African private sector has taken a back seat to attracting foreign capital and development assistance from the donor community. Given this limited interaction, as well as the likelihood of conflicting views about development strategy, NEPAD and the African private sector will need to work together in the coming years to forge some type of consensus on these issues.

### NEPAD and Resource Mobilization

Since its establishment, NEPAD has placed a consistent emphasis on resource mobilization. It seeks the ambitious goal of attracting USD 64 billion in annual development aid, a dramatic increase from the roughly USD 23 billion given to the continent in 2003. NEPAD will be able to capitalize on some momentum within the donor community over recent years to increase ODA, including the pledge by the G8 and other OECD countries to meet the 0.7% target by 2015, and the G8's commitment to provide USD 50 billion between 2005 and 2010, half of which would go to Africa.<sup>8</sup> African signatory states to NEPAD have also endorsed the idea of an

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<sup>7</sup> Ibid.

<sup>8</sup> Speech by British Secretary for International Development, on "Growth and Poverty Reduction: Creating More and Better Jobs in Poor Countries," 19 January 2006, available at [www.dfid.gov.uk/news/files/Speeches/wp2006-speeches/growth190106.asp](http://www.dfid.gov.uk/news/files/Speeches/wp2006-speeches/growth190106.asp).

International Finance Facility (IFF) as a way to secure immediate funds from capital markets, based on the official commitments of developed countries.<sup>9</sup> However, the gap between pledges and disbursements is large, and NEPAD will have to develop a mechanism to monitor how well the international community honors its commitments.

Moreover, while resource mobilization is a declared priority, it is less clear what strategies NEPAD hopes to employ to realize its targets or deal with related issues. For example, NEPAD's emphasis on mobilizing aid is not matched by any framework for effective utilization of aid. Likewise, there is no framework for how aid might be allocated to regional investments, such as infrastructure or water projects, nor is there any clear mechanism for ensuring coherence between aid allocated through NEPAD versus aid allocated bilaterally. Yet NEPAD has recognized that foreign direct investment is not evenly spread throughout Africa, with Nigeria, Angola, and South Africa accounting for more than half of all FDI attracted to the continent; and the continent will continue to experience problems with resource flows until it addresses this disparity.<sup>10</sup>

A related issue is that of mobilizing and using remittances from Africans in the Diaspora. The Report of the Commission for Africa has noted that as much as 40% of Africa's savings are held outside the continent, while savings in Africa are very low.<sup>11</sup> It was suggested that there needs to be a continental framework for addressing this issue, which could be an opportunity for NEPAD. Here, the AU has developed several proposals related to the role and potential of African Diaspora communities and has even floated the idea of the Diaspora being recognized as the sixth region of the continent.

On a range of these issues, the role of the NEPAD Secretariat is currently unclear. It was suggested by conference participants that an important role could be to act as a continental think-tank to generate ideas to promote resource mobilization and continental investment. Africa does not, as of yet, boast a continent-wide investment strategy and instead relies

on multiple disparate strategies at the state level. Such plans run the gamut, focusing on increasing domestic savings and investment, improving management of public revenue and expenditure, improving Africa's share of global trade, attracting foreign direct investment, reducing debt, and increasing ODA.<sup>12</sup> The NEPAD Secretariat could play a valuable role in bringing coherence and new ideas to the table, including the evaluation of the effectiveness of current strategies and monitor international and other commitments.

### III. "Good Governance" and the African State

#### Governance, Constitutional Democracy, and the Demilitarization of African Politics

Promoting "good governance" and democratization are among NEPAD's central pillars,<sup>13</sup> and these issues enjoyed much attention during the April 2006 meeting. The challenges are manifold. Democratic gains in some states are matched by the undermining of multiparty democracy in others. Participants expressed particular concern about the lack of term limits for some heads of state, including through constitutional manipulation. Term extensions additionally have knock-on effects, undermining a range of other governance goals, such as efficient and effective civil services, free and fair elections, a strengthened judiciary, and enhanced roles for parliaments.<sup>14</sup> Zimbabwe and Uganda (as well as failed attempts at term extensions in Zambia and Nigeria) are obvious examples of this phenomenon.

On a more positive note, timely interventions by NEPAD and the AU to preempt undemocratic transitions in Togo and São Tomé and Príncipe are examples of the organizations' potential role in averting unconstitutional changes of government. Such a role has been codified in NEPAD's Democracy and Political Governance Declaration, the 2000 Constitutive Act of the AU, and the 2006 Draft Declaration on Democracy, Governance and Elections.<sup>15</sup> Participants generally recommended that

<sup>9</sup> See the IFF proposal at [http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/documents/international\\_issues/international\\_development/int\\_gnd\\_iff2003.cfm](http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/documents/international_issues/international_development/int_gnd_iff2003.cfm).

<sup>10</sup> United Nations General Assembly, *New Partnership for Africa's Development: Second Consolidated Report on Progress in Implementation and International Support*, Report of the Secretary-General, A/59/206, 4 August 2004.

<sup>11</sup> Commission for Africa (CfA), *Our Common Interest: Report of the Commission for Africa*, London, March 2005, also available at [www.number-10.gov.uk/files/pdf/Chapter%202-final.pdf](http://www.number-10.gov.uk/files/pdf/Chapter%202-final.pdf).

<sup>12</sup> See Wiseman Nkuhlu, "NEPAD: A New chapter in African-led Development," in Ebenezer Obadare and Dapo Oyewole (eds.), *The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD): Challenges and Developments*, Centre for Democracy and Development (CDD), Nigeria, 2003, pp. 29-39.

<sup>13</sup> See Centre for Conflict Resolution and Centre for Policy Studies, *The AU/NEPAD and Africa's Evolving Governance and Security Architecture*, Report of a Policy Advisory Group Meeting, Misty Hills, South Africa, 11-12 December 2004.

<sup>14</sup> African Union, *Draft African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance*, Draft/Charter/II/Rev.1, 2006.

<sup>15</sup> See Organization of African Unity/African Economic Community, *Constitutive Act of the African Union*, Addis Ababa: Ethiopia, 11 July 2000.

this role be further strengthened and that the AU and NEPAD develop a continental framework specifically on the question of constitutional (and unconstitutional) amendments by heads of states. Some also proposed that the APRM include provisions for handling unconstitutional amendments at the national level.

Participants also noted the tendency among some African political leaders to resort to military solutions for problems that are primarily political in nature and rooted in social and economic marginalization. This militarized approach to politics undermines the broader objective of democratic governance, risks fanning extremism and ethnic nationalism, and can fuel broader crises that counteract efforts to build a common nationhood. Here, a proposal was made to develop a continental strategy for “demilitarizing” African politics, with some participants recommending the urgent development of continental standards for democratizing security institutions and ensuring democratic control of armed forces. It was further recommended that any such continental initiative or code of best practice be incorporated into the APRM framework.

## IV. The African Peer Review Mechanism

The seminar placed special focus on the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), established in 2003 as a mutually agreed instrument for self-monitoring by participating member governments (currently 26).<sup>16</sup> The APRM promotes a “holistic approach to development.” It emphasizes the links between peace and security, economic growth and development, and governance, and calls for meaningful incorporation into national development plans of a range of social goods, such as poverty reduction, gender equity, participatory politics, transparency and accountability, and environmental sustainability. Against this framework, the APRM asks African governments to undertake “self-assessments” to ensure that national plans correspond with this holistic outlook.<sup>17</sup>

To date, four countries have completed their national assessments—Ghana, Kenya, Rwanda, and Mauritius. Three other countries are in the process of

completing their peer review assessments—South Africa, Uganda, and Lesotho—and South Africa is expected to finalize its own by May 2007.<sup>18</sup> These national assessment processes are seen to vary widely in their seriousness, and Ghana is generally perceived to be a model in its relative credibility (as well as the only country that has been successfully reviewed at the APRM Forum of Heads of States and Governments). But there is need for more “role models” to emerge beyond Ghana. The Nigeria process appears to be on hold, due to preparations for the 2007 presidential elections, and the Mauritius report was sent back for lack of a program of action.

The APRM’s strength lies in its mandate to commit participating states to conformity with an agreed set of values and standards contained in NEPAD’s *Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic, and Corporate Governance*.<sup>19</sup> It is seen as both a strength and a source of potential weakness that its mechanism is voluntary and that the relevant “peers” are states whose practices vary significantly in terms of their adherence to these values. It was critical that the APRM process be neither an exercise in uncritical “legitimation” or “self-congratulation” nor a punitive instrument linked to conditionalities.

### How Participatory is the APRM?

In principle, the APRM process accords both state and non-state actors roles and responsibilities in reviewing national progress. However, while some of the countries have attempted to reach out to a wide-range of constituencies during the review process, others have not. Moreover, under the best of circumstances, this outreach had limits, especially given the complexity of the peer review questionnaire which put ordinary citizens at a disadvantage, making them less able to engage meaningfully.

Again, the processes varied widely from country to country, in some instances being a rushed process that gave too little time for civil society groups to prepare or make significant representations to country review teams, and in other instances being seen as far too slow. More established NGOs also seem to have been privileged at the expense of organizations that represent the more poor or marginalized, and for the APRM to become genuinely representative, it would

<sup>16</sup> Zambia being the latest country to accede – October 2006; for an understanding of what the APRM is, see UN Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), *The African Peer Review Mechanism: Some Frequently Asked Questions*, October 2002.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid.

<sup>18</sup> See for example South African *African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) Report*, Second Consultative Conference, Kliptown, 4-5 May 2006.

<sup>19</sup> See *New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance*, [AHG/235(xxxviii) Annex I], 2002.

need to involve relevant community organizations more seriously.

While the APRM was generally welcomed as a vehicle to bridge the gap between governments and citizens, many also expressed concern about ambiguity and inequity in the respective roles of state, private sector, and civil society actors in conducting country reviews. For example, while it is technically required that the self-assessment team be headed by a non-state representative, in at least one of the countries undergoing review, the Governing Council was headed by a cabinet minister. This concern was reinforced by the broader worry about the lack of selection criteria for participation and the ability of major human rights violators such as Zimbabwe and Sudan to become members.

Overall, it was generally agreed that for the APRM to become a serious instrument for the promotion of good governance, it would have to show that it was more than a “one-time event” for each country and could become properly institutionalized. This could be accomplished through a variety of means. Among the ideas proposed by participants were such actions as establishing APRM parliamentary committees in national parliaments, tabling and debating country reports in parliament, establishing national non-state fora to discuss APRM reports and monitor progress in implementing any APRM Action Plans, and tabling country reports at the Pan-African Parliament for debate.

Like NEPAD itself, the APRM’s impact is, to date, mixed. On the one hand, it has shown itself to be a promising tool for promoting governance and democratization in Africa; on the other, it is not without critics and its long-term prospects are unclear.

## V. The Disconnect Between Peace, Security, and Development

While NEPAD embodies the mantra “no peace without development, and no development without peace,” and while its development strategy, in theory, makes security a priority,<sup>20</sup> some seminar participants suggested that there remained a serious disconnect between NEPAD’s focus on development and its peace and security components.

Some noted the absence of an obvious interface between development initiatives and peace and security goals. In Nigeria, for example, the government has made an effort to decentralize NEPAD to its 36 states, but eight of these (located in the Niger Delta) have major security problems, which in the absence of being addressed leave the development projects vulnerable to reversal.

Participants further observed that there is too little interface between NEPAD’s structures and the AU or key regional entities, which together play the main peace and security role on the continent. This is at a time when one of the main challenges facing the continent is the issue of peace and security and the mechanisms and modalities available to produce it. The Horn of Africa was a particular concern to participants as a region which lacks a robust regional security architecture and consequently remains one of the most crisis-prone parts of the continent.

That the peace and security component of NEPAD is comparatively neglected in real terms may be due to the greater attraction African governments have to its economic dimensions and less so to its political elements, but this would have to be rationalized in relation to the AU and regional entities in the interest of a more effective approach to Africa’s interlinked challenges of security and development.

## VI. NEPAD and the AU – What Relationship?

The relationship between the AU and NEPAD, as well as NEPAD’s status within the AU, remains ambiguous, despite a consistent line from African leaders that NEPAD is a socioeconomic program of the AU. This ambiguity creates multiple layers of confusion, sends mixed signals to external and African partners about the relative priority and roles of NEPAD and the AU, and risks undermining the broader objective of promoting development, democratic governance, and peace and security on the continent.

For example, the United Nations General Assembly went out of its way in 2002 and 2003 to adopt NEPAD officially as an internationally endorsed development plan for Africa,<sup>21</sup> yet because of its uncertain institutional status, some African governments and civil society actors have been reluctant to embrace it and have even distanced themselves from

<sup>20</sup> Ibid.

<sup>21</sup> United Nations General Assembly Resolutions A/Res/57/2; A/Res/57/7; and A/Res/57/300.

it. In 2005, for example, President Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal, one of NEPAD's principal architects, openly questioned its status within the AU. Even some of those who initially embraced NEPAD have begun to rethink what benefits they will derive from it. The AU and NEPAD are also in the difficult position of essentially competing over a limited pool of external support and it was even implied that some donors have at times played NEPAD and the AU against one another.

Overall, there is a need for much greater clarity about the respective institutional roles and ambitions, in the absence of which it will be extremely challenging to mobilize robust support from African people and governments who will remain tempted to question NEPAD's added value. Partly this turns on the existential uncertainty about whether NEPAD is primarily a mobilizing vision, a policy framework, or a set of specific projects. In the absence of resolving such questions, the status quo is characterized by redundancy and even competition, with NEPAD appearing to some to behave like a "mini-AU," and with rival programs in critical areas (e.g., both the AU and NEPAD now have post-conflict peacebuilding strategies and social policy strategies). Alternatively, resolving such ambiguity will enable governments to devise policies and programs that reinforce and are reinforced by NEPAD.

It is especially important to clarify the roles and relationship of the Secretariats and then to adequately resource them. There are already commitments to multi-year capacity building for the AU and this needs to be squared with commitments to bolstering human and material resources for NEPAD. One thing appears clear: NEPAD will, in due course, become a specialized institution of the AU Commission.

## VII. NEPAD and the RECs

A truly continental strategy for African development depends on strong regional institutions, and the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) are

generally recognized as essential to the NEPAD vision.<sup>22</sup> Of the eight RECs recognized by the AU and NEPAD as the building blocks of continental union, seven have economic integration as their *raison d'être*, while the East African Community (EAC) is in the process of establishing a political union.<sup>23</sup>

NEPAD has engaged the RECs more forthrightly than the AU and has stressed the need to address their capacity constraints, particularly in the context of implementing key NEPAD projects such as NEPAD's Infrastructure Program, the Short-term Action Plan (STAP), the Action Plan for the Environment Initiative, and the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Program (CAADP). The African Development Bank (ADB) has explicitly assisted the RECs with capacity development to take up NEPAD projects.

The RECs, of course, also vary widely in their capacity and the political relationships underpinning them, and they face broader institutional challenges beyond capacity constraints. These include how the regions as defined by the RECs correspond to those as defined by the AU; the degree of harmony between RECs and the AU in the substance of their policies, frameworks, and programs; the complexity of developing continent-wide strategies, mobilizing resources for them and ensuring implementation; developing modalities for inter-REC cooperation; and the basic challenge of financing their own work.

These are sensitive, predominantly political questions and will require political will to adequately address.<sup>24</sup> The issue of rationalizing or harmonizing the RECs touches on issues of vested interest, regional loyalties, sensitivities about sovereignty, and others. While these issues are being addressed, questions of efficiency, financial soundness and management will also need attention. For the RECs truly to become the building blocs of the AU/NEPAD's continental vision, it will be necessary both to enhance their capacity in technical terms and to begin to address these more fundamental issues.

<sup>22</sup> See United Nations General Assembly, *New Partnership for Africa's Development: Second Consolidated Report on Progress in Implementation and International Support*, Report of the Secretary-General, A/59/206, 4 August 2004.

<sup>23</sup> See African Union Commission, *Draft Protocol on Relations Between the African Union and Regional Economic Communities*, Second Draft, Addis Ababa, 8 August 2003. The eight are the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the East African Community (EAC), the Common Market of Eastern and Southern African States (COMESA), the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC), the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), and the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD). For a SADC perspective, see Garth le Pere and Elling N. Tjønneland, "Which Way SADC? Advancing Co-operation and Integration in Southern Africa," Institute for Global Dialogue (IGD), Occasional Paper No. 50, October 2005.

<sup>24</sup> African Union, *Scenarios for the Rationalization of Regional Groupings for Economic Cooperation and Integration*, from Meeting of Government Experts on the Rationalization of Regional Economic Communities (RECs), Accra, Ghana, 27-28 October 2005.

<sup>25</sup> See International Peace Academy (IPA), *NEPAD: African Initiative, New Partnership?* Report, New York, 16 July 2002.

## VIII. NEPAD – Looking Forward?

At the core of NEPAD is the notion of a new compact between Africa and its external partners.<sup>25</sup> The foundation of this new partnership is an explicit bargain in which industrialized powers meet their obligations on debt relief, aid, market access and trade, and resources for peacemaking and peacekeeping, in exchange for continental actors meeting their own obligations, notably in the areas of democratization, good governance (including anti-corruption measures), and peace and security.

However, NEPAD's substantive agenda, especially the focus on "good governance," ultimately turns on the question of the state, its effective capacity, and its legitimacy. Arguably, the African crisis is best understood as a crisis of governance and the African state. Given this, it is surprising, and regrettable, that NEPAD places comparatively little attention on the role of the state, and some participants pointed to the importance of NEPAD's giving greater priority to the question of the state and, further, to the building of what has sometimes been called a "democratic developmental state."<sup>26</sup>

Seminar participants poignantly noted that one of the reasons for Africa's marginalization and underde-

velopment was the failure of African states (which, of course, had multiple causes beyond Africa) to devise more sustainable development strategies with a reasonable distribution of wealth among citizens. NEPAD's comparative neglect of the question of the state was seen by some to place excessive reliance on the market as the engine of development in Africa, on private sector development in general and on foreign direct investment in particular.

Alternatively, the centerpiece of a long-term strategy could be to build states that put development and democracy at the heart of their agendas; achieve sustained high levels of growth on a consistent basis; and use the dividends for addressing poverty, inequality, and underdevelopment. Such states would possess the capacity to intervene in and regulate the market, particularly at critical stages. Overall, such a state would commit to the promotion of equitable growth and—very importantly from a civil society point of view—its approach would need to be broadly participatory.

*Meeting Note prepared by the Centre for Policy Studies, Johannesburg, and the International Peace Academy, New York: Dr. Chris Landsberg, rapporteur.*

<sup>26</sup> For a perspective on the Developmental State, see Peter Evans, "Developmental Institutions in an era of Neo-liberal Globalization," Draft paper, UC Berkeley, 17 October 2005; and Mark Robinson and Gordon White, eds., *The Democratic Developmental State: Politics and Institutional Design*, Oxford University Press, 1998.

## ANNEX I: APRM/NEPAD Update

Since the IPA meeting in spring 2006, significant developments have occurred in NEPAD and APRM. Some of these are summarized below:\*

### APRM

- To implement its national program of action (NPA), Ghana merged the program with the National Poverty Reduction Strategy (NPRS) and transformed its APRM Governing Council into an implementing body.<sup>1</sup> With this reorganization the country expects to harmonize compliance of both APRM and NPRS guidelines. However, the massive \$5 billion budget of the program constitutes a challenge with regard to converting partner pledges to real funds.
- The Rwandan and Kenyan country reports were completed and submitted to the NEPAD Heads of State and Governments Implementation Committee (HSGIC). A number of similarities are observed in their NPAs, especially in regard to strategies for intra- and inter-state conflict prevention, the promotion of regional integration, the strengthening of land and population policies, and expanding space for closer civil society/government relations. There is a need to enhance current institutional capacities significantly if the desired transparency for implementing their programs is to be ensured.
- The APRM process in Mauritius was re-commissioned after major setbacks which were triggered by inadequate civil society sensitization, an ill-designed action program and arduous national elections in 2005.<sup>2</sup> However, the country confronts the difficult task of renewing interest in an already poorly received process.
- South Africa, dogged by civil society complaints that its review process was unduly hurried, created additional complications by accidentally submitting an error-ridden draft review report to the HSGIC at the AU Summit in Ethiopia in January 2007. In order to avert similar embarrassment in the future there is a need to take full advantage of the abundant capacities available in the NEPAD and APRM Secretariats in nearby Midrand.
- Tensions from the general elections in Nigeria and insecurity in its Niger Delta region raised concerns over the momentum of its APRM process. Nevertheless, the national secretariat appeared to have firm focus on its agenda as it launched the crucial countrywide validation workshops to elicit public comment on the Assessment Report. This focus ought to be maintained so as to successfully complete and submit the final report to the HSGIC during the Accra Summit in July 2007.
- Uganda initiated its self-assessment report in February 2007 and stands to benefit from the experience of countries currently advanced in the review process. However, the unfinished war in the north and lingering dissatisfactions with the government over its muscling of the constitution in 2005 to allow for extended presidential terms raised questions as to whether the review could be pursued with the expected diligence and integrity.
- Zambia received an advance mission from the APRM Secretariat in December 2006, but a weak economy, high level of corruption, and a fractious political environment make some people apprehensive about the complicated and demanding APRM process.

### NEPAD

- *AU-NEPAD integration*: Clarity emerged over the issue of AU-NEPAD integration at the HSGIC meeting in Algiers in March 2007 as the Committee agreed to a complete merger of both secretariats and the transformation of NEPAD into an AU *agency* by June 2008.<sup>3</sup> It is however necessary to transcend the current rhetoric among the major countries<sup>4</sup> and resolve the ambiguities and functional duplications between the two bodies if a successful transformation is to be achieved.

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\* Update provided by Mashood Issaka, Senior Program Officer, International Peace Academy.

<sup>1</sup> "Ghana's APRM: Processes and Preliminary Outcomes," in *ECA in the APRM*, available at: [www.uneca.org/aprm/Story101806.asp](http://www.uneca.org/aprm/Story101806.asp).

<sup>2</sup> Update on the Mauritius process from a conversation with Mr. Amedee Darga, a Mauritian participant in the April 2006 meeting.

<sup>3</sup> "Integration of NEPAD into AU to take place by June next year," NAM News Network, March 23, 2007; or at <http://www.namnewsnetwork.org/read.php?id=14395>.

<sup>4</sup> For example, see page 7 above.

## ANNEX I: AGENDA

### Seminar

#### NEPAD FIVE YEARS LATER: CRITICAL INSTITUTIONAL AND CIVIL SOCIETY PERSPECTIVES

Jointly hosted by  
International Peace Academy, New York &  
Centre for Policy Studies, South Africa  
27- 29 April 2006  
Windsor Golf and Country Club, Nairobi, Kenya

Thursday April 27, 2006

6:30 pm – 8:00 pm **RECEPTION: Windsor Golf and Country Club Hotel**

#### **SPECIAL ADDRESS**

Chairs: **Dr. Elizabeth Cousens**, Vice-President, International Peace Academy  
**Dr. Bernard Kouassi**, Executive Director, African Peer Review Mechanism  
(APRM) Secretariat, South Africa

Speaker: **Ambassador Bethuel Kiplagat**, Executive Director, Africa Peace Forum, Kenya,  
and Chairperson, APRM Panel

Friday April 28, 2006

9:00 am – 9:15 am **WELCOME REMARKS**

**Dr. Elizabeth Cousens**, Vice-President, International Peace Academy  
**Ambassador Bethuel Kiplagat**, Executive Director, Africa Peace Forum, Kenya,  
and Chairperson, APRM Panel  
**Dr. Bernard Kouassi**, Executive Director, APRM Secretariat, South Africa

9:15 am – 9:55 am **OFFICIAL WELCOME**

Chair: **Ambassador Bethuel Kiplagat**, Executive Director, Africa Peace Forum, Kenya,  
and Chairperson, APRM Panel

“Africa On Its Own: NEPAD’s Contribution to Change in Africa”

**Honorable Ekwee Ethuro**, Assistant Minister, Ministry for Planning and  
Development, Kenya

“NEPAD; The Past, the Present, and the Future”

**Dr. Grace Ongile**, Chief Executive, NEPAD, Ministry of Planning and  
Development, Kenya

9:55 am – 10:55 am **1ST SESSION**

#### **FIVE YEARS OF NEPAD: REFLECTIONS**

Chair: **Ambassador John L. Hirsch**, International Peace Academy

Nigeria: “NEPAD: Nigeria’s Perspectives”

**Dr. Lawrence Anukam**, Director, Programs and Implementation Department,  
NEPAD Nigeria

Senegal: “Senegal and NEPAD: Quo Vadis”

**Mr. Mamadou Seck**, Ministry for African Economic Integration, Good  
Governance and NEPAD

Discussion

11:15 am – 12:40 pm

Egypt: “NEPAD and the Political Economy of Change in Egypt and North Africa”  
**Professor Ibrahim El-Nur**, American University of Cairo

NEPAD Secretariat: “NEPAD as the Socioeconomic Development Plan of the AU”  
**Ms. Litha Musyimi-Ogana**, Advisor, Gender and Civil Society Organisation,  
NEPAD Secretariat, South Africa

Discussion

2:10 pm – 3:35 pm

2ND SESSION

**REGIONAL ECONOMIC COMMUNITIES, CIVIL SOCIETY AND NEPAD**

Chair: **Ambassador John L. Hirsch**, International Peace Academy

EAC: “NEPAD as Guide to Development Planning: The Case of the EAC”  
**Dr. Kipyego Cheluget**, Deputy Secretary-General (Projects and Programs), EAC

SADC: “SADC, Africa and NEPAD: Strengthening Regional Integration in SADC”  
**Mr. Ross Herbert**, Africa Research Fellow & Head, NEPAD and Governance  
Project, The South African Institute of International Affairs

Discussion

3:55 pm – 5:20 pm

3RD SESSION

**NEPAD: LESSONS FROM STATES EMERGING FROM STRIFE**

Chair: **Professor Francis M. Deng**, Director, Center for Displacement Studies,  
Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies,  
Washington DC

Liberia: “Building Capacity for Revival: The Role of NEPAD in Liberia’s Political, Social  
and Economic Transformation”  
**Honorable Toga McIntosh**, Minister for Planning and Economic Affairs,  
Liberia

Ethiopia: “NEPAD as a Mechanism for Change in Ethiopia and the Horn”  
**Mr. Tedhasseh Medhane**, Center for Policy Research and Dialogue, Ethiopia

Discussion

6:30 pm

**KEYNOTE ADDRESS**

Chair: **Ambassador Ochieng Adala**, Senior Program Officer, Africa Peace Forum, Kenya

Speaker: “UN NEPAD Support: An update of the UN Systems Support Project for NEPAD”  
**Dr. Ejeviome Otobo**, Deputy Director, Office of the Special Adviser on Africa,  
United Nations

Saturday April 29, 2006

9:00 am – 9:20 am

**OPENING REMARKS**

Chair: **Ambassador John L. Hirsch**, International Peace Academy

“APRM: The Supervisor’s Perspectives”

**Ambassador Bethuel Kiplagat**, Executive Director, Africa Peace Forum, Kenya,  
and Chairperson, APRM Panel

- 9:20 am – 10:40 am 1ST SESSION
- THE AFRICAN PEER REVIEW MECHANISM: SHARING THE LESSONS**
- Chair: **Dr. Bernard Kouassi**, Executive Director, APRM Secretariat
- Ghana: “Ghana and the APRM Process: A leader’s experience”  
**Dr. Kojo Assan**, Director, NEPAD, Ministry for Regional Cooperation and NEPAD
- Mauritius: “Resolving the Mauritius APRM Challenge: The tools”  
**Dr. Amedee Darga**, Director, StraConsult, Mauritius
- Discussion
- 11:00 am – 12:20 pm 2ND SESSION
- NEPAD AND INTERNATIONAL PARTNERS**
- Chair: **Ms. Litha Musyimi-Ogana**, Advisor, Gender and Civil Society Organisation, NEPAD Secretariat, South Africa
- UN: “UNECA and NEPAD: Challenges of economic and political reform in Africa”  
**Dr. Robert Okello**, Director, Office of Policy and Program Coordination, UN Economic Commission for Africa, Ethiopia
- ADB: “The ADB and NEPAD: Towards more effective African support”  
**Mr. Andriannarison Rakotobe**, Head, NEPAD Unit, African Development Bank, Tunisia
- World Bank: “The World Bank and NEPAD: Towards more effective support”  
**Mr. Manuel de la Rocha**, Regional Integration Unit, Washington, DC
- Discussion
- 12:30 pm – 2:30 pm **SPECIAL ADDRESS**
- Chair: **Ambassador John L. Hirsch**, International Peace Academy
- Speaker: “Beyond Security: Exploring the role of Africa’s continental organisations in the Changing paradigms of security and development”  
**Professor Francis M. Deng**, Director, Center for Displacement Studies, Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, Washington, DC
- 2:30 pm – 3:45 pm 3RD SESSION
- NEPAD AND AFRICAN CIVIL SOCIETY**
- Chair: **Dr. Grace Ongile**, Chief Executive, NEPAD, Ministry of Planning and Development, Kenya
- “NEPAD: Blessing or Anathema – A civil society view on eastern and southern Africa”  
**Dr. Sheila Bunwaree**, Department of Social Sciences, University of Mauritius
- “Defining the tools for mitigating complex emergencies through NEPAD”  
**Mr. Paul Smith Lomas**, Regional Director, Oxfam Africa, Kenya
- “How visible is NEPAD in Africa and beyond?”  
**Dr. Funni Olonisakin**, Director, Conflict, Security and Development Group, Kings College, London
- Discussion

3:45 pm – 4:15 pm 4TH SESSION

**THE WAY FORWARD: NEPAD, THE AU AND PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA**

Chair: **Ambassador John L. Hirsch**, International Peace Academy  
**Dr. Bernard Kouassi**, Executive Director, APRM Secretariat  
**Ambassador Bethuel Kiplagat**, Executive Director, Africa Peace Forum, Kenya, and Chairperson, APRM

Reactions

Closing: **Dr. Elizabeth Cousens**, Vice-President, International Peace Academy

### ANNEX III: LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

**Ambassador Ochieng Adala**

Senior Program Officer, Africa Peace Forum, Kenya

**Mr. Abdulai Haruna Alhassan**

NEPAD, Ministry for Regional Cooperation and  
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**Mr. Chris Amadi**

NEPAD Nigeria

**Dr. Lawrence Anukam**

Director, Programs and Implementation Department,  
NEPAD Nigeria

**Dr. Kojo Assan**

Director, NEPAD, Ministry for Regional Cooperation  
and NEPAD, Ghana

**Mr. Eltigani Ateem**

UN Economic Commission for Africa, Ethiopia

**Dr. Sheila Bunwaree**

Department of Social Sciences, University of Mauritius

**Mr. Batabiha Bushoki**

Co-Director, Campagne pour la paix, Kenya

**Dr. Kipyego Cheluget**

Deputy Secretary-General (Projects and Programs),  
East African Community, Tanzania

**Mr. Jabulani Dada**

Centre for Policy Studies, South Africa

**Mr. Amedee Darga**

Director, StraConsult, Mauritius, and Consultant,  
APRM Mauritius

**Mr. Manuel de la Rocha**

Regional Integration Unit, The World Bank,  
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Director, Center for Displacement Studies,  
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**Ms. Daphney Dlamini**

Economist, Office of the Deputy President of South  
Africa

**Mr. Oghenemano Edigheji**

Centre for Policy Studies, South Africa

**Professor Ibrahim El-Nur**

American University in Cairo, Egypt

**Honorable Ekwee Ethuro**

Assistant Minister, Ministry for Planning and  
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**Mr. Ross Herbert**

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**Mr. A. A Ismael**

NEPAD Kenya

**H.E. Bo Jensen**

Ambassador, Royal Embassy of Denmark, Kenya

**Ambassador Bethuel Kiplagat**

Executive Director, Africa Peace Forum, Kenya,  
Chairperson, African Peer Review Panel

**Mr. Alfred Kombudo**

NEPAD Kenya

**Dr. Bernard Kouassi**

Executive Director, African Peer Review Mechanism  
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**Ms. Alassane Latchilatou**

President, Ouvriers du Monde, Cotonou, Benin

**Mr. Paul Smith Lomas**

Regional Director, Oxfam GB, Kenya

**Mr. Michael Mah'moud**

NEPAD Adviser, African Development Bank, Tunisia

**Mrs. Line Mberanguenza**

Ministry of Trade and Industry, Gabon

**Honorable Toga G. McIntosh**

Minister for Planning and Economic Affairs, Liberia

**Mr. Tedhasseh Medhane**

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**Mr. Kinuthia Muratha**

NEPAD Kenya

**Ms. Litha Musyimi-Ogana**

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**Dr. Robert Okello**

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**Mr. Jerry Okungu**

NEPAD Kenya

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**Dr. Ejeviome Otodo**

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**Mr. Andriannarison Rakotobe**

Head, NEPAD Unit, African Development Bank, Tunisia

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Senior Program Officer

**Ms. Kapinga Y. Ngandu**

Program Officer

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