IPI Blue Papers

Peace Operations

Task Forces on
Strengthening Multilateral
Security Capacity

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NOTE

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Foreword

We live in difficult times. Rapid socioeconomic changes, demographic bulges, and intertwined security crises are affecting us all, and most especially the poor. Criminal and violent organizations are gaining control over territory, markets, and populations around the world, complicating peacemaking and generating insecurity. States with ineffective and corrupt institutions prove too weak to deal with interlinked threats ranging from transnational organized crime to infectious disease. Meanwhile, the number of actual and aspirant nuclear-armed countries is growing, as is the likelihood that nonstate actors will acquire weapons of mass destruction through illicit global trade.

Global warming and environmental degradation particularly distress already impoverished regions. Fluctuating food and energy prices put people and governments to the test, while the demand for resources—notably water and energy—increases due to unprecedented development and population growth.

To this already gloomy picture, the year 2008 added tectonic shifts in the economic landscape. A devastating financial crisis is producing dramatic consequences with likely long-term impacts on economic development, aid, and emerging markets alike.

Yet, at a time when common efforts are needed more than ever, division and discord can be spotted in many multilateral institutions, from the United Nations to NATO and the European Union. Peace operations are under serious stress, while political disunity undermines the authority and effectiveness of the Security Council. The optimistic embrace of a "flat" world of responsible sovereign states is challenged by those who push for a return to exclusive state sovereignty and jealously guarded territorial integrity.

However, crises provide unparalleled opportunities for change. These moments are transitory, but they need to be seized upon to

put ideas into action, to strengthen the capacity to meet the challenges we face, which in today's globalizing world means more responsive, effective, and efficient multilateral mechanisms and policies.

In response to these challenges, IPI launched the **Task Forces on Strengthening Multilateral Security Capacity** in 2008. The purpose of these Task Forces was to suggest ideas for action to strengthen the capacity of the United Nations (UN) and its partners to deal effectively with emerging, multifaceted, and global challenges to peace and security. The Task Forces addressed not only the policy steps that are needed, but also the political and institutional strategies required to implement them. This strategic perspective has too often been the missing link in efforts to strengthen the UN system.

Given the links among security, development, and environmental challenges, the initiative opened with a symposium on Development, Resources, and Environment. The symposium provided a larger context for the work of the subsequent Task Forces, which focused on two core dimensions of the security concerns facing the UN and its partners: (1) Transnational Security Challenges and (2) Inter- and Intra-state Armed Conflict (see Annex 3 for details of the process).

The **IPI Blue Papers** are the product of this intense process of consultation, which engaged more than sixty UN member states, half of them at ambassadorial level, and seventy experts in a variety of thematic areas. It included the preparation of more than twenty-five background papers and fourteen multiday meetings. Each Blue Paper includes a section on why action to strengthen capacity in a particular area is needed and a section with ideas for action. The content is based on the Task Force discussions, but does not necessarily represent all the views articulated during the entire process. Although the institutional focus of the Task Forces was primarily the UN, this report aims to assist key stakeholders to prioritize and leverage the comparative advantages of the UN

and other multilateral institutions, including their ability to forge productive and sustainable partnerships with other groups and organizations.

While policy discussions on related topics are taking place in other fora, IPI brings to this initiative nearly forty years of constructive collaboration with the United Nations and its membership, as well as a more long-term strategic perspective than in-house and intergovernmental processes can offer. With these Blue Papers, IPI hopes to continue a process that will produce concrete steps toward stronger multilateral capacity in peace and security.

Despite the difficulties ahead, we believe that tomorrow's world needs more multilateral capacity, not less. It needs a stronger UN, capable of adapting and strengthening its capacity to address the realities of the twenty-first century. It needs a UN able to work with its partners and in particular with member states, which remain the first line of response to many of the threats discussed here.

This is the purpose of the IPI Blue Papers, and I am very pleased to introduce them to you.

Finally, I would like to thank most warmly the co-chairs of the Task Forces, the member-state participants, the experts, and IPI staff, without whose hard work and intellectual contributions the IPI Blue Papers would not have seen the light of day.

Terje Rød-Larsen
President, *International Peace Institute*
January 2009

Acronyms

AMIS	African Union Mission in Sudan
AU	African Union
C-34	UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
DFS/UNDFS	United Nations Department of Field Support
DPA/UNDPA	United Nations Department of Political Affairs
DPKO/UNDPKO	United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
DSRSG	Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General
ERDC	enhanced rapid deployment capabilities
EU	European Union
FPUs	formed police units
ICC	International Criminal Court
IFI	international financial institution
INTERPOL	International Criminal Police Organizaton
IPI	International Peace Institute
MINURCAT	United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad
MOU	memorandum of understanding
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	nongovernmental organization
OAS	Organization of American States

OCHA/UNOCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PBC	Peacebuilding Commission
PBSO	Peacebuilding Support Office
PCCs	police-contributing countries
PoC	protection of civilians
SC/UNSC	United Nations Security Council
SEA	sexual exploitation and abuse
SHIRBRIG	Multinational Standby High Readiness Brigade for UN Operations
SRSG	Special Representative of the Secretary-General
TCCs	troop-contributing countries
UN	United Nations
UNAMA/ISAF	United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan/International Security Assistance Force (NATO)
UNAMID	African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHQ	United Nations headquarters
UNIFIL	United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
UNMIK/KFOR	United Nations Mission in Kosovo/Kosovo Force (NATO)
UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNOWA	United Nations Office for West Africa
USG	Under-Secretary-General

Executive Summary

Major reassessments of UN peacekeeping have tended to follow in the wake of large-scale failures of peacekeeping operations. Continued violence in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), the inability to mount a UN operation in Somalia, and the lack of progress in Darfur may or may not count as major failures. However, it is clear that some kind of reassessment is required.

Those who mount and support peace operations, both in the UN Secretariat and in the field, are challenged on multiple levels—political, strategic, and operational—at the same time. The UN Departments of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and Field Support (DFS) are often forced to operationalize increasingly challenging mandates from an increasingly polarized membership. The departments must do so in a more complex geopolitical environment than ever before and in cooperation with an array of national and international partners that often have competing agendas. Finally, the UN's management and human resource policies and systems are not adequate to support over 110,000 currently deployed personnel. Its doctrine development does not yet fully prepare its peacekeepers—civilian, military, and police—for the ever-expanding mandates with which they are charged.

Given the inflated expectations many in the world have for UN peacekeeping, and the unwinnable circumstances into which peace operations are often inserted, any reform effort should match the challenge. Such efforts must include both member-state capitals and the world body. On the political level, states should establish a pragmatic and sustainable consensus on the primary goals and uses of the instrument of peacekeeping. Such a consensus would ease the doctrinal deadlock that plagues the UN Secretariat. The UN should work cooperatively with its global partners and stakeholders in peacekeeping to develop a strategic vision

for peace operations over the next ten years. It should work out clearer divisions of labor, drawing on comparative advantages. Operationally, the UN should take a harder look at its management practices and systems with an eye toward strengthening its fledgling management culture.

IDEAS FOR ACTION

I. **Hold a ministerial-level meeting on peacekeeping:** Bring high-level attention to peacekeeping and begin the necessary political negotiations between North and South, East and West, to sustain and strengthen peacekeeping in the mid- to long-term. This meeting should be planned and convened by a small, but geographically diverse, group of interested member states.

- In addition to addressing pressing issues of capacity, management, and financing, member states should develop a consensus on what peacekeeping should be used for (e.g., creation of a buffer zone, protection of civilians, maintenance of law and order, all of the above, etc.).

II. **Forge a consensus among member states on entry, exit, and long-term planning:** The Secretariat should commission an outside group to begin a mid- to long-term assessment of future peacekeeping needs and continue its internal study of transition and exit benchmarking. The Secretariat should develop criteria on the necessary conditions for entry into a peace operation and present these to the Security Council.

III. **Break political stalemates in stagnant peace operations:** The Secretariat should conduct a comprehensive review of each current operation and the political crisis that made it necessary. The possibility of altering the UN's engagement in stalemated missions should be left open.

IV. **Improve engagement with peacekeeping stakeholders:** Adjust Security Council working methods to allow for better

engagement with troop- and police-contributing countries, regional and subregional organizations, and member states with the capacity to deliver specialized equipment. DPKO and DFS should also increase their informal consultations in member-state capitals.

V. **Manage UN peace operations more effectively:** Increase delegation from the Secretariat in New York to managers in the field, while at the same time improving accountability systems; make the selection process of senior managers more transparent; and strengthen efforts to combat sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA).

VI. **Accelerate development of doctrine within DPKO and DFS:** The Secretariat, working with the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (the C-34), should continue to forge ahead on doctrine, guidelines, and training on critical issues like the protection of civilians. The Secretariat should also engage with states informally, as was done with the development of the Capstone Doctrine.

VII. **Get boots and suits on the ground:** Give financial incentives to troop contributors for more rapid deployment; develop deployable expert civilian capacity within and outside the UN; push forward the development of SHIRBRIG and the African Standby Force; develop options for a strategic reserve of "over the horizon" forces, and solidify partnerships with regional and subregional organizations, through capacity building and implementing the Ten-Year AU-UN Programme.

WHY ACTION IS NEEDED

The Challenge of Peace Operations

1. In some ways, UN peacekeeping can be considered a victim of its own success. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the recently created Department of Field Support (DFS) are supporting peacekeeping operations in more places, with more people, performing more tasks, and with, arguably, a greater success rate than at any other time in the UN's history.[1] However, it is clear that the UN's capacity to support its current peace operations is under strain, and its ability to handle additional multidimensional operations is questionable.[2]

2. Capacity constraints are only one part of the problem. Today, a number of peace operations are taking place in—or are planned for—areas where there is little peace to keep. Many of these are intrastate conflicts with complicated regional dynamics that require a more holistic response than traditional peacekeeping can offer. Some exhibit broader regional characteristics, as new transnational spoilers—such as militant groups (in the Middle East and East Africa) and drug traffickers (in West Africa)—become entwined with local conflicts.

3. Given the challenging conflict dynamics facing peacekeeping, clarity on policy and doctrine has become critical. However, political divisions among member states continue to prevent consensus on some of the more pressing policy questions facing peacekeeping—particularly on the use of force, civilian protection, and exit strategies.

4. On an institutional level, the need for clearer and better cooperation with other, increasingly active, entities is evident. Given the broad scope of today's peace operations, cooperation with organizations as varied as the International Criminal Court (ICC), the World Bank, and INTERPOL, is a fundamental element of success. Additionally, the UN

and its partners in peacekeeping—member states and regional and subregional organizations—require partnership arrangements that are logistically efficient, financially feasible, and make best use of each partner's comparative advantage.

5. Operationally, the expansion of the scope of peacekeeping activities has brought with it a host of day-to-day challenges related to coherence, coordination, and management, that have yet to be fully resolved. Uncertainties persist over when and how to end a peace operation, or transition into a follow-up presence, in a way that does not precipitate a return to conflict.

6. UN peacekeeping has become the Security Council's default tool for conflict resolution and peacemaking. As such, it is often employed without prior strategy development. Successful peacekeeping not only requires propitious conditions for entry and adequate numbers of troops and materiel, but a coherent strategy to guide the mission from its entry through to its end. It requires the development of clear doctrine to inform a professional civilian staff, professional police, and professional soldiers on how to fulfill their respective tasks. Successful peacekeeping also requires a seasoned manager with the proper authority and responsibility to set the tone for that staff and to carry out the agreed-upon strategy.

AT THE POLITICAL LEVEL

7. The geopolitical landscape that provided the context for the immediate post-Cold War expansion of peacekeeping has since shifted in two key respects. First, the UN membership has become increasingly polarized over basic questions of intervention, which was both highlighted and exacerbated by the tense debates over Iraq in 2003. Such divisions have led to lowest-common-denominator compromises over strategy

and financing among Security Council members—and in some cases to outright stalemate. Further, the ongoing debate over language—between "peacekeeping" and "peace operations"—masks a larger debate between those who favor a minimalist, traditional approach to UN peacekeeping and those who see the need for robust, multidimensional peace operations with an emphasis on addressing political or other "root causes."

8. On the ground, as well as in New York, this debate means that the UN is forced to make difficult choices between a steadfast emphasis on traditional peacekeeping and a more holistic approach that addresses sensitive issues, such as the disarmament and demobilization of militias, drug trafficking, and corruption. Similarly, it is increasingly forced to make difficult choices regarding the protection of civilians through the use of military assets. These realities can be hard to reconcile with the traditional organizational orthodoxy of the non-use of force, except in self-defense.

9. Yet, despite growing concern about reemerging divisions within the Security Council, even a cursory glance at the numbers shows a very sharp increase in personnel and funding devoted to peacekeeping over the past decade. Security Council members have come to see peacekeeping as a lower-cost, low-risk, and relatively less contentious method of addressing many conflicts—whether or not it produces the conditions for sustainable peace. Yet, the dramatic increase in the use of peacekeeping as the UN's default conflict-management tool also highlights the lack of attention paid to alternative conflict-management tools in the international community's toolkit—and to the need for a more coordinated and strategic approach to choosing among them.

10. The upswing of peacekeeping activity raises three important questions:

- First, which kind of contemporary conflict is UN peacekeeping best suited to handle? Concerns exist that peacekeeping might not always be the most appropriate tool to reach for, particularly given the complexity of many contemporary conflicts. Conflicts such as those in Lebanon, Sudan, the DRC, Chad, and Somalia all have regional and even global dimensions with which peacekeeping operations often struggle to cope.

- Second, does the UN Secretariat have the capacity to handle additional missions?

- And third, are there sufficient available and deployable resources (such as military, police, specialist equipment, civilian expertise) to meet the ever-growing demand?

11. Many contemporary conflicts involve deliberately fragmented insurgent groups. These groups operate across borders with neighboring states, increasing the difficulty of concluding durable peace agreements to create the more stable conditions in which peacekeeping operations have traditionally operated. Cross-regional and global militant organizations further complicate peace efforts by engaging in transnational organized crime, plundering of natural resources, or outright violence against civilians or peacekeepers themselves. Apart from the recently mandated and modestly resourced MINURCAT and some earlier experimentation in Central America, West Africa, and the African Great Lakes, UN peacekeeping operations have little ability to operate on a cross-border or subregional level. Security Council mandates, as well as operational desks at headquarters, are typically restricted to one country and sometimes to only one part of a country. It remains to be seen if a conflict with strong and complex regional dynamics can be managed in such a narrow way.

12. On a broader level, the UN's recent experience in Darfur has the potential to establish a disturbing precedent in terms of host-country consent for peace operations. The Sudanese

government's efforts to undermine the strength of the mission—from stalling deployment, to complicating the importation of necessary equipment, to preventing access to certain areas—have proved largely successful. At the same time, those pursuing stronger enforcement action in Darfur have been unable to leverage sufficient pressure to prevent the host government from paralyzing the AU-UN hybrid operation. Ultimately, the experience in Darfur might either persuade the UN Security Council of the need to form a more united political front, or it may serve as a field guide for other recalcitrant host governments on how to neutralize a UN mission. It could easily do both.

13. The recent decision by the International Criminal Court to issue an arrest warrant for the President of Sudan only adds an extra layer of complexity to this dynamic, forcing the Council to confront hard choices between peace and justice, or to look for ways to reconcile those two objectives. This also alludes to challenges the Council confronts in harmonizing peacekeeping efforts with other law-enforcement efforts (for example, in relation to narco-trafficking and terrorism).

PEACE OPERATIONS POLICY

14. The UN membership still lacks consensus on a number of vexing policy issues, many of them relating to these hard political choices. First, there is general disagreement over questions of entry. The Security Council has yet to consistently apply its own guidelines on the minimal conditions for the deployment of a peacekeeping mission.[3] It is possible that in some cases the Council views alternative conflict-management tools to be more difficult or more costly (financially or politically) in the short term than a peacekeeping force. With a lack of palatable alternatives, the Council's proposed preconditions for entry are interpreted

loosely, and peacekeeping continues to expand. Peacekeeping often becomes a first resort, rather than a last resort, thus risking both overstretch and misuse of this tool.

15. Second, as with the question of "entry," there is also no consensus over how and when peacekeepers should "exit." The Security Council and other relevant UN organs, such as the General Assembly, the Peacebuilding Commission, the Secretariat, and missions on the ground, have not yet reached a common, in-depth understanding of what the benchmarks should be for a withdrawal or significant transition from a major peacekeeping operation to a smaller postconflict peacebuilding presence. How and when to "exit" is arguably an even more complicated question than how and when to "enter"—as conditions on the ground change quickly and the benchmarks are likely to be case-specific. Also, the definition of these benchmarks—many of which are political in nature—may create tensions between the peace operation and the host government.

16. Third, this absence of strategic coherence is also reflected at a more operational level, particularly when peacekeepers are forced to reconcile sometimes competing objectives, such as civilian protection and impartiality. Consensus guidance to peacekeepers on how to protect civilians is yet to be provided throughout the UN system. And while the protection of civilians (PoC) has become an increasingly common (if poorly defined) element of mission mandates, a corresponding commitment to guidance and training on PoC is still lacking. Above all, soldiers and police in a peace operation cannot be expected to protect civilians if they are (a) not given the proper resources, nor (b) trained and informed on how and in what circumstances to do so. While the operational challenge is clear, the political debate continues in the C-34 and the Security Council on what PoC actually means.

MANAGEMENT OF PEACE OPERATIONS

17. The challenge of providing peacekeeping personnel with guidance on civilian protection is not unique. Field staff lack written guidance on a range of mandated tasks. This gap in guidance has only increased with the multidimensionality of missions, as field staff have been asked to perform a plethora of new tasks. Part of this doctrinal gap is due to political sensitivities on issues such as PoC, while in other respects it is simply the result of an overwhelmed staff and a lengthy bureaucratic approval process. DPKO has performed a "gap analysis" to understand where guidance is lacking, and it is moving to address such doctrinal lapses through its Capstone Doctrine development process and other measures. However, the current lack of clear guidance has often led to on-the-ground interpretation of mandated tasks, fostering incoherence and uncertainty in the field.

18. This, in turn, points to a deeper problem that pervades the management of UN peace operations in the field: the imbalance between the authority entrusted to and the accountability expected of peace operations' managers in the field. In large part, rules and policy on recruitment, hiring, procurement, and discipline are seen by those in the field as tying the hands of senior managers, unnecessarily constraining their discretion and ability to respond to changing circumstances, and reducing their effectiveness. Senior managers in peace operations complain of high vacancy rates in key personnel positions, burdensome regulations on procurement, and a culture of staff impunity that imperils the productivity and legitimacy of the mission. Policy reforms at headquarters are required in order to give field managers increased flexibility and authority while simultaneously ensuring a high level of accountability to those ultimately responsible for UN peace operations: the member states that authorize, participate in, and fund them.

19. Related to the issue of accountability in the field is another problem that still vexes UN peacekeeping: sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA). Both the perception and the reality of SEA—perpetrated by troops, police, and civilian staff—continue to plague the UN in the field. While the SRSG has formal responsibility for the actions of troops and staff, his or her authority over them is limited. Troops are ultimately accountable only to their home countries, and the possibility of the immediate discipline of staff for misconduct is remote in most cases. Victims, victims' families, and their communities are often not fully informed regarding any follow-up investigation and its outcome.

20. A final point on management is that many observers from inside and outside the UN criticize the lack of a strategic culture in UN planning. This weakness in mid- to long-term strategic planning is surely present in many organizations; however, its effects are both more dramatic and more visible in peacekeeping. While day-to-day operational concerns are always important, there is a need for a greater emphasis on systematic, strategic planning prior to and through the life of a mission. Effective strategy also requires moving beyond a short-term, six- to twelve-month planning paradigm and toward a longer-term outlook. The long-term outlook would chart a course for making the hard choices needed to help steer the situation onto a path toward sustainable peace. The strategic planning should take stock of the likely knock-on effects of planned activities, as well as allow for some flexibility to face unpredictable future developments. Such an approach is only possible if the Security Council members shift their thinking to this longer-term paradigm and adequately equip and organize the Secretariat to perform the necessary strategic planning.

AT THE INSTITUTIONAL LEVEL

21. A number of hard choices confront the UN and its partners at the institutional level, including how to ensure that operations are adequately equipped, despite competing demands for resources. The UN Secretariat, the Security Council, and troop-contributing countries (TCCs) all confront a major challenge in getting troops, equipment, and civilian expertise on the ground when and where their presence is most critical. Deployments are still too small with respect to some of the more challenging protection mandates and often too slow to stem the most extreme violence in a crisis situation.

22. Several issues are at play here. The first is simply the shortage in global capacity for troops, equipment, and civilian experts—especially given the high demand for these resources outside the UN. Second is the reluctance of developed countries to make their troops available to the UN. Third, the challenge of finding available troops, police, and willing civilians has become more difficult as the UN increasingly deploys to uncertain, insecure environments, such as Darfur and Chad. The surge of peacebuilding activity in the developing world combined with non-uniform standards and training makes the challenge greater. On a related note, as the need has grown for policing and police training in peace operations, the global capacity of available and qualified police officers has become similarly strained.

23. In a quick-deployment situation, many TCCs wait to begin preparations for deployment until they receive a formal green light from the Security Council. This alone can delay actual deployment another sixty to ninety days.

24. Equally important to the rapid deployment of troops is the provision of the equipment and materiel necessary to create a mobile, responsive, and formidable deterrent force. In places

like Darfur, the lack of proper equipment and transport has played a large role in the ineffectiveness of AMIS (the African Union Mission in Sudan) and now UNAMID (the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur). Such equipment is largely concentrated in the hands of developed countries, which have been slow to offer it to UN peacekeeping efforts. Additionally, in Darfur, the host country has challenged or delayed the importation of such equipment.

25. Despite improvements over the last decade, the triangular relationship between the Security Council, the TCCs, and DPKO/DFS is still not optimal. The Security Council, while formally soliciting the views of the TCCs, does not necessarily take those views into account when creating or renewing mandates. Additionally, some TCCs believe that with the creation of the Strategic Military Cell for the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)—not replicated for any other mission—a "two-tiered system" for TCCs now exists. The Strategic Military Cell provides military guidance to UNIFIL at the strategic level and reports directly to the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations. Hence, those that contribute troops to UNIFIL are allowed a greater say in strategic planning for and execution of their mission than those that contribute to the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), for instance. In addition, there are concerns that the input of the UN Secretariat—specifically on what UN peacekeepers are or are not capable of—is not given enough credence by the Security Council.

26. Finally, the operability of standby or high-readiness peacekeeping forces has been limited by the number of regional and subregional organizations now involved in peace operations. As such, some national units are double- or triple-earmarked for the UN, a regional, and a subregional force—be it a standby or a rapid-reaction force. This is

one of several indicators that institutional partnerships between the UN and regional organizations are still not optimized. The UN and its partners lack a sophisticated understanding of their respective comparative advantages, or any clear—even if implicit—division of labor in managing conflict situations and building peace. Formal partnerships between organizations, such as in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Darfur, find integration, predictability, and efficiency to be recurring challenges.

27. These institutional challenges point to a failure, to date, by the member states, the UN Secretariat, and the UN's political organs to make the hard choices if peacekeeping operations are to be made "fit for purpose." Without a more concerted effort by member-state officials at the highest level to engage and grapple with these trade-offs, the gap between the high expectations the world has for peacekeeping and its conflicted reality will continue to grow. Over time, this tenuous situation risks leading to widespread disillusionment with perhaps the most successful innovation the UN has in its conflict-management toolkit—peacekeeping. In fact, such was the pattern that beset the UN in the mid-1990s. Avoiding that pitfall will require the UN Secretariat and member states to make hard choices about exactly what they expect of peacekeeping implemented by the UN and its partners in years to come.

WHAT SHOULD BE DONE

Ideas for Action

I. HOLD A MINISTERIAL-LEVEL MEETING ON PEACEKEEPING

28. **Negotiate trade-offs at a high level:** On many important issues, peacekeeping is stuck in the mire of long-standing North-South and more recent East-West debates. This gridlock, however, has not impeded its growth. But if peacekeeping is going to continue as the centerpiece of the international community's efforts to stabilize and resolve conflict, member states need to engage in serious political bargaining to strengthen peacekeeping for the present and the future. As such, political negotiations on some of the necessary trade-offs (for instance, between the funders of peacekeeping and its main troop contributors) need to happen at a higher level than the C-34. Discussions should focus on deciding where peace operations fit into the international community's broader peacemaking and conflict-resolution strategy; agreeing on the necessary conditions for peacekeeping success; altering Security Council working methods to include the representation of all those participating in and affected by an operation; and ensuring adequate troop and equipment contributions.

II. FORGE A CONSENSUS ON ENTRY, EXIT, AND LONG-TERM PLANNING

29. **Develop usable and agreed-upon criteria for entry:** When should the UN decide to authorize a mission and how should its presence be designed? "United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines," (the Capstone Doctrine) outlines the minimum conditions for the establishment of a peacekeeping mission. The conditions outlined are similar to the criteria described in a Security Council Presidential Statement of 1994 (UN

Doc. S/PRST/1994/22). Concerns remain, however, that the guidelines are not being followed and that there is still not sufficiently focused attention being paid to the question of entry. The Security Council should review and revise these criteria and convene a thematic session to agree to them through a new presidential statement.

30. **Initiate planning on the future of UN peacekeeping:** A forward-looking, independent study should be conducted that develops scenarios on what UN peacekeeping demand might look like in five- to ten-years' time and in what ways the UN could better position itself to meet such challenges. The study should aim to make recommendations on strategies to prepare for matching different levels of demand, including the involvement of partners.

31. **Develop practical benchmarks for success:** Despite recent progress on benchmarking developed case by case in some missions, the UN lacks a comprehensive strategy on planning for the drawdown of troops or a mission's transition to a smaller or altered presence. Realistic benchmarks for withdrawal or drawdown of a mission should draw on lessons-learned from the successes and failures of past peacekeeping missions, as well as current thinking on the necessary conditions for sustainable peace. This could be developed outside the UN in the NGO/think-tank community, or within the DPKO Division of Policy, Evaluation, and Training, or the Peacebuilding Support Office.

32. **Create stronger region-wide strategy and managerial structures:** Given the cross-regional dynamics of contemporary conflict, as well as the rise of militant groups and criminals operating in global networks, it is important to increase the capacity for geographically broader political analysis and management. The proposal to establish more regional DPA offices, such as the United Nations Office for West Africa (UNOWA), with a mandate to provide broad

political support to UN peace operations in the region, was an acknowledgement of this need. More could also be done to bring a regional perspective to peace operations through coordinating with, and strengthening the work of, the Peacebuilding Commission and Peacebuilding Support Office.

III. BREAK POLITICAL STALEMATES IN STAGNANT PEACE OPERATIONS

33. **Critically review all field missions:** Some peace missions are plagued by a political stalemate in which neighbors and other relevant UN member states have chosen not to use their leverage or expend the political capital necessary to break the stalemate. In such cases, a catalytic event may be required to increase political pressure or crystallize unity in the Security Council. The Security Council should request a frank review of all current operations, focused particularly on the few stalemated situations. The review should take a hard look at each mission's effectiveness and future prospects for success, keeping open the possibility of recommending the closure of ineffective missions. A critical eye should also be focused on whether more can be done to engage with regional stakeholders—both those that have the capacity to undermine and those with the capacity to support the peace process.

IV. IMPROVE ENGAGEMENT WITH PEACEKEEPING STAKEHOLDERS

34. **Refine Security Council working methods:** In Security Council Resolution 1327 of November 2000 and Resolution 1353 of June 2001, the Council committed itself to broader and more sustained dialogue with TCCs, PCCs (police-contributing countries), regional and subregional organizations, member states, and the Secretariat. There are, however, concerns that this dialogue is at times only pro forma.

35. Given the need to foster an atmosphere of increased trust and cooperation among all parties, the Council should revisit how the arrangements agreed to in Resolution 1353 have been implemented, taking into consideration the desire of TCCs and others to be involved earlier on in the process of drafting a resolution. As the Secretary-General recommended in his report on MINURCAT,[4] the Security Council should agree to leave in draft form any resolution authorizing a UN military presence until the necessary resource commitments are made. This would compel earlier and more substantive consultation between TCCs and the Council, perhaps leading either to increased troop commitments or to dissuading the Council from establishing a mission in situations where force generation will be an acute problem.

36. **Engage with member-state capitals to ensure better resources:** The increased involvement of developed nations in some UN peace operations is a positive trend. However, such engagement—the availability of troops and force enablers (e.g., ground transport, light tactical helicopters, and transport helicopters)—should be extended to the full universe of UN peace operations. Those member states with the ability to do so should be asked by the Secretary-General to invest in the capacities critically needed (transport vehicles, attack helicopters, information-gathering equipment, etc.) by the UN and other multilateral organizations. In order to increase member-state confidence in its ability to manage troops and resources, DPKO should regularly meet in capitals with developed countries capable of providing necessary peacekeeping equipment and materiel. DPKO could also help facilitate meetings between developing and developed countries to foster bilateral cooperation on capacity enhancement.

37. **Define and systematize organizational partnerships:** There is a lack of knowledge about the relative capabilities

and comparative advantages of regional and subregional organizations in relation to the UN. A thorough, independent study should be conducted of the relative peacekeeping capabilities (and liabilities) of regional and subregional organizations, as well as of lessons learned from the various forms of institutional partnerships with the UN. Drawing on the experience of the AU-UN Ten-Year Capacity-Building Programme, a sustained "mentoring" approach to building the capacity of the array of regional and subregional organizations should be explored.

V. MANAGE UN PEACE OPERATIONS MORE EFFECTIVELY

38. **Increase delegation to, and authority of, SRSGs:** The Brahimi Report underscored the need for greater delegation of autho-rity to the field, stronger expertise to manage field operations, and better oversight and accountability mechanisms. This has not yet happened. The Under-Secretary-General for Field Support should initiate a comprehensive review of how to better align authority and accountability in the field (e.g., on procurement, personnel recruitment, and administration of justice, especially). Member states should welcome this opportunity to take a renewed look at these issues.

39. **Improve and make more transparent senior-management selection arrangements:** Given the overwhelming import-ance of the senior management team in the field and the SRSG in particular—especially if more responsibility is delegated to the field—UNHQ should develop written criteria and formalize a selection process for the SRSG and his or her team. In the selection of an SRSG and in the written job description, the applicant's political skills and experience should be given priority. Accordingly, a DSRSG and Chief of Staff with complementary UN and management experience should be sought for each mission.

40. The Secretary-General should direct member states to submit rosters of potential candidates for SRSG who are of significantly high stature and to update rosters periodically.

41. Senior leadership induction should be expanded to familiarize future SRSGs with the entire UN system, not just DPKO, DPA, and DFS.

42. **Transform the DPKO human resource paradigm:** Well-documented since the Brahimi Report is the challenge of making the UN human resources system for field operations adequate to meet the contemporary needs of a permanent function of the United Nations (e.g., reduced periods of vacancy for key posts, higher rates of retention, and facilitated rotation of staff between the field and headquarters).[5] In addition to delegating more responsibility for recruiting and hiring personnel to the field, creating a cadre of 2,500 career professional civilian peacekeepers would go a long way toward addressing the core needs of the field. To create the required political support, a group of interested, diverse states should advocate and help create consensus around the need for and benefits of this critical plan.

43. **Keep the prevention of SEA a high priority:** The high-profile issue of sexual exploitation and abuse in UN field missions continues to challenge UN management in the field and at headquarters. There is a need for continued high-level attention and engagement on the issue. The Secretary-General (SG) should continue to highlight this as a priority in his dealings with member states, especially TCCs, in face-to-face meetings in capitals. Recommendations presented in the 2005 report to the General Assembly, "A Comprehensive Strategy to Eliminate Future Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations," (UN Doc. A/59/710) should be implemented fully by the General Assembly and the Secretary-General. Additionally, in the field, the SRSG should be mandated by the Secretary-

General to report back to the victim and/or the victim's community regarding the final results of any investigation or court martial proceeding.

44. **Continue efforts at mission integration in the field while improving integration at headquarters:** The effort at mission integration has increased the coherence of UN action in the field, yet effective integration is still hampered by the lack of integration among departments and agencies within the UN family in New York. Thematic working groups, such as on transnational organized crime or the establishment of a Joint Crime Threat Analysis Cell, are ideas for cross-departmental information sharing and analysis that, in addition to enhancing output, would improve integration at headquarters.

VI. ACCELERATE DEVELOPMENT OF DOCTRINE WITHIN DPKO AND DFS

45. **Codify doctrine on protection of civilians:** In the past decade, UN field missions have made considerable progress in averting massacres and other significant violations of human rights. It is important to capture these lessons learned as well as to identify where there are gaps in doctrine and training on this issue. Efforts to fill these gaps within the UN (DPKO, OCHA, C-34) and outside of the UN (Stimson Center, etc.) should be encouraged by member states and informed by the on-the-ground experiences of UN force commanders and field managers.

46. The UN should work with member states in capitals and with regional peacekeeping training centers to ensure that the training of troops for peacekeeping missions includes the protection of civilians. But UN headquarters should also look beyond military techniques and military actors for the protection of civilians. Police, child protection officers, and other relevant civilian personnel in peacekeeping operations

should also receive proper training and guidance on the protection of local civilian populations.

47. The recently issued Capstone Doctrine—"United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines"[6]—is an important first step in formulating doctrine for peacekeeping. This internal DPKO/DFS publication should be required reading for newcomers to peacekeeping, as a primer on the guiding principles for contemporary peace operations. The UN Secretariat should continue the consolidation and further elaboration of the "United Nations Peacekeeping Doctrine Framework," as proposed in Annex 1 of the Capstone Doctrine.

VII. GET BOOTS AND SUITS ON THE GROUND

48. **Renew a push for rapid deployment and rapid response:** The international community has long understood the importance of the rapid deployment of peace operations as well as rapid reinforcement in crisis or potential crisis situations. Still, both are politically and operationally difficult to implement. Substantial delays are seen at almost every step, from force generation to procurement, to transport and logistics, to the recruitment of civilian personnel. As such, TCCs should be given a financial incentive for putting a majority of their promised troops on the ground within thirty days. DPKO should make recommendations on the feasibility of the four available options for rapid crisis reinforcement in specific contexts: using partners (e.g., NATO or the EU); a UN strategic reserve of "over the horizon" forces composed of elements from key troop contributors; an operational reserve (within the mission area); and inter-mission cooperation.

49. **Create a system to address the "blue suit" capacity gap:** It is critical not only to have blue helmets in place early on in a peace operation, but also to have blue suits: civilian peacekeepers with expertise in the range of functions

necessary to stabilize postconflict states. Interested member states should continue developing detailed, task-specific rosters for rapid deployment of expert civilians into peace operations.

Conclusion

50. Many of the challenges facing the UN in the field are related to political processes and negotiation; so too are the challenges facing peacekeeping at headquarters in New York. Although there was broad consultation during the development of the Capstone Doctrine, the outcome did not address some of the more pressing issues, such as the protection of civilians, and did not achieve a consensus on what peacekeeping is and where it is going. For this, a larger consensus-building process is required, involving political negotiation at the highest levels of UN member states. This should be done through a ministerial meeting focused explicitly on peace operations. Ideally this process would allow for negotiations on the less tractable issues of doctrine, entry, exit, rapid deployment, resources, and Security Council working methods.

51. Apart from this larger political task, there is a host of other, more easily implementable reforms that can take place at the UN headquarters and enhance the effectiveness of UN peace operations. These include giving more authority to and expecting more accountability of managers of peace operations (SRSGs in particular), rethinking the current human resources paradigm for peacekeeping in order to create a standing civilian cadre of peacekeepers, and increasing and institutionalizing engagement with regional and subregional partner organizations. This less flashy and, arguably, less controversial set of ideas would further professionalize the peacekeeping business to make it a more predictable, more efficient, and ultimately more reliable tool for conflict management in the twenty-first century.

Endnotes

1. On the reduction in armed conflict during the post-Cold War period, see Andy Mack, "Global Political Violence: Explaining the Post-Cold War Decline," Coping with Crisis Working Paper Series (New York: International Peace Academy, March 2007). On the dramatic rise in peacekeeping over the past decade, see Center on International Cooperation, "Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2008," Briefing Paper (New York, 2008). For the effectiveness of contemporary peacekeeping, see Virginia Page Fortna, *Does Peacekeeping Work?: Shaping Belligerents' Choices After Civil War* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008), and Lise Morjé Howard, *UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

2. See also Richard Gowan, "The Strategic Context: Peacekeeping in Crisis, 2006–08," *International Peacekeeping* 15, No. 4 (August 2008): 453-469.

3. The guidelines were first set out in United Nations, *Statement by the President of the Security Council*, UN Doc. S/PRST/1994/22, May 3, 1994, and reiterated in UN Departments of Peacekeeping Operations and Field Support, "United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines [Capstone Doctrine]," (New York, January 2008).

4. United Nations Secretary-General, *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad*, UN Doc. S/2008/601, September 12, 2008, para. 95.

5. See United Nations Secretary-General, *Investing in the United Nations for a Stronger Organization Worldwide*, UN Doc. A/60/692, March 7, 2006.

6. United Nations Departments of Peacekeeping Operations and Field Support, "Capstone Doctrine."

Further Reading

Barber, Martin, Francesco Mancini, and Adam C. Smith. "The Management of UN Peace Operations: Progress and Challenges." New York: International Peace Institute, 2009.

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United Nations. *Letter Dated 24 March 2005 from the Secretary-General to the President of the General Assembly.* UN Doc. A/59/710, March 24, 2005.

United Nations. *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations* [Brahimi Report]. UN Doc. A/55/305-S/2000/809, August 2000.

United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support. "United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines [Capstone Doctrine]." New York, January 2008.

Annex 1: Background Non-paper

The growth in scale and complexity of peacekeeping renders this an opportune time for reflection on the future of peace operations. Peacekeeping reform has been on the UN agenda for many years and the latest round of initiatives, sparked by the Brahimi Report, is still in progress. The challenge for this roundtable is to identify politically achievable reforms that should be addressed as a matter of priority, without reinventing the wheel.

1. **What are the current policy and institutional shortcomings in multilateral capacity for peace operations?**

    - Entrance strategy

      A feature of current policy debates is the lack of consensus on the minimal conditions for deployment of a peacekeeping mission. This is especially troubling in view of the fact that pressure to deploy operations in volatile environments is likely to grow, including alongside counterinsurgency and even counterterrorism operations. To say that peacekeeping is not the right instrument when there is no peace to keep may be true, but is not very helpful as policy guidance since "peace to keep" is a matter of degree. A more useful rule of thumb is that for peacekeeping to succeed it must be accompanied by a viable political process. Yet, that begs two questions: to what extent can a peace operation help to cultivate that process? And, how ambitious should the mandate of a peace operation be? Another weakness associated with "entrance strategy" is the relatively poor record of the international community in adopting a regional approach to conflict management, despite the growing awareness of spillover effects. Finally, the UN has long stressed the importance of rapid deployment, and yet, substantial delays continue at almost every step, from force generation to procurement, to transport and logistics, to recruitment of civilian personnel with the knowledge and expertise to hit the ground running (including senior leadership).

    - Capacity for robust/complex peacekeeping

The inability to deploy rapidly is part of a larger problem of capacity shortfalls. It is now common practice for the Security Council to assign peacekeepers protection-of-civilians and other mandates that require robust action, and UN missions in Sierra Leone, the DRC, and Haiti demonstrate that the UN can succeed. But the relative unwillingness of developed countries to commit troops to UN peacekeeping, the shortage of critical enabling units like transport and attack helicopters, and the limited global supply of formed police units suggest that there are limits to what the UN can do. In addition to shortcomings on the security side, UN missions often suffer from an inability to engage robustly in what Lakhdar Brahimi and Salman Ahmed have called "political process management." Plus UN and non-UN operations are increasingly being given responsibilities in the areas of governance and the rule of law. These require civilian expertise the UN is striving to develop, but recruitment of qualified personnel is slow, and the ability to engage effectively with national authorities and external stakeholders tends to be weak.

- Institutional partnerships

The number of actors and organizations involved in peacekeeping has grown in recent years. Regional organizations like the AU, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), ECOWAS, the EU, and NATO, have deployed missions with military components, the Organization of American States (OAS) and OSCE have established civilian missions, and various ad hoc coalitions have done both. While agreeing on an overarching division of labor among the various organizations is politically impossible, a tacit understanding of comparative advantages would go a long way toward building a more coherent international architecture for conflict management. Moreover, the partnerships forged in particular cases tend to be ad hoc, without a clear sense of which of the several models that have been attempted work best and in what circumstances—sequentially deployed, co-deployed, and "hybrid" operations. In addition, the new complexity of peacekeeping has given rise to the need for greater integration among UN actors and with the international financial institutions (IFIs). While the notion of "integrated missions" has taken hold, there are still deficiencies in coordinating at the headquarters level and aligning

assessment, planning, and budget cycles to fill the gap between peacekeeping and peacebuilding.

- Withdrawal

  The UN lacks clear benchmarks for withdrawal of a peace operation or transition to a smaller follow-on presence, although the Capstone Doctrine has made a promising start. The key is to establish not only what it takes to achieve sustainable peace (a long-term process), but what a peace operation can do toward that end in the relatively brief period when it is deployed. This requires a better sense of the "core business" of peacekeeping: political processes, security, and the rule of law. The Security Council has demonstrated a greater willingness to "stay the course" in recent years, but the danger of premature withdrawal is real—both because host countries tend to tire of a large UN presence and because the political will in the Security Council and among other external actors tends to dissipate. Conversely, peacekeepers are sometimes deployed when the main parties formally consent to the operation, but then seek to obstruct it at every turn. The Council and Secretariat need to develop strategies for preempting or countering that eventuality, and/or be prepared to withdraw when the UN presence ceases to be viable.

2. **What have previous attempts to address these shortcomings accomplished?**

   The most recent attempts at peacekeeping reform can be divided into three interrelated initiatives: the 2000 Brahimi Report; "Peace Operations 2010"; and the Secretariat restructuring. Other intertwined initiatives are reform of Security Council working methods, and the recommendations of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change, and the SG's *In Larger Freedom* report,[1] both of which fed into the World Summit 2005.

   - *Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations* (the Brahimi Report)

     The Brahimi Report is the most far-reaching review of peace operations ever conducted by the UN. A 2003 study by the

Stimson Center found progress in most of the reforms that were implementable by the UN secretariat, but less progress in recommendations directed at member states. The capacity of the department was expanded (184 new posts were authorized in 2000 and 2001, stocks at the logistics base in Brindisi increased, etc.), Integrated Mission Task Forces were established to enhance coordination across the system, and the Security Council took note of the key conceptual underpinnings of the report—including the need for robust action against spoilers. But philosophical divisions about the nature of peacekeeping were an obstacle to deeper reform. On doctrine for robust operations, for example, the Security Council requested that the SG prepare a "comprehensive operational doctrine," but the C-34 was much less enthusiastic. The reservations stemmed from concerns among developing countries that more expansive peacekeeping would take resources away from development; and the related fear that more robust peacekeeping was a Trojan horse for intervention by the North in the South. The net result was schizophrenia: the Security Council continued to provide robust and complex mandates for UN operations, but the resources were often unavailable, and guidance on how to carry out those mandates was not developed until the recent Capstone Doctrine was produced.

- Peace Operations 2010

The 2004 report of the Secretary-General's High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change and his own *In Larger Freedom* (2005) highlighted the lack of global capacity to meet growing demand for robust and complex peace operations. Little progress has been made on some of the more far-reaching recommendations of the two reports, such as the creation of strategic reserves, greater involvement of developed-country troops in UN peace operations (other than in UNIFIL), and the commitment of dedicated air- and sea-lift capacities. As with the Brahimi Report, more progress has been made on reforms the Secretariat can enact itself, set out in "Peace Operations 2010,"[2] which covers five areas: personnel, doctrine, partnerships, resources, and organization. As noted, positive progress has been made on the development of doctrine, and partnerships with the AU, EU, and IFIs are becoming more systematic. However, recruitment, retention, and training of

quality personnel remain problematic. Action on resources and organization was effectively put on hold while the new Secretary-General undertook a major restructuring of the Secretariat.

- The 2007 DPKO Restructuring

  Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon proposed, and the General Assembly accepted, a division in the DPKO in mid-2007, creating a new Department of Field Support (DFS), headed by an Under-Secretary-General who reports to and takes direction from the USG for Peacekeeping Operations. A total of 152 new posts were added, including three at the Assistant Secretary-General level. Greater authority for field personnel, the budget, and information technology was transferred to DFS. A new Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions was created in DPKO, as well as a new Policy, Evaluation, and Training Division. To ensure effective collaboration within and between the two departments, and to better coordinate with the rest of the UN system, six Integrated Operational Teams have been created. The main rationale for the restructuring, presented as the culmination of prior reform proposals, was "better planning, faster deployment, a more responsive system of support . . . and more effective, efficient and transparent use of resources." A thread that runs through the rationale is accountability. Thus, success of the restructuring should be measured by how effective it is in ensuring the Secretariat units responsible for delivering on SC mandates actually do so.

3. **What policies and institutional renovations, including legal frameworks and financial arrangements, are needed?**

- Entrance strategy
  - The SC must be clear about the minimal conditions for deployment of a UN operation and more attentive to warnings from the Secretariat when those minimal conditions do not exist. The 1994 Presidential Statement (UN Doc. S/PRST/1994/22) on this should be updated. In undertaking strategic and technical assessments, the Secretariat should be forthright in "telling the Council what it needs to know, not what it wants to hear." And it should do so publicly when necessary.

- More attention should be devoted to the political dimensions of peacekeeping, including by cultivating SRSGs and providing each with a staff that has the experience and knowledge to engage robustly and constructively in political processes.

- Member states and the Secretariat should treat the Capstone Doctrine as an authoritative statement on the nature, scope, and basic principles of peacekeeping. The Secretariat's efforts to finalize guidance documents should be supported, including in controversial areas like protection of civilians and security sector reform. The Capstone Doctrine and subsidiary guidance should be widely disseminated and used for training and evaluation purposes.

- Building on Resolution 1353 of June 2001, SC working methods should be improved to enable a more interactive relationship between the SC and potential troop and police contributors on authorization, extension, change in mandate, or completion of a mission.[3]

- UN capacity

  - To meet the demand for well-equipped and well-trained troops, as well as enabling units, developed countries and large new contributors should be urged to contribute more to UN operations. Seek early agreement on developing "enhanced rapidly deployable capabilities" (e.g., a strategic reserve) to reinforce UN missions in times of crisis.

  - Continue with efforts to expand the global supply of formed police units (FPUs). Member states should be encouraged to train and prepare these units for deployment in UN operations. The UN should facilitate bilateral arrangements between donors and PCCs on training and equipping FPUs.

  - Establish a standing civilian capacity for rule of law, security sector reform, and governance/administration tasks. Member states should develop cadres of "rapidly deployable civilians" for UN and non-UN operations.

  - Devise more flexible and responsive procurement, recruitment, and other mission-support-related rules, with greater delegation of authority to the field.

- Seek better enforcement of sexual-exploitation-and-abuse standards, including devices for increasing pressure on states that fail to investigate and prosecute alleged perpetrators.

- Conduct an external review in 2009 of the Secretariat restructuring, focusing on accountability for performance.

- Regional approach/institutional partnerships

  - Strategic assessment missions should visit neighbors and regional powers prior to making recommendations on deployment of a peace operation. Security Council missions should do the same to shore up regional support for a peace process. SRSGs should be encouraged to engage systematically with regional stakeholders.

  - Seek a tacit understanding of the comparative advantages of the UN and regional organizations, bearing in mind the unique legitimacy of the UN and its ability to field long-term, multidimensional missions; the quicker response of some regional organizations; the greater capacity of some organizations for robust action; and the greater knowledge of subregional organizations about the dynamics of conflicts in their neighborhoods.

  - Standardize MOUs between the UN and regional organizations, and include in them provisions for high-level policy dialogue, joint assessments, joint planning of operations, joint training standards, and mechanisms for mutual support in times of crisis.

  - Build on the integrated mission framework by working out better arrangements for joint assessments, planning, and programming by peacekeepers and development partners, including the UNDP and World Bank.

- Withdrawal

  - Devise benchmarks for withdrawal of a peace operation or transition to a follow-on presence, building on the proposals outlined on pages eighty-eight and eighty-nine of the Capstone Doctrine. The benchmarks should focus on progress made in fulfilling core peacekeeping functions, with the working assumption that multilateral peace operations should remain deployed for about ten years.

- Develop diplomatic strategies for sustaining the cooperation of strong governments and other parties to a conflict, and for withdrawal when their behavior becomes so obstructive that a peace operation ceases to be viable.

4. What strategy is needed to achieve these renovations?

Most of the above recommendations require action at the intergovernmental and Secretariat levels and some would benefit from nongovernmental input. It is beyond the scope of this short paper to set out a strategy for each. However, below are suggestions on how to move forward on seven priorities.

- Conditions for deployment of a mission. A think tank should undertake a study of the impact of the 1994 presidential statement on conditions for deployment of a peacekeeping operation (referred to in the Capstone Doctrine). It should then convene a series of informal meetings among Secretariat officials and a small group of geographically diverse but like-minded states that have peacekeeping experience with a view to drafting a new presidential statement. With the tacit or explicit approval of the SG, the draft should be submitted to the Security Council for adoption.

- Partnerships with regional organizations. The Peacekeeping Best Practices Section should study the comparative advantages of the UN, regional organizations, and ad hoc coalitions in conducting peace operations. The study should also consider recent innovative "partnerships"—like UNAMID, MINURCAT, UNAMA/ISAF, and UNMIK/KFOR—to draw lessons about institutional arrangements that best take advantage of each organization's strengths. These lessons should then be fed into a policy discussion at the highest level of the UN and relevant regional organizations, with the goal of forging deeper mutual understanding about the role of each organization in the emerging international architecture for peace operations.

- Cultivate a new generation of SRSGs and civilian experts. The DFS Senior Leadership Unit should ask member states to nominate interested candidates with appropriate backgrounds. In their interactions with other international and nongovernmental organizations, senior UN officials should identify effective leaders and recommend them to DFS. A think

tank should then invite these people to meet with current SRSGs and UN officials so they are on the UN's radar. Meanwhile, DFS and DPKO should continue to explore options for more rapid deployment of civilian experts at the middle-management level, including by drawing on standby cadres being developed by member states.

- Doctrine for protection of civilians. Drawing on the expertise of military, police, and civilians with experience in the field, a think tank should develop a draft doctrine for the protection of civilians. The draft should then be presented to the Secretariat of the UN (as well as that of the AU, ECOWAS, the EU, and NATO, as appropriate) for consideration. The doctrine should be finalized by the Secretariat and included among the guidance documents. The group of like-minded states referred to above should facilitate efforts to seek tacit intergovernmental support for the doctrine.

- Enhanced rapid deployment capabilities (ERDC). Currently four options for reinforcing a UN mission in a crisis are on the table: call on partners (e.g., NATO, the EU); a UN strategic reserve of "over the horizon" forces composed of elements from key troop contributors; an operational reserve (within the mission area); and inter-mission cooperation. The Secretariat should accelerate the development of a proposal and rationale, to be submitted to the C-34 for consideration, and—if there are budgetary implications—to the General Assembly for approval.

- Effectiveness of the Secretariat restructuring and mission support. In 2009 or 2010, a team of management consultants should do a comprehensive review of the impact of the restructuring, as well as the rules for recruitment and procurement for field missions. In addition to considering whether the new lines of accountability have made the system more responsive and effective, special attention should be paid to the Integrated Operational Teams, Integrated Mission Planning Process, and Integrated Mission Task Forces. If the study calls for further reforms, the SG should so report to the relevant intergovernmental bodies—culminating in a proposal to the General Assembly for further reforms.

- Developed-country participation in peace operations. The group of like-minded states referred to above should launch

an advocacy campaign to urge greater participation among developed countries and other large states that have the potential to contribute more to peace operations. This group should consult the Secretariat on where the needs are greatest (FPUs, helicopters, etc.) and then identify states with the capacity to meet those needs, bearing political considerations in mind. It should also consider whether special arrangements at UN headquarters, like the Strategic Military Cell for UNIFIL, can be adapted for use in all missions.

Ian Johnstone with IPI

Notes:

1. United Nations Secretary-General, *In Larger Freedom: Towards Security, Development, and Human Rights for All*, UN Doc. A/59/2005, March 21, 2005.

2. See United Nations Secretary-General, *Overview of the Financing of the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Budget Performance for the Period from 1 July 2004 to 30 June 2005 and Budget for the Period from 1 July 2006 to 30 June 2007*, UN Doc. A/60/696, February 24, 2006, paras. 6-21.

3. Security Council Report has found that many TCCs are dissatisfied with implementation of Resolution 1353. Security Council Report, "Security Council Transparency, Legitimacy, and Effectiveness," Special Research Report no. 3, October 18, 2007, p. 7.

Annex 2: Reflections from the Opening Plenary Meeting

1. **What are the current policy and institutional shortcomings in peace operations?**

    - At present, there is a tendency within the Security Council to consider peacekeeping the default response for almost all crises with very little attention to the question of whether peacekeeping is in fact the appropriate instrument.

    - Multidimensional peace operations grew up in the context of conflicts that concluded with the end of the Cold War, that had clear peace agreements in place, and that were not regionally intertwined. For these conflicts the Security Council was unanimous and its leverage was clear. Today, the same peacekeeping model is applied in conflicts where these political conditions do not exist. Would a more modest approach that focused merely on the containment of conflict be more appropriate?

    - Overstretched capacities for peacekeeping within the UN Secretariat are compounded by a global overstretch of peacekeeping capacities among member states and regional organizations, such as NATO, the EU, and AU. As a result, it is becoming increasingly difficult for UN missions to deploy rapidly and to fulfill robust or complex mandates, particularly in the area of civilian protection.

    - In response to the Brahimi Report's recommendation to leave resolutions in draft form until the Secretary-General could confirm that he had secured the required number of troops, police, and civilians, the Council requested that he consult and inform troop and police contributors as to the practicability of resolutions (Resolution 1327). Efforts to do so have been uneven and insufficient in some cases.

    - Senior leaders in the field often face a trade-off between efficiency and the demand for oversight and transparency in administrative and procurement procedures with sometimes grave consequences for staff security and the ability of the

mission to fulfill its mandate.

- Although the Security Council has demonstrated an increased willingness to stay the course, it continues to grant mandate renewals for six to twelve months at a time, which presents serious barriers to planning and managing a mission effectively.

- Attention to the operational aspects of peacekeeping has crowded out attention to the important role of UN missions and the SRSG, in particular, in nurturing political processes.

- The regional nature of conflict is well understood but this is still not reflected in how peace operations are organized on the ground.

2. **What have previous attempts to address these shortcomings accomplished and why have some failed?**

- Earlier reform efforts, the Brahimi Report in particular, had traction for several reasons. There was a clear desire among member states at that time for a review of UN peacekeeping apparatus, the issue of peacekeeping cut across the North-South divide (in that there was a common definition of the problem), and the budgetary treatment of peacekeeping allowed it to be viewed as somewhat separate from the often zero-sum approach to budgetary negotiations at the UN.

- Ongoing disagreement over the concept of "peace operations" as compared to "peacekeeping" continues to stymie institutional reform.

- The Brahimi Report set a target of thirty to ninety days for deployment. Meeting this target requires either several months' lead-time or serious financial investment in prepositioned capacities and assets, many of which may not always be used. It is worth considering whether these investments of time and money are realistic and, if not, whether the target is realistic. This raises the question of whether the UN can sustain the loss in credibility that results from delayed deployments.

- Implementing reform is very challenging in the context of surging peacekeeping activities. Planning new missions continues to divert attention from reform efforts and while it may be possible to separate staff and dedicate them entirely to implementing reform, they risk being disconnected from ever-

changing realities and demands on the ground.

3. **What policies and institutional renovations, including legal frameworks and financial arrangements, are needed?**

- Revisiting the minimal conditions for deployment contained in UN Doc. S/PRST/1994/22 would allow member states to have an important normative and operational debate about the role and function of peacekeeping operations and the present limitations of the instrument for today's complex conflicts.

    - Under what circumstances is a UN peace operation the right instrument?

    - What conditions are necessary for a mission to be viable?

    - Does a viable political process exist, and could a UN peace operation nurture such a process?

    - Does the conflict have a regional dimension and how can a UN peace operation work with regional elements?

- In addition to the minimal conditions for the deployment of a peace operation, the necessary conditions for states to participate and for a mission to be accepted by the host country should be considered.

- A top-to-bottom management review of policies and procedures should be undertaken to better align authority and accountability. This could be undertaken in the context of an overall review of the DPKO restructuring. Like medium-sized enterprises, peacekeeping operations should be able to function without having to sacrifice accountability for effectiveness and/or safety.

- Instead of looking at how to increase the quantity of personnel in DPKO, ways to make current staff more effective—including more training and revised staff regulations—should be considered.

- Authority should be delegated to senior leaders in the field to enable them to engage effectively with the political process. Creative thinking must be undertaken to consider how accountability can be ensured without the heavy burden of the existing approvals process.

- Doctrine on protection of civilians is needed and may be more effectively undertaken by an independent institute, outside the UN. Several practical steps need to be taken in order to fulfill protection mandates, including

  - Development of a standby force that can reinforce a mission when it is in crisis; and

  - Reinforcement of formed police units by building global capacity and brokering arrangements between those who can train and equip and those who can provide the units.

4. What strategy is needed to achieve these renovations?

- It is worth considering which of these shortcomings are remediable and which are simply endemic to the enterprise. What is the relationship between reform efforts undertaken in the last five to ten years and the record of success and failure? How has the nature of the tasks changed?

- Given overstretched capacities, can the UN take on another complex operation at the present time? Member states must grapple with the trade-off between the potential for failure and the cost of inaction.

- Peacekeeping should remain separate from other reforms on operational issues because it tends to be less contentious than prevention and peacebuilding. However, for doctrine, a holistic approach is necessary.

- It is worth considering how to proceed when there is lack of agreement among the P5, in particular focusing on whether there is the role for the General Assembly in these cases.

- Previous reform efforts have taken at least five to ten years from the time of conception to implementation. The problem is that in those five years the world changes. Reform must look ahead to anticipate challenges, both political and operational in the future.

- The Brahimi Report was successful because the authors spent an enormous amount of time with member states before anyone saw a written document. Broad consultation prior to publishing any recommendations is critical.

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Annex 3: Methodology and Timeline

Four questions guided the Task Forces in helping IPI to generate policy and institutional ideas for action:

1. What are the current policy and institutional shortcomings in multilateral security capacity on these issues?

2. Why have previous attempts to address these shortcomings failed?

3. What policies and institutional renovations, including legal frameworks and financial arrangements, are needed?

4. What strategy is needed to achieve these renovations?

The Opening Symposium on Development, Resources, and Environment served as an essential backdrop to the Task Forces. By examining these critical related issues, the symposium provided a larger geopolitical and economic context for the work of the subsequent Task Forces on security challenges. The two Task Forces, convened sequentially, addressed two thematic clusters of issues, each of which were broken down into smaller roundtables, as follows:

Task Force One	Transnational Security Challenges
	1. Transnational Organized Crime
	2. Weapons of Mass Destruction
	3. Global Terrorism
	4. Small Arms and Light Weapons
	5. Biosecurity

Task Force Two	Inter- and Intra-state Armed Conflict
	6. Peace Operations
	7. Mediation and Peace Processes
	8. Peacebuilding
	9. Conflict Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect

Each Task Force consisted of members drawn from UN member states, academia, and policy-research institutions. The composition of each group ensured a broad range of perspectives regarding multilateral security capacity on the issues in question. Through this intensive work process, the Task Forces constituted core groups of stakeholders with an interest in developing practical strategies for addressing the institutional and policy shortcomings in these areas.

Task Force members met in opening and closing plenary sessions, as indicated below. Experts, in collaboration with IPI, prepared a series of non-papers, serving as a basis for discussion. Smaller groups gathered between the plenary sessions in roundtables, along with invited guest experts, for more in-depth, topic-specific discussions. Following each roundtable IPI produced a summary reflecting the group's discussions that served as a guide for the closing plenary session. Likewise, IPI drew on the Task Force deliberations to produce the final reports, detailing practical and achievable steps for strengthening multilateral action in the area in question. As noted, the content of these reports is the responsibility of IPI, and does not necessarily represent the positions or opinions of individual Task Force participants.

TIMELINE

Opening Symposium "Development, Resources, and Environment: Defining Challenges for the Security Agenda"
February 7-8, 2008 [Greentree Estate, Long Island]

Task Force One: Transnational Security Challenges

Opening Plenary Meeting
April 2-4, 2008 [Greentree Estate, Long Island]

1. Roundtable on **Transnational Organized Crime**
   April 10-11, 2008 [Millennium UN Plaza Hotel, New York]

2. Roundtable on **Weapons of Mass Destruction**
   April 24-25, 2008 [IPI, New York]

3. Roundtable on **Global Terrorism**
   May 1-2, 2008 [IPI, New York]

4. Roundtable on **Small Arms and Light Weapons**
   May 8-9, 2008 [Millennium UN Plaza Hotel, New York]

5. Roundtable on **Biosecurity**
   May 21-22, 2008 [IPI, New York]

Closing Plenary Meeting
May 28-30, 2008 [Greentree Estate, Long Island]

Task Force Two: Inter- and Intra-state Armed Conflict

Opening Plenary Meeting
June 11-12, 2008 [Greentree Estate, Long Island]

6. Roundtable on **Peace Operations**
   June 16-17, 2008 [IPI, New York]

7. Roundtable on **Mediation and Peace Processes**
   June 30-July 1, 2008 [IPI, New York]

8. Roundtable on **Peacebuilding**
   July 2-3, 2008 [IPI, New York]

9. Roundtable on **Conflict Prevention and the
   Responsibility to Protect**
   July 8-9, 2008 [IPI, New York]

Closing Plenary Meeting
October 15-16, 2008 [Greentree Estate, Long Island]

Annex 4: Task Force Participants

Co-Chairs

H.E. Mr. Abdullah M. Alsaidi, *Permanent Representative of the Republic of Yemen to the United Nations*

H.E. Mr. Dumisani Shadrack Kumalo, *Permanent Representative of the Republic of South Africa to the United Nations*

H.E. Mr. Claude Heller, *Permanent Representative of Mexico to the United Nations*

H.E. Mr. Peter Maurer, *Permanent Representative of Switzerland to the United Nations*

H.E. Mr. John McNee, *Permanent Representative of Canada to the United Nations*

H.E. Mr. Vanu Gopala Menon, *Permanent Representative of the Republic of Singapore to the United Nations*

H.E. Mr. Heraldo Muñoz, *Permanent Representative of Chile to the United Nations*

H.E. R.M. Marty M. Natalegawa, *Permanent Representative of the Republic of Indonesia to the United Nations*

H.E. Mr. Christian Wenaweser, *Permanent Representative of the Principality of Liechtenstein to the United Nations*

Permanent Missions and Delegations to the United Nations

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Algeria
Argentina
Australia
Austria
Bangladesh
Brazil
Canada
Chile
China
Colombia
Costa Rica
Cuba
Czech Republic
Denmark
Egypt
Ethiopia
European Union
Finland
France
Germany

Ghana
Greece
India
Indonesia
Ireland
Israel
Japan
Liechtenstein
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Malaysia
Mexico
Morocco
Mozambique
Netherlands
New Zealand
Niger
Nigeria
Norway
Pakistan
Palau

Portugal
Qatar
Republic of Korea
Romania
Russian Federation
Singapore
Slovak Republic
South Africa
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Tanzania
Turkey
Uganda
United Kingdom
United States of America
Uruguay
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Expert Moderators and Contributors

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Task Force One on Transnational Security Challenges

Transnational Organized Crime

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