POLICE REFORM IN POST-CONFLICT SOCIETIES: WHAT WE KNOW AND WHAT WE STILL NEED TO KNOW

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REPORT

POLICY PAPER · NEW YORK · APRIL 2005
The Security–Development Nexus Program

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Introduction

Police reform is one of the most important and complex challenges in any environment. It is particularly challenging, however, in post-conflict situations where the police have often perpetrated serious human rights violations. Often cut off from the populations they are meant to serve and protect, many operate more like military contingents than public security officers. Transforming such police forces into rights-respecting police services that simultaneously provide protection and fight crime has challenged local and international reformers.

Many United Nations (UN) departments and agencies—in particular the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)—have developed extensive experience in police reform over the past fifteen years in various peace operations, starting in Namibia in 1989. The UN has helped to reform or create new police forces in El Salvador, Cambodia, Haiti, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, East Timor (now known as Timor-Leste), Rwanda, Croatia, Georgia/Abkhazia, Burundi, Sierra Leone, Guatemala, Angola, Liberia and the Democratic Republic of Congo.

The rising number of organizations carrying out police reform evidences the increasing importance attached to it. The UN is joined in police reform efforts by bilateral donors, a large and diverse number of international organizations, nongovernmental organizations and, increasingly, the private sector. The circumstances in which reformers intervene have expanded as well. Internationally led police reform originally took place in the aftermath of conflict; now it is also part of a broader conflict prevention strategy.

Given the fast pace and wide scope of police reform activities, it is understandably difficult to assess experiences and draw out lessons from the wide range of initiatives being conducted. Based on desk-based research and interviews, this study examines what we know so far about police reform, and concludes by setting out what more needs to be learned in order for current police reform strategies to become more effective and sustainable.

Box 1. DPKO and UNDP Current Involvement in Police Reform

Ongoing UN peacekeeping operations with international civilian police

1	Afghanistan	8	Haiti
2	Burundi	9	Liberia
3	Côte d'Ivoire	10	Sierra Leone
4	Cyprus	11	Sudan
5	Democratic Republic of Congo	12	Timor-Leste
6	Georgia	13	Western Sahara
7	Kosovo		

Ongoing UNDP police reform programs

1	Albania	11	Kosovo
2	Argentina	12	Liberia
3	Bangladesh	13	Moldova
4	Brazil	14	Mozambique
5	Colombia	15	Nicaragua
6	Ecuador	16	Rwanda
7	El Salvador	17	Sierra Leone
8	Guatemala	18	Somalia
9	Haiti	19	Sudan
10	Indonesia		

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[1] Charles Call, "Challenges in Police Reform: Promoting Effectiveness and Accountability," Policy Paper (International Peace Academy, 2003), p. 4.

What We Know So Far

1. Police reform takes a long time, involves transforming power relations in a society and requires more than technical tinkering with police doctrine or practice.

Police reform, like any effort to change an institution, is intensely political. Power distribution and relationships will change, and resistance is only natural and to be expected. Many in the old order will see reform as a direct threat, a zero-sum game where they stand to lose and others will gain. People invested in the old structure will not be happy with this conclusion and can be expected to resist change. There is a built-in tension between the UN's correct judgment that it is important to "build on locally and take local ownership seriously" and the reality that the very need for reform means that what exists "locally" is inadequate and requires change.[1]

The UN and others embarking on police reform must understand from the outset that the exercise involves much more than a mere "technical fix" or tinkering exclusively with the operational side of the police institution. The local population will interpret every project, every training as a political initiative, and, accordingly, will calculate what they stand to gain or lose from the effort.

Police reform requires the population to have confidence in the police and expects the police to serve the public regardless of political agendas. Such a dynamic represents a pivotal change in how society is governed in most post-conflict and crisis states. "Policy makers and critics have to recognize that civilian police missions are an integral part of a vast and ambitious project of conflict management and political and socio-economic development."[2] In addition, they must also recognize and budget for a long-term commitment, since this will take years, not months.

2. Organizational change of any kind is never easy. This is doubly so for police in post-conflict or crisis countries.

UN initiatives on police reform must also recognize that changing the culture or ethos of an institution is never easy. For most post-conflict and crisis states, the overarching goal of police reform is to "move from a model of policing based on repression and social control to a model based on prevention and investigation."[3] The population's historic and well-justified mistrust of the police must be overcome, and this will take time. The new or reformed police must earn the trust of the population, and one mistake or reversion to the past can have a devastating impact. In short, the reality is that there is almost no room for error, especially in the early days of police reform, so getting off to a good start is vital and generating early, tangible results is crucial as well.[4]

3. Respect for human rights and effective crime fighting go together: police reform cannot be seen as resulting in "weak policing."

A third core aspect of police reform in conflict or crisis states centers on the concern that protecting human rights will be equated with being soft on crime. This perception must be fought at all costs. The police themselves will reject reform if they believe that it

[2] Annika S. Hansen, "From Congo to Kosovo: Civilian Police in Peace Operations," Adelphi Paper #343 (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2002), pp. 13–14.

[3] Rachel Neild, *Police Training: Themes and Debates in Public Security Reform: A Manual for Civil Society* (Washington, D.C.: Washington Office on Latin America, 1998), p. 11.

[4] John P. Kotter, *Leading Change* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Business School Press, 1996), p. 119. Kotter emphasizes the importance of "generating short-term wins" as a way of building credibility, momentum and support for reform because people need to see that all the effort is paying off.

will lead to greater criminality or will somehow undermine their effectiveness as police officers. Put simply, the police will not change their behavior unless they see it is in their personal and professional interest to do so. In addition, as police expert David Bayley has noted, word-of-mouth among police officers is more important than any training course. Police telling other police that this or that change has meant an improvement in their performance or was effective in fighting crime is a very powerful change agent.[5] Police must believe that crime and disorder will decrease as a result of the reforms. Part of the challenge for the UN is to combine the human rights perspective on policing (revising codes of conduct, erecting oversight bodies and training) with the professional law enforcement and crime control perspective. All too often, the former has predominated in UN initiatives.

Some maintain that controlling crime requires "tough" policing, and that the population, too, will call for more robust police action if they feel threatened by crime, even if this encroaches on human rights. Such public clamor for tougher policing has arisen in Haiti, El Salvador, Guatemala and South Africa, all countries with histories of brutal police behavior. These cases demonstrate that if people feel vulnerable to crime, they will not only tolerate but actually advocate for the police to take almost any actions necessary to combat crime. Thus, it is absolutely imperative that UN police reform be seen as supporting simultaneously more effective and respectful policing. This can be quite challenging, especially in the violence and disorder typical of a post-conflict setting where most state structures, to the extent they ever functioned, have dissolved. Police reformers must convince the public that "democratic policing is not weak policing."[6]

4. Effective reform requires paying attention to the institutional development of the police and broader criminal justice institutions.

A clear lesson that has emerged from all this activity is that police reform must be carried out in tandem with judicial reform. Modernizing laws, training judges, making courts more efficient and humanizing prisons are all part of "rule of law" efforts. This study is quite intentionally limited to examining police reform efforts, knowing that in actual practice all the institutions related to justice and security must adapt to the post-conflict or crisis situation.

UN actors have overwhelmingly focused on raising awareness of human rights standards among their main target audiences in these police reform efforts, namely the police themselves and the community at large. The corollary to this awareness-raising is a heavy emphasis on training, creating materials for training courses and public information campaigns. In almost every country studied, the UN has designed training modules on human rights for the police, the courts, the prison system, the ombudsperson office, parliament and other official entities charged with law enforcement and security. The Task Force for the Development of Comprehensive Rule of Law Strategies for Peace Operations, created by the UN Executive Committee on Peace and Security (ECPS) in May 2003, produced a report surveying training efforts for the police, judiciary and prisons. In its report to the ECPS, the Task Force discovered over fifty different training modules and manuals created by UN agencies or departments in the rule of law area, which includes the police. The Task Force's attempt to compile all known training materials of relevance was the first instance of the UN drawing together its disparate efforts in this crucial rule of law activity.

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[5] See David Bayley, *Democratizing the Police Abroad: What to Do and How to Do It* (National Institute of Justice, 2001), p. 20.
[6] Ibid., p. 40.

The UN must improve its capacity to maintain its institutional memory to avoid wasteful repetition and to enhance its efficiency and effectiveness.

Innovative practices like sustained mentoring of police by experienced outsiders can reinforce what is learned in the police academy. UN Civilian Police (CIVPOL) in Bosnia, Haiti, Kosovo and East Timor have mentored local police to good effect, particularly when the two were co-located and the mentors were properly managed and trained. Tools like laminated pocket guides for the police, translated summaries of the core UN human rights principles for policing, and the sponsorship of police involvement in community projects have become almost automatic parts of police reform efforts.

Likewise, the UN has developed human rights education materials for schools, professional organizations, journalists, community groups and local human rights organizations. Radio and television broadcasts illustrating human rights principles—also flourish on the airwaves of many countries. This is especially important in places like Haiti, Rwanda and Cambodia, where a high number of the population is illiterate.

While all this is important, the central thesis of this paper is that training and raising awareness about human rights are necessary but not sufficient for meaningful police reform anywhere, but especially in crisis and post-conflict states. Police officers in most places already know that they are not supposed to beat or torture people, extract bribes or become involved in trafficking of any kind, whether drugs or people. In addition, most people know that the police should not do these things, suggesting that training and increased knowledge of rights will not single-handedly change behavior or prevent human rights violations by the police.

5. Management tools, sound administration practices and fiscal controls are as important as knowledge of human rights.

Most experts on police reform maintain that in addition to human rights training and public awareness campaigns, the UN must engage in sustained efforts to build integrity, professionalism and discipline in a police force. Tools of modern management, sound administration, financial controls and objective standards for judging performance are all pivotal issues. Strong leadership, in the police force and in wider government officialdom, will also help determine the success or failure of police reform.

The UN's record on police reform is much spottier once one moves outside the area of training, creating human rights education materials and raising awareness. The UN needs to pay more attention and devote greater resources to those issues that fall under the rubric of institutional strengthening. The UN's experience and expertise on good governance and capacity-building needs to be coupled with the technical knowledge and experience of police and human rights specialists. No one sector should have a monopoly; police reform will not succeed without collaboration.

6. Some of the best ideas come from the ranks: police officers should have a meaningful role in all aspects of the reform process.

Another key element in police reform is the time-consuming and difficult work of consulting police officers to get their views on what works and what does not. As Bayley notes, "the grain of the organization must be made to work with reform rather than against it."[7] Reform cannot be simply decreed from

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[7] Bayley, op. cit., p. 20.

above. While the support of top management is crucial, each person in the force must feel that s/he has a stake in change.[8] The rank and file must have a say and be heard out, or reform efforts will not take root. Indeed, a study of efforts to implement community policing found that some of the best ideas came from the police themselves and not from the outside "experts" or the police hierarchy.[9] This "bottom-up" approach must be combined with skillful and committed leadership that set clear standards on what is proper behavior and what will not be tolerated in the new police.

7. Local history, traditions and culture must be acknowledged in all police reforms; failing to anchor programs in local realities means that the programs, too, will fail. Broad-based expertise is required.

UN actors must be thoroughly familiar with the local traditions, practices and conditions regarding policing and security; a deep understanding of how the police were structured and organized in the past is essential. UN actors must also understand past criminal patterns, networks and gangs, both inside and outside the old police, and how they operated.

In post-conflict and crisis countries, the police were often part of the problem. Cut off from the community they were meant to be protecting and serving, the police in places like Haiti, Cambodia, Rwanda, Kosovo, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan and Bosnia often acted like occupiers, squelching any perceived criticism of the authorities and not hesitating to use violence to maintain control. In the countries studied, most people's interactions with the police have been negative.

In many places, people have had no experience with a police apparatus that would provide services and protection and observe human rights, so the UN must be ready to help citizens formulate demands for respectful, responsive policing.[10] While it is difficult to overcome this background, at the same time, as Bayley notes, "there is a repressed demand for responsive, sympathetic policing."[11] Despite understandable skepticism bred from decades of abusive police behavior, most people want to have a good experience with the police—they want to rely on the police for protection and the prevention of crime. Police reformers must know the local history, down to details like the color of the old police uniforms and the names of notorious police units. Reform efforts must not in any way even hint that discredited and abusive symbols, units or tactics will continue to be used.

This type of understanding requires broad-based expertise. Put simply, improving human rights performance in the police is too important and complex to be left to human rights or police experts alone. It is not enough to bring in a human rights expert to lecture on international human rights standards to a group of cadets in a police academy, or for a police expert to discuss how to conduct a "stop and frisk." Police reform is a multi-faceted, multi-disciplinary effort that takes careful coordination among many actors and will require many years and a great deal of money. The question of how to ensure the sustainable generation of financial resources within the state—local taxes and fees—to avoid dependence on foreign largesse is yet another major challenge. Given the complexity of reform, those with expertise in management, personnel, logistics, communications, procurement, data management, institutional reform, psychology, sociology,

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[8] Kotter, op. cit. Kotter shows how both establishing a sense of urgency and creating a coalition of management and employees are crucial elements for implementing change. Empowering employees—for our purposes, the police officers themselves—for broad-based action is a third element.

[9] Rachel Neild, *Themes and Debates in Public Security Sector Reform: A Manual for Civil Society: Community Policing* (Washington, D.C.: Washington Office on Latin America, 1998).

[10] Call, op. cit., p. 5.

[11] Bayley, op. cit., p. 25.

criminology, public information campaigns, anthropology and community relations must also participate.

Thus there is no single element in the UN system that has the competence, expertise or resources to conduct police reform. It will require a joint effort from many departments and agencies, including the Department of Political Affairs (DPA), DPKO, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), UNDP, UN Children's Fund (UNICEF), UN Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), Office on Drugs and Crime (Vienna), as well as regional bodies like the European Union (EU), the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the Organization of American States (OAS), the African Union (AU) and others.

8. International actors must offer more than just criticism of police misconduct; identified problems require positive solutions.

Another important lesson gleaned from international efforts to reform police is that merely monitoring and reporting on human rights abuses does not automatically lead to reform or improved respect for human rights. Blaming or shaming the police into reforming their behavior by publicly exposing their abuses can be counterproductive. Feeling under siege, the police may refuse to cooperate, share information or participate in reform efforts, or even revert to past behavior. Even many UN CIVPOL may react in this way, thus further complicating UN efforts.

This does not mean that UN officials should hide, soft-pedal or, worse yet, attempt to justify police misconduct or criminal behavior. Rather, a shift in tactics or approach may yield the desired results without compromising principles in any way. Human rights monitors typically have relied on exposing abuses as the way to attract attention to a problem

and then fix it. Yet because most police will not accept being hectored or lectured to, this will only entrench existing institutional resistance to change. The adversarial approach may create a siege mentality among new police, who will see the human rights community as the "enemy," a dangerous situation that has unhappy precedents in many countries.

Experience across several peace operations shows that a "diagnostic approach" works much better. Here the human rights or policing experts analyze the situation, pinpoint any abusive behavior, try to understand what causes the human rights violations, and then seek to work with the responsible authorities to fix the problem. This diagnostic approach is preferable not only for police reform but also for reform of the judiciary, prisons, public administration or any institution charged with upholding human rights. As the authors of a major study on human rights in peace operations have concluded:

> Perhaps the most important lesson from the field mission experience is the complementarity between human rights monitoring and institution building. Monitoring gave missions the ability to identify the sources and scope of human rights problems throughout the country. This information could then be used to design reform measures and training programs. Finally, field monitoring provided direct feedback on the effectiveness of reform strategies or programs as they were implemented.[12]

This diagnostic approach of analysis, diagnosis, planning, implementation, review and assessment has proven to be the best approach to police reform in post-conflict countries. It also has the added benefit of involving the various actors and harnessing the expertise needed for effective reform, so that it is not seen as just a human rights project. The police

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[12] Thomas Hammarberg, "Introduction and Overview," in Alice Henkin, ed., *Honoring Human Rights: From Peace to Justice* (The Aspen Institute, 2000), p. 183.

themselves must be active and meaningful partici-pants, another essential element for success.

If, however, after good faith efforts by the UN and other international actors to work cooperatively with the authorities to solve problems and offer solutions, the government denies that there are problems and delays or fails to take necessary action, then the UN should not hesitate to criticize publicly both the violations of the police and the authorities' inaction or cover-up. In this case public "shaming" is the tool of last resort, not first.

9. Internal and external bodies responsible for oversight of the police must be independent, objective, transparent and effective. They must have the power and resources to do their job.

As Bayley argues, "creating effective disciplinary systems within the police should be a first-order priority."[13] Effective, transparent and fair accounta-bility mechanisms, both internal and external, will help ensure police discipline and secure public trust, and are among the most important aspects of improving police respect for human rights. A major problem in many countries has been police impunity, cases in which the police literally got away with murder, torture, rape and extortion. Any misbehavior by the new police will have devastating impacts on reform and a dangerous dynamic will quickly develop if the population comes to view the new police as just like the old, unworthy of public trust or support. This was initially the case with the UN mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL), whereas in Haiti in 1994-95 an energetic inspector general of the new Haitian National Police disciplined, suspended and even turned over for prosecution misbehaving and abusive police officers.[14] This revolutionary development sent a clear signal to both the police and the population: impunity is over—you can lose your job and even go to jail if you violate the law or the police code of ethics.

Much has been written on whether internal oversight is better than external civilian review boards and vice versa. Likewise, the precise structure, organization and powers of control mechanisms have been the subject of many studies. While these are meaningful issues, a key element of success is creating and maintaining a dynamic relationship among the police department, civil society and the oversight body.[15] More importantly, civilian oversight itself can never substitute for good, visionary police leadership and effective internal monitoring.

The public needs to know the complaint procedure and have confidence in it. If a police officer has done something wrong, a citizen should be able to file a complaint and be sure that it will indeed be acted on. To this end, the police should conduct a public information campaign describing the process of how citizens lodge complaints about police misconduct. The inspector general or internal review board of the police should air public reports, give press briefings and issue press releases describing the allegations, both the nature of the alleged police abuse and the names and ranks of the officers involved.[16] For a while in the mid-1990s, the inspector general's office of the new Haitian National Police gave a weekly press conference, announcing the number of complaints made against the police, actions taken—including the referral of serious cases for criminal prosecution—and

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[13] Bayley, op. cit., p. 40.

[14] Research has shown that in promoting change and better police practices, criminal prosecutions are a blunt tool and have a limited deterrent effect. Prosecutions are cumbersome, expensive, backward-looking and often dismissed by other police officers as frivolous and politically motivated. Paul Chevigny, *The Edge of the Knife: Police Violence in the Americas* (New York: The New Press, 1995), p. 101.

[15] See the project "Policing in Democratic Societies," The Vera Institute of Justice, available at http://www.vera.org/project/project1_1.asp?section_id=2&project_id=31

[16] Washington Office on Latin America and the National Coalition for Haitian Rights, *Can Haiti's Police Reforms Be Sustained?* (1998).

updates on the status of earlier cases. This openness encouraged the population to work with the police to provide information and tips, identify suspects and prevent crime.

An effective police oversight mechanism helps reinforce the twin goals of respectful and effective policing: disciplined and proper police behavior means fewer rights violations and more public cooperation,

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Box 2. A Case Study from Kosovo

UNDP in Kosovo pioneered an important initiative in police reform: the first comprehensive opinion survey examining public perceptions of the police and gauging the general sense of security or lack thereof across Kosovo's thirty municipalities.[17] The objective of the UNDP survey, *Light Blue: Perceptions of Security and Police Performance in Kosovo*, was to understand what the population, the primary client of the police, thought of the police's performance in preventing crime and providing security. It sought to clarify what the public knows about the Kosovo Police Service (KPS), its training, where police are stationed, and the range of its activities, as well as measure the public's perception of the KPS's "professionalism."

The survey asked 6,000 people a range of questions, including:

• How many police officers are assigned to the station in your area, and how often do you see them on foot patrol?
• How often do you encounter a KPS officer and what is the nature and quality of the interaction?
• Do you see the KPS as effective partners, working to help the community?
• Do KPS officers treat people with respect?
• How quickly do KPS officers respond when called for emergencies?
• Do you feel safer now that you did one year ago?
• Is crime increasing or decreasing in your municipality?

Through such questions, the survey assessed police performance to date and evaluated the impact of human rights training at the police school and on-the-job mentoring and monitoring performed by the UN CIVPOL. The results provided key baseline information, an empirical basis for evaluating and reformulating professional development priorities, operational guidelines, and policy planning. More broadly, the wealth of information and insights allows an objective assessment of the efforts of the UN and OSCE to build a new rights-respecting and crime-fighting police service in Kosovo over the past five years. The main finding of the eighty-seven-page report is that "a majority of Kosovans now perceives the police as a trusted and credible institution," and that the KPS "must further broaden public trust and engage communities through regular dialogue about steps to jointly improve current levels of safety and security."[18] Also important, the very process of conducting the survey, done largely by Kosovans, builds expertise in local security sector research and analysis capacities, resulting in a core of local experts capable of conducting similar initiatives on their own in the future. The survey also promotes widespread awareness of public security issues, prompting constructive discussion and debate in a society not used to such open discourse, and should help build trust between the KPS and the public.[19]

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[17] The only other example that the author found of a public opinion survey geared specifically to generate information about the population's perception of the police took place in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[18] UNDP, *Light Blue: Perceptions of Security and Police Performance in Kosovo* (June 2004), p. 13.

[19] The Vera Institute of Justice is conducting a study of how to design and interpret public opinion surveys on police performance. Working with the NYPD, the institute is trying to elicit more precise information from the public about how they view the police. "Unlike general opinion surveys that tend to measure the residual effect of news stories and other second-hand accounts of police misconduct and heroism, this project documented and quantified how people feel about their own first-hand experiences with police officers and police commanders." See "Surveying Citizens about Police," available at http://www.vera.org.

which in turns leads to lower crime. Some police officers resist oversight, especially from external bodies, interpreting it as a hindrance to effective crime-fighting. Bayley suggests that rather than framing the issue as a trade-off between oversight and effectiveness, accountability and human rights can be seen as management and performance issues. The "clever tactic with the police is not to beat them over the head with respect to external methods of accountability, much as I approve of many of them, but to work with them and get them on our side in changing their management mentality."[20]

No police reform will be successful without a heavy emphasis on police accountability. The police as an institution must demonstrate a commitment to human rights that goes beyond training and includes oversight bodies that investigate and punish miscon-duct; incorporate human rights principles into all operating procedures including recruiting, promoting and managing personnel; and publicly report on investigations into abuses and on crime statistics in general.

Police control mechanisms serve important purposes in addition to assessing behavior and punishing misbehavior. The internal affairs unit or inspector general's office assists in "analyzing and changing the regulatory and management systems and practices of the police to refine their capabilities and improve their performance, both in effectiveness and ethics."[21] As opposed to criminal prosecutions that affect very few officers and have limited direct impact on behavior, internal disciplinary mechanisms, if fair and objective, have a great potential to encourage good behavior since they directly influence an officer's career. Performance assessments go into personnel files, which then affect promotions, transfers, raises, assignments, and opportunities for further training and skills enhancement.

Overall analyses by both internal oversight bodies and external civilian review boards reveal patterns, trends and problems in the cases/complaints filed with each body. Such information generates policy changes and recommendations, as well as adaptations in training and the incentive structure. The police themselves are often very interested in identifying which tactics or practices generate civilian complaints.[22] Developing analyses of patterns of abuse, "hot spots" or tactics that lead to abuse is essential for corrective action and reform.

10. The entire system of incentives and rewards needs to reflect the new police ethos of serving and protecting the public; recruitment and promotion must be based on objective criteria and not on nepotism or political favoritism.

As a corollary to accountability, a new police culture that rewards ethical behavior and punishes corruption and abusive practices must be established. Police reform must address the institution's entire system of incentives and rewards and must elevate integrity as the ultimate value. Recruiting must be based on fair, transparent and objective criteria that are publicly announced, and promotions, salary increases, favored postings and other legitimate perks must derive from a rigorously objective assessment of performance, eliminating political favoritism, nepotism and cronyism, which often characterize the ethos of abusive and corrupt police forces. It is crucial that reforms realign incentives and punishments to promote integrity and competence in every aspect of

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[20] Melissa Ziegler and Rachel Neild, *From Peace to Governance: Police Reform and the International Community* (Washington, D.C.: Washington Office on Latin America, 2002), p. 8.

[21] Rachel Neild, *Themes and Debates in Public Security Sector Reform: A Manual for Civil Society: Internal Controls and Disciplinary Units* (Washington, D.C.: Washington Office on Latin America, 1998), p. 1.

[22] Rachel Neild, *Themes and Debates in Public Security Sector Reform: A Manual for Civil Society: External Controls* (Washington, D.C.: Washington Office on Latin America, 2000), p. 11.

the police, so as to embed these values in every procedure and policy.[23] This requires an effective and powerful coalition within the police that will promote this change, clarify the vision, and create a sense of urgency. It is not enough to say that top management must support the change; the process must go deeper and also include department heads and station chiefs. Integrity and the "right way" must be recognized and rewarded, or the new ethos will never take hold.[24]

UNDP, in particular, must recognize broader governance challenges when it comes to police reform. The police do not operate in a vacuum, and it is often the national political ethos and system of incentives and punishments that need reforming. In Macedonia, for example, despite solid efforts to reform the police and strong human rights training, "an entrenched culture of politically partisan decision-making throughout the country intrudes on policing."[25] Corruption is another concern, a persistent problem with police in post-conflict countries, and while training and anti-corruption campaigns have their place, more is needed. Poor salaries, for example, do not alone cause corruption, but they can play an important role. The government's capacity to raise sufficient revenues fairly so that all public servants, including the police, receive an adequate salary, is thus part of an overall context of governance reform that has a huge impact on effective and respectful policing.

Conclusion: What We Still Need to Know

For police reform to become more effective and sustainable, a number of questions require further research and analysis:

- How can the need to remove unqualified or abusive members of an existing police force be balanced with the need to observe standards of fairness and due process, in a context where time is of the essence?

- How can police reform best be integrated with the equally important imperative to reform general public administration and the judiciary? We have seen that the former usually outpaces the latter two, creating new problems. How can these problems be anticipated and mitigated?

- How can people with the potential to become senior police managers be quickly identified and given the appropriate institutional support to take charge as soon as possible?

- What are the best approaches for engaging key representatives of civil society in the police reform effort, particularly in a post-conflict society whose people may have no trust in the police or the state?

- What can be learned from the experts in "change management" and organizational psychology about the best way to create a new system of incentives/rewards and sanctions to transform the ethos and organizational culture of the police or other rule of law institutions?

- What are the best sources of ongoing funding for the new police, and how can international actors help ensure that reform efforts will be sustainable in every way, but especially financially, once the international community leaves?

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[23] Gordon Peake, *Policing the Police: Police Reform Experience in Kosovo, Southern Serbia and Macedonia* (London: Saferworld, 2003), p. 22.

[24] Kotter argues, "Major change is often said to be impossible unless the head of the organization is an active supporter. What I am talking about here goes far beyond that. In successful transformations, the president, division general manager, or department head plus another five, fifteen, or fifty people with a commitment to improved performance pull together as a team...in the most successful cases, the coalition is always powerful—in terms of formal titles, information, expertise, reputations and relationships, and the capacity for leadership." Op. cit., p. 6.

[25] Peake, op. cit., p. 35.

- How, beyond falling crime rates, can progress be measured? How are good governance and public confidence and support measured? What are good indicators? How can public opinion surveys be designed to measure whether the police inspire trust and confidence in the people they serve?

About this Policy Paper

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Author Acknowledgements

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