Peace, Security, and Governance in the Great Lakes Region

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About IPA's Africa Program

The seminar on peace, security, and governance in the Great Lakes region, jointly organized by IPA and the Office of the Special Representative of the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region (Kenya), in partnership with the African Dialogue Centre for Conflict Management and Development Issues (Tanzania), the Mwalimu Nyerere Foundation (Tanzania), the UN Sub-regional Centre for Human Rights and Democracy in Central Africa (Cameroon), and the Centre for Conflict Resolution (South Africa), took place in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, from 15–17 December 2003. The meeting involved nearly sixty diplomats, high-ranking military officers, academics, and civil society actors, drawn largely from the Great Lakes region, and was the fourth in a series of seminars to address ways in which Africa's sub-regional organizations could increase their capacity to manage local conflicts. The seminar served as a major component of the Africa Program's current three-year project (2003–2006) on strengthening Africa's security mechanisms and actors.

The policy seminar on the Great Lakes region emerged out of IPA's partnership with the Organization of African Unity and sub-regional organizations engaged in enhancing their capacities for conflict management and strengthening Africa's security mechanisms.

The Africa Program of IPA works with partner institutions:

• To serve as a useful guide to Africa's regional organizations and actors in assessing their strengths and weaknesses in the area of conflict prevention, management, and resolution;
• To identify the key factors required to maximize the potential of Africa's fledgling security mechanisms and to provide tangible support for the efforts of regional organizations at strengthening their political and military institutions;
• To share comparative experiences between, and learn policy lessons from, the African Union, the New Partnership for Africa's Development, and sub-regional organizations, such as the Economic Community of West African States, the Southern African Development Community, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, the East African Community, and the Economic Community of Central African States;
• To encourage the involvement of civil society actors in developing and shaping Africa's regional security mechanisms and to facilitate the development of civil society networking within Africa;
• To serve as a valuable resource for external actors and donors involved in assisting the development of Africa's security mechanisms;
• To create networks of knowledgeable and interested Africans to influence developments on their continent through interaction among themselves; and
• To provide a resource for scholars and students of conflict management in Africa, particularly since there exists a paucity of knowledge on the continent's institutions and actors engaged in the field of conflict management.

About the Rapporteur

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Executive Summary

The seminar, "Peace, Security, and Governance, in the Great Lakes region,"1 the first in the third phase of the International Peace Academy’s (IPA) Africa Program, jointly organized with the Office of the Special Representative of the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region (Kenya), took place in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, from 15–17 December 2003. Other partners in the convening of the policy seminar included: the African Dialogue Centre for Conflict Management and Development Issues (Tanzania), the Mwalimu Nyerere Foundation (Tanzania), the UN Sub-regional Centre for Human Rights and Democracy in Central Africa (Cameroon), and the Centre for Conflict Resolution (South Africa). Approximately sixty participants – diplomats, high-ranking military officers, academics, and civil society actors – drawn largely from the Great Lakes region, attended the conference. Notable participants included: Mr. Joseph S. Warioba, former prime minister of the United Republic of Tanzania; Mr. Phillemon Sarungi, (MP), Minister for Defence and National Service of the United Republic of Tanzania; and Dr. Salim Ahmed Salim, Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Mwalimu Nyerere Foundation and former secretary-general of the Organization of African Unity.

The primary objective of the seminar was to assess the prospects for durable peace and security and to identify the challenges to democratization in the Great Lakes region. The policy seminar proved particularly timely as the main countries in conflict in the region – Rwanda, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) – stand at varying degrees of transition and harbor the potential for renewed violence. Rwanda has conducted two elections since the 1994 genocide, but the credibility of the electoral processes has been disputed and elements of structural violence have not completely disappeared. In Burundi, while the main Hutu insurgent group has acceded to the peace agreement, the Parti pour la libération du peuple hutu – Forces nationales de libération (PALIPEHUTU-FNL) have not. Furthermore, plans for the demobilization of former combatants and reintegration of refugees from the 1993 political violence are yet to be effectively implemented. Finally, in the DRC, the active presence of Rwandan militias in the Kivu provinces is causing the Rwandan army to deploy into the DRC, thus violating the Pretoria Agreement between the two countries. It highlights the need to resolve domestic security concerns in Rwanda in tandem with the sub-regional peace process underway in the DRC.

Prospects for the consolidation of peace in the region will depend on an empowered civil society, strongly institutionalized and efficient sub-regional organizations, and strategic intervention by the international community. In this regard, IPA’s partnership with the Office of the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General (SRSG) for the Great Lakes Region gave participants an opportunity to provide recommendations for increasing the impact of the upcoming International Conference on the Great Lakes Region on peace, security, and governance in the sub-region. The international conference, to be organized as a series of summits by the Office of the SRSG starting in November 2004, will also provide the sub-region’s civil society, women’s groups, and youth organizations the opportunity to participate in the planning of a blueprint for engendering economic and social development in the Great Lakes region.

Equally important, conflict resolution in the sub-region’s core countries of Rwanda, Burundi, and the DRC was discussed as a function of how well these countries successfully address domestic and regional issues. To this end, participants emphasized such measures as building strong democratic and economic institutions, eliminating poverty and underdevelopment, curbing the spread of HIV/AIDS, stemming the illicit trade of small arms and light weapons (SALWs), and designing durable solutions for addressing issues of concern to refugees and internally displaced people (IDPs). Furthermore, participants underscored that partnerships with the international community, the strengthening of regional economic communities, and increased economic integration were critical to resolving these issues.

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1 The Great Lakes region includes: Rwanda, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Uganda, Tanzania, and Kenya.
Policy Recommendations and the Way Forward

The participants developed a number of policy recommendations to outline the way forward for civil society organizations, national governments, regional institutions, and international bodies to address the peace and security issues of the Great Lakes region. Specifically, participants emphasized the need to: ensure that the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region should succeed in addressing the root causes of the conflict in the Great Lakes from regional and domestic perspectives; include civil society and women’s groups in peacebuilding processes; stem spillover effects such as the illicit trade of SALWs, the spread of HIV/AIDS, the deepening of poverty, and forced population movements (refugees and IDPs); rationalize and strengthen regional economic communities; and more effectively engage the international community.

International Conference on the Great Lakes Region

Participants viewed the upcoming International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, set to commence with a series of summits in November 2004, as an important component for solving the regionalization of conflicts in the Great Lakes. In order to ensure the effectiveness of the conference and the comprehensiveness of the process, participants emphasized that the Office of the SRSG should include women’s groups, civil society organizations, and youth associations. Furthermore, to enable the conference to establish institutional linkages for growth and conflict resolution, the Office of the SRSG was urged to identify specific socio-economic or democratization projects that would benefit the region, thereby beginning the process of creating institutions to achieve common goals.

Peace, Justice, and Reconciliation

The core countries of the Great Lakes region should develop mechanisms to balance the needs of justice and reconciliation in the pursuit of sustainable peace. Many participants noted that in Burundi, to foster reconciliation, the government should design affirmative action programs and create legal instruments that ensure the rights of minority citizens. The government should also implement a sustainable repatriation project for the refugees resulting from the expulsions of 1972 that is accompanied with strong economic development programs. In Rwanda, the international community was urged to address the irregularities in the two elections, while not discounting ethnic tensions that still linger in the aftermath of the 1994 genocide. Moreover, Rwanda’s security fears must be adequately addressed in order to facilitate the complete withdrawal of Rwandan troops from the DRC. Finally, in the DRC, illicit exploitation of natural resources should cease, and the groups that are not signatories to the Global and Inclusive Agreement on Transition in the Democratic Republic of the Congo should be acknowledged and included in the transitional institutional arrangements.

Participation of Civil Society and Women’s Groups in Peacebuilding and Reconciliation

Civil society organizations, in particular women’s groups, have played a significant role in peacebuilding and reconciliation; however, they have not been adequately represented in the peace processes. Moreover, these groups are weakly institutionalized. While national, regional, and international processes must include civil society organizations and a gender sensitive approach to peacebuilding, these non-governmental groups must also undertake improvements of their own. In particular, participants urged civil society organizations to increase the strengths of their institutions, design long-range financing structures, and connect their missions more closely to the populations they serve.

Solutions to Regionalized Conflicts

Given the regionalization of conflict in the Great Lakes region, solutions should address the sources of political and social instability of neighboring states. The subregion’s states and the international community should focus on stemming the proliferation of refugees and IDPs, the illicit trade of SALWs, the spread of HIV/AIDS, and the endemic poverty of the region. Concurrently, they must also resolve domestic political and economic catalysts for violence such as poor governance, the absence of democratic institutions, ill-
conceived economic policies, and poorly institutionalized regional economic communities.

- Managing the flow of refugees and IDPs will require designing solutions that address both immediate and root causes of forced displacement. Solving immediate causes entails ending armed conflicts. However, more durable solutions should focus on root causes of displacement, such as inadequate economic and social conditions, and questions of citizenship and identity. Equally important, solutions must provide support to the refugee-receiving country – for example, to improve opportunities for the displaced and facilitate citizenship procedures – as well as to the refugee-generating country – such as bolstering their capacity to absorb repatriated refugees and to create sustainable reconciliation programs.

- The illicit trade in SALWs can be curbed with the assistance of regional and international mechanisms. Short-term solutions recommended by participants include adequately funding and monitoring disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programs following conflicts. In the long-term, states in the Great Lakes should provide political and economic support to concerted regional agreements, engage in mutual monitoring, and cooperate on border security.

- The states in the region, in cooperation with the international community, can forestall the security threat posed by the high incidence of HIV/AIDS by, among other measures, including public health as a critical component of economic and governance policies and post-conflict reconstruction programs. Importantly, the devastating economic and social consequences of the disease must be adequately addressed.

- The rationalization of regional economic communities (RECs) can help curb the effects of poverty on regionalized instability. Presently, the region’s states have multiple memberships in the RECs, causing divided loyalties, weak commitment to goals of individual RECs, and subsequently poor institutionalization. However, states in the Great Lakes region must resolve the debate on more effective construction of RECs. Participants debated whether RECs should reflect formal or informal market flows, natural boundaries, or market complementarities and synergies. Furthermore, national policies should reflect more effective use and public investment of revenues from natural resources. Properly managing natural resources is especially important given that eight countries in the region – Angola, Cameroon, Chad, the DRC, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, the Republic of Congo, and São Tomé and Principe – produce oil.

**Effective Engagement of the International Community**

The institutions in the Great Lakes region and the international community must work together to resolve domestic political and economic catalysts for violence, such as poor economic and political governance. The international community should facilitate economic reforms and democratic transitions through the provision of financial, diplomatic, and institutional support to national governments and regional organizations. More to the point, the UN should work closely with Africa’s sub-regional organizations – namely the African Union, the Economic Community of Central African States, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, and the Southern African Development Community – to provide the legitimacy afforded through the UN’s perceived neutrality and the logistical support needed for effective operationalization of a security mechanism. Similarly, the US, France, and Belgium – historically the most influential northern democracies in the Great Lakes region – should support work with various ministerial representatives, not just at the foreign ministry.
1. Introduction

The seminar, “Peace, Security, and Governance in the Great Lakes region,” jointly organized by the International Peace Academy (IPA) and the Office of the Special Representative of the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region (Kenya), took place in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, from 15–17 December 2003. In convening this major policy seminar, IPA partnered with Africa-based national and regional organizations: these were the African Dialogue Centre for Conflict Management and Development Issues (Tanzania), the Mwalimu Nyerere Foundation (Tanzania), the UN Sub-regional Centre for Human Rights and Democracy in Central Africa (Cameroon), and the Centre for Conflict Resolution (South Africa). There were nearly sixty participants – diplomats, high-ranking military officers, academics, and civil society actors – drawn largely from the Great Lakes region. Notable participants included Mr. Joseph S. Warioba, former prime minister of the United Republic of Tanzania; Mr. Phillemon Sarungi, (MP), Minister for Defence and National Service of the United Republic of Tanzania; and Dr. Salim Ahmed Salim, Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Mwalimu Nyerere Foundation and former secretary-general of the Organization of African Unity.

The primary objective of the seminar was to assess the prospects for durable peace and security and to identify the challenges to democratization in the region. The seminar devoted particular attention to the cycles of violence, which have hampered local, regional, and international efforts to secure peace, ensure stability, and establish legitimate foundations for democracy in Rwanda, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Equally important, the seminar evaluated the roles of civil society; regional and international actors; and the trans-national issues of poverty, underdevelopment, refugees and internally displaced people (IDPs), and HIV/AIDS.

The seminar also served as a platform for the Office of the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General (SRSG) for the Great Lakes Region to present its proposal for an International Conference on the Great Lakes Region. The International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, which is planned to commence in November 2004, holds great potential to create opportunities for civil society groups to enter into dialogue with national and regional actors involved in peace, development, and reconciliation processes, thereby engendering regional stability.


Through the project on Strengthening Africa’s Security Mechanisms and Actors, the Africa Program endeavors to provide policy-makers with relevant recommendations from civil society groups, scholars, and African regional and sub-regional organizations that will help to strengthen the ability of Africa’s sub-regional organizations and actors to prevent, manage, and resolve conflict.

Brief Overview of Conflict in the Great Lakes Region

Regionalized conflicts are characterized by a complex interaction between localized rebellion, a clash of interests among countries of the region, and a...
weakened capacity or will of international actors to avert humanitarian crises – as transpired in the 1990s in the Great Lakes region, culminating with the war in the DRC. The decade of violence in the Great Lakes region began with the 1993 civil war in Burundi, which was followed by the 1994 Rwandan genocide of Tutsis and moderate Hutus. Both conflicts resulted in large numbers of refugee flows into neighboring Zaire (now the DRC). The conflict then spread into Zaire, as both Tutsis and Hutus reside there in significant numbers. Rwanda, citing the need not only to protect its own citizens from Hutus, but also to protect Tutsi-Congolese, launched incursions into eastern DRC in 1996.

In the beginning of the war in the DRC (1996), Rwanda and Uganda formed an alliance with the Congolese government. However, this Kampala-Kinshasa-Kigali alliance soon unraveled, amid the number of security concerns cited by Uganda and Rwanda. Uganda maintained that it needed to stop insurgents (the Lord’s Resistance Army and the Allied Democratic Forces) from attacking through southern Sudan and eastern DRC – in the process, drawing Sudanese troops on to the DRC’s territory. Rwanda’s governments invoked the right to “self-defense” against cross-border incursions into its territory by DRC-based Hutu militias. In reaction to the growing hostilities, Angola, Namibia, and Zimbabwe stated that they intervened militarily to preserve the unity of a Southern African Development Community (SADC) member state. Chad also provided a small number of troops at the DRC government’s request and Libya allegedly provided some funding. Political and security justifications for their intervention notwithstanding, the opportunity to exploit the DRC’s lucrative natural resources also provided an impetus for the military intervention of some states of the region.

The rationale for intervention by the neighboring states became self-enforcing and the localized conflicts became regional. As such, the conflicts within and between the countries of the Great Lakes will require regionally-based and targeted solutions, along with the cooperation of relevant neighboring states. While peace may be negotiated between local and national actors, it is insufficient for peace in the region. Despite the existence of peace agreements between the DRC, Rwanda, and Uganda, instability in the region continues – the Rwandan military has not completely withdrawn its personnel from the eastern part of the DRC.

In sum, the DRC war has demonstrated that despite the formal termination of war and renunciation of violence by national actors, a durable peace between local antagonists and neighboring states may remain elusive until regional and international incentives encourage a complete withdrawal of the foreign forces from the DRC. Notably, any agreement must resolve the underlying issue Rwanda has cited for its involvement – continued presence of Hutu génocidaires. Furthermore, the absence of robust institutions of good governance and rule of law, exacerbated by ruling elites’ refusal to acknowledge past acts of genocide – such as occurred in Burundi in 1972 and eastern DRC in 1998 – all contribute to a lack of trust between armed opposition groups and incumbent regimes and foment political violence.

3 For more on regionalized conflicts see IPA, The Regionalization of Conflict and Intervention, 5–9 May 2003, New York, pp. 2–3.
4 This background was summarized from Mwesiga Baregu, “The DRC and the Great Lakes Conflict Formation: Problems, Options, and Dilemmas,” presented at the seminar organized by IPA in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, from 15–17 December 2003. See also International Crisis Group, Africa’s Seven Nation War, ICG Democratic Republic of Congo Report No. 4, 21 May 1999 (electronic version).
Crafting a Regional Approach: International Conference on the Great Lakes Region

The *International Conference on the Great Lakes Region*, which will be organized by the SRSG for the Great Lakes Region, in partnership with the African Union (AU), is intended to coordinate peacemaking processes, development assistance, and investment, for the DRC, Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, Tanzania, and Kenya. The main objective of the *International Conference on the Great Lakes Region* is to create a *Stability, Security, and Development Pact* (SSDP). The pact will address four key areas – regional peace and security; democracy and good governance; economic development; and regional integration – in order to effectively address social and humanitarian crises. In the search for regional solutions, participants considered the *International Conference on the Great Lakes Region*, a hopeful solution to the stalemate in the region. These optimistic views were nevertheless tempered by calls to the special representative to provide concrete proposals to meet the needs of the sub-region’s inhabitants.

This proposed regional pact underscores the importance that should be given to the process necessary for the achievement of its stated goals. As a start, a preparatory summit of heads of states would be held in November 2004 to set the priorities for the *International Conference on the Great Lakes Region*. Smaller meetings at the national and local levels would then follow, in order to enable governmental and non-governmental bodies to craft policies to implement the principles set at the first preparatory meeting. Second, a meeting of representatives of the ministries of foreign affairs of the participating countries will take place to coordinate national and regional policies striving for peace, security, and development. Third, the

*International Conference on the Great Lakes Region* will organize a summit of foreign affairs ministers. Finally, a second summit of heads of states will take place to formally adopt the SSDP. To enable the *International Conference on the Great Lakes Region* to adequately capture the dynamics of the region and produce relevant policy recommendations, participants emphasized the importance of carefully selecting civil society representatives and including women at all levels. To this end, participants were encouraged that civil society representatives, nominated by both government and independent sources, would include trade unions, parliamentarians, academics, and religious groups in order to create a people-oriented conference. A special regional meeting on women’s roles in peacebuilding would take place, to ascertain consideration of gender issues in all of the conference’s work. However, a number of the participants noted that the absence of the rule-of-law and good governance

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8 According to the Office of the SRSG, Angola, Congo-Brazzaville, and Zambia may be included in the framework, although there are no specific details about their roles.


10 Ibid.

11 The importance of considering a gender perspective in peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction and ensuring the inclusion of diverse members of civil society organizations were highlighted in the papers by Rose Kadende-Kaiser, “Gender, Conflict and Peacebuilding in the Great Lakes Region,” and Angela Ndinga Muvumba, “The Great Experiment: Civil Society, Democracy, and Governance in Uganda and the Great Lakes,” presented at the seminar organized by IPA in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, from 15–17 December 2003.
practices in the region make it difficult for groups of
civil society to be given access to the process envisaged
by the proposed framework of the conference. While the
organization of the International Conference on the
Great Lakes Region reflected consensus on the need for
regional solutions to the chronic problem of insecurity
and violence in the Great Lakes, some participants called
for more specific projects for the conference that would
be relevant to both the governments and people of the
region. By focusing on concrete projects, participants
argued that institutions that engender development
could emerge more easily and be of greater relevance to
the region.

Plan of the Report

The overriding message from the participants
underscored that in order to devise durable, region-
ally-based solutions to the conflicts in the Great
Lakes region, the security concerns of individual
countries must be integrated into a coherent regional
framework. This report reflects that outcome by
looking first at individual countries’ security
concerns, then examining the relevant regional
framework by which they may be addressed. The next
section of the report assesses the peace and security
environments in the three core countries of the Great
Lakes – Rwanda, Burundi, and the DRC. Section three
highlights domestic bases of regional instability, such
as inadequate democratic reform and poor economic
policy. In section four, the report illustrates the
mechanisms by which domestic problems have
become trans-national security concerns – causing
refugee flows, exporting poverty, spreading
HIV/AIDS, and facilitating the illicit trade of small
arms and light weapons (SALWs). External actors –
the UN, the US, France, and Belgium – may help as
well as hinder the resolution of conflicts in the Great
Lakes Region, as is elaborated in section five. The
report concludes in section six with policy
recommendations on bringing stability and develop-
ment to the Great Lakes region.

From left to right: Mr. Mark Chingono, Centre for Conflict Resolution;
Dr. Ruth Iyob, Director, Africa Program, IPA; Ms. Lindiwe Zulu,
Vodacom.
2. Peace and Security in the Great Lakes Region

The Great Lakes region has made some progress in overcoming instability, but several threats remain. Over the past five years, the progress made by Rwanda, Burundi, and the DRC, the core states of the region, owes much to concerted multilateral and regional diplomatic efforts. While the UN and other international organizations forged many of the entries into the mediation processes, “on the ground” knowledge of regional organizations and political actors, such as Tanzania’s Julius Nyerere and his successor, Nelson Mandela, in Burundi, were critical to their interventions.

By virtue of its proximity, the security environment of Central Africa, which shares the states of Rwanda, the DRC, and Burundi, impacts the Great Lakes region, and vice versa. Just as the potential of political violence in the Republic of Congo (ROC), Chad, and the Central African Republic may affect the Great Lakes region, the stability in Rwanda, the DRC, and Burundi remain central to peace in Central Africa. Stability in the Great Lakes region will curb conflict generating factors such as refugee flows, the illicit trade of SALWs, persistent poverty, and the spread of HIV/AIDS. 12

Many participants urged the creation of regional peace processes to bring stability to the region. However, efforts to construct a truly regional process have been hampered by the relative weakness of the East African Community (EAC), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), and the Communauté économique des pays des grands lacs (CEPGL), the main sub-regional organizations in the Great Lakes. In particular, ECCAS, which has established a regional security mechanism, the Conseil de paix et de sécurité de l’Afrique centrale (COPAX), suffers from a lack of trust between its members, which impedes the development of institutional measures to resolve conflict. 13 Consequently, efforts by the region’s mediators to resolve conflict have relied on moral suasion and the diplomatic efforts of other regional and international actors. 14

In Rwanda, Burundi, and the DRC, the most conflict-prone countries in both the Great Lakes and Central Africa regions, different stages of transition and “post-conflict” reconstruction prevail. As such, many participants underscored the need for an approach that would be sensitive to the particular challenges of the individual conflicts, while also contributing to a comprehensive regional peace. Despite the existence of peace agreements among the different contending parties, these processes are far from self-sustaining. The threat of re-ignition of violence and insecurity remains high. While domestic efforts to ensure peace agreement implementation are primary, there is a need for complementary efforts by regional and other external actors.

Rwanda

In April 2004, Rwanda marked ten years since the genocide of approximately 800,000 Rwandans (mostly from the Tutsi community) orchestrated by Hutu

From left to right: Dr. Khoti Kamanga, University of Dar es Salaam; Ms. Amy Smythe, UN Mission in the Congo; Ms. Angela Muvumba, IPA.

13 Ibid.
extremists. Peacebuilding in Rwanda has emphasized reconciliation and building democratic institutions. In many respects, Rwanda holds important lessons for successfully emerging from the trauma of intense political violence to a functioning state. While much progress has occurred, the current government of Rwanda has also been criticized for not adequately nurturing political liberalization. Moreover, some participants noted, Rwanda's support of the insurgent Rassemblement congolais pour la democratie (RCD)-Goma in the DRC continues to impede the regional peace process.

In the years following the genocide, institutions for reconciliation have been established – such as the traditional gacaca courts, in Rwanda, and the UN-established International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), which is based in Arusha, Tanzania. The ICTR, which has been the most prominent institution to emerge from the genocide, has been criticized from many angles. One of the most frequently cited criticisms is its perceived sluggishness. Since operations began in 1995, the ICTR has completed 13 trials; currently 56 people are in custody and 20 people are on trial. Much of the slow processes of the ICTR may be due to the judges’ preoccupation with respecting the rights of the accused and carefully avoiding the appearance of automatic bias against the extremist Hutus. The intent of the ICTR is also unclear; charged with punishing those responsible for the genocide, it is difficult to determine how far up the chain of command to prosecute. Finally, the Rwandan government has proved reluctant to place members of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) on trial for war crimes – a tactic some fear will leave the reconciliation process incomplete. Some participants noted that preventing the RPF to stand trial also cast a shadow on the accountability of the Kagame government and reinforced perceptions that the Rwandan government continues to treat ethnic groups unequally. Furthermore, it highlights the tension of choosing the right balance between justice and peace – which would entail allowing both RPF members and Hutus to stand trial – and stability.

Democratic institutions also have developed incompletely. While post-genocide Rwanda has conducted two national elections – the local elections of March 2001 and the presidential elections of May 2003 – these exercises have been faulted for massive electoral flaws. Most recently, in the 2003 presidential elections, opposition groups were banned and harassed by the government. Moreover, in the last few years, civil society has been subjected to continued coercion, as evidenced by the closure of a number of independent newspapers and the defection of officials critical about government. While some called for patience with Rwanda’s democratic transition and reconciliation efforts, others questioned the extent of its achievements following the genocide. Indeed, while Rwanda holds regular elections and adopts institutions associated with democratic transition, it simultaneously pursues policies that may lead to structural violence. Because of widespread electoral fraud and restrictions on civil society, participants challenged Rwanda’s progress on democracy and worried that the international community had not adequately addressed serious deficits in governance by the post-genocide regime. Several participants felt that the Rwandan government’s undemocratic practices, restrictions on the ICTR, as well as the alleged continued support for insurgents in neighboring DRC, posed threats to peace and security. Some even feared that Rwanda may experience another round of ethnic violence.


If a robust transition was to occur in Rwanda, many participants emphasized that the international community could not choose to remain neutral on the development of its electoral institutions and reconciliation efforts in exchange for avoiding confrontation with the Rwandan government. Such behavior on the part of the international community, participants felt, had developed – and Kagame seemed willing to exploit it – in the aftermath of their collective sense of guilt over the gross mismanagement and silence during the genocide. Urgently, some warned that the international community should take decisive steps to avoid a return to ethnic violence in Rwanda. Deciding to actively evaluate the progress in Rwanda presents the international community with a dilemma: should the international community praise Rwanda’s steps toward democratization or call attention to democratic transgressions? How should the international community react to the Rwandan government’s failure to cooperate with the work of the ICTR? In the end, many felt that the international community should be more willing to criticize Rwanda.

Burundi

After nearly a decade of war, Burundi now stands at a critical moment in its peace-building efforts. Following several faltering steps in the peace process, the latest accords, the Pretoria Protocol on Political, Defence and Security Power Sharing in Burundi, signed in October 2003 and the Pretoria Protocol on Outstanding Issues, signed in November 2003, provide hope that peace may be attained in Burundi. The Pretoria Protocols reaffirm the Arusha Agreement signed in 2002 and call for a cease-fire between the government and the Mouvement conseil national pour la defense de la democratie-forces pour la defense de la democratie (CNDD-FDD). This agreement is of significance because it indicates a shift in the CNDD-FDD, the largest Hutu armed insurgency, whose constituency of armed insurgent groups had previously been unable to reach a working agreement on inclusion in the transitional government.

Yet, despite this breakthrough, participants underscored the fragility of the peace process. Firstly, many cited the continued exclusion of a key component of Burundian society, the Parti pour la libération du peuple hutu – Forces nationales de libération (PALIPEHUTU-FNL). Secondly, post-conflict reconciliation, in turn, is threatened by the failure of the Burundi government (and the international community in general) to acknowledge the 1972 genocide of Hutus and by inadequate planning for the repatriation of refugees. Even today, it is an event that some ruling Tutsi elites deny, thereby diminishing the prospects of true reconciliation. Two recommendations to facilitate the Burundian peace process emerged. The first recommendation was the importance of acknowledging the impact of the 1972 genocide in Burundi. The second recommendation was the importance of addressing the flow and repatriation of Burundian refugees throughout the region.

Repatriation and Reintegration of Refugees to Burundi

At present, it is estimated that in Tanzania there are approximately 540,000 refugees from Burundi. Their impending repatriation to Burundi raises concerns locally and regionally that violence may return to Burundi as only minimal economic opportunities have

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been devised for the returning refugees. In fact, participants noted, one reason for the intransigence and popularity of the PALIPEHUTU-FNL are the continuing dire economic conditions in rural areas, where government services are either very minimal or absent. As such, it was recommended that the government invest significant resources in economic development and political reform in rural areas. Still, some participants cautioned, economic investment alone, though increasing the number of private enterprise opportunities, will not solve the problem of ethnic tension or facilitate reconciliation. To resolve inter-ethnic violence, participants recommended the institution of a system of affirmative action and a guarantee of minority rights.

Addressing Past Genocide

The continuing presence and support of the PALIPEHUTU-FNL not only reflects the dearth of economic opportunity, but also the still-unacknowledged genocide of Hutus by Tutsis that took place in Burundi in 1972. The denial by the government of the tragic events of 1972 that resulted in a massive influx of Hutu refugees into neighboring countries, underscores the absence of a political will to build trust and obtain reconciliation. According to many participants, in order to move the peace process forward in Burundi, it is imperative to recognize the genocide of Hutus. The past looms large in Burundi, highlighting the need to address questions of impunity along with the threat of political instability. Navigating between acknowledgement and justice for past crimes will require dialogue and mediation between state actors and members of civil society in order to facilitate reconciliation. The role of regional actors and the international community in assisting the ongoing Burundian peace process was deemed necessary at this juncture, where peacekeeping efforts require both international support and domestic cooperation.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo

The Democratic Republic of the Congo, a vast nation with immense natural resources, has twice served as a theater of war in the 20th century. The most recent war, in 1998, brought the regional cleavages and domestic tensions into sharp relief. Like its neighbors in the Great Lakes region, the DRC’s peace remains precarious. In August 2003, after the Global and Inclusive Agreement on Transition in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which allowed the Lusaka Agreement of 1999 to proceed, the DRC established a transitional government, which is mandated to oversee the demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration of armed groups and to prepare for forthcoming democratic elections. However, the intertwined legacy of the past links the previous governments of the DRC to its former allies/rivals, whose military and economic interventions continue to hamper the process of peacebuilding. In addition, regional and international commercial interests in the DRC, known for its gold, diamonds, coltan, copper, and timber, further complicate the peacemaking process. Indeed, the wholesale predation of the DRC’s natural resource wealth has continued despite the peace accords, which included few meaningful provisions for the creation of a transparent legal framework for resource exploitation.

The complex causes of conflict in the DRC point to the need for an integrated approach to conflict resolution – an approach that considers not only the interests of relevant political actors, but also the economic, socio-cultural, and environmental factors that have contributed to and sustained hostilities. To be successful, it was recommended that the hidden interests in the DRC be made visible. Thus, in addition to the need for dialogue among Congolese civil society and members of government, the impact of spillover of conflicts from neighboring Rwanda and Burundi must be addressed – in particular, allegations of the ongoing illicit exploitation of the DRC’s natural resources by neighboring actors.

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3. Domestic Bases of Regional Instability

The contemporary political and humanitarian crises in the Great Lakes have domestic roots.\textsuperscript{22} The domestic conflicts spiraled into regional crises, created refugee flows, and spawned the growth of many armed opposition groups – each of which drew support from a neighboring country. Subsequently, political and economic reform, legitimate leadership, and an accountable government emerged as major prerequisites for the establishment of an enduring peace in this region.

**Democratic Reform and Conflict Management**

The weak institutions of the Great Lakes states directly impact their ability to manage conflicts. As weak states, they cannot adequately protect minority groups or vulnerable ethnic groups or reconcile rival groups; manage democratic institutions effectively; provide checks and balances in their governing systems; or establish transparent governing procedures. As a result, participation and trust by the polity in governance is diminished.\textsuperscript{23} Thus, although the key states in the Great Lakes region – Rwanda, Burundi, and the DRC – are at various states of post-conflict transition to democratic states, conflict between ethnic groups will most likely be resolved outside the state’s systems, increasing the chances of violence. Hence, many emphasized, political reform becomes paramount to ensure the success of the proposed democratic transitions in these countries with legacies of inter-communal violence, institutionalized inequality, and privatization of state resources by the elite. In the absence of reconciliation between communities that have undergone cycles of violence in Rwanda and Burundi, the fear of a resurgence of conflict needs to be addressed urgently. In both countries, participants asserted, the reconciliation process could be facilitated through ensuring the equal rights and representation of minorities. Repatriation and reintegration of refugees into Burundi requires not only economic, but political will as well. In the case of Burundi, many suggested that a form of affirmative action to enable refugees to access economic resources and political power might provide the impetus necessary to keep the peace process on track.

Civil society organizations and the international community can play a significant role in facilitating the consolidation of peace. Historically, civil society organizations have pressed governments for democratic reforms, monitored and advocated for human rights, and demanded new leadership, as occurred in Uganda. Yet, civil society organizations suffer from their own weak institutions, tenuous connections to local populations, inadequate funding strategies, and poor networks.\textsuperscript{24} However, by taking ownership of the process of peacebuilding and working in partnership with international actors to prevent the escalation of conflicts, some of these constraints may be overcome. In fact, some participants conceded, the financial and diplomatic resources of the international

\textsuperscript{22} Khadiagala.


\textsuperscript{24} Muvumba.
community will prove critical to enabling national and regional actors to design mechanisms to ensure peace and security.

**Economic Policy Reform and Conflict Management**

The states of the Great Lakes region have sought to ameliorate their dire economic conditions through the creation of regional economic communities (RECs). The RECs in turn form economic institutions that are charged with integrating the sub-region’s economies. Currently, the Great Lakes region hosts a number of regional institutions with overlapping memberships: ECCAS, CEPGL, the EAC, the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), and the Preferential Trade Area (PTA). For a variety of reasons, the RECs have not succeeded in fostering economic integration or in generating economic growth. This failure is compounded in light of the rich natural resources of the DRC and the discovery of oil in eight of eleven states in Central Africa – Angola, Cameroon, Chad, the DRC, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, the Republic of Congo, and São Tomé and Principe.25

Many participants felt that stronger efforts toward economic integration would not only end the region’s economic stagnation, but that such economic relationships may help to repair political problems as well. However, the major existing institutions for economic integration, ECCAS, EAC, and CEPGL, are neither efficiently nor satisfactorily defined, nor adequately institutionalized. Further exacerbating the weaknesses of the RECs, many states belong to more than one sub-regional organization. Such divided loyalties to numerous regional economic communities has consequences: while national economies falter, ethnic rivalries and conflict inter-linkages drain depleted resources and further weaken efforts to link economic reforms to conflict management.

In considering means by which to strengthen the RECs and increase their effectiveness, participants debated whether the establishment of new, larger sub-regional organizations would meet regional economic challenges or whether existing organizations could be strengthened.26 Participants identified several difficulties in changing the current structure of RECs. Most significantly, some participants noted that member states may have vested interests in maintaining the status quo. Moreover, it may be difficult to establish agreement among the region’s states on what a bigger or more efficient REC may entail: with many states’ overlapping regional affiliation, deciding which states should be represented by which REC could prove problematic. Furthermore, deciding how to determine the boundaries of an REC – whether through natural boundaries or established formal or informal market routes – could prove contentious. Finally, not all participants agreed on the need for a new REC. Instead they advocated that countries should be paired by forming trade agreements based on their synergies and complementarities to engender economic development.

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4. Trans-National Conflict Issues

In addition to the pressing matters of national governance and economic self-sufficiency facing the countries of the Great Lakes, trans-national issues such as the widespread flows of refugees and large numbers of internally displaced people; impoverishment; the HIV/AIDS pandemic; and the proliferation of the illicit trade of SALWs, all present challenges that require a coordination of regional and international efforts to ensure peace and security.

Solutions to trans-national problems may be found both regionally and domestically. From a regional perspective, participants stressed that the role of national leaders in putting aside rivalries to address common objectives was crucial to finding the balance between respecting the rights of sovereign states and ensuring regional consensus on addressing regional conflicts. Internally, addressing the issues of citizenship and institutionalizing constitutional arrangements were also factors that would enable national actors to implement reforms to stem the tide of population flows and transmission of diseases.

Refugees and Internally Displaced People

In one of the world’s largest regional concentrations of people displaced by war, refugees and IDPs totaling almost 900,000 are distributed throughout the six Great Lakes states. Refugees and internally displaced people often have been seen only as an enduring problem – that is, as an economic burden and security threat to those states that host them. Local prejudices to the contrary, refugee communities are not a principal locus of criminal activity, despite the hardships of refugee life. Nonetheless, the range of options for dealing with refugees and IDPs are limited to repatriation or resettlement – both of which, as some participants noted, are short-sighted and ill-suited measures to the realities of long-term displacement. In the view of many participants, a more effective approach would acknowledge the long-term, socio-economic and juridical reality of displacement and regard refugees as potential agents of regional cooperation and recovery.

In order to devise relevant and durable solutions for reducing the number of refugees and IDPs, as well as improving their living conditions, it is imperative to distinguish between immediate causes of displacement – namely, armed conflict – and root causes – such as unmet basic social and economic needs and the denial of identity and autonomy. In the short term, refugees must be placed in locations that provide adequate resources to meet their basic needs. The search for solutions for easing the hardship of displacement must be inclusive – comprising the refugees, the refugee-generating countries, and the

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27 Khadiagala; Mwanasali. Only Tanzania does not have a population of IDPs.

28 The actual figure may be higher, as these represent the official numbers only (Khoti Kamanga, “Refugees and Internally Displaced Peoples in the Great Lakes Region: A Continuing Challenge,” presented at the seminar organized by IPA in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, from 15–17 December 2003). See also United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Global Appeal 2004 (Geneva, Switzerland: UNHCR, December 2003), (electronic version).

29 Kamanga.

30 Ibid.
refugee-hosting countries. A particularly effective policy, it was noted, could be to target development assistance that benefits both the refugees and the communities in which they live. Integration of displaced people into local communities is often the least examined option. However, in many instances, participants noted, where refugee communities are longstanding and where their “home” countries are still too fragile to repatriate them, greater consideration should be given by host countries to improving their status and opportunities by developing partial or full forms of national and regional citizenship. In this regard, Tanzania is a noteworthy example of a pan-African nation – one of the few African countries that has granted citizenship to incoming refugee populations. For this option to be more broadly feasible, there is a need for greater recognition of efforts to offset the socio-economic and political costs by host countries as long-term refugees are assimilated into countries for asylum.31

Poverty

Poverty is one of the root causes, as well as a result of, the region’s political violence.32 In the DRC for example, the looting committed by the neighboring states that intervened on both the government and rebel sides exacerbated the economic devastation of the civil war.33 Outside of war in large part, the economies of the Great Lakes region have remained underdeveloped due to the state-centric policies pursued in the post-colonial period, the tendency for politicians to use the state as a means of personal enrichment, and lack of appropriate investment in human capacity development and other factors that will spur economic development. Specifically, privatization of state resources by ruling elites, the persistence of shadow markets, and the erosion of social services have stunted national and regional economies. Weak national economies, in turn, lack the dynamism necessary to provide the resources to be channeled toward resolving regional conflict.34

The poverty in some of the states of the Great Lakes region is even more paradoxical given the rich endowment of natural resources. As noted previously, eight of the eleven countries in the overlapping Central Africa region produce oil.35 The poverty of a number of the oil-producing countries is due to mismanagement and non-transparent accounting of the oil-revenue. For the most part, many governments in the oil-producing countries, in cooperation with international oil companies, have exclusively controlled the oil revenue of these countries.36 While the gross national product of many of these countries is positive because of the large amount of revenues from oil,37 their ranking on the United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP) Human Development Index remains low. Indeed, ten of the fourteen countries comprising the Great Lakes and Central Africa regions fall in the “low human development” category, and never rise above 116 (Equatorial Guinea’s rating) out of 175.38

Recommendations for alleviating poverty comprised improving economic governance and the engagement of the international community to employ more effective monitoring. In particular, economic governance should focus on the elimination of

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31 Ibid.
33 Prunier.
34 Ibid; Francis.
35 Mwanasali. See also Global Witness, Time for Transparency: Coming clean on oil, mining and gas revenues, March 2004 (electronic version).
36 Ibid; Francis; Mwanasali.
bribery and other forms of corruption. For its part, the international community may use a number of tools at its disposal such as monitoring resource flows and uses of development assistance funds.\textsuperscript{39} Other recommendations emphasized the acceleration of the region’s economic integration (see the section above on Economic Policy Reform and Conflict Management).

**HIV/AIDS**

It is not an understatement to say that the HIV/AIDS pandemic constitutes the most lethal threat to social and economic development in the region. By 2003, approximately 26.6 million people (an increase of almost 14 percent from 2002) in sub-Saharan Africa were infected with HIV, out of a global estimated total of 40 million.\textsuperscript{40} In the Great Lakes region, the prevalence of HIV/AIDS among the adult population is as follows: Kenya: 14 percent; Rwanda: 11 percent; Burundi: 11 percent; Tanzania (excluding Zanzibar, which has 0.75 percent prevalence rate): 7 percent; Uganda: 5 percent; and the DRC: 5 percent.\textsuperscript{41}

Combined with the excessive poverty and underdevelopment of the majority of rural areas of the region, the effect of infectious diseases on vulnerable sectors of society needs to be addressed. HIV/AIDS becomes a trans-national problem especially during conflict. In the Great Lakes, where regionalized conflict has existed for nearly a decade, this risk is particularly acute as armed groups travel across borders and use rape and forced marriage as weapons of war. In this regard, failure to include public health policy as an integral part of post-conflict reconstruction will lead to devastating impacts on affected communities, as well as the region.\textsuperscript{42}

**The Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons**

Another area of continued vulnerability for the Great Lakes region is the untrammeled illicit proliferation of small arms and light weapons. Though estimates vary widely, it is widely recognized that the Great Lakes region is inundated with SALWs – which allow conflicts to persist.\textsuperscript{43} In the DRC itself, an estimated one million SALWs are in private hands.\textsuperscript{44} This situation owes as much to the weakness of local government capacities for law enforcement and border control as it does to the multiplicity of avenues for the illicit global arms trade more broadly.

In the long-term, participants noted, controlling the trade of SALWs requires a concerted international solution. In the short-term, greater attention and resources must be directed to the coordinated implementation of the various disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programs in the region. As currently structured, DDR programs suffer from a host of ills, including inadequate funding, poor monitoring and collection capacities, and the neglect of the provision of long-term economic alternatives to ex-combatants.

Given that steady progress in DDR is essential to the success of the next phases of peace implementation in the DRC and Burundi, and given that the illicit arms trade is an inherently regional phenomenon, in the long-term, participants allowed, a region-wide approach offers a more durable solution. Specifically, national programs would be complemented by regional agreements, mutual monitoring, and cooperative border security. The *International Conference on the Great Lakes Region* provides a ready venue by which regional approaches may be developed and by which increased donor assistance may be solicited.

\textsuperscript{39} Prunier.


\textsuperscript{41} Adult population refers to ages 15-49. The statistics for the various countries are the most recent available: Kenya - 2000; Rwanda - 1999; Burundi - 1999; Tanzania - 2001 and Zanzibar - 2000; Uganda - 2001; and the DRC - 1999. The figures are obtained from the “National Response Brief” on the UNAIDS website (available from http://www.unaids.org/nationalresponse/search.asp 3 February, 2004).

\textsuperscript{42} Mwanasali; UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, *Great Lakes Region and Central Africa – Mid-year Review*, May 2003 (electronic version), p. 7.

\textsuperscript{43} Maria-Lovence Tusingwire, “With Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons, the Millennium Development Goals are in Jeopardy,” *SmallArmsNet.org: Arms Management in Africa* (available from http://www.smallarmsnet.org/issues/themes/unmillgoals.htm 5 April 2004).
5. The Role of External Actors

External actors – such as the United Nations, the United States, France, Belgium, and South Africa – have had a mixed impact on the resolution of conflict in the Great Lakes region. In many respects, the response by external actors has been inadequate. As has been widely chronicled, the lack of response by the UN and the US in the Rwandan genocide may have exacerbated the scale of the tragedy, which left nearly 800,000 – mostly Tutsis – murdered. Indeed, as one participant stressed, the combined exploitation and neglect of the region by the major powers is a stain on the moral conscience of the West and one that can only be redeemed by a determined commitment of influence and resources to peace, security, and development in the region.\(^44\)

To fill the leadership vacuum left by the international community, South Africa has taken the initiative in peacemaking activities. Notably, in Burundi and in the DRC, South Africa facilitated a negotiated settlement to the conflict. The resolution of the conflict in the DRC especially, and the extension of democracy into the country, became a major goal of South Africa’s foreign policy. To this end, South Africa’s president, Thabo Mbeki, not only mediated the conflict, but also supported the peacekeeping operations and included the DRC into the Southern African Development Community, in an effort to exert control over Laurent Kabila, one participant asserted. In Burundi, South Africa went beyond peacemaking to committing troops to the peacekeeping forces under the auspices of the African Union, the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB). South Africa was also instrumental in facilitating a regional and international response to the crisis in Burundi. Jacob Zuma, the deputy president of South Africa and the special representative in Burundi, in conjunction with Jean Francois Ndongou, the foreign minister of Gabon, and others from Tanzania illustrated South Africa’s preference for an inclusive approach. South Africa lobbied for the involvement of the African Union and financial contributions from the UN and the EU (the latter addressed below).\(^45\)

Nonetheless, South Africa faced limitations on the degree of political leverage it could exert over the Great Lakes region to seal negotiated settlements. In the DRC, South Africa was frequently accused of biased mediation, as it negotiated with the insurgents while continuing to have diplomatic ties with the other countries that were intervening in the DRC – Angola, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, and Zimbabwe. South Africa’s failure to denounce the support given by Uganda and Rwanda to armed factions that staged a rebellion against Laurent Kabila in 1998 was seen by Kabila as a betrayal by South Africa – especially given South Africa’s repeated interventions in Lesotho at times of instability. Moreover, the inclusion of the DRC into SADC had also backfired – resulting in accusations that South Africa sought to impose its version of democracy on the DRC. In Burundi, South Africa failed to broker a peace agreement that all parties – namely the CNDD-FDD and the PALIPEHUTU-FNL – accepted.\(^46\) South Africa also came up against financial constraints: the $110 million annual cost for supporting the 1,600 troops it had committed as part of AMIB could not continue for the three years South Africa had promised – prompting it to propose the involvement of the EU and the UN. The EU eventually provided $8 million for AMIB.\(^47\)

South Africa’s difficulties illustrate the constraints faced by regional powers that seek to undertake conflict resolution. On the one hand, South Africa’s intervention conferred legitimacy to the peacemaking process because, arguably, it had a vested interest in fostering political stability in the region. However, regional goals can conflict with its foreign policy goals

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\(^{46}\) Ibid.

\(^{47}\) Ibid.
and national financial constraints. The challenges encountered by South Africa highlights a role for outside entities such as the UN, the US, France, and Belgium.

Until recently, the conflicts in Africa have not elicited substantial intervention by the West. In the event that the US, France, or Belgium did intervene, it was with little regard to the internal political consequences for the African country – except to the extent that those consequences affected their countries. As a result, authoritarian leaders like Mobuto Sese Seko remained in power. These tendencies are slowly being reversed. The timing reflects a number of internal political changes – such as Belgium’s election of a Liberal-Social government, the improvement of relations between France and Rwanda, and the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 in the US. Moreover, the consequences of inaction – the genocide in Rwanda – have galvanized the international community to guard against a repeat of such events. Reflecting these policy changes, France and Belgium have shown an increasing willingness to intervene in conflict resolution in the Great Lakes region: France deployed troops in Ituri province in the DRC and Belgium sees itself as an honest broker for peacemaking efforts in the region. Furthermore, as a result of the US war on terrorism and the fact that failed states can easily harbor terrorists, the US has increasingly supported and encouraged the involvement of France in Africa.

In tandem with the foreign policy changes of the major northern democracies, the UN is also demonstrating a willingness to re-engage in the Great Lakes region, as demonstrated by the appointment of a special representative for the Great Lakes region and the establishment of the UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo. In the past, the UN could not muster sufficient political will among its members to intervene in difficult conflicts – reflecting the policies of its most powerful member states to stay out of relatively politically unimportant countries, as they perceived much of Africa to be. Nonetheless, the UN’s attention to the Great Lakes in particular, and Africa in general, has been erratic and insufficient. International intervention in conflict resolution must be coordinated with the region’s fledgling security mechanisms – combining legitimacy in intervention with resources for effective operationalization. While some African states, such as South Africa, and sub-regional organizations have undertaken intervention – with mixed outcomes – the political inter-linkages in the region may weaken such initiatives. To counter these outcomes, the UN should work closely with the AU and relevant sub-regional organizations, such as SADC, IGAD, and ECCAS. Moreover, for effective democratization efforts, it was noted that northern democracies should develop confidence-building measures at levels besides that of the foreign ministry.

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48 Ibid.
49 Schraeder.
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid.
53 Ibid.
54 Schraeder.
6. Policy Recommendations and the Way Forward

The participants developed a number of policy recommendations to outline the way forward for civil society organizations, national governments, regional institutions, and international bodies to address the peace and security issues of the Great Lakes region. Specifically, participants emphasized the need to:

- Ensure that the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region should succeed in addressing the root causes of the conflict in the Great Lakes from regional and domestic perspectives; include civil society and women’s groups in peacebuilding processes;
- Stem spillover effects such as the illicit trade of SALWs, the spread of HIV/AIDS, the deepening of poverty, and forced population movements (refugees and IDPs);
- Rationalize and strengthen regional economic communities; and more effectively engage the international community.

International Conference on the Great Lakes Region

Participants viewed the upcoming International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, set to commence with a series of summits in November 2004, as an important component for solving the regionalization of conflicts in the Great Lakes. In order to ensure the effectiveness of the conference and the comprehensiveness of the process, participants emphasized that the Office of the SRSG should include women’s groups, civil society organizations, and youth associations. Furthermore, to enable the conference to establish institutional linkages for growth and conflict resolution, the Office of the SRSG was urged to identify specific socio-economic or democratization projects that would benefit the region, thereby beginning the process of creating institutions to achieve common goals.

Peace, Justice, and Reconciliation

The core countries of the Great Lakes region should develop mechanisms to balance the needs of justice and reconciliation in the pursuit of sustainable peace. Many participants noted that in Burundi, to foster reconciliation, the government should design affirmative action programs and create legal instruments that ensure the rights of minority citizens. The government should also implement a sustainable repatriation project for the refugees resulting from the expulsions of 1972 that is accompanied with strong economic development programs. In Rwanda, the international community was urged to address the irregularities in the two elections, while not discounting ethnic tensions that still linger in the aftermath of the 1994 genocide. Moreover, Rwanda’s security fears must be adequately addressed in order to facilitate the complete withdrawal of Rwandan troops from the DRC. Finally, in the DRC, illicit exploitation of natural resources should cease, and the groups that are not signatories to the Global and Inclusive Agreement on Transition in the Democratic Republic of the Congo should be acknowledged and included in the transitional institutional arrangements.

Participation of Civil Society and Women’s Groups in Peacebuilding and Reconciliation

Civil society organizations, in particular women’s groups, have played a significant role in peacebuilding and reconciliation; however, they have not been adequately represented in the peace processes. Moreover, these groups are weakly institutionalized. While national, regional, and international processes must include civil society organizations and a gender-sensitive approach to peacebuilding, these non-governmental groups must also undertake improvements of their own. In particular, participants urged civil society organizations to increase the strengths of their institutions, design long-range financing structures, and connect their missions more closely to the populations they serve.

Solutions to Regionalized Conflicts

Given the regionalization of conflict in the Great Lakes region, solutions should address the sources of political and social instability of neighboring states. The sub-region’s states and the international community should focus on stemming the proliferation of refugees and IDPs, the illicit trade of SALWs, the spread of HIV/AIDS, and the endemic poverty of the region.
Concurrently, they must also resolve domestic political and economic catalysts for violence such as poor governance, the absence of democratic institutions, ill-conceived economic policies, and poorly institutionalized regional economic communities.

- Managing the flow of refugees and IDPs will require designing solutions that address both immediate and root causes of forced displacement. Solving immediate causes entails ending armed conflicts. However, more durable solutions should focus on root causes of displacement, such as inadequate economic and social conditions, and questions of citizenship and identity. Equally important, solutions must provide support to the refugee-receiving country – for example, to improve opportunities for the displaced and facilitate citizenship procedures – as well as to the refugee-generating country – such as bolstering their capacity to absorb repatriated refugees and to create sustainable reconciliation programs.

- The illicit trade in SALWs can be curbed with the assistance of regional and international mechanisms. Short-term solutions recommended by participants include adequately funding and monitoring DDR programs following conflicts. In the long-term, states in the Great Lakes should provide political and economic support to concerted regional agreements, engage in mutual monitoring, and cooperate on border security.

- The states in the region, in cooperation with the international community, can forestall the security threat posed by the high incidence of HIV/AIDS by, among other measures, including public health as a critical component of economic and governance policies and post-conflict reconstruction programs. Importantly, the devastating economic and social consequences of the disease must be adequately addressed.

- The rationalization of regional economic communities can help curb the effects of poverty on regionalized instability. Presently, the region’s states have multiple memberships in the RECs, causing divided loyalties, weak commitment to goals of individual RECs, and subsequently poor institutionalization. However, states in the Great Lakes region must resolve the debate on more effective construction of RECs. Participants debated whether RECs should reflect formal or informal market flows, natural boundaries, or market complementarities and synergies. Furthermore, national policies should reflect more effective use and public investment of revenues from natural resources. Properly managing natural resources is especially important given that eight countries in the region – Angola, Cameroon, Chad, the DRC, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, the Republic of Congo, and São Tomé and Principe – produce oil.

**Effective Engagement of the International Community**

The institutions in the Great Lakes region and the international community must work together to resolve domestic political and economic catalysts for violence, such as poor economic and political governance. The international community should facilitate economic reforms and democratic transitions through the provision of financial, diplomatic, and institutional support to national governments and regional organizations. More to the point, the UN should work closely with Africa’s sub-regional organizations – namely the AU, ECCAS, IGAD, and SADC – to provide the legitimacy afforded through the UN’s perceived neutrality and the logistical support needed for effective operationalization of a security mechanism. Similarly, the US, France, and Belgium – historically the most influential northern democracies in the Great Lakes region – should support work with various ministerial representatives, not just at the foreign ministry.
ANNEX I: Keynote Address

“Reflections on the Burundi Peace Process”

Mr. Joseph S. Warioba,
Former Vice President and Prime Minister of the United Republic of Tanzania

Chairperson,
Ladies and Gentlemen,

I wish to thank the organizers of this seminar for inviting me to make remarks at this luncheon. In these remarks I will offer my personal reflections on the Burundi Peace Process, an issue which has consumed the efforts of this country, the East Africa region, Africa and the international community for nearly a decade.

The Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi was signed on the 28th of August 2000 by seventeen political parties, the Government and the National Assembly of Burundi. The signing of the agreement was the culmination of a five-year, intensive, all-inclusive process of negotiations facilitated first by the late President Julius Nyerere and later by President Nelson Mandela.

The negotiations had evolved around five clusters of issues: the nature of the conflict, democracy and good governance, peace and security for all, reconstruction and development and lastly guarantees on the implementation of the agreement. The agreement itself is very short, consisting of only six articles, but the protocols, annexes and appendices to the agreement provide in detail the substance of what was agreed. Success of the peace process depends on the implementation of the whole agreement.

The frank discussion that took place on the issue of the nature of the conflict and the resultant protocol has provided the political will to the Barundi to pursue peace, reconciliation, democracy and development. Before that, the ethnic divide and mistrust prevented the Barundi to deal objectively with their problems. The Hutu and Tutsi communities could not sit together and conduct a dialogue in good faith. Indeed it took economic sanctions by the region to force the Burundi parties to assemble in Arusha.

It was clear that without dealing with the past first, from the colonial legacy to post-independence problems, the Barundi would not be able to sit together as a people and find solutions to their problems. I was not here yesterday when you discussed the presentation on Burundi. The same or similar presentations have been made in the past by the same author and others about the causes of the conflict. All these and many more were discussed frankly in the Committee on the Nature of the Conflict. The understanding resulting from those discussions enabled the communities to a large extent to think and act as Barundi rather than Hutu and Tusti.

The protocol on democracy and good governance is the road map to the creation of a democratic society in Burundi. It has set out the guiding principles for a democratic constitution and a timetable to achieve democratic elections. It recognizes the right of the majority to be fully involved in the governance of the country while at the same time it provides adequately for the protection of the minority. It has set a transitional period of three years, divided into two phases of 18 months each, one phase under Tusti leadership and another under Hutu leadership.

The success of the agreement in this respect has been phenomenal. Many people were not convinced, even after Arusha, that the two major groups in Burundi would work together in the transition. Even though the transition government was installed later than had been anticipated, it has done extremely well despite the formidable challenges it has faced. The transition from President Buyoya to President Ndayizeye was smooth, and the working relationship among the leadership has been cooperative and focused.
The Protocol on Peace and Security for All provided for the organization of the defense and security forces, including the separation of the army, police, gendarmerie and intelligence service, missions of the various forces, structure, recruitment and training. The intention was to create truly national institutions in place of the existing, almost monoethnic, forces. The protocol could not, however, be completed because no agreement could be reached on the cessation of hostilities and ceasefire. The reason for this was the absence of the armed groups in the negotiations.

Since Arusha, South African Deputy President, Jacob Zuma, has done commendable work to move the process. The Pretoria Protocols, which were formally signed in Dar es Salaam last month, have immensely moved the process towards a durable peace in Burundi. The inclusion of CNDD-FDD in the transition government will strengthen the processes towards achieving a permanent effective ceasefire and then moving towards democratic elections.

The successes achieved so far are encouraging and are a source of hope. The remaining challenges are however very serious. The establishment of a new army for Burundi in accordance with the Arusha Agreement, the resultant demobilization and resettlement, the return of the refugees and their resettlement together with the internally displaced persons, are not simple acts. If these are not handled carefully they may be a source of strain. For example, the new army is likely to be small. If adequate provision is not made for smooth resettlement of those who will be demobilized, trouble might erupt again. Similarly, if the return of refugees is delayed or if the refugees return en masse without adequate arrangements for smooth resettlement, there will be serious strains. More than ten percent of the Burundian refugees are in other countries and when the internally displaced persons are included, the percentage approaches fifteen. Care needs to be taken to deal with these issues.

Additionally there is the issue of inclusion of the rest of the armed groups. Without reaching agreement with these groups the ceasefire will not be complete.

Burundi is a small country but densely populated. It is very thin on natural resources and the people are very poor. For forty years, the country has not known real peace. The reconstruction and development of the country is an enormous challenge. Lack of resources and extreme poverty are dangers to peace and security. The protocol on reconstruction and development was intended to address this challenge. While efforts are being made to achieve peace and security in Burundi, it is equally important to forcefully address the issue of resources needed for rehabilitation, reconstruction and development. The role of the international community is crucial in this respect. But, so far, the protocol on this issue remains largely on paper.

There is also a political and logistical challenge arising from the transitional arrangements. The Arusha Agreement provides for a transition of thirty-six months. During that time, the transition government would be established and would carry out certain tasks to prepare for elections. These tasks included the adoption of a new constitution and electoral law and the establishment of various institutions.

The transition period started a year late, mainly because of problems that delayed reaching agreement on cessation of hostilities and a ceasefire. Had it gone according to plan, local government elections would have already taken place and the national assembly elections would be in preparation by now. It is now clear that the timetable will be hard to meet.

The Arusha Agreement also provided for a two-phase leadership of the transitional administration. The first phase would be led by a Tutsi and the second phase by a Hutu. President Buyoya led the fist phase for eighteen months up to May 2003 and then handed over to President Ndayizye for the next eighteen months.

Time is needed for preparation for smooth elections at all levels from local to national. Soon, the question will be asked whether the remaining time is adequate for the purpose. Should the question of extension of the transition arise, intense political heat will surface. How long will the extension last and who will lead during that time? This is an issue that is likely to reopen the ethnic divide.

To reach agreement on the Pretoria Protocols, attention was mainly placed on power dispensation. What is
generally known is that CNDD-FDD has agreed on the implementation of the Ceasefire Agreement of December 2002 as a result of being accommodated in the transitional government.

The main purpose of Arusha is however democratic governance. This will be achieved by the holding of elections. President Ndayizeye is scheduled to vacate office by November 2004. The current efforts to bring into the fold the remaining groups, including PALIPEHUTU-FNL and the original CNDD, PALIPEHUTU and FROLINA, should go hand in hand with efforts to achieve elections as scheduled. Failure to do that will take Burundi back to Pre – Arusha.

In conclusion, we can say major achievements have been made in the Burundi Peace Process. A transitional government was established in accordance with the Arusha Agreement and it has functioned relatively well. There is understanding and political peace among the political parties and the ethnic divide and mistrust has been tempered. The smooth transition from a Tusti phase to Hutu phase and the constructive relationship between Hutu and Tusti leaders in government is a testimony to this.

However, we have to recognize that there are still issues to be resolved. These include the complete cessation of hostilities, achieving a permanent and effective ceasefire, establishment of a new army, demobilization, return and resettlement of refugees and internally displaced persons and the preparation and holding of elections. If the spirt that has lead to these achievements to date persists, and I see no reason why it should not, the remaining issues can be resolved.

The Barundi have shown a determination to stay the course, but they still need assistance. The region, Africa and the international community should understand this and continue to assist the parties diplomatically so that they can resolve the remaining issues, and equally important, to enable Burundi to obtain resources for reconciliation, rehabilitation, reconstruction and development, which is in the real sense the basis on which the country can attain and maintain peace, security and democracy. In doing this, all concerned, particularly the major powers involved, should focus more on the interest of the Barundi rather than on their on national interests – particularly the major powers involved.

Thank you.
Ladies and Gentlemen,
Distinguished guests,
Ambassador David Malone,
Professor Adebayo Adedeji,
Ambassador Ibrahima Fall,
Distinguished members of the diplomatic corps:

It is an honor to welcome all of you today, to a country living in a very challenging geographical area in Africa. Tanzania has had to live with neighbors caught between a tragic past that they inherited and perpetuated, and the challenge to create a new beginning for their collective survival and stability.

Our president, His Excellency, Mr. Benjamin William Mkapa, who as you may have gathered is unavoidably out of the country, has been at the forefront, in cooperation with his colleagues in the region in search for peace. I convey to you his warmest wishes for the success of your meeting here.

Over the last forty years, Tanzania has had a strong history of acting as a peacemaker in Africa. It is therefore entirely appropriate that this seminar on peace, security and governance in the Great Lakes region be held in Tanzania. Most people, when asked to define Tanzania’s role in peace and security in the Great Lakes region, often think of Arusha, Tanzania, a town that has hosted summits and negotiations related to the Burundi peace process and the Rwanda peace accords. Arusha also hosts the United Nations’ (UN) International Criminal Tribunal on Rwanda. But Tanzania’s role has a much longer history and a greater scope. We were at the forefront of the southern African liberation movement and we were catalysts for regional economic integration through the establishment of the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC), the forerunner of SADC in 1980. We have hosted refugees from Eastern, Central, and Southern Africa’s conflicts. Finally, distinguished participants, Tanzania has committed itself to see this region’s conflicts permanently resolved and has therefore committed itself to post-conflict reconstruction and reconciliation. In the capacity of President Mkapa as the current SADC Chair, Tanzania has had the honor of continuing to play an important peacemaking role in the region. This is a role that has already been carried out very effectively by his predecessors and Tanzania’s task is to further that tradition. Because my ministry is directly involved in the SADC Organ on Politics, Defense and Security Cooperation, I consider it a special honor to be able to take part in this seminar, which is dealing with related issues.

In my brief remarks this morning, I want to highlight Tanzania’s historical and contemporary efforts to nurture peace and security in the Great Lakes region and Africa. I will speak to you today about our past, present, and future commitments to strengthening African responses to conflict in order to build durable peace.

Decolonization and Liberation

In order to fully grasp the nature and scope of Tanzania’s involvement in peacemaking in Africa, one must reflect on the critical role this country played in the liberation of southern African countries from minority rule and racist regimes. Beginning in the 1960s, Tanzania actively engaged in the liberation and decolonization struggles. Tanzania hosted the seat of the Organization of African Unity’s (OAU) Liberation Committee, founded in 1963 under the leadership of Mwalimu Julius Nyerere. In addition to serving as the official headquarters of the OAU Liberation Committee,
Tanzania, hosted several liberation movements fighting for Africa’s freedom. The OAU Liberation Committee was based in Dar es Salaam, and its main objective was to achieve liberation for the rest of the continent. Our best tool for achieving this goal was in cooperation with other countries and through the Committee’s tireless efforts to provide political, material, and moral support for many of southern Africa’s liberation movements. Tanzania was also the major catalyst for creating the Front Line States in 1974 in order to establish a common front for security against, and to lessen economic dependence on, apartheid South Africa. Our achievements are striking, yet easily taken for granted today. Because of the OAU Liberation Committee, together with other initiatives, independence and majority rule were achieved in Mozambique and Angola in 1975, Zimbabwe in 1980, Namibia in 1990; and finally, South Africa in 1994.

Tanzania and the UN Special Committee on Decolonization

In 1961, the UN General Assembly created a 17-member Committee on Decolonization, charged with devising the most efficient route to sovereignty and independence for the world’s remaining colonies. In 1962, the committee was expanded to 24 states. The genesis of the Special Committee lay in the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, which was adopted in 1961. Tanzania’s then-Ambassador, John Malecela, and subsequently Salim Ahmed Salim, served at the helm of the UN Special Committee on Decolonization for many years. In addition to its commitment to the liberation of southern Africa and decolonization, Tanzania was a founding member of the Non-Aligned Movement and actively participated in the Group of 77 developing countries at the UN.

The Impact of Instability on Tanzania

Tanzania’s unique role in peace and security is partly a reflection of its experiences as a host country to hundreds of thousands of refugees from conflicts in neighboring countries. In fact, close to a million refugees from Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Rwanda, have found safe haven in Tanzania. Many of these refugees have been voluntarily repatriated. We hope that those still remaining in Tanzania will also be voluntarily repatriated and that the governments of their countries of origin will create a conducive environment to permit them to return and live in peace and freedom.

Tanzania as Peacemaker

Tanzania has served as the site for peace negotiation and reconciliation. During the Rwandan and the Burundi peacemaking processes, Arusha was the site for both negotiations. More importantly, Tanzania’s government acted as an “honest broker” during the peace processes. Mwalimu Nyerere dedicated the last years of his life to seeking a durable solution to the Burundi problem. Inasmuch as we should be satisfied that our brothers and sisters in these countries have concluded peace agreements, we are all sufficiently familiar to recognize that this is the beginning of many challenges toward sustainable stability in these countries. We are aware that the difficult aspects of demobilization and integration of their armed forces have yet to take place. In addition, agreements in and of themselves do not change attitudes; they merely provide a framework for implementation of agreed and desired measures. The parties that were in conflict in these countries now face the challenge to foster a new attitude in their societies, which is necessary for lasting national reconciliation.

Resolving Internal Conflict

Now, I want to be frank and explain to you that Tanzania’s experiences in peacemaking have not all been focused on exporting peace, but also on cultivating it internally. You are all aware that the United Republic of Tanzania underwent its own political tensions when a dispute arose between the Chama cha Mapindu (CCM) and the Civic United Front (CUF) on questions related to elections. But Tanzania learned an extremely important lesson through its efforts to resolve its own internal conflict. After nine months of negotiations, without outside involvement, the CCM and the CUF signed a reconciliation agreement in October 2001. The agreement also led to
His Excellency, President Benjamin Mkapa’s appointment of an additional CUF official to the Union Parliament. In May 2003, the Zanzibar Electoral Commission conducted by-elections to fill vacant seats in the parliament. Observers considered these by-elections, the first major test of the reconciliation agreement, to be free, fair, and peaceful.

I believe that this is an important lesson for Africa. With some foresight and determination, we are capable of finding solutions to our conflicts. We need not always be dependent on mediators from outside Africa. This case was an interesting illustration of “African solutions to African problems.”

Economic Integration

Internationally, we in Africa must also acknowledge that beyond our own internal challenges, we must begin to face the facts and realities of globalization. Information and technological forces driving the process of globalization have made the world, and Africa’s place in it, more complex. This is directly related to the major challenges which lie ahead for our region. There remain a number of conditions which must be met in countries emerging from conflict. These conditions revolve around addressing certain difficult issues such as demilitarization, demobilization, reintegration of combatants into societies, post-conflict reconciliation, and reconstruction. For example, we still have not recognized that demilitarization and demobilization have not been completed in Burundi; that parts of the DRC face enormous challenges in terms of building infrastructure and reconstructing communities that have been torn apart by war; that, in fact, peace and security throughout the region are directly related to how we are able to integrate our economies and move toward economic liberation for all of our peoples. As we become more aware of these problems, African policymakers, academics, military personnel, diplomats, government officials, and civil society actors must foster effective responses to the different challenges we all face.

There is a saying that the absence of war does not signify the presence of peace. This saying captures the fundamental challenges which lie ahead for the Great Lakes region. The absence of war in Burundi, Rwanda, or the DRC does not mean that there will automatically be a lasting peace. The absence of war is an opportunity to build peace. That is why the purpose of this seminar is so timely. I have noted that the organizers wrote in the concept paper that “as the search for a durable peace in the Great Lakes region continues, regional economic integration is increasingly viewed as a potential mechanism for conflict prevention, resolution and management in the Great Lakes region.” Only through regional unity can we face the challenges in this region with confidence and have a decent chance for success.

In addition to regional economic integration potentially offering a system of collective security, such integration has the advantage of creating larger markets for goods and services and a stronger voice for regional actors in international trade negotiations. Regional economic integration can potentially provide a mechanism to counter the negative effects of globalization on weak and vulnerable economies in the region. Such integration could also help to accelerate the region’s development and help cement the conditions necessary for nurturing a durable peace. Regional integration could potentially help to reduce ethnic divisions and increase regional cooperation. We need to devise strategies for the implementation of short and medium term regional integration projects that will have an impact that is more meaningful for building peace. We hope that the international conference on the Great Lakes—spearheaded by the African Union (AU) and the UN—can help this region achieve these noble goals.

Conclusion

Ladies and Gentlemen,
Distinguished Guests,

Let me conclude by stating my deepest appreciation for your commitment to the important issues of peace and security in the Great Lakes region. In these brief remarks, I have attempted to outline some of the activities of the United Republic of Tanzania in nurturing
peace and security in the Great Lakes region. Our commitment is, of course, based on a sense of enlightened self-interest. These interests are based on our own historical engagement with the liberation of African peoples from marginalization, inequality, and poverty. We wish to see people living in refugee camps in Tanzania voluntarily repatriated to their home countries; we would like to see post-conflict reconstruction efforts in Burundi, the DRC, and Rwanda satisfactorily completed; we would hope that peace and stability become realities for the millions of citizens in this region as we move from crises and conflicts to security and stability.

I thank the organizers of this event for honoring us by bringing this seminar to Tanzania and wish you every success in your efforts to promote durable peace, good governance, and regional integration in the Great Lakes region.
ANNEX III: Agenda

15 December 2003

9:00 am—10:15 am  Welcome

Ambassador David M. Malone, President, International Peace Academy

Mr. Ibrahima Fall, Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region, Kenya

Dr. Felix G. N. Mosha, Executive Director, African Dialogue Centre for Conflict Management and Development Issues, Tanzania

Mr. Joseph W. Butiku, Executive Director, Mwalimu Nyerere Foundation, Tanzania

Opening Address

Mr. Phillemom Sarungi, (MP), Minister for Defence and National Service, Tanzania, “Tanzania’s Security Role in the Great Lakes Region”

10:15 am—11:30 am  Session I: Security Dynamics in Central Africa and the Great Lakes Region

Chair: Mr. Ibrahima Fall, Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region, Kenya


Dr. Gilbert M. Khadiagala, Associate Professor, The Johns Hopkins University, United States, “Security Dynamics in the Great Lakes”

Dr. Felix G. N. Mosha, Executive Director, African Dialogue Centre for Conflict Management and Development Issues, Tanzania, “Mediation Efforts in the Great Lakes”

11:45 am—1:30 pm  Session II: The Tragic Triplets: The Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, and Burundi

Chair: Mr. Joseph W. Butiku, Executive Director, Mwalimu Nyerere Foundation, Tanzania

Professor Mwesiga Baregu, Professor, University of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, “The Democratic Republic of the Congo”
Dr. Filip Reyntjens, Chair, Institute of Development Policy and Management, University of Antwerp, Belgium, "Rwanda"

Professor René Lemarchand, Professor Emeritus, University of Florida, United States, "Burundi"

2:30 pm—4:30 pm

Session III: Economic Agendas, Regional Integration, and Development

Chair: Professor Adebayo Adedeji, Executive Director, African Centre for Development and Strategic Studies (ACDESS), Nigeria

Professor Gérard Prunier, Researcher, French National Center for Scientific Research, France, “Economic Dimensions of Conflict in the Great Lakes Region”

Dr. David Francis, Lecturer, Bradford University, United Kingdom, “Regional Economic Integration and Development in the Great Lakes”

4:45 pm—6:00 pm

Mr. Ibrahima Fall, Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region, Kenya, “The International Conference on the Great Lakes Region”

16 December 2003

9:30 am—11:30 am

Session IV: Governance, Gender, and Migration

Chair: Ms. Amy Smythe, Senior Gender Advisor, UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, The Democratic Republic of the Congo

Ms. Angela Ndinga Muvumba, Senior Program Officer, International Peace Academy, “The Role of Civil Society in Governance and Democratization”

Dr. Rose Kadende-Kaiser, Lecturer, University of Pennsylvania, United States, “Gender, Conflict, and Peacebuilding in the Great Lakes Region”

Dr. Khoti Kamanga, Senior Lecturer and Coordinator, Centre for the Study of Forced Migration, University of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, “Refugees and Internally Displaced People in the Great Lakes Region”

11:45 am—1:30 pm

Session V: The Role of Regional and External Actors

Chair: Ms. Lindiwe Zulu, Executive Head of Government Relations, Vodacom, South Africa

Dr. Chris Landsberg, Director, Centre for Policy Studies, South Africa, “South Africa’s Role in the Great Lakes”
Professor Peter Schraeder, Professor, Loyola University, United States, “France, Belgium, and the United States in the Great Lakes”

Dr. Adekeye Adebajo, Executive Director, Centre for Conflict Resolution, South Africa, “The United Nation’s Peacekeeping Role in the Great Lakes”

Mr. Kingsley Moghalu, Former Legal Adviser and Spokesman, United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), Tanzania, “The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: Problems and Prospects”

1:30 pm—2:45 pm  
Keynote Address

Introductory Remarks: Dr. Salim Ahmed Salim, Chairman of the Board of Trustees, Mwalimu Nyerere Foundation, Tanzania, and Former Secretary-General, Organization of African Unity

Mr. Joseph S. Warioba, Former Vice President and Prime Minister of the United Republic of Tanzania, “Personal Reflections on the Burundian Peace Process”

2:45 pm—4:15 pm  
Session VI: Human Security in the Great Lakes Region

Chair: Ambassador John Hirsch, Senior Fellow, International Peace Academy

Professor Adebayo Adekeye, Executive Director, African Centre for Development and Strategic Studies (ACDESS), Nigeria, “The Constitution of Order in the Great Lakes through Human Security”

Discussant: Dr. Salim Ahmed Salim, Chairman of the Board of Trustees, Mwalimu Nyerere Foundation, Tanzania, and Former Secretary-General, Organization of African Unity

17 December 2003

9:30 am—10:45 am  
Rapporteur’s Report and Discussion

Chair: Ambassador John Hirsch, Senior Fellow, International Peace Academy

Dr. Dorina Bekoe and Ms. Karen Ballentine, Associates, International Peace Academy

11:00 am—1:00 pm  
The Way Forward

Chair: Ambassador John Hirsch, Senior Fellow, International Peace Academy

Dr. Ruth Iyob, Director, Africa Program, International Peace Academy

Dr. Musifiky Mwanasali, Regional Democracy Adviser, United Nations Sub-regional Centre for Human Rights and Democracy in Central Africa, Cameroon

Dr. Adekeye Adebajo, Executive Director, Centre for Conflict Resolution, South Africa
# ANNEX IV: Seminar Participants

1. **Professor Adebayo Adedeji**  
   Executive Director  
   African Centre for Development and Strategic Studies (ACDESS)  
   Ijebu Ode, Nigeria

2. **Mr. Nuwe Amany-Mushega**  
   Secretary-General  
   East African Community  
   Arusha, Tanzania

3. **Ambassador Adonia Ayebare**  
   The Embassy of the Republic of Uganda  
   Kigali, Rwanda

4. **Ambassador Mamadou Bah**  
   Special Representative of the African Union  
   Chairman  
   Bujumbura, Burundi

5. **Ms. Mary Balikungeri**  
   Director  
   Rwanda Women’s Network  
   Kigali, Rwanda

6. **Professor Mwesiga Baregu**  
   University of Dar es Salaam  
   Dar es Salaam, Tanzania

7. **Mr. Marc-André Brault**  
   Special Envoy  
   Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade  
   Ottawa, Canada

8. **Mr. Batabiha Bushoki**  
   Campaign pour la paix  
   Nairobi, Kenya

9. **Mr. Arsène Mwaka Bwenge**  
   Centre d’Etudes Politiques  
   Université de Kinshasa  
   Kinshasa, DRC

10. **Mr. Churchil Ewumbue-Monono**  
    Embassy of Cameroon  
    Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

11. **Catherine Flemming**  
    Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade  
    Ottawa, Canada

12. **Dr. David Francis**  
    Director  
    Africa Center  
    Bradford University  
    Bradford, United Kingdom

13. **Mr. David Hamadziripi**  
    High Commissioner of Zimbabwe to Mozambique  
    Maputo, Mozambique

14. **Ms. Nina Wodstrup Jensen**  
    Danish Defence Staff  
    Ministry of Defense  
    Copenhagen, Denmark

15. **Mr. Morten Jespersen**  
    Department for Africa  
    Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
    Copenhagen, Denmark

16. **Dr. Rose Kadende-Kaiser**  
    University of Pennsylvania  
    Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

17. **Dr. Khoti Kamanga**  
    Centre for the Study of Forced Migration  
    Faculty of Law  
    University of Dar es Salaam  
    Dar es Salaam, Tanzania

18. **Ms. Pascasie Kana**  
    Opération d’appui à l’auto-promotion  
    Bujumbura, Burundi
19. Professor Gilbert M. Khadiagala  
Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies  
The Johns Hopkins University  
Washington D.C.

20. Mr. Jean-Paul Kimonyo  
Center for Conflict Management  
National University of Rwanda  
Butare, Rwanda

21. Dr. Chris Landsberg  
Director  
Centre for Policy Studies  
Doornfontein, South Africa

22. Professor René Lemarchand  
University of Florida  
Gainesville, Florida

23. Mel McNulty  
Department for International Development  
Nairobi, Kenya

24. Ms. Aida Mebrate Mengistu  
United Nations Development Programme  
Khartoum, Sudan

25. Mr. Kingsley Moghalu  
Former Legal Adviser and Spokesman  
United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda  
Arusha, Tanzania

26. Mr. David Monyae  
Center for Africa's International Relations  
University of the Witwatersrand  
Johannesburg, South Africa

27. Ambassador James Mugume  
Director  
International Cooperation  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
Kampala, Uganda

28. Betty Murungi  
Director  
Urgent Action Fund Life Ministry Centre  
Nairobi, Kenya

29. Ms. Immaculée Birhaheka Namudumi  
Appui aux initiatives des femmes  
Bukavu, DRC

30. Mr. Eugene Nindorera  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
Bujumbura, Burundi

31. Ms. Imelda Nziroirera  
Centre de promotion des droits de la personne humaine et de la prévention du genocide  
Bujumbura, Burundi

32. Mr. Vicente Pinto de Andrade  
Catholic University of Angola  
Luanda, Angola

33. Professor Gérard Prunier  
French National Center for Scientific Research  
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

34. David Pulkol  
Former Director-General  
External Security Organization  
Office of the President of Uganda  
Kampala, Uganda

35. Dr. Filip Reyntjens  
Institute of Development and Policy Management  
University of Antwerp  
Antwerp, Belgium

36. Ms. Helena Rietz  
Africa Department  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
Stockholm, Sweden

37. Captain C. H. Ross  
South African Defence Forces  
Centurion, South Africa

38. Mr. Phillemon Sarungi, (MP)  
Minister for Defence and National Service  
Dar es Salaam, Tanzania

39. Professor Peter Schraeder  
Loyola University  
Chicago, Illinois
Major-General Philippe Sibanda  
Zimbabwe Armed Forces  
Harare, Zimbabwe

Ms. Amy Smythe  
Gender Office  
UN Mission in the Congo  
Kinshasa, DRC

Mr. Joseph S. Warioba  
Former Vice President and Prime Minister of the United Republic of Tanzania  
Dar es Salaam, Tanzania

Ms. Lindiwe Zulu  
Vodacom  
Midrand, South Africa

Office of the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region  
Nairobi, Kenya

Mr. Ibrahima Fall  
Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General

Mr. Cheick Lamine Conde  
Political Affairs Officer

Mr. Khassim Diagne  
Political Affairs Officer

Mr. Abdel-Rahman Ghandour  
Special Assistant

Ms. Pauline Kapongo-B  
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Mr. George Ola-Davies  
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Ms. Seraphine Toe  
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African Dialogue Centre for Conflict Management and Development Issues  
Arusha, Tanzania

Dr. Felix G. N. Mosha  
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Centre for Conflict Resolution  
Cape Town, South Africa

Dr. Adekeye Adebajo  
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Dr. Mark Chingono  
Senior Manager, Research Project

Ms. Bulelwa Makalima Ngewana  
Senior Manager, Africa Project

Alison Lazarus  
Senior Trainer

Mwalimu Nyerere Foundation  
Dar es Salaam, Tanzania

Mr. Joseph W. Butiku  
Executive Director

Dr. Salim Ahmed Salim  
Chairman of the Board of Trustees  
UN Sub-regional Centre for Human Rights and Democracy in Central Africa  
Yaoundé, Cameroon

Dr. Musifiky Mwasasali  
Regional Democracy Adviser  
International Peace Academy

Ambassador David M. Malone  
President

Dr. Necla Tschirgi  
Vice President
61. Dr. Ruth Iyob  
   Director, Africa Program

62. Ambassador John Hirsch  
   Senior Fellow

63. Mr. Arthur Bainomugisha  
   Civil Society Fellow

64. Ms. Karen Ballentine  
   Senior Associate

65. Dr. Dorina Bekoe  
   Associate

66. Mr. Mashood Issaka  
   Program Officer

67. Ms. Angela Ndinga Muvumba  
   Senior Program Officer
Partner Organizations

The Office of the Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region (Kenya)

The Office of the Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region, based in Nairobi, Kenya, was established in 1996. Mr. Ibrahima Fall has served as the Special Representative since July 2002. The mandate of the office is to resolve the conflict in the Great Lakes region. To that end, its major activities include organizing an international conference to promote peace, security, and development in the region, and preventing the fragmentation of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Over the past year, Mr. Fall has laid the groundwork for the international conference by meeting with government representatives and civil society actors. The first preparatory meeting for the international conference is scheduled for November 2004.

The African Dialogue Centre for Conflict Management and Development Issues (Tanzania)

The African Dialogue Centre for Conflict Management and Development Issues, based in Arusha, Tanzania, undertakes research and provides advice and training on methods to identify early warning signs and avoid violent conflict. Through its network of non-governmental organizations in the continent, the African Dialogue Centre publishes material on good governance and conflict prevention, management, and resolution in Africa, as well as papers on methods for sustainable peace in Africa.

The Centre for Conflict Resolution (South Africa)

The Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR), affiliated with the University of Cape Town (UCT), in South Africa, has specialized experience in training, education, and research to reduce violence and engender peace in Africa. CCR provides third-party mediation assistance, capacity training, and is engaged in the promotion of national and regional peace initiatives. The organization is working increasingly on a pan-continental basis to strengthen the conflict management capacity of Africa’s regional organizations, and is increasingly focusing on research on South Africa’s role in Africa; the UN’s role in Africa; AU/NEPAD relations; and HIV/AIDS and security.

The Mwalimu Nyerere Foundation (Tanzania)

The Mwalimu Nyerere Foundation, established in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, in 1996, highlights the importance of ensuring the human rights of Africans. To this end, the Mwalimu Nyerere Foundation endeavors to improve people’s capacity for self-reliance, as well as promote public policies that eliminate poverty and establish democratic governance. In particular, the Mwalimu Nyerere Foundation focuses on programs that engender African unity, build institutional capacity, and guarantee justice for all.

The UN Sub-regional Centre for Human Rights and Democracy in Central Africa (Cameroon)

The UN Sub-regional Centre for Human Rights and Democracy in Central Africa, in Yaoundé, Cameroon, commenced operations in 2001. It is charged with promoting the respect for human rights and democratic development as a means to resolve conflict and engender sustainable economic development in Central Africa. Specifically the Centre disseminates information on international norms and laws that protect human rights and foster democracy.
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