The Regionalization of Conflict and Intervention

Executive Summary

- Regional conflict formations are interconnected wars among adjacent countries that are mutually reinforcing and therefore typically protracted. They are characterized by complex political, economic, social, and military transborder linkages. Regional conflict formations are distinct from interstate and intrastate wars, and thus also require new strategies for intervention by the international community.

- Transborder war economies include economically motivated violence by rebels and states, war profiteering by third parties, and coping mechanisms among civilian populations. Thus, while it is true that some insurgencies may be characterized by forms of economic predation, it remains unclear whether interdiction or cooperation is the best strategy for managing conflict goods during regional peacebuilding efforts.

- The West African conflict formation offers several lessons: good governance helps prevent conflict while autocracy fuels war, government support for rebels in nearby countries creates cycles of retribution, subregional organizations need adequate military capability for intervention, regional hegemons possess capacity for intervention but may compromise impartiality, and appeasement has typically failed with “spoilers”.

- Certain regional organizations and coalitions of the willing possess comparative advantages relative to the UN: rapid deployment capabilities, better local information, enhanced interoperability, sustainability of intervention, the capacity for peace enforcement, the ability to “deepen” and “widen” an operation for better human security, and more financial resources to offer warring parties as incentives for compliance.

- However, a trend toward the regionalization of intervention does have liabilities as well: regional organizations must frequently contend with local conflicts of interest among members, and most regional organizations in developing countries do not
have the required institutional and financial capacity for intervention. Thus, the regionalization of intervention has likely exacerbated a global pattern of “peacekeeping apartheid”.

• UN partnerships with regional organizations and coalitions of the willing should be guided by the following principles: regular consultation within a common framework, prior agreement regarding the level of support, a clearly defined division of labor according to comparative advantages, a strategy that is commensurate with the resources made available, and a coherent implementation among partners.

I. Introduction

The International Peace Academy held its annual New York Seminar, May 5-9, 2003, at West Point’s historic Hotel Thayer. Nearly seventy panelists and participants representing the UN, regional organizations, member governments, NGOs, academia, and the media contributed to a lively debate on this year’s theme, “Regional Approaches to Conflict.” Recent developments in places such as Liberia, Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and Iraq set the context for discussions. Perhaps due to the importance of US-UN relations, a concern with the situation in Iraq was reflected in many comments by panelists and participants at the seminar. The associated issue of how US unilateralism may represent an extreme example of an overall trend away from UN universalism is a theme that this report will return to in the concluding section.

The seminar at West Point began by exploring the dynamics of regional conflict complexes and transborder war economies in places such as West Africa, Central Asia, the Andean region, and the Balkans. It then continued with an analysis of the various roles played by regional organizations and coalitions of the willing—often in collaboration with the United Nations—in terms of peacemaking, peacekeeping, peacebuilding, and peace enforcement. At a deeper level, the positive and negative implications of increasingly regionalized forms of intervention were also considered. While it admittedly raises more difficult questions than it provides definitive answers, this report represents a brief analytical summary of the five day IPA seminar on “Regional Approaches to Conflict.”

II. The Regionalization of Conflict

It has become commonplace among scholars and policymakers to assert that the latter half of the 20th century witnessed a decline in the incidence of interstate war and a rise in the frequency of intrastate war. Certainly in the post-Cold War era the international community has directed its attention and resources toward peacefully resolving what have been typically understood as civil wars—achieving considerable success in some cases while seemingly inexplicably failing in others. However, as knowledge, policy, and practice inevitably lag behind real world events, an important reason for failure within these interventions can often be traced back to fuzzy assumptions made about the nature of conflict itself. For example, while the apparently “civil” wars in regions such as West Africa exacerbated one another through prominent regional dimensions such as transborder war economies, the regionalization of conflict has until recently attracted scant attention among academic and policymaking communities. As this section strongly implies, getting the analysis right is a necessary precursor for effective intervention.

A. Regional Conflict Complexes

According to one panelist, regional conflict formations (also known as regional conflict complexes) can be understood as “sets of transnational conflicts that form mutually reinforcing linkages with each other throughout a region, making for more protracted and obdurate conflicts.” This analytical category should be understood as distinct from interstate conflicts and intrastate conflicts with multiple parties, nor can it be reduced to situations where there is simply a “spill over” effect from one conflict to another or where there are several essentially autonomous civil wars within a region. Rather, regional conflict formations are typically characterized by fundamental, interconnected networking and processes within a region: institutional weaknesses of one or more states, regional security competition, a parallel and transnational informal economy, transborder social networks, illegal trafficking and trade, natural resource exploitation, militarization and arms transfers, and transborder armed groups.

While the primary characteristics of regional conflict complexes have been noted above, it is a more compli-
In the context of debating transborder war economies, several panelists and participants critiqued a prominent school of thought among the academic and policy communities, the economic predation thesis, which suggests that most insurgencies are primarily motivated and facilitated by the availability of lootable commodities. While granting that in cases where state military capacity is very weak an insurgency may transform from politically motivated violence to economically motivated violence, one panelist argued that a rebel’s instinct for self-preservation from “extermination” is actually the most fundamental consideration. Furthermore, focusing upon the supposed economic motivations of rebel groups ignores a wide range of other relevant dimensions among interconnected conflicts: governance and the rule of law, external regulatory regimes, the demand for “conflict goods” among consumers in developed countries, coping mechanisms among civilian populations, and the role of neighboring states. For example, in countries such as the DRC where transborder war economies have clearly perpetuated a regional conflict formation, rebel violence for economic purposes really only tells part of a much more complex story that includes: civilian economic subsistence through the extraction and trading of natural resources such as coltan, and apparent commercial motivations for intervention among the armed forces of
regional states such as Zimbabwe, Uganda, and Rwanda. Formulating and implementing effective strategies for mitigating the adverse effects of transborder war economies has proven particularly difficult due to a lack of knowledge, the unintended consequences of state-centric sanctions regimes, insufficient transnational regulation of the private sector, and conflicts of interest among intervening organizations and states. There is little agreement among scholars who study war economies, and thus there is also a notable lack of consensus among those who make policy in response to war economies. For example, is interdiction or cooperation the best approach for managing “conflict goods” during peacebuilding? In situations where sanctions are the tool of choice, with few exceptions they are directed at just one state without adequate consideration for the regional dimensions of resource extraction and arms transfers. Likewise, the potential adverse socio-economic consequences of sanctions regimes upon legal commerce in neighboring states are rarely fully considered. And when steps are taken toward addressing transnational dimensions, the regulatory regimes tend to be fairly weak – particularly if they encompass the private sector. Ironically, the biggest obstacle for the international community in combating transborder war economies may actually be the complicity of its own states.

C. Case Study: West Africa

Unfortunately for West Africa, perhaps no other area of the world better illustrates the processes and structures that typify a regional conflict complex. As one panelist described, the wars in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau, and Cote d’Ivoire have formed an “interconnected web of conflicts”. Keeping in mind that there are transborder networks within the region that are not easily described through reference to conventional geographic categories, it is nonetheless useful to analyze these four wars in terms of the domestic, regional, and international levels. And while there are not yet very many success stories to tell about the international community’s role regarding war and peace in this area, two of these West African conflicts are noteworthy in terms of UN intervention: Liberia represents the first time that the UN deployed a peacekeeping force, UNAMIL, alongside a pre-existing regional force, ECOMOG; while in Sierra Leone, UNAMSIL is currently the UN’s largest peace operation in the world.

In Liberia, the war from 1989 to 1997 was characterized by rapacious natural resource exploitation and an attempt by warlord Charles Taylor to buy off his domestic rivals, divided support for various factions and the deployment of ECOMOG at the sub-regional level, and what one panelist termed a “poor man’s war” in terms of international financial resources committed for peace operations. Eventually, Taylor won the presidency in 1997 and a new insurgency, Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD), was launched in 1999. Meanwhile, in Sierra Leone the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) funded their brutal war campaign through illicit diamond exports, nearby countries backed different factions (e.g. Taylor’s support for the RUF) while also eventually deploying a peacekeeping force, and finally the UN subsequently assumed responsibility for the peace operation with the withdrawal of ECOMOG forces in 2000. As for Guinea-Bissau, domestic peace negotiations were conducted in bad faith, there was a meager commitment of 700 peacekeepers deployed at the sub-regional level, and there was a general reluctance among actors outside of West Africa to intervene in any significant way. Finally, the current conflict in Cote d’Ivoire results in part from economic decline (i.e. $14 billion in external debt as of 1999) and sharp north-south divisions within the country; at the sub-regional level, there has been some blowback from Cote d’Ivoire’s involvement in Liberia, while the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has also deployed peacekeepers; and at the international level, France has sent 4,000 troops to support the regime while the US has reportedly blocked recent French initiatives within the UN Security Council.

There are multiple lessons from the West African experience that are useful reference points for understanding the ongoing wars in Liberia and Cote d’Ivoire as well as suggesting possibilities for how to better manage future regional conflict complexes:

- good governance is a crucial element for conflict prevention, while autocracy has been shown to fuel conflict in a number of cases (e.g. Sierra Leone, Liberia);
- support by governments for insurgencies in neighboring states can create cycles of retribution and chronic regional instability;
- sub-regional organizations such as ECOWAS need adequate military capacity for intervention in conflicts where peace enforcement operations are necessary;
• regional hegemons (e.g. Nigeria) can serve as the backbone for effective intervention, but they need to learn to “speak softly” while carrying a “big stick”;

• appeasement and inclusion has typically failed with “spoilers” (e.g. Foday Sankoh), suggesting that establishing criminal tribunals may be more effective;

• and the role of external actors has facilitated peace in some conflicts (e.g. UK in Sierra Leone) but may have complicated others (e.g. France in Cote d’Ivoire).

III. The Regionalization of Intervention

As one panelist commented, quoting Sir Brian Urquhart, there was “a crisis of too much confidence” in the early 1990’s as the UN assumed responsibility for numerous difficult and complex peacekeeping operations. The UN’s subsequent problems created a backlash against the organization, with its operational capacity being fundamentally called into question. As a result of what another panelist termed the “Somalia-Rwanda syndrome”, less than half of all peace operations since 1997 have been undertaken by the UN, while instead the majority of peace operations have been assumed by either regional organizations or coalitions of the willing. Of course, this distinction is not entirely clear-cut in practice as a number of these peace operations have also actually had some form of UN authorization, coordination, or complementary field presence. While an increased reliance upon regional organizations and ad hoc arrangements such as coalitions of the willing has had some success, it is also worth critically probing the potential long term implications for international peace and security.

A. OSCE and EU

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) has three main strengths in the area of conflict management: inclusive membership from Russia in the East to the US in the West, a comprehensive conception of security, and an extensive set of field missions throughout Europe. Accordingly, the OSCE will likely play a key role in resolving most conflicts in the Caspian region (e.g. Nagorno-Karabakh) and Eastern Europe (e.g. Georgia). However, one notable exception is Chechnya, where the OSCE has withdrawn at the request of Russia. The OSCE has also developed a wide range of conflict prevention tools such as institutionalizing standards for minority and human rights, election monitoring, and developing early warning mechanisms through field missions. While the OSCE can continue to make a strong contribution toward preventing and resolving conflicts, the organization does also have some serious limitations with respect to peace operations: it does not deploy military forces so it usually operates only in conjunction with a political settlement, and the fiscal requirements of reconstruction are often beyond the OSCE’s capacity.

The European Union (EU) first established some institutional capacity for conflict management in 1999 as part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Key components of the EU’s evolving operational capacity are peacekeeping, policing, rule of law, civilian administration, and coordination. The organization is now moving toward meeting its goal of being able to deploy 60,000 peacekeepers, 5,000 policemen, and up to 300 justice personnel. Initial field presences include: the European Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia with 500 police, a successor to the UN’s International Police Task Force (IPTF); and the 350 troop deployment called “Concordia” in Macedonia, a successor to a NATO peacekeeping operation. [Note: since this conference was held in May, the EU has also sent peacekeepers on the organization’s first out of area deployment to support the UN’s operation in the DRC.] In terms of conflict resolution, the EU is uniquely placed to play a key role in resolving enduring conflicts such as Cyprus. Finally, as demonstrated in Kosovo, the EU can also contribute significant financial resources and expertise toward post-conflict reconstruction efforts.

With respect to undertaking peace operations, there are a few potential comparative advantages that North American and European institutions may have relative to the UN:

• peacebuilding may be facilitated by using the prospect of future integration with the EU as an incentive for compliance with a peace process;

• regional organizations can be more efficient due to rapid deployment capabilities, better information, enhanced interoperability, and sustainability;

• some regional bodies (e.g. OSCE, EU) can “widen”
and “deepen” intervention - yielding a more comprehensive approach and better human security;

• and in the case of NATO, the regional security alliance has much greater capacity than the UN for engaging in peace enforcement when necessary.

B. AU and IGAD

The African Union (AU) has developed a substantial protocol on peace and security, including provisions for intervention within member states under certain conditions, but this has yet to be ratified. Previously, its predecessor the Organization of African Unity (OAU) had created a conflict prevention mechanism for interstate wars in 1993 and a protocol on unconstitutional changes of government in 1999, but these initiatives proved extremely difficult for an essentially administrative body to implement in practice. Thus, a decision was made to reform the OAU toward common political, economic, and defense systems using sub-regional organizations (e.g. ECOWAS, SADC, and IGAD) as the building blocks for the newly formed AU. However, increasing the operational capacity of the AU has been a slow process. Remaining challenges include: political disparities among diverse member states; coping with different types of conflict such as interstate, intrastate, and regional; defining working relationships for the organization sub-regionally, regionally, and globally; a lack of financial resources; and institutional inertia. Nonetheless, the AU has brokered the Algiers agreement between Ethiopia and Eritrea, while also deploying a symbolically important field presence.

Unfortunately, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) represents a perfect example of how an organization can be paralyzed by conflicts of interest among its own members. Some important examples include: each of the member states have supported their own warlords within Somalia’s ongoing conflict, thus perpetuating what might otherwise appear to be a civil war; US-backed IGAD member states border another member state Sudan, thus raising the cost of continued warfare for that regime but not resolving the conflict; and two other members, Ethiopia and Eritrea, had a border dispute that ultimately resulted in trench warfare with massive humanitarian consequences. There are a few lessons to be learned from IGAD’s experiences with conflict in the Horn of Africa. First, authoritarian and semi-authoritarian member states are incapable of enforcing good governance codes of conduct through a peer review process. Second, organizations such as IGAD are inherently state-centric, therefore leaving little room for the participation of civil society organizations in regional peacebuilding activities. Finally, focused intervention by actors from outside the Horn of Africa, including measures such as imposing aid conditionality, may be required to facilitate peace.

While capacity building for regional and sub-regional organizations in Africa is a worthwhile endeavor, increasing reliance upon them to undertake African peace operations does have certain limitations:

• organizations must often contend with competing interests of member states that may be contrary to the realization of effective regional peace operations;

• with few exceptions, most regional organizations in the developing world lack adequate financing and institutional capacity to engage in peace operations;

• where capacity exists (e.g. SADC/South Africa, ECOMOG/Nigeria), a regional hegemon’s interests may not be reconcilable with the need for impartiality;

• and the fundamental problem of devolution to regional organizations remains the massive inequalities characterizing global expenditures for peace operations.

C. UN Partnerships

In some cases, regional organizations have operated without UN authorization or in contravention of the UN Security Council (e.g. NATO’s bombing of Kosovo during 1999). However, as the following examples suggest, the UN has more commonly acted in partnership with a regional organization or a coalition of the willing:

• a dual key arrangement with UN authorization for a regional organization, but some control retained by the UN (e.g. initial NATO operations in Bosnia),

• complementary deployment of a regional organization with a UN peace operation (e.g. ISAF and UNAMA in Afghanistan),

• a regional organization’s peace operation that hands
off to a UN peace operation (e.g. ECOMOG and UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone),

- a UN mission that transitions to a regional organization’s peace operation (e.g. UNPREDEP and NATO peacekeeping in Macedonia),

- a regional organization’s operation as a pillar within an overall UN mission (e.g. EU reconstruction and UNMIK in Kosovo),

- deployment by a coalition of the willing (or a state) but not under the control of an existing UN mission (e.g. Operation Turquoise and UNAMIR in Rwanda),

- or a coalition of the willing operation authorized by the UN Security Council that transitions to a UN mission (e.g. INTERFET and UNTAET in East Timor).

Ultimately, as one panelist observed, these partnerships are usually “supply driven” rather than “need driven” – typically resulting from expedient political trade-offs rather than strategic considerations by member states.

Considering the ad hoc manner in which UN peace operation partnerships often come into existence, they do require a significant degree of coordination and cooperation during implementation. Although, reconciling institutional mandates and managing organizational rivalries often presents a serious challenge: as one panelist commented, “everyone wants to coordinate, but no one wants to be coordinated”. Nonetheless, in the area of conflict prevention, the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) has identified thirteen modalities to guide ongoing UN collaboration with regional organizations (e.g. increased joint staff training). Meanwhile, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) has taken the lead regarding civil-military coordination issues during deployment. Key functions include planning, information sharing, and task division – activities not easily coordinated among multiple UN agencies, let alone in conjunction with other organizations. In particular, ensuring that aid and development workers are provided adequate protection by peacekeepers remains a key dilemma. Unsurprisingly, this can be a contentious and problematic issue in situations where the mandates for civilian and military components reside with different organizations.

Beyond the logistics of coordination during peace operations, panelists and participants at the conference also suggested several underlying principles that should guide UN partnerships: regular, substantive, and reciprocal consultation among partners within a common framework; prior agreement regarding the level of material support expected from each organization or coalition; a clearly defined division of labor organized according to the comparative advantages of the respective actors; a strategy that is commensurate with the resources made available for the peace operation; and coherent implementation so that one partner’s efforts (e.g. military coercion by a coalition of states) do not undermine another’s (e.g. mediation by the UN). Finally, although a coalition of the willing or a regional organization may assume a lead intervention role, this should imply neither the right to dictate terms for the participation of other organizations nor license to dodge responsibility for the aftermath of a military intervention. As one panelist remarked, “he who kicks in the door should not walk away from the house.”

IV. Conclusion

One might reasonably assume that regional conflicts would ideally require a regional form of intervention by the international community. Intuitively, it seems to make sense that if the problem is “regional”, then the proposed solution should be “regional” as well. But what has this really meant in terms of policy and practice thus far? Unfortunately, policy planning rarely goes beyond state-centric approaches that fail to specifically target the political and economic networks that often sustain regional conflict complexes. Although, with the recognition that sanctions upon Liberia were required in order to resolve a conflict in adjacent Sierra Leone, the UN has shown some signs of strategic adaptation in this regard. Nonetheless, the obstacles to better policy formation in the future appear to be both conceptual and institutional. Thorough empirical research and critical policy analysis should probe the regional dimensions of contemporary conflicts, while organizations should also explore ways to incorporate new insights regarding transborder conflict dynamics into bureaucracies typically already structured in terms of country-specific portfolios.

The international “division of labor” for intervention can be conceptualized in terms of a continuum, with universalism and unilateralism at opposite poles. In most instances, the participation of regional organizations and coalitions of the willing would fall somewhere between
these two extremes. While it is true that regional organizations and coalitions of the willing can play a constructive role (e.g. INTERFET in East Timor), in general the devolution of primary responsibility for implementing peace operations away from the UN has also exacerbated global inequalities. This trend has resulted in what one panelist has termed a “peacekeeping apartheid” – a far from ideal situation for anyone concerned about the fate of war-torn developing countries. Nonetheless, regional organizations and coalitions of the willing can often play complementary roles within the existing UN framework for the maintenance of international peace and security. In contrast, the unilateralism exemplified by the US invasion of Iraq may ultimately threaten to undermine the institutional and normative foundations of the international system itself.

Participants at the 2003 New York Seminar, West Point
Appendix I: Agenda

2003 New York Seminar

Thayer Hotel, West Point
May 5-9, 2003

Program Chair

David M. Malone
President, International Peace Academy

“Regional Approaches to Conflict”

Rapporteur

Charles Cater
D.Phil. Candidate, International Relations
St Anthony’s College, Oxford, UK

Monday, May 5, 2003

09:30   Travel to Hotel Thayer, West Point

15:00 - 15:20 Orientation

   Colonel Jussi Saressalo, Military Adviser, International Peace Academy

15:20 - 15:50 Opening Remarks

   Dr. Neclà Tschirgi, Vice President, International Peace Academy

16:00 - 17:30 Keynote Speaker:

   The Role of Regional Organizations in Conflict Management
   H.E. Mr. René Nyberg
   Ambassador of Finland to Russia

   Address
   Future Partnership with Regional Institutions: The Role of the United Nations in Conflict Management
   Mr. Christopher Coleman, Senior Political Affairs Officer, Africa Division, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations

   Discussion
19:00 - Reception and Dinner

Address: H.E. Ms. Marjatta Rasi
Permanent Representative of Finland to the United Nations

Tuesday, May 6, 2003

07:30 - 09:00 Breakfast in the main Dining Hall

09:00 - 10:30 Panel 1: Regional Approaches to Contemporary Conflicts

Chair: Dr. Neclà Tschirgi, Vice President, International Peace Academy

Panel: CIC’s Work on Regional Conflict Formations
Dr. Barnett Rubin, Director of Studies and Senior Fellow, Center on International Cooperation, New York University
Ms. Andrea Armstrong, CIC Research Associate
Regional Dimensions of Contemporary Conflicts and Their Implications for Peacebuilding
Dr. Susan L. Woodward, Professor of Political Science, The Graduate Center, The City University of New York

Discussion

10:30 - 11:00 Coffee break

11:00 - 12:30 Panel 2: Regional Economic Dimensions of Conflicts

Chair: Ms. Karen E. Ballentine, Senior Associate, International Peace Academy

Panel: Regional Economic Dimensions of Civil War
Dr. Neil Cooper, Senior Lecturer, Department of Politics, University of Plymouth
The Regional Political Economy of Conflict in West Africa
Dr. Emmanuel Kwesi Aning
African Security Dialogue & Research, Accra

Discussant: Dr. Barnett Rubin, Director of Studies and Senior Fellow, Center on International Cooperation, New York University

Discussion

12:30 - 14:00 Lunch
14:00 - 15:30  **Panel 3: Regional Approaches to Conflict Prevention**

Chair:  **Dr. Chandra Sriram**, Senior Associate, International Peace Academy

Panel:  The UN’s Subregional Approach to Conflict Resolution and Prevention in West Africa  
**Mr. Ibrahima Fall**, Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region

The UN’s Strategic Efforts to Coordinate Better with Regional and Subregional Organizations in Conflict Prevention  
**Dr. Tapio Kanninen**, Chief, Policy Planning Unit, Department of Political Affairs, United Nations

Discussant: The Linkages between the UN and Regional Organizations in Conflict Prevention and the Capacities of Regional Organizations  
**Mr. Rasheed Draman**, Ph.D. Candidate  
Politics Department, Carleton University, Canada

15:30 - 16:00  **Coffee break**

16:00 - 17:30  **Tour to West Point**, US Military Academy

19:00 -  **Reception and Dinner**

**Address**:  **H.E. Mr. Wegger Strømmen**  
Deputy Permanent Representative of Norway to the United Nations

**Wednesday, May 7, 2003**

07:30 - 09:00  **Breakfast in the main Dining Hall**

09:00 - 10:30  **Panel 4: UN and Regional Organizations in Peace Operations**

Chair:  **Ambassador John L. Hirsch**, Senior Fellow, International Peace Academy

Panel:  Challenges and Opportunities  
**Dr. Fred Tanner**, Deputy Director, Head of Academic Affairs, Geneva Center for Security Policy

Perspectives from the Field  
**Major General Martin Luther Agwai**, Deputy Military Advisor, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations

Discussant:  **Dr. Michael Pugh**, Reader in International Relations, Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Plymouth

Discussion
10:30 - 11:00  Coffee break
11:00 - 12:30  Panel 5: Civil-Military Cooperation in Peace Operation (CIMIC)

Chair:  Dr. Stephen E. Henthorne, FRUSI, MInstF, Professor, Civil-Military Relations, US Army Peacekeeping Institute

Panel:  Relations between the Humanitarian Community and the Military
Ms. Ingrid Nordström, Deputy Chief, Military and Civil Defense Unit (MCDU), OCHA, Geneva

Civil-Military Coordination in UN Commanded Peacekeeping Operations
Mr. Anthony Craig, Liaison Officer, Military Division, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations

Discussant: EU-Civilian Crisis Management and Cooperation with the Force
Mr. Michael Matthiessen, Director, Civilian Crisis Management, DG E-Directorate IX, General Secretariat, Council of the European Union

Discussion

12:30 - 13:00  Group photo
13:00 - 14:30  Lunch
14:30 - 18:00  Breakout Groups:

Group 1:  Confronting the Legacies of Regional War Economies: Challenges for Peacebuilding
Facilitator: Dr. Neil Cooper

Group 2:  Regional Approaches to Conflict Prevention
Facilitator: Dr. Chandra Sriram

Group 3:  UN and Regional Organizations in Peace Operations
Facilitator: Colonel Jussi Saressalo

19:30 - 21:00  Reception and Dinner

Keynote Speaker: David M. Malone, President, International Peace Academy

Thursday May 8, 2003

07:30 - 09:00  Breakfast in the main Dining Hall
09:00 – 10:30  Panel 6: Africa’s Evolving Security Architecture: Regional Approaches to Managing Conflicts

Chair:  Dr. Adekeye Adebajo, Director of the Africa Program, International Peace Academy

Panel:  The African Union (AU) and Security Mechanisms in Africa: Problems and Prospects
Professor Margaret Vogt, Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary-General, Department of Political Affairs, United Nations

Building Peace in the Horn of Africa: IGAD’s Peacemaking Efforts
Professor Ruth Iyob, University of Missouri, Department of Political Science

Discussant: Southern Africa’s Security Challenges
Mr. Joao Bernardo Honwana*, Chief, Conventional Arms Branch, Department for Disarmament Affairs – DDA, United Nations

Discussion

10:30 – 11:00  Coffee break

11:00 – 12:30  Panel 7: Regional Approaches to Post-Conflict Peacebuilding

Chair:  Dr. Simon Chesterman, Senior Associate, International Peace Academy

Panel:  The Role of the UN and Regional Actors in Providing Emergency Relief and Reconstruction
Ms. Ameerah Haq, Deputy Director of the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, UNDP.

Transitional Administration, State-Building and the United Nations
Dr. Simon Chesterman, Senior Associate, International Peace Academy

Discussant: Mr. David Harland, Chief, Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations

12:30 – 14:00  Lunch

Lunch speaker: Cadet Seth Johnston, US Military Academy

14:00-18:00  Breakout Groups

Group 4:  Civil-Military Cooperation in Peace Operations
Facilitator: Mr. Anthony Craig

Group 5:  Africa’s Evolving Security Architecture: Regional Approaches to Managing Conflicts
Facilitator: Professor Ruth Iyob
Group 6: Regional Approaches to Post-Conflict Peacebuilding
Facilitator: Dr. Simon Chesterman

19:30 - Reception and Dinner

Address: H.E. Mr. Thorsteinn Ingolfsson
Permanent Representative of Iceland to the United Nations

Friday, May 9, 2003

07:30 - 09:00 Breakfast in the main Dining Hall

09:00 - 10.30 Plenary session

Conclusions of breakout Groups 1 - 3
Conclusions of breakout Groups 4 - 6

Discussion

10:30 - 11:00 Coffee break

11:00 - 11:45 Concluding remarks by Dr. Simon Chesterman
Evaluation and presentation of certificates

12:00 Departure for New York City

13:30 Arrival to New York City

* To Be Confirmed
Appendix II:
New York Seminar 2003
Participants

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