Post-Conflict Transitions: National Experience and International Reform

Meeting Summary | The Century Association, New York | March 28-29, 2005
INTRODUCTION

A capable state, if it is only a state with a capacity to deliver things to people, that’s not good enough. It has to be a state that is grounded in the people . . . And the challenge for peacebuilding is how you work along with society and how you convince those who hold power to reconstruct a state that is rooted in society.

—Amos Sawyer, Former President of Liberia

I often said to our president, it was much easier to fight Indonesia than to build a nation now.

—Agio Pereira, Chief of Staff to the President, East Timor

On March 28-29, 2005, the Center on International Cooperation and the International Peace Academy brought leaders from eleven post-conflict countries to New York for two days of discussions with UN officials, Member States representatives, and other organizations. The purpose of the meeting was to examine specific national post-war experiences in order to better inform current deliberations on international peacebuilding reforms recommended by the Secretary-General’s High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change.1

Despite improvements in international engagement in post-conflict transitions, the record remains mixed. There is evidence that multidimensional peace operations do contribute to the consolidation of peace in the aftermath of war2 and, regarding UN operations specifically, a recent RAND study found that relatively underfunded and understaffed UN operations were more often effective than better-resourced US operations.3 Nonetheless, a recent study commissioned by the UN Department of Political Affairs found that countries with a UN peace operation were just as likely to revert to war as countries with no UN presence.4 Clearly, these odds need to be improved.

The December 2004 Report of the UN Secretary-General’s High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change recommended several reforms to improve UN peacebuilding, including the establishment of a Peacebuilding Commission, a Peacebuilding Support Office within the UN Secretariat, and a Peacebuilding Fund to help countries through the first years of transition from war to peace. The Secretary-General’s subsequent March 2005 report, In Larger Freedom, endorsed and built upon these recommendations, arguing that proposed reforms would fill a “gaping hole” in the current UN institutional structure. Member States proceeded to endorse these reforms at the World Summit in September 2005, which now need to be implemented.

Two major challenges shaped the High-level Panel’s recommendations on post-conflict transitions. The first was how to make peace in the wake of civil wars and place countries on a self-sustaining trajectory toward stability. The second consideration was how to foster, at the international level, a more robust collective security system. As one UN official remarked, “In the end, that system is only as effective as the units that comprise it. And, of course, the basic unit is the state.” For both of these reasons, statebuilding is increasingly understood as a central objective of peacebuilding.

The March 28-29 meeting gathered a diverse group of leaders from post-conflict countries who are not only experts in their own national processes of statebuilding but also some of the best-informed observers of UN and international peacebuilding efforts. National leaders were asked throughout the meeting to reflect on the process of statebuilding within their countries. Specifically, what are the conditions under which “better” or more effective states are likely to emerge in the wake of conflict and how can international actors support those conditions?

Speakers included former heads of states and government ministers, local officials and parliamentarians and civil society leaders from Afghanistan, Angola, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, East Timor, Eritrea, Kosovo, Liberia, Mozambique, Somalia, and Uganda (see Annex I for the list of speakers). High-level officials from the United Nations chaired many of the sessions. UN participants included the Assistant Secretary-General for Strategic Planning, the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, the Assistant Secretary-General for Mission Support, the Assistant High Commissioner for Refugees, and Special Advisors to the Secretary-General on High-level Panel Follow-up. The meeting also brought together approximately 75 other participants including representatives of Member States, UN staff, NGO representatives, and academics with expertise on the countries under discussion and various aspects of post-conflict transitions and peace operations (see Annex II for a list of participants).

I. PUBLIC SAFETY AND SECURITY

Perspectives from Liberia and the Democratic Republic of Congo

Emergence from war presents multiple security challenges. A transitional government requires security from armed opponents. Opposition groups who are to lay down their arms need guarantees they can do so safely. Citizens, including vulnerable groups and minorities, need security to participate and start the business of recovery. Refugees need security to return. Business needs security of property and trade. International organizations need security to operate.
Neighboring countries demand security assurances. Peacekeeping, international police monitoring, security sector reform (SSR), disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR), and strengthening of criminal justice systems are all critical subtasks that necessarily involve a variety of domestic and international actors.

Whose security comes first?
In many post-conflict environments, international peacekeepers are thinly-stretched and face trade-offs in the provision of security. Priority is often given to the security of international peacekeepers and humanitarian personnel before that of the general population, which peacekeepers are often also ill-resourced to provide. In Afghanistan, for example, the international intervention was driven primarily by the security interests of the United States, secondly by those of the UN and aid community on the ground, and arguably only thirdly by an interest in enabling Afghans to provide security for themselves.

Do larger security forces produce more security?
In efforts to address the public’s safety, international operations often focus on rapid build-up of national police and military forces, facilitating, in turn, a rapid drawdown of international forces. In the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), “police training is taking place and the results are very positive. But the question is: will the trained policemen protect the local population?” The answer rests not only on technical competence but on “the capacity of the state to pay the salary of the police force on a regular basis and the creation of a mechanism where the population can voice grievances about police violence. Also critical is the state’s ability to control and punish policemen who use their official position to mistreat physically or financially the local population.” In Liberia, past elections had empowered those who were plundering and pillaging: “You don’t want to entrust that type of state with a monopoly on lethality.” Internationally-sponsored military reform is moving forward but in isolation from broader national dialogue and debate. Better to focus instead on “disarming those who have weapons and creating an environment for reconstituting a governing order.”

The need for reintegration to keep pace with disarmament and demobilization
In the case of Liberia, early international efforts to rein in the warlords were promising. “But DDR has to proceed hand-in-hand with opportunities for alternative livelihoods . . . and we have not looked sufficiently at the specific context of Liberia” to figure out how to achieve this objective. If demobilization outpaces economic recovery, the result may be idle young men without access to alternative livelihoods, a significant risk factor for renewed conflict. Similarly in DRC, some fighters have been demobilized but it is questionable whether “they have the ability to return to a civil, peaceful life after years of living a life immersed in violence.” The situation is complicated by the reluctance of many to accept these combatants back into their communities. Unless efforts to reintegrate ex-combatants can keep pace with programs to disarm and demobilize them, once again the result may be less rather than more security for the population at large.

Understanding the local context for DDR . . .
In the aftermath of civil wars, it may make sense to deemphasize wartime identities of combatants; but following independence movements, these identities may represent a touchstone for national service and statebuilding. In East Timor, internationally-led efforts to dismantle the guerilla army while building up a conventional military neglected to appreciate the interests of demobilized fighters. “They were given $100 a month for a few months, thinking this would pay them for what they have done, and they integrated into emptiness . . . and became irrelevant.” Today, working backward, the government is finding ways to reach out to former guerillas, for example by providing certificates that acknowledge their role in the liberation of the country. “And we found out that this was much more important than money.”

. . . and the regional dimension of security
Participants emphasized the frequent need for regional approaches to security issues. In West Africa, for example, price differentials in the weapons buy-back programs in
Liberia and Sierra Leone created arbitrage opportunities and expanded the regional arms trade. In the Great Lakes region, armed groups that fled both Rwanda and Burundi reassembled within the DRC, terrorizing local populations and undermining confidence in the state’s ability to provide security. In Uganda, military “rivalries” with Rwanda and engagement in the Sudan conflict have diverted both time and resources from domestic priorities. Participants noted that international efforts to monitor cross-border flows and foster regional security discussions on regional conflict formations are valuable and should be strengthened.

II. PUBLIC FINANCE AND SERVICE DELIVERY
Experiences from Uganda, Afghanistan, Somalia, and Mozambique
Citizens need to have confidence in the state’s ability to manage public resources entrusted to it and generate public services in return. Yet the obstacles to effective management of public resources are great in post-war transitions. Few peace agreements include provisions to redress imbalances in the distribution of resources even when this is recognized as a root cause of conflict. Immediate pressures to allocate line ministry functions for reasons of confidence-building and elite power-sharing further complicate efforts to redistribute scarce resources in an equitable and transparent manner. Large shadow economies based on trafficking and informal networks are often a legacy of conflict and highly resistant to taxation and state regulation. Finally, the way in which the massive influx of international aid is managed often sidelines and greatly complicates the work of national structures. Aid agencies, reluctant to channel their funds through weak public structures, often fund NGO service provision, thereby perpetuating state weakness and generating duplicative parallel structures. The relatively higher salaries offered by donors and the NGOs they support further weaken the public sector. These aid-related issues, unlike domestic factors, are directly under the authority of international actors to address, yet they persist.

Security and budgets are interdependent.
Security forces must be able to provide a minimum of order for the state to collect revenues, and the state must collect revenues to continue to finance security services. But this interdependence is not always well understood. In Afghanistan, sustained and vigorous efforts were required for the Finance Minister and his staff to wrest control of customs posts and revenues from local militias with the support of international troops. As a result, domestic revenues collection rose from 41% as a percentage of total operating costs to 70% in 2004/05, with a goal of 100% by 2007. But an uncertain security situation still presents the greatest threat. “This requires the end of the rule of the gun and disarmament of all warring factions in the country. It also means that no national or international figures for short-term political gain should legitimize the warlords.” This has however been the approach taken in Kenya-based talks to restore the Somali national government. “The notion is that all the warlords have to be on board for a system in Somalia to work,” one speaker noted. “All of them are in parliament and a good number of them are in the cabinet. But there is still no agreement among them.” Previous efforts of the Arta-based government to take root had been hamstrung by the inability to collect taxes from ports and airports controlled by these same militias.
Do No Harm: Aid impacts on national public finance systems
There was a strong sentiment that the most important measures that international agencies can adopt to help build the credibility and administrative capacity of the state are to narrow the massive disparity in wages between public salaries and international salaries for local staff, increase local procurement by international agencies, and channel larger portions of assistance through government institutions rather than international contractors, agencies, or NGOs. In Uganda today, one speaker noted, NGO influence and autonomy is undermining state authority. “NGOs are actually the largest employers. They get their money directly from donors. And when they go in the districts, they are more respected than the local leaders because they are seen as the people who are delivering.” In Afghanistan, government employees earn $35-40 per month while Afghans employed by donors and international NGOs earn $500-5,000 per month. International contracting means that very little of the $11 billion spent on international forces in Afghanistan ever enters the local economy. One positive innovation is the establishment of a multi-donor trust fund for Afghanistan which channels budget support to the Afghan government and helps to fund state programs while providing fiduciary controls on the use of aid—a key concern for citizens and donors alike.

Public finance, patronage, and corruption
In many of the countries discussed, political elites sought to control the national budget—not as a means to effectively finance public service delivery, but as a means to attract followers through distribution of patronage or to enrich themselves through corruption. In the DRC, one participant noted, there was much more haggling over the post of chief of procurement, given its opportunities for kickbacks, than chief of staff of the army. In Burundi, “a minister’s salary is more or less $300 dollars per month . . . and renting a house costs $200. That contributes to corruption.” It is in this sense that the links between public finance and political accountability, the topic of the next panel, emerge as essential.

III. POLITICAL TRANSITION, INTERIM PROCESSES, AND LEGITIMACY
Perspectives from East Timor and Eritrea
Political agreements to end armed conflict generally contain relatively detailed provisions for a political process to regulate political competition and generate leaders viewed as authoritative and legitimate. Critical subtasks often include: establishment of transitional authorities (a national power-sharing coalition or international administration); a constitutional design process; and a timetable for elections to replace transitional authorities. Commitment to human rights and democratic norms can strengthen international legitimacy of an emerging or recovering state. Elections are one means by which citizens express their consent to be governed by a new state, contributing greatly to its credibility. In deeply polarized societies, however, they can be seen as a zero-sum game, sparking violence. Political structures must strike the balance between expressing majoritarian preferences and protecting fundamental minority rights and protections.

The political dynamics of statebuilding after successful independence movements are distinct from those which follow the negotiated end of an internal conflict.
In East Timor and Eritrea, liberation movements won independence for one relatively united group, extending a considerable degree of coherence and legitimacy to the successor state. In Eritrea, the concept of “democratic centralism” emerged during the conflict, helping to unify Muslims and Christians into a common force fighting for independence. But in the post war period, one speaker noted, too much centralism militated against democracy and openness: “There was so much emphasis on centralism for ‘unity’ that the front did not concentrate on how to democratize, how to widen the participation of the population.” In addition, there was a marginalization of those who had not taken part in the struggle. Increasingly centralized authority eventually stifled open dialogue and curtailed what had begun as a vibrant and creative process of statebuilding. In East Timor, however, President Xanana Gusmao, leader of the military liberation movement,
discharged himself as commander-in-chief in the post-war period and, as a civilian head of state, worked to create space for a multi-party system.

National unity and competitive politics following successful independence movements

Eritreans were initially skeptical about multi-partyism: “It seemed wasteful . . . all this scrambling between different political parties in the process of nation formation.” They eventually established a transitional parliament with elected members on the (correct) assumption that all elected members would support the front. In East Timor, elections for the constituent assembly resulted by dominance by the independence party (FRETILIN), raising concerns about concentration of power. Nonetheless, a total of 12 political parties won representation, aided by an electoral law distributing remainders to unrepresented parties. One speaker expressed hope that, given the small size of the country, the proliferation of parties would slow but added, “. . . whatever it is, we will deal with it.”

Multi-party politics following civil wars

Negotiated settlements help to end civil wars but contain a dimension of unresolved competition that can greatly heighten the stakes for post-war elections. International notions of liberal democracy, one speaker noted, are based on the premise that an adversarial relationship among individuals or institutions can lead to the best policy outcomes. “But this assumes that we have basic agreement on underlying values and the fundamental rules of the game.” When you have no such agreement, “then you want people to talk about them as a way forward and talk and talk and talk.” “Elections are not a panacea,” another speaker noted and should not be rushed. But neither can they be put off indefinitely. In Uganda, international donors were uncharacteristically patient, as were Ugandans themselves. President Museveni outlawed all political parties in 1986, calling for a broad-based “Movement” system to replace divisive politics. In the 19 years that followed, progress was made in building up public institutions, managing economic policy, and restoring some measure of a rule of law even as war continued in north-ern Uganda. But initial discipline and restraint has given way to growing corruption and today additional steps are needed to separate the role of the ruling political party from the role of the state and to remove the military from politics.

Political legitimacy derives not only from the way leaders are chosen but from the policies they choose to pursue.

Which policies are more salient varies. In Burundi, “successful elections . . . will not mean that Burundi’s transition has been completed or that state structures are legitimate.” The struggle against impunity for past and current crimes continues and this casts a pall over the legitimacy of the current regime. In Afghanistan, “the legitimacy of the government does not only come from the ballot boxes but also from its ability to provide security and deliver basic services.” In Angola, one speaker argued, the 1994 peace agreement collapsed due to that narrow focus on military dimensions and power-sharing among elites, rather than broader democratization and national reconciliation. The first and last elections were held in 1992. Today, the MPLA-government rejects IMF transparency requirements and maneuvers between large power-rivalries over access to Angola’s oil and diamonds. “Where and how,” one speaker asked, “will Angolans find the strength to fend off such an alliance?” The international community needs to “stop lending its support to transitional processes in which only the power of guns or authoritarians claim to represent the people.”
Creation of standing police contingents for rapid deployment;
Improvement in funding sources for disarmament and demobilization efforts;
Expansion of the authority and capacity of Special Representatives of the Secretary-General (SRSGs) to improve in-country coordination.

The Secretary-General’s Report, In Larger Freedom, endorsed and built upon these recommendations, arguing that the proposed reforms would fill a “gaping hole” in the current UN institutional structure. At a General Assembly Global Summit in September 2005, Member States adopted many of these recommendations.

In analyzing national experiences, speakers identified several core principles that should animate international peacebuilding and statebuilding efforts.

First, assistance provided through any mechanism should be informed by knowledge of the region and its history. “We have a situation in Liberia where there is hardly anyone in the mission who knows Liberia—as a subject matter. There are many academics who have studied the culture, who understand the mores of the people but they are not involved.”

Second, strategies for both peace consolidation and statebuilding should be put in social context, building on and complementing informal processes. Coping strategies and creative mechanisms through which people arrange their lives in secure and productive ways complement statebuilding efforts.

Third, success of international peacebuilding efforts should be measured not by one election or one police force but by emergence of more credible and effective state structures. Statebuilding and democratization are long-term processes and cannot succeed without long-term international assistance and engagement. People need security, justice, and subsistence. This is how they know the state is working. Agreement on credible indicators appropriate to the national context can help to track success and should be linked to exit benchmarks for peacebuilding operations.

Additionally, internal reforms within international aid agencies to improve and align their procedures in the area of procurement, local wage policy, and aid modalities could have important and positive impacts.

The proposed creation of a Peacebuilding Commission, Support Office, and Fund were welcomed as necessary measures to improve international peacebuilding.

The creation of the Peacebuilding Commission was welcomed, most importantly, as a venue to better align international priorities with national ones. Participants also hoped the Commission would help coordinate bilateral, regional, and multilateral capacities which are being expanded but not necessarily in concert with each other.

Some participants mentioned the very high level of international resources devoted to peacebuilding efforts in the Balkans relative to African post-war transitions in Rwanda and Burundi. It was hoped that the Peacebuilding Commission would succeed in leveling the field for “forgotten crises” and that a Peacebuilding Fund will provide a means of expanding assistance to neglected countries.

The creation of the Peacebuilding Support Office was also welcomed as a means to centralize UN peacebuilding expertise. It was hoped that this office might help in recruitment and deployment of better trained and specialized personnel to field missions. All international agencies, including the UN, were urged to field more qualified mission staff, such as “adequately trained civilian police, constitutional and legal experts, individuals with experience in public management, and experts to assist national leaders in shaping an economic development plan while they are running the day-to-day economy.”

Participants also asked for more definition on several dimensions of the proposed Peacebuilding Commission that could significantly impact its effectiveness.

Some participants emphasized that lines of authority between the Peacebuilding Commission and UN authorities must be clearly drawn to avoid creating “another box generating rivalry among UN agencies” but, instead, an authoritative body...
helping to retain a focus on the country and mobilize resources at the international level while vesting operational authority to those working on the problem in the field.

Several asked whether civil society will be able to find a way into an institutional structure based on an inter-governmental mechanism so that “the [national] priorities of the population, not just those of the leaders,” are promoted and aligned with international ones. As another speaker argued, “If it were up and running, I would hope that it would be the entity that would deal with the way forward for Liberia... where it can engage people and yet engage states.” Others expressed concern, however, about the workings of a Peacebuilding Commission getting “bogged down” by too many participants.

Some asked whether the Commission would help the UN to be involved earlier and undertake more advance planning. The cautionary example offered was that of Kosovo, where the UN was asked to field a mission with little advance notice and having had little engagement in the negotiation process. “It would have been appropriate to have the Peacebuilding Commission get engaged in the Contact Group deliberations of December 1998 and in the negotiating process of Rambouillet in the Spring of 1999.”

Several participants asked for UN representatives to walk through a specific case so that they could better understand the concrete role the Commission would play at different points of the transition. If the Commission had existed at the outset of peacebuilding efforts in Burundi, Angola or East Timor, for example, what impact might it have had?

UN officials emphasized that several of these questions would hopefully be clarified in forthcoming reports from the Secretary-General and the September Summit, while others would be the subject of further negotiations. They emphasized that, while the Peacebuilding Commission would provide a critical forum for airing differing opinions and interests, critical tensions and trade-offs inherent in post-war transitions and international peace operations would remain.

Several national leaders highlighted High-level Panel recommendations which have received relatively less attention than the proposed Peacebuilding Commission, Support Office, and Fund.

For example, many supported the recommendations for SRSGs to have authority to strengthen in-country coordination and to better align international activities with national priorities. This was, some argued, more important than New York-based coordination mechanisms. Many felt also that greater troop strengths and more effective policing from the outset, as recommended by the Panel and endorsed by the Secretary-General, were essential for the credibility and effectiveness of international peacebuilding efforts. Participants also supported efforts to improve regional and international policing capabilities.

Some participants cautioned against placing “too many eggs in one basket” by focusing too narrowly on the proposed Peacebuilding Commission rather than seeing this as one step in a broader process of ongoing reform of the international system, including regional organizations. UN staff emphasized that the package of reforms outlined in the Secretary-General’s report, In Larger Freedom, emphasized an integrated package of measures addressing development concerns, security concerns, as well as human rights and rule of law concerns.

It was generally hoped that the Global Summit in September 2005 would move to increase the capacity of the UN to engage in effective mediation, peacekeeping, peacebuilding and to join forces with other international actors in concerted efforts responsive to local priorities. As the UN works to renew itself, participants urged the Organization to engage with the reality of multiple “right” answers to issues of state design, in which the choice and mix of national and local authority is not pre-determined but crafted to the unique opportunities and imperatives of different societies. Such flexibility would improve the effectiveness of peacebuilding and begin to answer the call of people to be empowered to be actors and decisionmakers in their own right.
ENDNOTES


ANNEX I
Conference Agenda

MONDAY, MARCH 28, 2005

9:00   Welcome by Shepard Forman, Director, Center on International Cooperation and Terje Rod-Larsen, President, International Peace Academy

9:15   Key Considerations Shaping the High-level Panel’s Peacebuilding Recommendations
Speaker: Stephen J. Stedman, Special Advisor to the Secretary-General for Follow-up to the UN Secretary-General’s High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change

9:30   Key Issues in Post-Conflict Transitions
Speaker: Barnett R. Rubin, Director of Studies and Senior Fellow, Center on International Cooperation

9:45-12:45   PANEL ONE
Asserting Monopoly over Legitimate Means of Coercion: Public Safety and Security
Chair: Jane Holl Lute, Assistant Secretary-General for Mission Support in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations
Speakers: Amos Sawyer, Associate Director, Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University and former President of Liberia
Francesca Bomoko, Director, Bureau d’Etudes de Recherche et de Consulting International, Democratic Republic of Congo

2:15-5:15   PANEL TWO
Public Finance and Service Delivery: National and International Resources and Priorities
Chair: Elizabeth Cousens, Vice President, International Peace Academy
Speakers: Reagan Ronald Okumu, Member of Parliament, Republic of Uganda
Jelani Popal, Former Deputy Minister for Customs and Revenue, Ministry of Finance, Afghanistan
Ali Khalif Galaydh, Professor, Hubert H. Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs, University of Minnesota and former Prime Minister, Somalia
Brazao Mazula, Rector, Eduardo Mondlane University in Maputo, Mozambique

5:15-5:45   Summary Observations: Security, Public Finance, and Political Legitimacy
Barnett R. Rubin, Director of Studies and Senior Fellow, Center on International Cooperation
Thant Myint-U, Acting Chief, Policy Planning Unit, Office of the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, United Nations

TUESDAY, MARCH 29, 2005

9:00   Welcome by Shepard Forman, Director, Center on International Cooperation

9:15-12:15   PANEL THREE
Political Transition, Interim Processes, and Legitimacy
Chair: Sir Kieran Prendergast, Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, United Nations
Speakers: Agio Pereira, Chief of Staff of the President, Democratic Republic of East Timor
Haile Menkerios, Director, Africa I Division, United Nations Department of Political Affairs, former Permanent Representative of Eritrea at the United Nations, and former Special Envoy of the President of Eritrea to the Great Lakes Region
1:45-4:15 PANEL FOUR
From Implementing Agreements to Building Effective and Responsive States: A Peacebuilding Commission

Chair: Shepard Forman, Director, Center on International Cooperation
Speakers: Veton Surroi, Member of Parliament, Kosovo
         Eugene Nindorera, Consultant and former Minister of Human Rights, Burundi
         Rafael Marques de Morais, Freelance Journalist and Director, Open Society Foundation, Southern Africa
Commentator: Kamel Morjane, Assistant High Commissioner for Refugees, United Nations and former Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the Democratic Republic of Congo

4:15-5:00 CLOSING PANEL
The Process Ahead

Bruce Jones, Senior Officer, Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General for Follow-up to the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change and Deputy Director, Center on International Cooperation
Robert C. Orr, Assistant Secretary-General for Policy Planning, Executive Office of the Secretary-General, United Nations
Terje Rød-Larsen, President, International Peace Academy
ANNEX II
Conference Participants

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Conflict Prevention and Peace Forum  
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Public Sector Governance  
The World Bank

Milena Novy-Marx  
The John D. & Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation

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Permanent Mission of Burundi to the United Nations

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CIC STATEBUILDING PROJECT PAPERS

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“New Thinking on State Formation and UN Peacebuilding Assistance” (Summer 2005)

“Mapping International Policy on Assistance for Post-Conflict Recovery” (Fall 2005)


“Public Finance and Post-Conflict Statebuilding,” James Boyce, ed. (Spring 2006)

CIC AND THE PROJECT ON INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS


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The International Peace Academy (IPA) is an independent, international institution dedicated to promoting the prevention and settlement of armed conflicts between and within states through policy research and development. IPA works closely with the United Nations, regional and other international organizations, governments, and nongovernmental organizations, as well as with parties to conflicts in selected cases. Its efforts are enhanced by its ability to draw on a worldwide network of government and business leaders, scholars, diplomats, military officers, and leaders of civil society.

IPA’s State-building Program considers the legitimacy, effectiveness, and sustainability of international attempts directed at stabilizing or (re)building the institutions of a state. The program’s main output is a multi-author edited volume investigating the core challenges of rebuilding states after conflict, to be launched in 2006. The volume, edited by Dr. Charles Call, considers key challenges in restoring the state’s ability to exercise its core functions—public security, rule of law, public finance, service delivery, and legitimating its authority—and applies these themes to in-depth case studies of the relationship between peacebuilding and state-building, covering a range of UN and non-UN state-building interventions.