THE EUROPEAN UNION IN AFRICA:
A STRATEGIC PARTNER IN PEACE OPERATIONS

REPORT ON A SEMINAR CO-ORGANISED BY
THE GENEVA CENTRE FOR SECURITY POLICY AND THE INTERNATIONAL PEACE ACADEMY (NEW YORK)

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GCSP SERIES ON PEACE OPERATIONS

In 2002, the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP) initiated a series of seminars on the broad theme of peace operations. Every year, these seminars bring together around 40 academics, experts, policy-makers and military officials to look into a particular aspect of peace operations.

Since 2002, the topics addressed have been as follows:

- 2002: "Peace operations in a Post-911 Context".
  This seminar led to the publication of a book (Thierry Tardy, ed., *Peace Operations after 11 September 2001*, Routledge, London, 2004)

- 2003: "The European Union and Peace Operations"

- 2004: "The Brahimi Report: Four Years On"

- 2005: "Pursuing Security in the Post-Conflict Phase: Implications for Current and Future Peace Operations";

Proceedings available at www.gcsp.ch, Meetings, Peace Operations.

In 2006, the conference was co-organised with the International Peace Academy (New York).

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INTRODUCTION

One major trend in the field of peace operations over the last five or six years has been the increase in cooperation among international organisations involved in peace operations. This cooperation is more or less institutionalised and continues to develop in varying degrees at the headquarter level and in the field. This trend finds its rationale in the necessity of burdensharing in a field where the needs are tremendous; international organisations do compete in peace operations, but are also willing to collaborate, drawing on their comparative advantages and complementarity.

The European Union (EU) and the United Nations (UN) provide an example, with the partnership they have established between themselves, but also through the relationships they develop with third organisations. In Africa in particular, both the UN and the EU have established relations with regional and sub-regional organisations in the broad field of peace operations.

It is in this context that the relationship between the EU and the African Union (AU) takes place, at a time when both organisations are undergoing profound change in their aspirations and capacities as security actors.

On the European side, within the context of CFSP and ESDP[1] developments, the EU has expressed a renewed interest for Africa, illustrated in the security field by the Africa Peace Facility (APF), ESDP operations taking place in Africa, and, more recently, the adoption of the EU Africa Strategy.

On the African side, the transformation of the African Union into a security actor and initiatives such as the NEPAD[2] reflect the new wave of efforts by African leaders to intervene on the continent.

These different evolutions, combined with the nature of security needs on the African continent, raise the issue of the role of the EU in Africa, and of the nature of the partnership between the EU and the African Union in peace and security.

The GCSP-IPA seminar addressed these issues in four sessions: the first dealt with the EU-AU relationship in general terms and questioned the nature of the partnership in peace and security; the second session looked at the situation in Darfur and at how the EU and the AU have interacted in one of the first tests of EU-AU cooperation in a peace operation; the third session was dedicated to the role of the EU and European member states in capacity-building in Africa; finally, the debate focused on the triangular relationship between the EU, the AU and the UN, analyzing comparative advantages of each institution and the challenges of the tripartite partnership.

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[1] CFSP: Common Foreign and Security Policy; ESDP: European Security and Defence Policy.
[2] New Partnership for Africa's Development.

1. THE EU-AU RELATIONSHIP IN PEACE AND SECURITY

The analysis of the EU policy *vis-à-vis* Africa over the last few years led to two streams of reflections: one positive, one critical. On the positive side, the EU policy was presented as moving in the right direction, through measures such as the Africa Peace Facility, the EU presence in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and in Sudan, and the December 2005 Africa Strategy[3]. The latter was described as a positive change in the way the EU interacts with the African continent for several reasons. Firstly, the strategy synthesizes in one single document what is meant to be a comprehensive framework for cooperation between the EU and Africa – with the continent taken as an entity. Secondly, the document establishes the link between development and peace and security, between the implementation of the Millennium Developments Goals (MDGs) and the existence of a stabilised continent, whereas until recently, the EU considered Africa mainly in economic terms. Thus, the Africa Strategy addresses in sequence: 'peace and security', 'human rights and governance', 'development', and 'economic growth and trade'. Thirdly, stress is placed on African ownership as a *sine qua non* for a constructive relationship. The document states that "Its underlying philosophy is African ownership and responsibility, including working through African institutions"[4]. The 'African ownership' principle is consistent with previous initiatives on both sides, such as the NEPAD and the African Peace Facility. Finally, the Africa Strategy was commended because its comprehensive approach also implies a need for better internal EU coherence, i.e. improved inter-pillar (between 1st and 2nd pillar) and intra-pillar coordination (within the 1st pillar between different aspects of EU external relations (development, trade, humanitarian aid, etc.))[5].

For the EU, the renewed interest in Africa finds its motivations in the need to stabilise the continent, in the sense that stability in Africa matters to European security. The Africa Strategy states that "Europe has a strong interest in a peaceful, prosperous and democratic Africa" and that "Our strategy is intended to help Africa achieve this". It was also argued that Africa presents challenges that the EU perceives as falling within its remit. The EU involvement in Africa in the security field is about funding programmes, training people, assisting regional organisations, supporting peace operations, possibly deploying itself in limited operations, all aspects of soft security and activities in which the EU wants to be involved. In other words, African security needs match EU aspirations as defined in the European Security Strategy[6]. Finally, the EU's quest for visibility partly explains its involvement in Africa. Beyond Europe, Africa is a place where the EU can demonstrate it exists as a security actor, when visibility on other continents (Middle East, Asia) may prove to be more difficult.

Furthermore, the European efforts were presented as matching to a large extent African needs and expectations. Some participants argued that despite some concerns about the nature of EU intentions (see below) and after initial reticence, African leaders and AU officials were by and large eager to cooperate with the EU and receive EU assistance. The fact that the AU is largely dependent on external resources and funding due to the extent and nature of African needs and the limitations of the AU own capacity to generate resources at this time, was widely accepted.

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[3] 'The EU and Africa: Towards a Strategic Partnership', European Council, Brussels, 19 Dec. 2005.
[4] Ibid.
[5] At the moment, different parts of EU assistance programs to Africa fall within different budgets (DG Relex *versus* DG Development).
[6] 'A Secure Europe in a Better World', European Security Strategy, European Council, Brussels, 12 Dec. 2003.

EU OPERATIONS IN AFRICA (AS OF JULY 2006)

ON-GOING	COMPLETED
• EUPOL 'Kinshasa' in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (support to the Congolese police)	• Artemis in the DRC (military operation in the city of Bunia)
• EUSEC in the DRC (Security Sector Reform)	
• EU Support to AMIS II in Darfur	
• EUFOR DRC (support to elections)	

On the critical side, the very meaning of the EU policy towards Africa, its consistency and its sustainability were questioned. Firstly, the existence of the Africa Strategy document does not seem to ensure the existence of a European 'strategy' for the continent. Several participants questioned the nature of the interests that drive the policies of the EU and its member states in Africa. Alleged EU common interests remain ill-defined and a strategy is subsequently difficult to discern. This led to the question of the existence of the EU as a homogeneous entity, or as a semi-autonomous actor, that would define and implement a policy distinct from that of individual states. This question has particular relevance in Africa, for at least two reasons: one is the persistence of national – rather than EU – approaches on the part of at least two prominent EU member states (France and the UK) that have a long history of presence in Africa; the other is the role that the European Commission has played in Africa long before the EU became involved through CFSP/ESDP. These two elements have a direct – and most often negative – impact on the ability of the EU to speak and act with one voice in Africa.

Furthermore, the EU has not yet rid itself of the suspicions that it acts as an instrument of French, British and sometimes Belgian policies. In the implementation of the Africa Strategy and in the building of a sound EU-AU relationship, one challenge for the EU is therefore to be perceived as a relatively impartial institution and partner, and not as a cover for French or British self-interest. In this respect, the argument was made that one way to attenuate suspicions would be for the EU to favour the Community approach (through the Commission) rather than the inter-governmental (CFSP) path, that gives too much importance to the most powerful European powers[7]. Not only would the Commission be seen as more impartial than the member states, but it would also be more eager to cooperate with the AU than the Council Secretariat[8].

By the same token, several participants emphasized that efforts made by both the EU and the AU in peace and security should not undermine other areas of cooperation such as development, governance, trade and health. The links established between security and development in the Africa Strategy were well noted, but some doubts were expressed as to the way these links would be translated at policy level.

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[7] This argument has particular resonance in the debate on the future of the African Peace Facility and the question whether its budget should remain within the European Development Fund (run by the Commission) or should be transferred to the CFSP budget.

[8] See on this 'The EU and Africa: Towards a Strategic Partnership', UK House of Lords Inquiry, Evidence submitted by ECDPM, London, Feb. 2006.

Secondly, several participants questioned the idea of Africa as a strategic priority for the EU, which, if true, would imply a long-term commitment by the EU and meaningful implementation of the Africa Strategy. In the security field, Europe is seen as willing to help, but the nature of the commitment can also reflect a desire to be less, rather than more, involved. Assistance in capacity-building is necessary and the role played by the EU in this field is key, but concerns were expressed that such assistance could in fact be the sign of an intent to disengage from African peace operations. If Africa were a strategic priority for the EU, it is likely that the response would be more ambitious and go beyond what is currently contemplated.

Thirdly, the idea of an EU-AU partnership is difficult to reconcile with the nature of the two institutions and with the principle of African ownership. Conceptually, the notion of a partnership implies a certain balance between partners, who have equal say in decisions taken in the framework of the partnership. In the case of the EU-AU relationship, the existence of such a balance is questionable; the AU was hardly consulted in the drafting of the EU Africa strategy, which more or less remains an EU-centred document presenting the EU vision on Africa. In general terms, the degree of dependence of one institution upon the other alters the parameters of the relationship. Conversely, if African ownership means that the EU is deprived of the attributes of partner status, for example in the participation in, or supervision of, programmes it finances, then again the question of a balanced partnership is at stake. One challenge for both organisations is to make Africa a real partner, i.e. to enable the continent to go beyond a recipient status. As expressed by one participant, the idea of the partnership is not to "let the Africans do the job and have Europe pay for it". The recognition of this unbalance has led to the project of a joint Africa-EU strategy, the principle of which was agreed upon at the EU-Africa Ministerial meeting in Bamako in December 2005[9]. Also considered in the analysis of the partnership was the conception of the role of the state in Europe and in Africa. The EU integration process has, by its nature, eroded the concept of sovereignty while the African continent is still very much state-centric. This impacts on the nature of institutions and therefore on their ability to 'speak the same language'. In this respect, the extent to which the AU could learn from the EU in the process of institution-building is controversial. On the one hand, the AU can learn from any organisation that has a long experience and that by and large has proven its strengths; on the other hand, the idea that a European model should be replicated in Africa did not meet any consensus.

2. THE EU-AU COOPERATION IN DARFUR

The European Union and the African Union have cooperated in Darfur since the very beginning of the AU involvement. As of early 2004, the EU assisted the AU in the diplomatic talks preceding the April 2004 cease-fire and in the establishment of the subsequent observer mission, the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS). In May 2005, the EU responded to the AU request for further assistance to the strengthening of AMIS by a 'consolidated package' (see box below), that included support in the area of police, planning, technical advice, training, logistics and funding.

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9 See EU-Africa Ministerial meeting, Bamako, Dec. 2005.

The EU-AU cooperation in Darfur was assessed positively in the seminar, both at headquarter level and in the field. Although the AU initially expressed some reluctance to the EU intervention in Darfur, several participants underlined the fact that AMIS II could probably not have taken place without EU logistical support and funding (from the Africa Peace Facility), which emphasizes the importance of the AU-EU relationship. The Darfur case was also seen as laying the foundations for future cooperation between the two institutions, at a time when both are willing to develop their crisis management capacities and roles in Africa.

In this positive context, the management of the Darfur crisis by international institutions (rather than states) has been hindered by several factors. Firstly, the general question about the EU strategic vision on Africa was raised in the particular context of Darfur, where it proved difficult to identify the objective of the EU, or to see the EU involvement in Darfur as part of a broader strategy. One element put forward was the fact that the EU brought support to the AU partly to help create the conditions for the signature of a peace agreement (which eventually came on 5 May 2006). In this exchange, the appropriateness of the EU's response to the Darfur plight was also questioned with reference to normative debates about the "responsibility to protect". If massive violations of human rights in Darfur (only) lead to EU technical and financial support to a limited AU mission, what does this say about the long-term EU vision of Africa? And about the EU understanding of the concept of "responsibility to protect"?

In a way, the lack of strategic thinking, observed both at the EU and AU levels, was also illustrated by the nature of AMIS and its ability to meet the security needs in Darfur, as well as by the uncertainty about the future of the mission, and the debate on whether it should be strengthened or not before the UN takeover. The argument was made that a reinforced (rather than weak) AMIS II handing over to the UN would be better not only for the subsequent UN operation, but also for the future of the AU crisis management policy, beyond the Darfur case.

Secondly, the fact that the Darfur case presented itself at a very early stage of the establishment of AU crisis management institutions constituted a real challenge for the organisation. Both the AU Commission and the Peace and Security Council had just been created and were in the process of being put in place (while the African Standby Force had not yet been established) when fighting commenced in Darfur. In a way, this simultaneity distracted the AU from its long-term objective of building its crisis management capacity. The AU was largely unprepared, and the Darfur case can hardly allow for an assessment of the AU effectiveness as a security actor. At the same time, Darfur forced the AU to go through a crisis management process and to test the relevance of its institutions. This, in the view of several participants, had an important learning value. It was also noted that despite its shortcomings, the AU displayed a degree of effectiveness as it was able to deploy rapidly and flexibly adapt to very difficulty theatre conditions.

Thirdly, on both sides, coordination has been an issue between different institutions involved. For the AU, the EU was one among many partners (UN, EU, NATO, states, donors). As for the EU, some duplications of efforts by EU member states operating on a bilateral basis were observed, in addition to the usual difficulties encountered by the EU in coordinating the Commission and the Coun-

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[10] Words of a participant.

cil Secretariat. Communication between the EU and the AU also suffered from a lack of well-established – instead of *ad hoc* – channels of communication between the two institutions. The question of "how to channel resources"[10] in an efficient and coordinated manner was particularly stressed. Furthermore, the fact that the EU assistance gradually integrated a military dimension posed the question of the expertise of Commission personnel, who eventually had to rely on the Council Secretariat's military expertise to administer the APF. The complex issue of personnel was raised by several participants. The lack of qualified personnel was observed on the AU side in all areas (peace-keeping, police, planning, administration). On the European side, the EU was praised for its help in recruiting and training of AU personnel, but was also criticised for sending EU staff that often had no experience in Africa (nor on European security issues) and that were deployed for a limited period of time, "between two jobs"[11].

Fourthly, although the Peace Facility was described as essential, it was pointed out that it exhibited weaknesses, in particular its lack of predictability, short-term approach, and the fact that it cannot fund direct military assistance to peace operations. These shortcomings were presented as hindrances to long-term planning for the AU.

Finally, a number of recommendations on further EU assistance to the AU were put forth, covering activities such as training (at various levels and in various areas, including training of trainers); pre-operational training for troop contributing countries (TCCs); provision of tactical air combat support; force and sector headquarters staff capacity-building; provision of logistic support; and funding of Civil-Military operations (CIMIC). For each element, the sustainability of assistance was said to be of key importance.

In the end, one participant underlined that the AU has gained from its relationship with the EU in the fields of operational capability, equipment and training, as well as confidence. Conversely, the Darfur case led the EU to confront the reality of its cooperation with the African Union, and to better grasp the nature of the AU's needs.

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[11] Words of a participant.

EU PACKAGE IN SUPPORT OF AMIS II[12]

"1. Support in the Area of Police
- Support to AMIS II CIVPOL chain of command;
- Assistance to pre-Deployment and In-Mission Training for CIVPOL Personnel;
- Assistance to the AU in developing its capacity to plan and conduct police operations;
- Assistance in building premises for CIVPOL in refugee camps.

2. Planning and Technical Experts
- Work with AU Member States to select experienced African officers for the AMIS II Chain of Command and to provide financing;
- Provide operational and logistic planners for AMIS headquarters in Addis Ababa, Khartoum and El Fasher.

3. Airlift
- Provision of strategic and tactical airlifts and airlift co-ordination to assist with the Force rotation and AMIS II expansion.

4. Logistic Support
- Provision of vehicles, communications equipment, mobile generators and other materiel;
- Provision of logistic planners.

5. Training, Assistance and Advisory Teams
- Provision of teams to assist AMIS II in preparing the additional personnel and those rotated, pending further contributions;
- Training of pilots for the offered aircraft (two AN 2, two C212s).

6. Aerial Observation
- Providing aerial observation capacity for AMIS II.

7. Media Support
- Assistance to the AU to develop the AU media strategy.

8. MILOBS
- Provision of additional monitors.

9. Financial
- Provision of financial support, pending further contributions;
- At least additional €1 million for civilian aspects to be updated later;
- €57 million still available from the APF to support the enhancement of AMIS II.

10. Administrative and Management Coordination Cell
- Co-located with AU in Addis Ababa;
- Liaison officers with ability to operate as required in Darfur;
- Movement coordination officer."

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[12] Source: 'Consolidated EU Package in support of AMIS II', Brussels, 26 May 2005. For an update, see "EU Response to the Crisis in Darfur", EU Council Secretariat, June 2006 (update 6), accessible at   http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ue-docs/cmsUpload/060610-Darfur-Update6.pdf

3. THE EU AND CAPACITY-BUILDING

The issue of capacity-building lies at the heart of the EU's conception of its role in Africa. In the field of peace operations, the EU can support the AU and African states in two ways: direct support to peace operations (through the provision of logistics, technical assistance, funding, etc.), and capacity-building, i.e. the enhancement of African capabilities to undertake peace operations. €35 million of the €250 million African Peace Facility have been ear-marked for capacity-building (see box below), while the remaining €200 million were to be used for operational support[13]. The bottom line is that there will be no AU peace operations without institutions, equipment and trained personnel, and the building of these assets – the establishment of the African Standby Force for example – requires external assistance. Capacity-building is all the more important as security needs in Africa are extensive and the UN is already overstretched (with more than 90,000 personnel in 18 operations as of June 2006).

CAPACITY-BUILDING THROUGH THE AFRICAN PEACE FACILITY (APF)[14]

"€35 million are earmarked for capacity-building in the APF, to finance the following activities:

- supporting the AU in the development of a comprehensive peace and security policy;
- supporting the establishment of a relevant planning capability within the AU Peace and Security Directorate;
- supporting the establishment and training of reconnaissance teams to enhance AU and sub-regional potential for the functional preparation of peace operations;
- enhancing the capacity of the AU and sub-regional organisations in the financial and administrative management of peace operations, either with AU backing or through donor support."

The difficulty encountered by the AU in putting AMIS into place illustrated the breadth of the organisation's needs and the necessity for external assistance from various actors. This led Javier Solana to state that "capacity-building in the AU and sub-regional organizations [should be put] at the heart of our policies in Africa"[15].

Yet, the EU as an organisation is a new actor in capacity-building in Africa. Some of its member states, such as France (through the programme RECAMP[16]) and the UK, but also the US[17] and the UN, have been involved in this field for some time. More recently, along with the EU, the G8 has also started to address capacity-building collectively.[18] Although some EU member states continue to play a role at the national level, the current trend is to 'Europeanize' programmes. As an example, the French are working to gradually bring their RECAMP programme into the European fold.

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[13] The €15 million remainder was to be used as a reserve and for evaluations. In April 2006, another €50 million was added for operational support.
[14] Source: 'Securing Peace and Stability for Africa. The EU-Funded African Peace Facility', European Commission, July 2004.
[15] 'Contribution by EU High Representative Javier Solana to the EU Strategy for Africa', Brussels, 21 Nov. 2005.
[16] 'Renforcement des capacités africaines de maintien de la paix': Reinforcement of African Peace-Keeping Capacities. RECAMP was established in 1997. In 2006, the AU and 13 non-African countries participate in this programme. RE-CAMP is divided into three pillars: education, training, and operational support in peace operations. The education pillar has led to the creation of 14 national schools with a regional scope. RECAMP has also three equipment depots (Dakar, Libreville and Djibouti), that could be used by the AU for the African Standby Force.
[17] With the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI), that later became the Africa Contingency Operations Training Assistance (ACOTA). The US has also launched the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), aimed at training peacekeepers worldwide, with a strong focus on Africa.
[18] See 'Joint Africa/G8 Action to Enhance African Capabilities to Undertake Peace Support Operations', G8 Evian Summit, June 2003.

Four sets of issues were identified in the seminar as requiring attention when looking at the EU and capacity-building in Africa.

Firstly, capacity-building contains an important political dimension, in the sense that it is about changing the nature of the relationship between the EU and African states or institutions by making them real partners, and not only aid recipients. This leads in turn to the notion of African ownership, which is indissociable from the ability of Africans to rely on their own capacity for peace operations. As one participant put it, "the aim of capacity-building is to nurture local ownership"[19]; it is to lessen the degree of dependence of the recipient and therefore to rebalance the relationship. At the same time, one observes a "tension between African ownership and EU support for capacity-building"[20]. African ownership stems from African capability, but the development of these capabilities requires external assistance.

Secondly, the argument was made that capacity-building lacked a precise conceptual framework, which reflects the previously-mentioned ill-defined EU strategic vision on Africa. In particular, for what types of peace operations capacity-building should be tailored remains unclear. Is capacity-building about enhancing African capacity to carry out multidimensional peace operations (as the very broad mandate of the African Standby Force suggests), or is it about military capacity-building? Is the objective that the AU could do peace operations on its own, or is it to enable it to conduct operations as stop-gap measures before the UN takes over?[21]

These questions lead to AU aspirations in the peace and security field, which have a direct impact on capacity-building as the issue cannot be considered in a vacuum, independently of a broader political agenda. According to one participant, the problem is that the AU lacks a "comprehensive peace operations strategy" and the EU capacity-building support does nothing to address this lacuna. In other words, the EU assists the AU in building its crisis management structure without making any effort to "clarify the inherent ambiguities in the capacity-building process."[22]

This leads to the issue of the comprehensiveness of capacity-building, that should presumably not be overly focused on the military (as it currently is), but should encompass the civilian area, and should include building governance capacity as a priority[23]. This also requires a better balance between capacity-building and direct operational support, the latter of which still receives a greater share of funding[24].

The third set of issues relates to the ambiguity that has always characterised the EU approach *vis-à-vis* capacity-building in Africa. The EU policy and that of its member states can be read as a genuine way to empower Africans, but also as a way for Europeans to eventually disengage from situations with which they no longer want to deal. Interestingly enough, one participant noted that it was partly the perception that developed countries would disengage from Africa that led African leaders to build a crisis management capability. This leads to the paradox by which current EU involvement might also be the sign of a will to disengage, at least from certain activities. This trend has always been observed in the field of UN peace operations in Africa, in which European member states no longer participate (see below).

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19 Words of a participant; also see 'Capacity Development', UNDP Technical Advisory Paper 2, New York, July 1997.
20 'The EU and Africa: Towards a Strategic Partnership', vol.I (Report), House of Lords, European Union Committee, London, 7 July 2006, p.83.
21 A European Commission document on the APF states that "The African Peace Facility will support AU initiatives designed to promote and accelerate the establishment of the appropriate conditions for the UN to intervene and fulfil its international responsibilities." 'Securing Peace and Stability for Africa. The EU-Funded African Peace Facility', European Commission, July 2004.
22 Paper presented at the seminar by Mark Malan, 'The EU and AU as Partners in Capacity-Building for Peace Operations: Not Grasping the Strategic Nettle', July 2006, p.15.
23 See 'Contribution by EU High Representative Javier Solana to the EU Strategy for Africa', Brussels, 21 Nov. 2005.
24 See on this 'The EU and Africa: Towards a Strategic Partnership', vol.I (Report), House of Lords, European Union Committee, London, 7 July 2006, pp.78-79.

Finally, the question of the absorption capacity of the AU was raised. Shortfalls in human resource and equipment are of particular importance, and hamper the ability of the AU to fully benefit from external assistance. At the same time, the point was made that capacity-building was also about enhancing the AU absorption capacity.

4. THE EU-AU-UN TRIANGULAR RELATIONSHIP

The development of the EU-AU relationship in the security field takes place in a broad environment wherein the United Nations plays a central role. As of 31 May 2006, the UN deploys 7 operations in Africa[25] (out of 15 globally), for a total of 67,247 military and police personnel (out of 87,764 globally)[26]. Africa is the continent where the UN deploys the majority of its manpower and its presence there is much higher than that of any other organisation.

The EU-AU relationship has grown over the last few years while, simultaneously, the EU and the UN on the one side, and the AU and the UN on the other, were developing their own relations. The triangular relationship that follows is characterized by some degree of competition and institutional self-interest inherent to any inter-institutional relations, but also, and to a large extent, by cooperation. The three organisations display comparative advantages that lead to complementarity and eventual synergies. Yet, the triangular relationship is still in the process of being defined, in terms of objectives, division of labour, and modalities. Furthermore, what we see in practice is more the combination of three bilateral relationships (UN-EU, UN-AU and EU-AU) than a real triangular dialogue.

The EU and the UN have already gone quite far in defining the terms of their relationship. This has taken the form of the September 2003 'Joint Declaration on UN-EU Cooperation in Crisis Management', which defines areas of cooperation between the two institutions, the subsequent creation of the Steering Committee that brings together EU and UN officials every six months for discussion on the modalities of cooperation, and close field cooperation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in particular. The EU member states also assume 40% of the UN peacekeeping budget. In general terms, what comes out of this relationship is that the EU is willing to cooperate with the UN in peace operations in Africa with some strict conditions. The Artemis operation in the DRC in 2003, and the EUFOR RD Congo operation in 2006, show what the EU is ready to do in support of the UN, but also what it is not prepared to do – contributing directly to UN peace operations with troops for example[27]. Overall, the UN Secretariat welcomes the EU's will to be present in Africa through operational support and capacity-building, but is of the view that EU member states should also participate directly in UN-led operations.

The restrictions that the EU poses on its partnership with the UN are echoed at the EU-AU level. The EU is willing to participate through various activities in AU peace operations, but is reticent to take risks that are generally not supported at the domestic level. For the EU, the challenge is also to deal with the paradoxical situation in which, however it acts with regards to Africa, be it intervention or abstention, its posture is analyzed with some degree of suspicion.

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[25] Operations are deployed in Western Sahara (MINURSO), Liberia (UNMIL), Ivory Coast (UNOCI), DRC (MONUC), Burundi (ONUB), Ethiopia-Erytrea (UNMEE), and Sudan (UNMIS).
[26] Background Note, UN Peacekeeping Operations, 31 May 2006, UN Website.
[27] The EU member states provide 2.5% of the troops to UN-led peace operations in Africa.

As for the UN and the AU, the nature of the role of the UN in Africa makes it an inevitable partner for the AU, to the extent that one objective for the AU is to become a reliable partner of the UN – i.e. not a substitute – in the management of African conflicts even as it takes more and more direct responsibility. The UN-AU relationship has been substantiated over the last few years. To some extent, the AU has been drawing on the UN institutional structure and experience as a model. For the Africans, the UN is seen as more impartial than the EU, and as a source of legitimacy (mandating issue). It is also more predictable, and more reliable in the long run than the EU. Though not an ever-present option, the UN (Secretariat if not the Security Council) is generally more willing to assist than others on a continent that is known for being forgotten by the great powers.

The UN Secretariat supports the AU efforts to take on more responsibilities in the security field, and favours burdensharing as a principle, but is also eager to ensure that the UN retains a certain degree of centrality and that regional organisations abide by UN peacekeeping standards.

Overall, the three institutions need each other in the management of conflicts in Africa. They display comparative advantages (see table below) making them largely interdependent. In the future, the ability of the three organisations to deal with this interdependence in a constructive manner will directly impact on the management of peace and security in Africa.

COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGES OF THE UN, THE AU AND THE EU IN THE AREA OF PEACE OPERATIONS IN AFRICA		
	Strengths	**Weaknesses**
UN	• Impartiality (UN is seen as more impartial than the EU, which is seen as more impartial than NATO) • Legitimacy, mandate • Availability • Experience and institutional knowledge • Long-term commitment	• Overstretch • Lack of political leverage • No peace enforcement capacity • Slow to deploy
AU	• Legitimacy in Africa • Capacity to deploy quickly • Local expertise	• Young institution • Lack of resources and experience • Uncertain political support
EU	• Resources • Political leverage • Holistic approach to crisis management • Considered more impartial than former colonial powers • Ability to do limited 'robust peacekeeping'	• Lack of strategic vision • Lack of political cohesion • Fragmented institutional structure

PROGRAMME OF THE SEMINAR

THE EUROPEAN UNION IN AFRICA: A STRATEGIC PARTNER IN PEACE OPERATIONS

FRIDAY 7 JULY 2006

Welcome and Introduction
> **Fred TANNER**, Acting Director, GCSP
> **Thierry TARDY**, Faculty Member, GCSP
> **Catherine GUICHERD**, Visiting Fellow, IPA

FIRST SESSION – **THE EU-AU RELATIONSHIP IN PEACE AND SECURITY**

Chair: **Thierry TARDY**, Faculty Member and ETC Director, GCSP
Speakers: **Wolfram VETTER**, Africa Task Force, General Secretariat of the Council of the EU
Seth APPIAH-MENSAH, former Military Adviser to the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission in Sudan
Gorm RYE OLSEN, Danish Institute for International Affairs

SECOND SESSION – **THE EU-AU COOPERATION IN DARFUR: A CASE STUDY**

Chair: **Mukesh KAPILA**, former UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for the Sudan
Speakers: **Alba LAMBERTI**, International Crisis Group, Brussels
Peter GHANSAH, former Intelligence and Security Officer, African Union Mission in Sudan
Peter STAMPS, European Commission, European Union

THIRD SESSION – **THE EU AND CAPACITY-BUILDING**

Chair: **Fred TANNER**, Acting Director, GCSP
Speakers: **Robert ESPOSTI**, Ministry of Defence, France
Mark MALAN, Kofi Annan Peacekeeping Training Centre, Accra
Winrich KÜHNE, Centre for International Peace Operations, Berlin

FOURTH SESSION – **THE EU-AU-UN TRIANGULAR RELATIONSHIP: BUILDING ON ONE ANOTHER'S STRENGTHS**

Chair: **Catherine GUICHERD**, Visiting Fellow, IPA
Speakers: **Margaret VOGT**, United Nations Department of Political Affairs
Christian MANAHL, General Secretariat of the Council of the EU

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RESEARCH AND SEMINAR ACTIVITIES

To complement and reinforce its training, the GCSP is involved in research and seminar activities related to international security issues. Research is conducted by individual faculty members as well as collectively with experts from other institutions. In addition, and on demand, the GCSP provides expertise to the Swiss authorities, including to the Federal Parliament.

GCSP research and seminar activities, conducted in close co-operation with institutions active in security areas, include round tables and meetings with the participation of experts from the GCSP and affiliated institutions and eminent leaders presenting their views and insights. Most notably, these joint activities are regular events that generate widely circulated discussion papers.

The outcome of these topical research and seminar activities are published in GCSP Occasional Papers and in relevant journals.

THE GENEVA CENTRE FOR SECURITY POLICY (GCSP) IS ENGAGED IN 4 AREAS OF ACTIVITIES:

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