International Peace Academy

From Promise to Practice: Strengthening UN Capacities for the Prevention of Violent Conflict

FINAL REPORT

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I. Introduction

While the promise of conflict prevention has risen to the fore of international policy agenda since the end of the 1990s, its practice and effectiveness remains elusive. Following in the footsteps of peacebuilding, conflict prevention is a loose conceptual framework for the increasingly broad range of actors engaged in conflict-affected zones. The concept of conflict prevention expands the scope of peacebuilding temporally and spatially, calling for the early prevention of violent conflict and the prevention of further outbreaks through "structural" as well as "operational" initiatives.[1] It promises cross-cutting approaches to mitigate the sources of potential conflict rather than merely the symptoms at arguably a lesser cost and with great potential for lasting peace than other forms of intervention.[2] The challenge, of course, is that violent conflict can be hard to predict, especially in the early phases when efforts to prevent its escalation might be most valuable. More, it is harder to prevent effectively, and further to demonstrate that preventive initiatives have been successful.

The purpose of this report is to take stock of the International Peace Academy's (IPA) research and policy development work on conflict prevention since 1999. This work has focused on strengthening evolving practices of conflict prevention in the UN system and beyond. The report seeks to identify achievements as well highlight some of the opportunities, and key challenges, that remain for the future.

H.E. Ms. Anna Lindh (Foreign Minister, Sweden) and Ms. Isobelle Jaques, Associate Director, Wilton Park

II. From Reaction to Prevention, and From Promise to Practice: Conflict Prevention and the IPA

The evolution and overlap of the UN system's engagement in peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding activities, as elaborated in UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's *An Agenda for Peace*,[3] has been examined in great detail. For the most part, such analyses converge around two major points: first, the idea that the evolution of peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding in the UN system has been piecemeal and largely reactive to the newly permissive environment that emerged with the end of the Cold War[4]; second, that the UN system faced some of its most serious and well-documented failures in the post Cold War period, most notably in Somalia, Rwanda and the Balkans.[5] Together, these experiences led to the call for a shift in the UN's engagement in

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[1] These terms were coined by the large-scale study that helped placed conflict prevention at the center stage of international policy, the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict. See Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, *Preventing Deadly Conflict: Final Report* (New York: Carnegie Commission, 1997), chapters 3 and 4.

[2] Michael E. Brown and Richard N. Rosecrance, *The Costs of Conflict: Prevention and Cure in the Global Arena* (Lanham MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1999).

[3] *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking, and Peacekeeping*, UN Doc. A/47/277 - S/24111 (17 June 1992); *Supplement to An Agenda for Peace*, UN Doc. A/50/60 - S/1995/1 (3 January 1995).

[4] David M. Malone and Karin Wermester, "Boom and Bust? The Changing Nature of Peacekeeping" *International Peacekeeping*, Special Issue edited by Adekeye Adebajo and Chandra Lekha Sriram, vol. 7 no. 4 (Winter 2000).

[5] On Somalia, see Ameen Jan, "Somalia: Building Sovereignty or Restoring Peace?" Elizabeth M. Cousens and Chetan Kumar with Karin Wermester, eds. in *Peacebuilding as Politics: Cultivating Peace in Fragile Societies*, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers,

Introduction   *1*
From Reaction to Prevention, and From Promise to Practice:
Conflict Prevention and the IPA

conflict affected zones; a shift from a culture of reaction to a culture of prevention - a shift from promise to practice.

With a view to identifying opportunities to move the prevention agenda forward, the IPA launched its first project devoted to conflict prevention in 1999. Following the success of that program, in 2000 the IPA launched a three-year project aimed at assisting the UN system to strengthen its efforts in this area.

From Reaction to Prevention: Opportunities for the UN System in the New Millennium (June 1999- June 2000)

In 1999, the IPA, in collaboration with the UN Executive Office of the Secretary-General and the Government of Sweden, developed *From Reaction to Prevention: Opportunities for the UN System in the New Millennium*, a project that sought to strengthen existing and nascent capacity for conflict prevention within the UN system and its family of agencies. The premise of the project was that the UN system had an increasing wealth of information at its disposal, but relatively limited capacity to prioritize and analyze case-specific knowledge. Further, there was a lag between emerging research on conflict dynamics and policy and programming at the UN.

The first phase of the project began with a review of major studies on the causes of, and trends in, armed conflict in order to clarify areas of agreement and disagreement and identify contradictions and gaps. Two background papers were commissioned to shed light on these issues.[6] These papers formed the basis of discussions at the *Expert Workshop* that convened major experts and practitioners to apply the findings of

UN Deputy Secretary-General Ms. Louise Fréchette with IPA President David M. Malone

scholarship to current practices within the UN system.[7] The research and discussions led to further refinement of the background papers and set the stage for an international policy conference that brought together close to one hundred policymakers to take stock of existing, if nascent, efforts in conflict prevention and to consider the implications of emerging research with a view to identifying concrete steps to improve the UN system's capacity in prevention.[8]

From Reaction to Prevention yielded several notable findings on both the research and policy fronts. Among these is the finding that, contrary to conventional wisdom, civil wars actually decreased in both number and magnitude from 1992 to 1998. In addition, most studies indicated that poverty in and of itself is not a major factor in the incidence of armed conflict; rather, what has been termed "horizontal inequality"— that is, inequitable access to basic resources (and power)—and resource scarcity are more likely to contribute to conflict. Conversely, nascent research on

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2001); on the Balkans, see in particular *Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to General Assembly resolution 53/35: The fall of Srebenica*, 15 November 1999, A/54/549; and on Rwanda see the *Report of the Independent Inquiry into the actions of the UN During the 1994 Genocide*, 15 December 1999, at www.un.org.

[6] Anne-Marie Gardner, "Putting Prevention on Solid Ground: Recent Findings from Studies of Conflict Trends and Causes", and Fen Osler Hampson, "Preventive Diplomacy: A Review of the Scholarly and Policy Literature." These papers were included as chapters in Fen Osler Hampson and David M. Malone, eds., *From Reaction to Conflict Prevention: Opportunities for the UN System* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002).

[7] *From Reaction to Prevention: Opportunities for the UN System in the New Millennium*, Expert Workshop, West Point, NY, 31 January-1 February 2000.

[8] See Charles K. Cater and Karin Wermester, "From Reaction to Prevention: Opportunities for the UN System in the New Millennium" (New York, International Peace Academy Conference Report, 13-14 April, 2000).

economic factors in civil wars suggested that an abundance of natural resources could increase the probability and duration of violent conflict as actors seek to enrich themselves through illicit means.[9] Finally, the findings confirmed what many suspected: that there were few case studies from which to draw "best practices" on conflict prevention.

These findings suggested two major areas for further research and policy development in conflict prevention. First, the dearth of case study literature suggested the need to develop a body of case-studies from which to draw a greater understanding of what might work, and what might not, in conflict prevention. Second, the role of economic factors in both potentially contributing to and mitigating conflict suggested the need to develop a greater understanding of the linkages between development and security initiatives in the area of conflict prevention.

From Promise to Practice: Strengthening UN Capacities for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (June 2000-June 2003)

On the basis of this initial work, and with the understanding that conflict prevention is most likely to be effective where action is taken early to address potential sources of conflict, the IPA launched *From Promise to Practice: Strengthening UN Capacities for the Prevention of Armed Conflict*, a multi-year research and policy development project. The purpose of this project has been to provide operational and practical suggestions for the development and implementation of conflict prevention initiatives by the UN system and its agencies. In particular, the project has devoted considerable attention to gaining a better understanding of how best to strengthen the UN's capacity to address the causes of armed conflict, rather than merely the symptoms. As such, the project has focused not on conflict management or preventive diplomacy, but rather on what is sometimes called structural prevention. The emphasis has been on the role that development and governance actors can play

Ms. Isobelle Jaques, Dr. Stefan Amer, H.E. Ms. Anna Lindh, and Dr. David M. Malone, at Wilton Park

in ensuring that normal conflicts within a society do not become violent, but rather are resolved peacefully. The project has developed on two closely related research and policy development tracks.

Research: Case Studies on Conflict Prevention

The research track of the project has proceeded in two phases. The first entailed the development of a series of case studies focusing on a broad range of countries in which preventive efforts were either attempted or in which opportunities for prevention were missed. The second phase of research built on many of the findings of the first, and sought to address a perceived need to gain a greater understanding of regional variations in the causes of conflict. In both instances the purpose of the research was to help provide an analytical foundation for the policy community in and around the UN system.

Policy Development: Strengthening Operational Capacities and Linkages

The policy development track of the project has involved convening meetings with a range of experts, practitioners, and policy makers at all levels working around the world on relevant topics. Such meetings

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[9] Hampson and Malone, *From Reaction to Conflict Prevention*; Mats Berdal and David M. Malone, eds., *Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001). The role of economic agendas in civil wars was developed into a separate multi-year research and policy development project at the IPA, Economic Agendas in Civil Wars (2000-2003).

often play a facilitative role, strengthening the linkages between research and policy analysis, headquarters and field, the member states of the UN and the Secretariat and UN agencies, and among different types of actors—regional organizations, civil society groups, the private sector, international and local NGOs, and others. Thanks in large part to the flexibility that was built into the design of the project, the IPA has been able to be both responsive to particular needs emerging within various parts of the UN system, and forward looking in its approach. Such events have also been linked to the research undertaken by both the IPA and other scholars and practitioners.

Main Themes, Key Findings

Four main themes have been developed by the IPA as part of its multi-year prevention project: structural prevention; regional, subregional, and local actors; member states and prevention and peacebuilding; and a cross-cutting theme: the importance of regional approaches in both understanding how conflicts begin and end, and how best to tackle their prevention. Each of these themes is discussed in greater depth below.

A. Structural Prevention: the increasingly central role of development actors

The first theme has been the importance of **structural prevention**—that is, seeking to address the causes of conflict early, often through the work of development actors. Initiatives that seek to harness the preventive potential of development initiatives involve more than merely packaging "old wine in new bottles". Bringing development actors into the conflict prevention arena also involves ensuring a coordinated, and at times integrated, approach to development and security strategies and responses. Given the "stovepipe" structure of the UN system and many governments and multilateral institutions and NGOs, the challenges of operationalizing an integrated approach are both organizational and policy-related; they are also ongoing. Added to these institutional challenges are

the substantive hurdles. Bringing development programs to bear on conflict dynamics in meaningful ways requires a greater understanding of whether and how "development problems" impact on the incidence and perpetuation of armed conflict. It also involves decisions about how best to plan and implement development programming such that the potential for violent conflict can be reduced both in the immediate and in the longer-term. However, given that conflict dynamics and their causes involve a host of political, economic, historical, sociological, cultural and other variables, development initiatives must tread carefully, and often in politically charged contexts. In short, there are both promising prospects and significant challenges to the engagement of development actors in conflict prevention at the operational and substantive levels.

Deepening our Understanding of Structural Prevention

The IPA has sought to remedy, at least partially, a persistent and much lamented lack of systematic analysis of conflict prevention mechanisms that have been applied, their successes or failures and the reasons behind the outcomes. Believing it to be especially important to capture the experiential knowledge, ideas and best practices of field staff and others working in the area, on both developmental and political/security sides of the equation, the IPA commissioned a series of nine country case-studies. The case studies looked at conflict prevention initiatives in Georgia (Javakheti), Burundi, Tanzania (Zanzibar), Fiji, Kenya, East Timor, Colombia, Tajikistan and Liberia. The case studies examine successes, failures, and results that fall somewhere in between the two extremes.[10] The centrality of development actors in conflict prevention was one of the main lessons that emerged from the country case studies. However, a number of dilemmas faced by actors working in conflict-affected zones also emerged from the research.

Whether to act? The dilemma of how best to act in conflict-prone contexts is a major challenge for development actors. The access of such actors is

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[10] See Chandra Lekha Sriram and Karin Wermester, eds., *From Promise to Practice: Strengthening UN Capacities for the Prevention of Violent Conflict* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2003); a summary is provided in Chandra Lekha Sriram, *From Promise to Practice: Strengthening UN Capacities for the Prevention of Violent Conflict. Case Studies In Prevention* (New York: IPA Policy Report, 2002).

typically based on the consent of host governments, and while there are a variety of points of leverage that can be employed to ensure such access, these are fewer and far between during those phases of potential conflict when the activities of such actors are likely to have the most effective preventive outcome. For instance, their increasing engagement in areas such as governance and security sector reform—key pillars in the effort to prevent the outbreak of organized violence—may not be welcome by host governments unwilling to acknowledge, externally, the potential for violent conflict. In such instances, donors face a variety of choices, each of which are accompanied by associated costs and trade-offs: withdrawing; continuing their traditional development activities; adopting euphemisms to avoid directly referring to conflict or its potential; or highlighting the "technical" aspects of such initiatives. It became clear that what worked in one situation will not necessarily work in another. For instance, the use of euphemisms was more effective in the Javakheti region of Georgia, and less effective in Kenya.

How to act? Many of the studies highlighted not only that development initiatives have a role to play in addressing the underlying causes of conflict, which range from poverty and inequality to flawed institutions, but that their role is critical at all phases of potential and actual conflict. That is, development initiatives are useful whether there is low-level, scattered violence, widespread human rights abuses, or even wider civil conflict.[11] At the same time, the engagement of development actors, while frequently billed as technical, is often deeply political. For example, in the Javakheti region in Georgia and in Tajikistan, the critically weak state is a major underlying source of potential conflict; clearly, addressing institutional reform has implications for political processes and outcomes both in individual countries and for their neighbors. Similarly, institutions such as the judiciary played a vital role in managing the constitutional crisis that had the potential to escalate into organized violence in Fiji;

while development initiatives can provide important support for judicial reform, they have implications for power sharing arrangements. There is no doubt that such challenges have spurred, at least in part, the effort to mainstream—and thereby render less visible—conflict prevention activities into development programming.

Widening the Scope of Structural Prevention

In keeping with the project's mandate to strengthen the UN system's capacity in conflict prevention, the IPA has sought to engage with UNDP and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in particular and to support their evolving efforts to develop programming that is conflict-sensitive. At the same time, the project has sought to facilitate and strengthen linkages across relevant departments and units within the UN Secretariat and between the Secretariat and various agencies.

Conflict Indicators. In June 2001, the Secretary-General issued his far-reaching report on the prevention of armed conflict. Central to the report was the argument that "[p]revention should be initiated at the earliest possible stage of a conflict cycle in order to be most effective". To do this, however, there must be a prompt recognition of and response to early warning of the potential for conflict. Responses must be tailored to the particular risks and be implemented system-wide. The attempt to operationalize this early warning/early response approach within the UN system in early 2001 led to the development of a set of early warning indicators designed to aid the identification of potential conflict situations, ensure a common basis of understanding across UN departments and agencies, and promote coherent policy responses. The indicators were designed to produce analysis that could be of use by the Framework Team for Coordination in particular, as well as in the development of Common Country Assessment/United Nations Development Assistance Framework (CCA/UNDAF) reports, and in analysis in the field and at headquarters. In this light,

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[11] The case-study volume develops five "phases" of prevention, identifying sets of challenges and risks, as well as appropriate preventive actors. These phases are not linked to a conception of conflict as linear, playing out in a cycle, or otherwise time-bound; rather they are linked to the content of the problems that preventive actors face. See Sriram and Wermester, *From Promise to Practice*, chapter 2.

on November 9, 2001, the IPA hosted *Mainstreaming Early Warning and Conflict Prevention in the UN System—Rationalizing Tools*, a small experts meeting to discuss the utility of the (draft) clusters of indicators and their potential usability in the field.

The experts meeting elicited broad recognition that, while the indicators could be "sliced and diced" in myriad valid ways, far more important was how they were ultimately used for early warning reporting and analysis. Among the most salient issues to be considered at a conceptual level was the utility of a generic set of conflict indicators given the case-specificity of the regions and countries to which they are applied. A related issue was the question of how best to weigh the importance of different indicators in any given case. Practically, the key challenge is how to translate the early warning analysis derived from such indicators into effective preventive practice at headquarters and perhaps more importantly, at the UN Country Team level.

Justice and Security Sector Reform. Justice and security sector reform (JSSR) includes, among other components, judicial, military, and penal reform. One of the challenges of JSSR is the limited understanding and practice of the relationship between police effectiveness and accountability, and what types of programming can address the potential conflicts in that relationship. A common assumption in the JSSR literature and policy discussions is that there is a tension between police effectiveness and accountability. This tension is presumed to occur in a post-conflict environment when crime rates soar and domestic actors demand more stringent and "tougher" policing while international assistance focuses primarily on issues of police accountability to ensure that past abuses do not recur. However in practice, the police accountability-effectiveness relationship is more complicated and involves at least two additional elements. The first is the role of legal protections (due process, etc.) and police powers. While legal protections do put real constraints on police, oversight mechanisms do not necessarily limit effectiveness. Accountability and effectiveness might well, in this case, exist in a mutually reinforcing relationship. A second element, transparency, may also be added to the police effectiveness-accountability relationship.

Police policies, operations and activities must be made intelligible and known to the publics the police serve. As public servants, police services are an integral part of public administrations and, therefore, the principles of good governance apply to them.

From the perspective of the UN and its development capacities, the issue then becomes, how can field programming strengthen police effectiveness and accountability simultaneously and what sort of approaches can UNDP adopt? In an attempt to shed light on this question, in September 2002 the IPA organized *Justice and Security Sector Reform: Developing Guidance for the Field*, a workshop that was organized in collaboration with the new Justice and Security Sector Reform team of the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR), UNDP. The meeting brought together approximately thirty participants, including UN practitioners from headquarters and the field, experts from the World Bank, NGO's, academics, and representatives of key donor governments. The aim of the workshop was to develop guidance for the field as well as articulate challenges and options for practitioners engaged in police reform, particularly with respect to the relationship between police effectiveness and accountability. The meeting examined several specific cases from which useful lessons were drawn: Serbia, Indonesia, and Haiti.

Several key findings emerged from the discussion. The first was that JSSR activities must adopt an integrated approach; a small judicial or police reform project, for instance, is likely to fail if not tied into a more comprehensive JSSR framework. The development of such a framework could be facilitated by supporting the creation of domestic dialogue through the use of roundtables to ensure that all the relevant stakeholders buy into the reform process. At the implementation phase, overcoming a cycle of confrontation at the very local level and encouraging participation and conversation could be supported through community-based police programs. In addition, discussions during the meeting highlighted the importance of being selective given the enormity of the task and picking niches for UNDP and its partners. What is required is the selection of entry points that have strategic resonance and are catalytic in nature. The projects generated from these entry points must not only achieve "quick wins", but

must also be mutually reinforcing and additive over time.[12]

Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR). While disarmament and demobilization have been studied extensively and are relatively well understood as military processes (though less examined as social and economic processes) reintegration has received less attention, both in terms of analysis and resources, from the international community. It is, however, clear that unless former fighters become functioning and productive members of society, long-term peace will not be possible. Unlike disarmament and demobilization, which can be described as time-bound, reintegration is a process. As such, it necessarily involves many variables that are beyond the control of donors or the international community, including the willingness of ex-combatants to reintegrate and of communities to accept them. Ultimately, ex-combatants must reintegrate themselves, and the role of the international community can only be to facilitate this process. To a large extent, the success of a DDR program then depends upon winning the hearts and minds not only of ex-combatants but also of the government and the community at large. Political will is crucial; unless the population and the government are committed to peace and combatants are ready to return to civilian life, DDR programs are unlikely to succeed.

In December of 2002, IPA organized a workshop with BCPR, UNDP, *A Framework for Lasting Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration of Former Combatants in Crisis Situations*. The approximately fifty-five participants included experts and practitioners from various UN departments and agencies, as well as representatives from the World Bank, the International Organization for Migration (IOM), academics, and NGOs. With a specific focus on the reintegration of former combatants, participants analyzed the cases of Mozambique, Sierra Leone, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, to draw out

insights and find common features across the cases. The goal of the workshop was to encourage a more holistic view of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration and to address the gaps in knowledge between disarmament and demobilization on the one hand and reintegration on the other.

Participants at the workshop agreed that there is no blueprint for DDR. It is clear that programs and strategies that are successful in one situation might not fit the circumstances or realities of another. Appropriate timing, sequencing, and relevant actors depend on a host of issues and necessarily differ from case to case. The nature of the conflict, its duration, and causes, for example, have implications for the DDR process and influence what type of program will be most suitable. The workshop also identified key issues that need further elaboration and discussion. Those include mainstreaming a gender perspective, addressing health concerns such as mental health and HIV/AIDS, streamlining funding mechanisms, including neglected actors, and improving international and national coordination. These issues have to be addressed in a DDR strategy that is itself integrated into an overall recovery framework. Attention must now turn to how the international community, and development agencies such as UNDP, can best address these challenges as part of a broader concept of development.[13]

B. Regional, subregional, and local actors: key partners for the UN system

The second theme examined by the IPA's conflict prevention project is the importance not only of the UN system but also and crucially of **regional, subregional and local actors** in the prevention of armed conflict. Such actors are important in many respects, not least because local actors, in particular, enjoy unique access to information and key actors on the ground. However, the UN system has traditionally found it difficult to engage with these key actors in

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[12] Chandra Lekha Sriram, *UNDP, Justice, and Security Sector Reform: Developing Guidance For the Field* (New York: IPA Workshop Report, 23 September 2002), online at www.ipacademy.org; see also Charles Call, *Challenges in Police Reform: Promoting Effectiveness and Accountability* (New York: IPA Policy Paper, September 2002).

[13] Lotta Hagman and Zoe Nielsen, *A Framework for Lasting Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration of Former Combatants in Crisis Situations* (New York: IPA Workshop Report, 12-13 December 2002).

ways that are mutually supportive. In addition, regional, sub-regional and local actors often have very limited resources, and may, as in the case of development actors, also find it difficult to work independently while maintaining access and leverage to key players in a conflict. As such, the IPA has sought to facilitate effective linkages among the UN system and regional, subregional and local actors by holding a series of meetings that have sought to better understand and strengthen the comparative advantages of each type of actor with a focus on early joint efforts and initiatives.

Local actors. There are a multiplicity of organizations, networks, businesses and people that fall under the definition 'local actor'. The term civil society organizations (CSOs) can encompass a range of non-state actors active in conflict prevention work including religious organizations, the media, trade unions, civic associations, registered NGOs and private sector organizations. In this sense, CSOs are not in opposition to governments; rather civil society encompasses the range of domestic and international social organizations that surround, and in many ways shape, the state. Similarly, the UN is multifaceted: it comprises a set of departments, funds, and agencies with differing mandates, objectives and structures. The public face of the UN in any country or region may be very different from that experienced in another. Typically a number of agencies have an established, long-term presence in "the field"—this is especially true of UNDP. Often, several agencies and sometimes departments will be active, and their efforts coordinated by a UN Resident Representative or Coordinator. In some countries, a Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) may have been appointed. Because every case is likely to be unique, partnerships between the UN and CSOs can be difficult to arrange and even harder to replicate.

In an effort to confront and discuss such challenges, the IPA held an international policy workshop in New York in December 2001. *Empowering Local Actors: The UN and Multitrack Conflict Prevention* brought together approximately fifty members of the UN system and civil society organizations from around the

world. The purpose of the workshop was to follow-up on the June 2001 report of the United Nations Secretary-General on the Prevention of Armed Conflict[14] and to address some of the opportunities and challenges involved in working in tandem with *relevant local actors*. In particular, this workshop attempted to focus on the extent to which modes of engagement can move beyond *ad hoc* arrangements to some generalized guidelines for cooperation applicable in multiple situations.

Several key lessons emerged from the proceedings. The first and most prominent was that the primary obstacle to improving collaboration between these groups, and to empowering local actors to play a lead role in conflict prevention, is the difference in perceptions and expectations within and between CSOs and the UN system. Nonetheless, while increased mutual familiarity between UN and civil society actors should enhance the process of empowerment, not all barriers to increased cooperation can be explained by mere misunderstandings. In some cases CSOs have clear expectations of what the UN ought to contribute in a given situation, and yet they find that the UN does not deliver—sometimes because it cannot, sometimes because it should not, and at other times because it tries, but fails.

At the same time, both the UN and local actors have much to gain from working together in conflict

Julia Taft, Eleanor O'Gorman, and Tecla Wanjala, in New York

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[14] *Report of the Secretary-General on the prevention of armed conflict*, UN Doc. A/55/985 - S/2001/574, (7 June 2001).

prevention. This means that the UN must trust the expertise of local actors, and that local actors seeking UN cooperation must accept the limits and operating procedures of the UN system. The UN is not an alternative to local or domestic political processes, but a complement to them. Moreover, in many cases regional organizations and neighboring states offer the best hope of mobilizing political leverage to effect change: a reliance on local actors may sometimes obscure other more appropriate or effective mechanisms of conflict prevention. Finally, when engaging with each other both inter-governmental and civil society organizations should be clear about what they expect from each other, from themselves and from other organizations.[15]

Regional and subregional actors. Regional and subregional organizations are uniquely placed to affect several factors that are crucial in the prevention of violent conflict. Many of these factors can facilitate and help move forward the efforts of the UN system throughout its engagement in situations of conflict or potential conflict. First, member states may be more willing to *allow* the involvement of regional/subregional organizations. The actions of regional/subregional organizations are likely to be more discreet than those undertaken by the various bodies of the UN, particularly at the early stages of potential conflict. Moreover, such organizations may be better placed to act because they are familiar with the actors involved in the dispute and the situation on the ground. In addition, although their interests are not always benign, neighbors frequently have a greater interest in preventing conflicts that could potentially escalate to the regional level. Second, regional/subregional organizations have an important role to play in developing a regional "culture of conflict prevention" through the promotion of democracy, human rights and sustainable development. Third, they can and have been quite successful at longer-term and sustained conflict prevention efforts involving capacity building

and technical assistance. In the past few years, this has begun to include election monitoring and broader democratization assistance in several regions. Perhaps most significantly, such organizations are ideally placed to serve as a conduit between the international and national or local levels. Meaningful participation at the national and local levels is crucial for the immediate and effective implementation of conflict prevention measures, and there is an urgent need to develop better practices in this area. What is required is a comprehensive international and regional/subregional approach to conflict prevention that takes the local ownership of conflict prevention seriously.

With the understanding that the comprehensive impact of the UN system and regional/subregional actors engaged in conflict prevention is likely to yield more effective overall results, the IPA designed two meetings that sought to develop a greater understanding of how best to optimize the relationship between the UN and regional and subregional actors.

In April 2002, in collaboration with the Swedish Institute in Alexandria, the project organized the workshop, *Sharing Best Practices on Conflict Prevention: The UN, Regional and Subregional, National and Local Actors.*[16] The small, operationally focused workshop convened approximately thirty participants from within the UN system and various regional and subregional organizations, as well as diplomats, civil society activists, and academics. The workshop had a dual focus: first, it aimed to identify and share concrete best practices and experiences that can inform conflict prevention within and between the UN, regional and subregional, national and local organizations. Second, it aimed to explore comparative advantages and opportunities for partnering in this area. Discussions drew upon several background papers, which examined the role of, *inter alia*, training, local actors, and quiet diplomacy.[17]

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[15] Ben Rawlence, *Empowering Local Actors: The UN and Multi-Track Conflict Prevention* (New York: IPA Workshop Report, 10 December 2001).

[16] Chandra Lekha Sriram, Albrecht Schnabel, John Packer, and Augustine Touré, *Sharing Best Practices on Conflict Prevention: The UN, Regional and Subregional Organizations, National and Local Actors* (New York: IPA Policy Report, April 2002); Sara J. Lodge, *Sharing Best Practices on Conflict Prevention: The UN, Regional and Subregional Organizations, National and Local Actors* (Alexandria, Egypt: IPA Workshop Report, 8-10 April 2002).

[17] Sriram, et. al., *Sharing Best Practices* Policy Report.

Ms. Nasra Hassan, H.E. Mr. Pierre Shori, and Mr. Samuel Doe, at the Swedish Institute in Alexandria

Several lessons emerged from this meeting. First, there is considerable room for further coordination among the UN, regional, subregional, national and local organizations, particularly in the areas of early warning and risk analysis, training and capacity building. The role of external actors, such as the UN system, governments and international NGOs, must be to support locally and regionally led conflict management processes. Second, shared methodologies, terminology, and strategies help to prevent duplication and to enhance cooperation and information exchange. There are innovative practices across institutions that may be adapted and shared in early warning, training, and quiet diplomacy.

Building upon these initial discussions, the IPA worked in collaboration with Wilton Park to develop a conference on *Creating Conditions for Peace: What Role for the UN and Regional Actors?* This conference, which was held in July 2002, brought together some 65 participants, including practitioners from the UN and several regional and subregional organizations, government policy-makers, academics, and representatives of NGOs. Building on the findings from Alexandria, several key lessons emerged from these deliberations. It is clear that working relationships have to be forged between regional organizations and the UN; among regional organizations themselves; and among organs, departments and institutions of

the UN. Where such relationships exist at rudimentary levels, they need to be improved dramatically. Similarly, there ought to be a greater sharing of best practices in prevention, including training and early warning, and the development of country strategies. However, while this process must be nurtured, it must proceed cautiously, as there is a risk that many organizations will expand too rapidly and take on additional mandates and responsibilities that they are not able to fulfill. Most subregional organizations have tried to take on too many new demands and tasks, expanding before they have developed the institutional and policy capacity to implement new activities. Harmonization should proceed at a deliberate and realistic speed, beginning with manageable prevention initiatives, such as: the development of regional confidence-building measures; training in early warning and risk assessment; and the adoption and implementation of protocols concerning regional problems such as small arms, illicit trade and drug trafficking.[18]

C. Member states and prevention and peacebuilding—central partners

The third theme of the IPA's conflict prevention project has been the role of the UN member states, bilaterally, in clusters and through the main intergovernmental organs of the UN system (namely, the General

Sir Lopo do Nascimento, Mr. Lansan Kouyate, and Rear Admiral Rolf Hauter, at Wilton Park

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[18] David Carment, *Creating Conditions for Peace: What Role for the UN and Regional Actors?* (Wilton Park, UK: IPA Conference Report, 1-3 July 2002).

Assembly, the Economic and Social Council, and the Security Council). Often neglected, yet hugely important, the member states have a key role to play in the prevention of violent conflict through political will and resources, as well as through information sharing and analysis. At the same time, member states can be the key obstacle to prevention and its operationalization. They may seek to promote their particular interests, or to control, limit, or even halt discussion about certain potential conflicts for a variety of reasons. The IPA has sought to support the positive engagement of member states at a general level by supporting advocacy on conflict prevention with strong analytical foundations, in addition to attempting to bring key member states on board important initiatives such as the Secretary-General's 2001 report on prevention. The IPA has also sought to bring the UN's inter-governmental organs closer together in meaningful ways such that the comprehensive impact of the membership can be heightened in conflict prevention and peacebuilding.

In order to support the drafting of the UN Secretary-General's report on conflict prevention, the IPA held a workshop in February 2001 which brought Security Council members, representatives of UN departments and agencies, and key experts in prevention together at West Point, NY.[19] The meeting sought to draw out, for the benefit of the Council members, key rationales underpinning the move towards conflict prevention, the various roles to be played by the member states, the Secretariat, and the Secretary-General himself. The distinction between prevention and intervention, the role of development in prevention, the role of leadership in fomenting and preventing conflict, the importance of accurate and sophisticated analysis, and the difficulty of assessing preventive efforts were all subjects of debate. A smaller brainstorming meeting was then held to discuss ways forward for the drafting of the report. These meetings, and the retreat report,

helped feed into the drafting process at the UN, as well as the reception, of the report.

In October 2001, IPA hosted a high-level retreat in Tarrytown, NY that brought together 30 key permanent and deputy permanent representatives of countries on the UN Security Council and the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), a few other member states and relevant high-level Secretariat representatives, entitled *The United Nations System in the New Millennium: Fostering Substantive and Operational Linkages in the Implementation of Peace*.[20] The purpose of the retreat was to discuss the division of labor among the primary UN intergovernmental bodies with a view to heightening their comprehensive role, and impact, in ensuring the establishment of self-sustainable peace. The meeting occasioned rich debate on the current involvement of the intergovernmental bodies in conflict prevention and peacebuilding and a diagnosis of the need for, but also of the obstacles to, their effective engagement and interaction. Concrete proposals to improve their consultation and, possibly, coordination in the future emerged.

D. A cross-cutting theme: the increasing importance of regional dimensions of and responses to conflict

In recent years there has been an increasing recognition that the causes of conflict are seldom purely internal. Rather, there are **regional or subregional dimensions of conflict** as they spill into and out of countries with flows of refugees, arms, resources, and combatants. Leaders in one state frequently have a vested interest in the outcome of conflict in a neighboring state, bolstering one side or the other. This means that responding to the apparent internal causes of conflict is not sufficient. As noted above, regional/subregional actors, and the development of regional strategies in conflict prevention, are important. However, it is equally important to

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[19] Chandra Lekha Sriram, *From Promise to Practice: Strengthening UN Capacities for the Prevention of Violent Conflict* (West Point: IPA Security Council Workshop Report, 9-10 February 2001), and follow-on high-level brainstorming, off-the-record. See also UN Doc. S/RES/1366 (30 August 2001), and UN Doc. S/PV.4334 (21 June 2001).

[20] Karin Wermester, *The United Nations System in the New Millennium: Fostering Substantive and Operational Linkages in the Implementation of Peace* (Tarrytown, NY: IPA Workshop Report, 19-20 October 2001), also published as UN Doc. S/2001/1054 (7 November 2001).

understand the nature of the potential conflict(s) that require response(s). It is well known that there are myriad causes of conflict, and that preventing violent conflict requires addressing root and proximate causes in a complex fashion. In addition, it is understood that different causes and types of conflict plague different countries to varying degrees. However, while research in recent years has generated findings on the range of possible causes of conflict generally, and case studies have applied many of these insights to particular countries, less work has been done on the ways in which the relative significance of different causes may vary in particular regions of the world.[21]

Generating a greater understanding of these regional variances is however significant to the elaboration of preventive policy responses in two senses. First, regional variances in the causes and nature of conflict can suggest a relative prioritization of tools and resources at the policymaking stage. Second, at the implementation stage, they can aid a greater understanding of the comparative advantages among the multiple preventive actors that are likely to be on the ground and thereby inform better strategic coordination. For this reason, the project has commissioned case-studies examining the specific risks of conflict, with an eye to possible entry points for those interested in developing tailored preventive responses, in four subregions: West Africa, the Horn of Africa, Central America and Central Asia. The publication of these will be finalized this year.[22]

Dr. Tapio Kanninen, Professor Assia Ben Alaoui, Ms. Raghda Quandour, and Ms. Nasra Hassan, at the Swedish Institute in Alexandria

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[21] There may further be variance in subregions, as work in Africa has demonstrated. See Report of the Secretary-General, "The causes of conflict and the promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa," (13 April 1998), UN Doc. S/1998/318. See also UK Department for International Development (DFID), "The Causes of conflict in Africa: Consultation Document," (London: DFID, 2001); "Regional Approaches to Conflict Management in Africa," (New York: IPA Report, 2001).

[22] Chandra Lekha Sriram and Zoe Nielsen, eds., *Subregional Causes of Conflict: Identifying Entry points for Conflict Prevention* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, forthcoming).

III. Taking Stock and Moving Forward: Conflict prevention at the IPA, the UN, and beyond

Policy and practice in conflict prevention has progressed significantly since appearing on the UN's policy and programming agenda at the end of the 1990s. At the same time, significant challenges remain. At the IPA, several key findings stand out from its four-year engagement in conflict prevention. Some of these have begun to be internalized by different parts of the UN system, which itself has taken strides toward turning the rhetoric of conflict prevention into practice in recent years. At the same time, there is more to learn, and more to be done, to move forward at the UN and beyond.

Key lessons in Conflict Prevention

While a number of notable findings have emerged from each of the research and policy development initiatives undertaken by the IPA, five general—if obvious—lessons stand out.

Opportunities and Challenges of the Development-Security Nexus. A key lesson to emerge from the project is that development actors have an increasingly *wide* and *deep* role to play in domains that have traditionally been reserved for "security" and "political" arenas. In addition, their utility as conflict prevention actors exists across the range of phases of potential and actual conflict. Associated challenges, and potential unintended consequences, of the involvement of development actors in security arrangements are however extremely important to assess. A coordinated, and at times an integrated, approach to development and security interventions is likely to help mitigate some of these (however, other challenges are likely to emerge as a result).[23] This requires overcoming both substantive and organizational challenges.

The UN does not act alone. This is an obvious but important point: while the efforts of the UN system in the prevention of violent conflict are important, they are unlikely to be sufficient, and may even be marginal. However, the UN system is ill suited to the development of systematic and mutually enhancing linkages with other actors, and fruitful collaboration with others tends to occur on an ad hoc basis and be largely dependent on personal leadership skills and networks. It is crucial that the UN system and its relevant parts develop more systematic ways of understanding its comprehensive, as well as individual, comparative advantages in a given situation, and further how best to support the comparative advantages of others. It is also worth questioning whether, in certain instances, the UN is in fact ill placed to act.

Key ingredients: Resources and Strategies. While the effectiveness of conflict prevention initiatives is dependent on a variety of factors (including luck and circumstances that are beyond the control of interlocutors), there are two key ingredients that are likely to heighten its effectiveness that are not "fixed constraints". The first is the importance of sufficient resources allocated appropriately, and over time. While political will, or what is more realistically termed national interest, is difficult to shift, regularization of the provision and allocation of resources is possible, and highly desirable. The second is the importance of well-informed and strategically coordinated strategies. This requires appropriate information and more importantly analysis of a given potential conflict, particularly at the gestation phase, and the development of strategy that attempts to capitalize on comparative advantages. While there are some generalizable lessons on particular issues, such strategies must be tailored carefully to fit local needs—there can be no one-size-fits-all approach to conflict prevention. Further, key to the effective implementation of such comprehensive approaches are leadership and communication skills that can elicit consensus among the broad range of stakeholders involved.

Modest expectations. Perhaps the single most important lesson emerging from the IPA's engagement in conflict prevention is an understanding of just how

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[23] See for example Mark Duffield, *Global governance and the new wars: the merging of development and security* (London: Zed Books, 2002).

difficult it is to achieve positive change. Beyond the "dog that didn't bark" issue lies the enormity of the challenge of shifting the interests and preferences of those leaders potentially or actually willing to use violence to achieve their ends, and those factors that coalesce to shape and sustain these. In part as a result, rather than big successes of conflict averted, effective conflict prevention is likely to be found in small steps toward creating the conditions in which violence is less likely to erupt. "Successful" conflict prevention is likely to be circumscribed and small-scale.[24]

Regional/Subregional and Transnational Dimensions. Looking to the future, the work undertaken by the IPA has highlighted the mixed impact of the processes of globalization on the incidence and duration of violent conflict. They have been accompanied by an increase in transborder resource and information flows, and have affected the poverty, growth and inequality of societies around the world. In part as a result, violent conflicts erupt, and are fought, locally in regions/subregions of the world that are not defined by existing borders, and with the help of transnational linkages of people, money and resources. Shifting to a mindset that results in policy and programming that transcends nation-state boundaries is a major challenge for the UN system in the future.

Key developments in the operationalization of preventive practice at the UN

Since 2000 there has been a shift within the UN, both substantively and operationally, toward the adoption of proactive responses to potential conflict and to the prevention of the recurrence of conflict. The Secretary-General has emphasized the importance of conflict prevention, including it as a key priority for the UN in his speech to the 56th General Assembly (2001) and his Nobel Prize Acceptance speech that year.[25] This commitment was elaborated earlier in greater detail in his report on the prevention of armed conflict in June 2001. Numerous advances at the level of policy and

programming have been made across the UN, and what follows is necessarily not an exhaustive summary of all of these. The work of the IPA in conflict prevention has to varying degrees and in formal and informal ways informed and been informed by many of these developments.

At the strategic level, the operationalization of preventive practice within the UN system has been characterized by efforts to bring development and security strategies to bear in a coordinated, and at times integrated, fashion on the prevention of conflict. This has been accompanied by a widening and deepening of the scope of development activities into political and security sectors across the range of phases of potential and actual conflict. Such strategic shifts have been carried forward in part thanks to new or refined institutional developments and tools and mechanisms that have helped operationalize these.

Institutional developments. The Department of Political Affairs (DPA), as the focal point for prevention, works closely with other UN departments and agencies in its support of the Secretary-General's preventive functions. The Policy Planning Unit, established in 1998, provides DPA's regional divisions with analysis for early warning and conflict prevention. In 1998, the Prevention Team within DPA and the Trust Fund for Preventive Action were also established. In addition, DPA convenes meetings of the Executive Committee on Peace and Security (ECPS) and uses this as a forum to promote inter-departmental and interagency discussions on conflict prevention.[26] Further to its role in the development of a more integrated strategy in the UN system, DPA is actively engaged in improving UN coordination with regional and sub-regional organizations.[27]

Marking an important stride forward in operationalizing the still-nascent role of development actors in the prevention of conflict, UNDP has also become an

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[24] Hampson and Malone, *From Reaction to Conflict Prevention.*

[25] Speech of the Secretary-General to the opening of the UN General Assembly (1 November 2001); see also http://www.nobel.se/peace/laureates/2001/annan-lecture.html.

[26] See *Report of the Secretary-General on the prevention of armed conflict*, pg. 19, esp. para. 73; http://www.un.org/Depts/dpa/docs/peacemak.htm.

[27] *Report of the Secretary-General on the prevention of armed conflict*, p. 20, fn. 80.

increasingly important actor in conflict prevention. Upgrading its Emergency Response Division, which was staffed with just over a dozen professionals in 1999, to the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery with over one hundred professional staff members in 2003, UNDP has expanded its ambit in policy development and programming in new and novel arenas. These include conflict analysis and early warning generally, justice and security sector reform, and the reintegration of former combatants. Similarly, the World Bank has taken great steps forward analytically and practically on conflict prevention through its Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit (formerly the Post-Conflict Unit).[28]

Mr. El Ghassim Wane, M. Samuel Doe, and Professor Mwesiga Baregu, at the Swedish Institute in Alexandria

Tools and mechanisms. New mechanisms and tools have been developed to enhance the early warning and conflict prevention capacities of the system. Bringing in the range of actors increasingly known to have preventive potential, several mechanisms have sought to better coordinate the activities of different parts of the system. The Framework for Coordination (Framework Team) is a headquarters-based coordination mechanism comprising an ever-increasing number of departments, agencies, and funds. Its purpose is to review recommendations for preventive action and forward them, as appropriate, to the Executive Committees on Peace and Security and Humanitarian Affairs.[29]

There has also been the innovative development of interagency task forces, which involve actors inside and outside the UN. The Secretary-General has sent such task forces to, for example, West Africa, enabling partnership with ECOWAS with an eye to developing a comprehensive approach to conflict prevention and peacebuilding in the subregion. Following this initiative, an office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for West Africa was established in January 2002 in Dakar, with a mandate to enhance the capacity of the UN in the areas of early warning, prevention and peacebuilding.[30]

Further steps have been taken toward the operationalization of peacebuilding and preventive practice. Most notable among these efforts has been the new innovation of Peacebuilding Support Offices. Such Offices have been set up with Security Council mandates under the supervision of DPA in Liberia, Guinea-Bissau, the Central African Republic and Tajikistan between 1997 and 2000.[31] These support offices seek to develop more integrated peacebuilding and conflict prevention strategies.[32]

Following the increasing involvement of development actors in this traditionally security-specific field, Common Country Assessments and UN Development Assistance Frameworks developed by UNDP are also being revised to ensure the use of a conflict prevention lens in development programming. UNDP's BCPR, in

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[28] http://lnweb18.worldbank.org/essd/essd.nsf/CPR/Home.

[29] "Note of Explanation on the Framework for Coordination Mechanism," (7 February 2000, on file with IPA). See also *Report of the Secretary-General on the prevention of armed conflict*, paragraph 68, page 18.

[30] *Report of the Secretary-General on the prevention of armed conflict*, pgs. 15-16; Letter from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2001/1128) 26 November 2001.

[31] http://www.un.org/peace/ppbm.pdf; *Report of the Secretary-General on the prevention of armed conflict* pp. 20-21, para. 77-78.

[32] *Report of the Joint Review Mission on the United Nations Post-conflict Peacebuilding Support Offices*, Department of Political Affairs/United Nations Development Programme, 20 July 2001.

collaboration with the UN Development Group and others, has undertaken to introduce a systematic approach to mainstreaming conflict prevention into UN development and governance assistance.[33]

Training and capacity building efforts have also begun to focus on conflict prevention. The UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs has developed a Capacity Building in Conflict Management project, which seeks to assist governments and their civil society partners in the sub-Saharan African region to strengthen governance capacities to anticipate and respond to conflict and crisis, defuse conflict-prone situations, and support local development initiatives with conflict

resolution tools, techniques and planning mechanisms.[34]

In addition, the UN Staff College has developed an important tool for conflict prevention: an Early Warning and Preventive Measures (EWPM) course, designed to train field and headquarters staff in early warning analysis and in developing responsive preventive measures. It has also developed country-specific workshops in several cases at the request of host governments, bringing in national government officials, members of civil society and representatives of UN country teams and their implementing partners.[35]

Mr. Youssef Mahmoud, Ms. Karen Tañada, Dr. Mely Caballero-Anthony, and Ms. Naimah Hasan, at the Swedish Institute in Alexandria

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[33] "Mainstreaming Conflict Prevention in the UN system Analysis and Development Programming: A Review of Common Country Assessment and UN Development Assistance Framework Processes," Governance and Rule of Law Unit, BCPR, UNDP, October 2001.

[34] See www.unpan.org/discover.asp for more on the overall initiative, and the Capacity-Building in Conflict Management project. See also *Report of the Secretary-General on the prevention of armed conflict*, pp. 24-25, para. 104.

[35] *Report of the Secretary-General on the prevention of armed conflict*, Pg. 33 para 153; see also www.itcilo.it/unscp/programme-focus/earlywarning/.

IV. Conclusion: Problems and Prospects for Conflict Prevention in the Future

Great strides have been made in conflict prevention over the past few years. The concept has been refined and the discourse has become common among a huge range of actors, from the UN to the donor community to academics. At the same time, and more importantly, the practice of conflict prevention has been refined. Across the UN system, efforts are being made to ensure that early warning analysis is developed in a timely fashion and that conflict-sensitive and conflict-preventive strategies are developed. A range of new tools is beginning to ensure that programming incorporates a conflict prevention lens. Nonetheless, more work remains to be done.

Research and policy challenges: next steps

The IPA's research has highlighted two key themes—the importance of regional/subregional dimensions of conflict, as well as the vital but conflicted role that development, humanitarian, and governance actors play in responding to conflict. More remains to be learned, however, about how preventive initiatives can be designed to best address regional dimensions of conflict, as well as how to address dilemmas faced by donors. Questions to be explored include:

- How can integrated strategies be designed that respond both to the particular needs of countries, but also to regional threats where the spillover of rebels, refugees, and arms, not to mention networks of support to governments and rebels by neighbors, is rife?

- How can donors' dilemmas be alleviated? Is it really feasible for development and security actors to work with political actors, and maintain their desired impartiality? How can these actors pursue conflict prevention without drawing political ire? What impact does the engagement of development actors in conflict prevention have on humanitarian action?

The IPA's policy work has sought to address challenging issue-areas in conflict prevention for the UN system, in particular development work with security dimensions engaged in by UNDP. More remains to be done, however, not only on the operationalization of work in the security sector, but also in governance and rule of law. Coming challenges increasingly recognized by the policy community will also need to be addressed by the UN system. They include the potential threats to security emanating from environmental and health issues. Key themes to be explored include:

- What are the coming challenges for development actors addressing justice and security sector reform? How can they cope with the proliferation of private security corporations in zones of conflict? How can they further elaborate community policing efforts? What is the appropriate role of the development community in supporting corrections facilities?

- With regard to former combatants, how can policies be implemented that ensure lasting reintegration, given that post-conflict economies are generally weak, and rife with incentives for criminality and return to conflict?

- What institutional development and capacity building helps to ensure the long-term channeling of conflict into peaceful means? How can such support, whether for judicial reform or elections, be designed better?

- What roles can capacity-building play in supporting long-term respect for human rights and rule of law? In post-conflict or mass atrocity countries, what approaches to accountability and reconciliation should external actors support?

- What are the coming challenges and potential new sources of conflict, such as health, in particular HIV/AIDS, water and environmental stresses, and how might they engender conflict? Who in the UN system is best placed to respond, and how might they begin to do so?

The Future of Prevention at the IPA

With *From Promise to Practice* drawing to a close in mid-2003, the IPA will no longer have a program that concentrates solely on conflict prevention. However, many of the broad themes will be taken up in *Strengthening the Security-Development Nexus*, a new program that will start in October 2003.

Strengthening the Security-Development Nexus will draw upon various strands of the IPA's programming in the areas of peace, security and peacebuilding to date but will also involve a more systematic and rigorous examination of the linkages between the twin imperatives for security and development in a global world. The program has two goals: first, to examine to what extent the UN's twin mandates for development and security have been integrated since the end of the Cold War; second, to make concrete recommendations about how the UN's development agencies, as well as the wider international development community, can more effectively utilize development assistance for peacebuilding, including conflict prevention, conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction. The program will focus on three thematic areas where the agendas for peace and development are beginning to merge – Governance, Security Sector, and Rule of Law – and will inject an explicit developmental perspective into the current peace and security debates.

Activities and Publications

Activities

From Reaction to Conflict Prevention

- *From Reaction to Conflict Prevention: Opportunities for the UN System in the New Millennium, Expert Workshop*, West Point, New York, 31 January-1 February 2000

- *From Reaction to Conflict Prevention: Opportunities for the UN System in the New Millennium, International Policy Conference*, New York, 13-14 April 2000

From Promise to Practice

- *Roundtable breakfast* with Ambassador Lakhdar Brahimi, New York, 4 October 2000

- *Expert meeting on Methodology* (for country case study volume), New York, 3 November 2000

- *Policy Forum on Preventing Conflict in the 21st Century: New Tools*, New York, 29 November 2000

- *Country Case Study Author Working Group Meeting (No. 1)*, New York, 19 January 2001

- *Security Council Workshop on Conflict Prevention*, West Point, New York, 9-10 February 2001

- *Informal Brainstorm Meeting* (Security Council Workshop follow-on), New York, 13 March 2001

- *Country Case Study Author Working Group Meeting (No. 2)*, Tarrytown, New York, 18 June 2001

- *Roundtable breakfast* with OSCE High Commissioner for National Minorities Rolf Ekeus, New York, 10 October 2001

- *The United Nations System in the New Millennium: Fostering Substantive and Operational Linkages in the Implementation of Peace*, Tarrytown, New York, 19-20 October 2001

- *Mainstreaming Early Warning and Conflict Prevention in the UN System—Rationalizing Tools*, New York, 9 November 2001

- *Empowering Local Actors: The UN and Multi-Track Conflict Prevention*, New York, 10 December 2001

- *Policy forum on Zanzibar's Political crisis: The Quest for a Lasting Solution*, New York, 7 March 2002

- *Sharing Best Practices on Conflict Prevention: The UN, Regional and Subregional Organizations, National and Local Actors*, Alexandria, Egypt, 8-10 April 2002

- *Policy Forum and Book Launch: From Reaction to Conflict Prevention and No More Killing Fields*, New York, 17 May 2002

- *Creating Conditions for Peace: What Role for the UN and Regional Actors?* Wilton Park, United Kingdom, 1-3 July 2002

- *UNDP, Justice and Security Sector Reform: Developing Guidance for the Field*, New York, 23 September 2002

- *Case Study Author Meeting: Regional Cases*, New York, 29 October 2002

- *Brainstorming on Internet Forum on Conflict Prevention Cases* (Co-convener: Conflict Prevention and Peace Forum), New York, 4 November 2002

- *A Framework for Lasting Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration of Former Combatants in Crisis Situations*, New York, 12-13 December 2002

Publications

From Reaction to Conflict Prevention

Reports

- *From Reaction to Prevention: Opportunities for the UN System in the New Millennium, Conference Report*, 13-14 April 2000, Charles K. Cater and Karin Wermester

Books

- *From Reaction to Conflict Prevention: Opportunities for the UN System*
  Fen Olser Hampson and David M. Malone, eds., 2002

From Promise to Practice

Reports

- *From Promise to Practice: Strengthening UN Capacities for the Prevention of Violent Conflict, Workshop Report*, 9-10 February 2001, Chandra Lekha Sriram

- *The United Nations System in the New Millennium: Fostering Substantive and Operational Linkages in the Implementation of Peace: Workshop Report*, UN document S/2001 1054, New York), 19-20 October 2001, Karin Wermester

- *Empowering Local Actors: The UN and Multi-Track Conflict Prevention, Workshop Report*, 10 December 2001, Ben Rawlence

- *From Promise to Practice: Strengthening UN Capacities for the Prevention of Violent Conflict, Case Study Policy Report*, February 2002, Chandra Lekha Sriram

- *Sharing Best Practices on Conflict Prevention: The UN, Regional and Subregional Organizations and Local Actors, Policy Report*, 8-10 April 2002, Chandra Lekha Sriram, Albrecht Schnabel, John Packer and Augustine Touré

- *Sharing Best Practices on Conflict Prevention: The UN, Regional and Subregional Organizations and Local Actors, Workshop Report*, 8-10 April 2002, Sara J. Lodge

- *Creating Conditions for Peace: What Role for the UN and Regional Actors? Conference Report*, 1-3 July 2002, David Carment

- *Challenges in Police Reform: promoting effectivess and accountability* (New York), 23 September 2002, Charles Call

- *UNDP, Justice and Security Sector Reform: Developing Guidance for the Field, Workshop Report* 23 September 2002, Chandra Lekha Sriram

- *A Framework for Lasting Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration of Former Combatants in Crisis Situations, Workshop Report*, 12-13 December 2002, Lotta Hagman and Zoe Nielsen

Books

- *From Promise to Practice: Strengthening UN Capacities for the Prevention of Violent Conflict*, Chandra Lekha Sriram and Karin Wermester, eds., 2003.

- *Subregional Causes of Conflict: Identifying Entry Points for Conflict Prevention*, Chandra Lekha Sriram and Zoe Nielsen, eds., forthcoming 2003.