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Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre

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# Appraising Efforts to Improve Conflict Management in West Africa

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and Marilyn Aniwa



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## About IPA's Africa Program

The Seminar on "Appraising Efforts to Improve Conflict Management in West Africa," jointly organized by International Peace Academy, the Economic Community of West African States, and the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre, took place from 17–19 October 2004, in Accra, Ghana. The meeting was a follow-up to the seminars in Abuja, Nigeria, in September 2001, and Dakar, Sénégal, in August 2002, which examined the sub-region's security mechanism. In convening the Accra meeting, IPA brought together fifty representatives from the United Nations, sub-regional organizations, civil society, and academia. The seminar served as a major component of the Africa Program's current three-year project (2003–2006) on strengthening Africa's security mechanisms and actors. This report summarizes the seminar's discussions and key recommendations and also assesses the current political environment in light of the issues raised at the meeting. Within the context of the seminar's discussions, the report also provides an update of the security challenges in West Africa, as well as regional, continental, and international efforts to enhance peacekeeping capabilities.

The Africa Program of IPA works with partner institutions:

- To serve as a useful guide to Africa's regional organizations and actors in assessing their strengths and weaknesses in the area of conflict prevention, management, and resolution;
- To identify the key factors required to maximize the potential of Africa's fledgling security mechanisms and to provide tangible support for the efforts of regional organizations at strengthening their political and military institutions;
- To share comparative experiences between, and learn policy lessons from, the African Union, the New Partnership for Africa's Development, and sub-regional organizations—such as the Economic Community of West African States, the Southern African Development Community, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, the East African Community, and the Economic Community of Central African States;
- To encourage the involvement of civil society actors in developing and shaping Africa's regional security mechanisms and to facilitate the development of civil society networking within Africa;
- To serve as a valuable resource for external actors and donors involved in assisting the development of Africa's security mechanisms;
- To create networks of knowledgeable and interested Africans to influence developments on their continent through interaction among themselves; and
- To provide a resource for scholars and students of conflict management in Africa, particularly since there exists a paucity of knowledge on the continent's institutions and actors engaged in the field of conflict management.

## About the Rapporteurs

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## Executive Summary

A seminar of the International Peace Academy (IPA), jointly organized with the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC), and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), was convened in Accra, Ghana, from 17–19 October 2004. The meeting was the last in a series of three seminars on conflict management in West Africa organized by IPA, a follow-up to the previous seminars in Abuja, Nigeria, in 2001, and Dakar, Sénégal, in 2002. Approximately fifty experts – ranging from diplomats, parliamentarians and military officers, to scholars and civil society activists, mostly from West Africa – participated in the Accra seminar.

The goals of the Accra seminar were three-fold:

- To review developments since 2002 on the implementation of the ECOWAS security mechanism and events in Côte d'Ivoire, Liberia, and Sierra Leone;
- To assess the status of the implementation of the recommendations made at past seminars; and
- To provide recommendations to the United Nations (UN), the African Union (AU), and sub-regional organizations on how to improve their strategies for successful intervention in Africa.

The rationale of holding this meeting, well expressed by Professor Adebayo Adedeji, executive director of the African Centre for Development and Strategic Studies, stemmed from the continuing need to improve ECOWAS's conflict management capacity in view of the number of exacerbated and latent conflicts in the sub-region. The continuing instability compels all stakeholders to examine the means by which ECOWAS addresses the issues, and to recommend other ways in which the organization can develop long-lasting solutions. The general consensus was that ECOWAS had made some modest improvements, especially in its mediation capacities in Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire. Major improvements included increased institutional capacity, integration of civil society, and increased

interaction with other sub-regional institutions and donors. However, participants remained concerned that ECOWAS has yet to develop the means to obtain accurate analyses of the root causes of conflicts – which could increase the capacity of ECOWAS to prevent and resolve existing crises – and still faces serious operational and logistical difficulties in operationalizing peacekeeping missions. Prospects for peace and security in the region have worsened over the past decade. Among continuing concerns are persistent instability in Côte d'Ivoire, the weakness of the transitional government in Liberia, and unaddressed political tension in Guinea. At the same time, experts highlighted the steps taken by the UN Mission in Sierra Leone toward security sector reform in Sierra Leone.

### Policy Recommendations and the Way Forward

The recommendations that emerged out of the discussions addressed the need to further strengthen ECOWAS's capacity and develop the means for consolidating peace in the sub-region. To this end, participants suggested the following actions for ECOWAS: a) strengthen collaboration with international organizations, other sub-regional organizations, and civil society; b) undertake periodic reviews of the region's political situation; c) invest in conflict prevention by addressing the proliferation of firearms and the presence of mercenaries, which continue to threaten the security in the region; d) improve ECOWAS's ability to address the roots of conflicts by working more closely with civil society organizations and think tanks; and e) reinforce its original mandate to work toward economic integration and development, and press member states to manage public assets transparently.

#### **ECOWAS must increase collaboration with international organizations**

Panelists urged greater collaboration between the UN, including the UN Office for West Africa, and ECOWAS – especially in operationalizing its *Protocol for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and*

*Security*<sup>1</sup> and the supplementary *Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance*.<sup>2</sup> In particular, the UN and ECOWAS should establish a stronger framework for cooperation and coordination, including a mechanism for coordinated deployment of forces in the sub-region.

#### **ECOWAS must increase collaboration with civil society organizations**

Participants pointed to the need to increase the integration of civil society groups through ECOWAS's Civil Society Focal Point. The rationale behind empowering civil society organizations as a conduit for change lies in their familiarity with the communities and the issues they face. Moreover, their participation in peacekeeping and demilitarization efforts is even more important since oftentimes they are in the best position to determine the spoilers in a peace process. Additionally, ECOWAS can increase civil society's stake in its peacebuilding efforts by engaging and educating the public on important agreements such as the protocols on conflict management and the moratorium on small arms.

#### **ECOWAS must invest in conflict prevention**

ECOWAS remains unable to reduce incipient crises and effectively prevent conflict. Participants recommended that ECOWAS undertake periodic reviews of the sub-

region's political developments to feed into the Chief of Defense Staffs' general assessments of West Africa's political climate. Additionally, ECOWAS was urged to address the proliferation of firearms and the presence of mercenaries.

#### **ECOWAS must focus on the root causes of conflict**

Understanding the root causes of conflict is fundamental for prevention. Participants advised ECOWAS to develop such analytical capacities by collaborating with independent agencies, think tanks, and research organizations. Essentially, such agencies should be encouraged to dedicate resources and personnel to deepen understanding about critical prevention issues.

#### **ECOWAS must renew its focus on development and reconstruction**

Participants advocated a greater focus on development and reconstruction, reasoning that economic growth increases the chance of sustainable peace. ECOWAS should address the structural and societal problems caused by political violence, and focus on rebuilding infrastructure and addressing the social and psychological needs of war victims. Furthermore, as a way to accelerate the resolution of conflicts, the peacekeeping and peacebuilding phases, whenever possible, should take place concurrently.

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<sup>1</sup> ECOWAS, *Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace-Keeping and Security*, December 1999 (available at: [http://www.iss.co.za/AF/RegOrg/unity\\_to\\_union/pdfs/ecowas/ConflictMecha.pdf](http://www.iss.co.za/AF/RegOrg/unity_to_union/pdfs/ecowas/ConflictMecha.pdf)).

<sup>2</sup> ECOWAS, *Protocol A/SP1/12/01 On Democracy and Good Governance Supplementary to the Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security*, December 2001 (available at: [http://www.iss.co.za/AF/RegOrg/unity\\_to\\_union/pdfs/ecowas/12ProtDemocGood.pdf](http://www.iss.co.za/AF/RegOrg/unity_to_union/pdfs/ecowas/12ProtDemocGood.pdf)).

## 1. Introduction

The International Peace Academy (IPA), in partnership with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC), convened a meeting in Accra, Ghana, from 17–19 October 2004. The seminar was held in Ghana in recognition of its critical peacekeeping role in the region, in addition to being the current chair of ECOWAS. The seminar was a follow-up to meetings on conflict management in Abuja, Nigeria, in September 2001, and Dakar, Sénégal, in August 2002,<sup>3</sup> as part of IPA's ongoing work to stimulate awareness and discussion on regional security mechanisms within and outside Africa. The objectives of the seminar were:

- To review developments since 2002 on the implementation of the ECOWAS security mechanism and recent events in Côte d'Ivoire, Liberia, and Sierra Leone;
- To assess the status of the implementation of the recommendations made at past seminars; and
- To provide recommendations directly to the United Nations (UN), the African Union (AU), and other sub-regional organizations on how to improve their strategies for successful intervention in Africa.

Honorable Kwame Addo-Kufour, Minister of Defence for Ghana, and Brigadier General Charles Mankatah, Commandant of the KAIPTC, who opened the meeting, were seconded by Professor Adebayo Adedeji, executive director of the African Center for Development and Strategic Studies, in their assessment of the overall political decline in the sub-region since 2002. They noted that the number of conflicts in the region had resulted in widespread human rights violations and the retardation of the region's economic growth. Moreover, as insufficient attention had been given to analyses of the root causes of conflicts, ECOWAS could not develop solutions for long-term peace. In light of the deteriorated political and security



Dr. Mohammed Ibn Chambas, Executive Secretary, ECOWAS.

environment, participants challenged ECOWAS and its partners to transcend their past approaches in managing conflict. They urged ECOWAS to tackle the ongoing and latent crises in the sub-region by strengthening its conflict prevention mechanism and increasing its collaboration with regional and international think tanks and civil society organizations.

## 2. Appraising ECOWAS's Progress

A critical component of the Accra Seminar was a review of the implementation of past recommendations that advised ECOWAS to strengthen its institutional capacity, undertake security sector reform, integrate peacebuilding and development, and build more effective partnerships with civil society and external actors. Executive Secretary Dr. Mohammed Ibn Chambas reported that ECOWAS has taken a number of steps to increase its institutional capacity – by improving methods for personnel recruitment, and establishing training courses for troops – and reinforcing its partnerships with stakeholders. However, he acknowledged that ECOWAS remains challenged in its ability to devise policies for security sector reform and effective peacebuilding and development.

<sup>3</sup> See IPA and ECOWAS, *Toward a Pax West Africana: Building Peace in a Troubled Sub-region*, September 2001; and *Operationalizing the ECOWAS Mechanism for Conflict Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping, and Security*, August 2002.

## Institutional capacity building

### *Improving Recruitment*

ECOWAS still suffers from a lack of personnel to carry out peacemaking and peacebuilding projects, as the secretariat remains seriously understaffed in key positions, ECOWAS encounters difficulty in fully operationalizing mandates and implementing policies.<sup>4</sup> Dr. Chambas reported that ECOWAS has recently taken steps to increase the level of manpower, bringing on board four directors for the Department of Political Affairs and adding ten program officers to the staff. The AU and the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) Secretariats have helped ECOWAS by seconding short-term advisors to its secretariat. Significantly, with assistance from the World Bank, ECOWAS has put policies in place to ensure that recruitment occurs in a strictly professional and objective manner.

### *Improving the Training of Troops*

A critical handicap in past ECOWAS interventions has been the uneven training level of troops that member states contribute for missions. In the last several years, ECOWAS has taken important steps to improve and harmonize the training of member states' troops for peacekeeping missions and for the future ECOWAS stand-by force. The three centers in the sub-region meant to serve as training institutes for military staff—the KAIPTC in Ghana, the Koulikoro Peacekeeping Training Centre in Mali, and the Nigerian War College — are operational and offer complementary curricula: the KAIPTC focuses on operational level issues, the Koulikoro Peacekeeping Training Centre provides tactical level training, and the Nigerian War College offers training in military strategy.<sup>5</sup> In addition to the three regional training centers, two logistic bases will be set up in Sierra Leone and Mali.<sup>6</sup> Assistance to the



Mr. Abou Moussa, Deputy Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Liberia.

training centers has been provided by the G8 over the last year; the United Kingdom (UK), France, Germany, the United State (US), and Canada have provided support to KAIPTC, while the French government has provided assistance to the Koulikoro Peacekeeping Training Centre.<sup>7</sup>

In April 2005, the ECOWAS Defence and Security Commission adopted the framework for an ECOWAS standby force. Of the 6,500 troops envisioned for the standby force, 1,500 would be designated as rapid responders, having the capacity to deploy within thirty days and remain on the ground for ninety days.<sup>8</sup> Notably, in November 2004, even before the formal adoption of an ECOWAS standby force, approximately 2,000 troops from member states participated in a ten-day training program in Benin, as part of the formation of the ECOWAS rapid response capability rapid responders unit. The UK, France, and the European Union (EU) have pledged to provide support for the training programs.

<sup>4</sup> This has also been observed by IPA staff in planning missions to ECOWAS.

<sup>5</sup> ECOWAS, *Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security*, Article 30. The *Protocol* initially indicates that Côte d'Ivoire will be a training site, but that site has been replaced by the center in Mali.

<sup>6</sup> Institute for Security Studies, "Costs and Steps for Establishing and Operationalising the African Standby Force: Executive Summary," October 2004.

<sup>7</sup> G8, "Implementation Report by Africa Personal Representatives to Leaders on the G8 African Action Plan."

<sup>8</sup> "ECOWAS defence chiefs adopt framework for standby force," *Angola Press*, April 23, 2005 (available from: <http://www.angolapress-angop.ao/noticias-e.asp?ID=335906>).

*Strengthening its Negotiating Capacity*

Of all sectors, ECOWAS's peacemaking capacity has undergone possibly the most significant improvement over the past two years – demonstrating its leverage in Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire. Most recently, ECOWAS's collective stance against the assumption of Togo's presidency by Faure Gnassingbé, the son of Eyadéma Gnassingbé, Togo's recently deceased, long-serving president, led to elections and discussions on formation of a transitional government. Perhaps most importantly, diplomatic intervention by ECOWAS in cases of the sub-region's instability is *expected* by the regional and international communities. Moreover, today ECOWAS's involvement in the event of West African instability goes beyond the peacekeeping missions it launched in the early 1990s; it includes peacebuilding and institutional development aspects, such as investigating accounting practices and charges of corruption in Liberia's transitional administration.<sup>9</sup>

**Partnerships with Stakeholders***The International Community*

ECOWAS has taken steps – particularly in Liberia – to strengthen its partnerships with other international actors to monitor the peace process and share information. In Liberia, the primary coalition has been the International Contact Group on the Mano River Basin, which comprises the UN, the AU, ECOWAS, the EU, the US, the UK, Nigeria, and Ghana. The contact group works to support the peace process in Liberia and the surrounding Mano River Basin countries of Sierra Leone, Guinea, Côte d'Ivoire, and Guinea-Bissau.<sup>10</sup> By working through a contact group countries can adopt policy positions with the benefit of international

support – and thus increased leverage – which may defuse accusations of bias. For example, the recent contact group meeting lent support to ECOWAS's work on increasing transparency in Liberia's transitional government.<sup>11</sup>

ECOWAS has also taken steps to strengthen its relationship with the UN Office in West Africa (UNOWA). In May 2004, ECOWAS and UNOWA agreed to undertake joint projects on the peaceful alternation of power; tackling of cross-border issues such as child soldiers, human trafficking, and the proliferation of firearms; reintegration of former combatants in Guinea-Bissau; coordinating humanitarian assistance; facilitating democratic transitions; and economic policy.<sup>12</sup> Furthermore, various ECOWAS initiatives are under way to coordinate projects between the European Union and the African Union; the African Union and the Regional Economic Communities (such as ECOWAS); and the United Nations, the African Union, and the Regional Economic Communities. For instance, consultations have begun with the European Union on a proposal for security sector reform in Sierra Leone, in view of the pending drawdown of the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), and in Guinea-Bissau, to strengthen civilian rule.<sup>13</sup>

*Civil Society*

In 2003, ECOWAS formally committed itself to institutionalizing civil society consultations in its deliberations and policies on peace and security. The resulting West Africa Civil Society Forum (WASCOF), a network of civil society organizations from all fourteen members of ECOWAS,<sup>14</sup> interacts with the civil society focal point, which ECOWAS designated along with a

<sup>9</sup> US Agency for International Development (USAID), "USAID/OTI: Liberia Field Report," April 2005 (available from: [http://www.usaid.gov/our\\_work/cross-cutting\\_programs/transitoin\\_initiatives/country/liberia/rpt0405.html](http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/cross-cutting_programs/transitoin_initiatives/country/liberia/rpt0405.html)).

<sup>10</sup> Until September 2004, this group was known as the International Contact Group on Liberia, which was established in September 2002.

<sup>11</sup> Government of Sweden, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, "Sweden to host international meeting on West Africa in Stockholm," Press Release, March 18, 2005; United Nations Office for West Africa, "International Contact Group on the Mano River Basin," Statement to the Press, March 21, 2005 (available from: [http://www.un.org/Depts/dpa/prev\\_dip/africa/office\\_for\\_srsrg/unowa/preleas/icg-mrb.htm](http://www.un.org/Depts/dpa/prev_dip/africa/office_for_srsrg/unowa/preleas/icg-mrb.htm)).

<sup>12</sup> ECOWAS, "Statement by Dr. Mohamed Ibn Chambas, Executive Secretary of ECOWAS to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Delegation to West Africa," June 22, 2004.

<sup>13</sup> Council of the European Union, "Sixth ECOWAS-EU Ministerial Troika Meeting Communiqué: Accra, Ghana, 8 November 2004," Doc. 13296/04 (Presse 291), November 9, 2004 (electronic version).

<sup>14</sup> West Africa Civil Society Forum (available at: <http://www.wacsof.org/html/english/index.htm>).



civil society unit in the secretariat. In addition, as Dr. Chambas reported, the secretariat and WASCOF have agreed to hold an annual civil society conference before the sub-region's annual summit of heads of state and government, where key issues and recommendations discussed will feed into ECOWAS's agenda. The second annual meeting of WASCOF took place in January 2005, with more than 150 organizations in attendance.<sup>15</sup> With respect to current priorities, ECOWAS views the civil society unit as particularly crucial to the success of NEPAD and its accompanying African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM).<sup>16</sup>

### Continuing Challenges

While important steps have been taken to increase ECOWAS's institutional capacity and strengthen its partnership with international actors, several critical challenges remain. In particular, ECOWAS continues to face constraints in the areas of conflict prevention, peacekeeping operations, security sector reform, and in the integration of peacebuilding and development.

#### *Conflict Prevention, Peacebuilding, and Post-Conflict Reconstruction*

The ECOWAS security mechanism adopted in 1999 established observation centers in Banjul (The Gambia), Ouagadougou (Burkina Faso), Monrovia (Liberia), and Cotonou (Benin), to work with the United Nations and other regional bodies to track evidence of early warning of conflict.<sup>17</sup> The observation centers have been challenged in the past by the lack of personnel and other logistical problems,<sup>18</sup> but some important

steps that may improve the centers have been taken since the Dakar seminar. Notably, in 2002, with \$5.3 million in assistance from the European Union and the United States, ECOWAS developed a communications network to link stations in member states with the four observation centers.<sup>19</sup> More recently, the US Agency for International Development allocated \$400,000 in 2005, as it did in 2004, to assist ECOWAS in implementing an early warning system, strengthening links with civil society, and increasing its capacity as a mediator in the sub-region's conflicts.<sup>20</sup>

Equally important, regional observers have called for ECOWAS to participate more actively in the economic development and reconstruction of war-torn societies, given ECOWAS's original mandate to address the economic issues of the sub-region, arguing that that peacebuilding and development projects remain difficult to implement because of the sub-region's pervasive poverty, under-development, and debt.

#### *Security Sector Reform*

The proliferation of small arms continues to impede efforts to consolidate peace in West Africa. Despite ECOWAS's 1998 moratorium on small arms, the UN Program for Coordination and Assistance on Security and Development (PCASED)<sup>21</sup> was not able to stem the illicit trade of firearms. In 2004, PCASED was replaced by the ECOWAS Small Arms Control Project (ECOSAP), in a renewed effort to address the proliferation of firearms in the sub-region. The UNDP has made a significant contribution of \$3 million to build the

<sup>15</sup> United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), "West Africa: Report on the Humanitarian Situation, No. 12: January 2005," January 25, 2005, *ReliefWeb* (available from: <http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/DDAD-69NQQ6?OpenDocument>).

<sup>16</sup> Women, Law, and Development in Africa, "Report on the West African Civil Society Forum," Accra, Ghana, December 11–12, 2003 (electronic version), Annex 3: "Speech by the Executive Secretary of ECOWAS, Dr. Mohamed Ibn Chambas, at the opening ceremony of the first ECOWAS-Civil Society Forum held at the Regency Hotel, Accra, Ghana on December 11, 2003," p. 10.

<sup>17</sup> ECOWAS, *Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention*, Article 23-4.

<sup>18</sup> IPA and ECOWAS, *Operationalizing the ECOWAS Mechanism*, p. 18.

<sup>19</sup> Integrated Regional Information Networks, "West Africa: ECOWAS sets up early warning system, plans military bases," *Weekly Round Up 134, Covering Period 20–26 July 2002*.

<sup>20</sup> USAID, "Congressional Budget Justification – FY 2005: Africa," (available at: <http://www.usaid.gov/policy/budget/cbj2005/afr/pdf/624-007.pdf>).

<sup>21</sup> Program for Coordination and Assistance on Security and Development, PCASED, is a United Nations Development Programme project created in March 1999 and located in Bamako, Mali.



From left to right: Mr. Lansana Gberie, Senior Research Fellow, KAIPTC, and General Henry Anyidoho, Accra, Ghana.

capacity of ECOSAP, a project estimated to cost \$33 million, to begin implementing the 1998 Moratorium on Small Arms.<sup>22</sup>

#### *Developing New Funding Sources*

ECOWAS still encounters difficulties in funding its programs on conflict prevention and resolution without significant outside assistance. Despite the community levy, which imposes a 0.5% tax on all non-ECOWAS imports,<sup>23</sup> ECOWAS has not assessed contributions from any member state.<sup>24</sup> The \$5 million currently available to ECOWAS for conflict prevention and resolution are unused funds from the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL).<sup>25</sup> In addition, Dr. Chambas reported that the secretariat has received financial support from development partners, including the African Development Bank, the Netherlands, Denmark, the UK, France, and Canada. Germany and the US have also indicated an interest in providing funds for conflict prevention and resolution in West Africa.

### 3. Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding in West Africa

The seminar evaluated the progress made in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Côte d'Ivoire, countries critical to the sub-region's stability, and also examined specific instances in which civil society played a role in the promotion of democracy – for example, at the national level (in Ghana), the regional level (through the Mano River Union), and the continental level (through the AU).

#### *Assessing Regional Stability*

##### *Sierra Leone*

Of the three cases, Sierra Leone has made the most progress toward the strengthening of institutions that promise to maintain peace. The country's Truth and Reconciliation Commission, established in 2002 as a means for promoting reconciliation, released its final report in October 2004. Experts at the Accra seminar directed particular attention to the progress begun in reforming the security sector, strengthening the rule of law, managing natural resources, and initiating governmental reforms.

Security sector reform. Major steps have been taken to institute security sector reform, affecting the national army, police, and ex-combatants. The International Military Advisory and Training Team (IMATT) has contributed to the improvement and training of the Sierra Leone army – notably, with the establishment of the new military academy. In addition, the government plans to downsize the force from a level of 14,500 to 10,500 by 2007. Furthermore, in collaboration with United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone–Civilian Police (UNAMSIL–CIVPOL), the national police is establishing

<sup>22</sup> Jimmey C. Fahngon, "UNDP to Buy Arms from Communities," *The News (Monrovia)*, May 5, 2005 (available from: [www.allafrica.com](http://www.allafrica.com)); see also "ECOWAS will soon give birth to ECOSAP," *Africa Analysis*, No. 457, October 15, 2004 (available at: <http://www.africaanalysis.com/pdf/AA457.pdf>).

<sup>23</sup> The community levy was adopted in 1996 and fully entered into force in July 2003 (see "Sixth ECOWAS-EU Ministerial Troika Meeting Communiqué"). See also "Ghanaian minister make case for ECOWAS community levy," *Panapress*, July 16, 2004 (available at: <http://www.panapress.com/newslatf.asp?code=eng049625&tdte=16/07/2004>).

<sup>24</sup> "Lessons from ECOWAS Peacekeeping Operations: 1990–2004," *Report of the ECOWAS Workshop*, Accra, Ghana, February 10–11, 2005 (available at: <http://www.kaiptc.org/kaiptc/Ecowas%20Report%2029%20Mar%2005.pdf>).

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*



From left to right: Brigadier General Charles Mankatah, Commandant, KAIPTC; Ms. Kapinga Ngandu, Program Officer, IPA; Amb. John Hirsch, Interim Director, Africa Program, IPA; Mr. Mashood Issaka, Senior Program Officer, IPA; and Dr. Dorina Bekoe, Senior Associate, IPA.

professional standards through the institutionalization of new policies and procedures. Regarding ex-combatants, UNAMSIL has accelerated the reintegration of approximately 54,000 ex-combatants.

Government control over diamond mining. As illicit mining and trading of diamonds played a major role in fueling the war in Sierra Leone, both the government and UNAMSIL have paid special attention to regulating the sector. The government of Sierra Leone adopted the Certificate of Origin Regime for the Trade in Sierra Leone Diamonds, one of the world's first diamond certification schemes, predating the Kimberley Process.<sup>26</sup> With these reforms, exports of certified diamonds increased from \$26 million in 2001, directly after the war, to \$126.6 million in 2004. However, it is important to note that the rising exports do not indicate that illegal diamond mining has ceased. Rather, it reflects the improved registration procedure that the government has put in place. Indeed, some

analysts estimate that \$30 million to \$170 million worth of diamonds were still smuggled out of Sierra Leone in 2004, and even, smuggled in from Liberia or other parts of Africa.<sup>27</sup>

Consolidation of state authority. The state has taken steps to extend its authority throughout the country. Government functionaries have returned to the provinces, traditional leaders have relocated to their various chiefdoms, and elections have been held to fill vacant posts of paramount chiefs. The government has also begun to rehabilitate a number of police stations, courts, prisons, and other government structures with financial assistance from the UNAMSIL Trust Fund. However, the shortage of judges and magistrates remains a major constraint in the effective administration of justice.

The promotion of human rights. There has been gradual improvement in the performance of the justice system with regards to respect for human rights by police and prison authorities. On July 30, 2004, the Sierra Leone parliament established the National Human Rights Commission to monitor these institutions. On the issue of children, in 2001 the parliament had established the National Commission for War Affected Children, which works with the UN Children's Fund to develop policies to protect women and children affected by the war.<sup>28</sup>

#### *Liberia*

As Liberia moves toward national elections in October 2005, the progress of the National Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL) is mixed. There are still serious economic and political impediments to consolidating peace, and the commitment of its leaders to democratic reform is problematic.

Economic challenges. While the NTGL remains unable

<sup>26</sup> On July 5, 2000, in compliance with Security Council resolution 1306 (2000), the government of Sierra Leone suspended with immediate effect all export of Sierra Leone's diamonds, pending the establishment of an effective Certificate of Origin regime for its trade in diamonds (see UN Security Council Resolution 1306 (2000) [Resolution on the Situation in Sierra Leone], 5 July 2000). See also Partnership Africa Canada and Network Movement for Justice and Development, "Sierra Leone 2005," *Diamond Industry Annual Review*, The Diamond and Human Security Project, February 2005, p. 4.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid.

<sup>28</sup> Alhaji Ahmed Tejan Kabbah, "Statement at the International Conference on Children," Freetown, Sierra Leone, 19 November 2004 (available at: <http://www.statehouse-sl.org/speeches/italy-dele-nov20-04.html>).

to provide the most basic services to the population, donor pledges for Liberia's reconstruction are materializing only at a slow pace. In February 2005, one year after an International Reconstruction Conference on Liberia garnered pledges totaling \$520 million, only \$359 million dollars has been received.<sup>29</sup> The funding gap affects the ability of the transitional government to provide shelters for internally displaced persons (IDPs) and the returning Liberian refugees in the region – seriously impeding Liberia's move toward sustainable peace. Funds are also lacking for adequate reintegration of former combatants: as of April 2005, Liberia faced a deficit of \$39.5 million in its reintegration program.<sup>30</sup> The poor planning of the reintegration program is as great a concern as its deficit; some participants feared that unless provided with the means to sustain daily living, former combatants will re-arm. One participant proposed a program that would take back weapons from ex-combatants in exchange for participating in community development projects, where they could earn wages.

Challenges of political reform. Despite the dire economic situation, most participants argued against giving the transitional government more financial assistance. Given the seeming lack of commitment to political reform, they questioned the value of requesting extra donor funds for the NTGL when the state could not manage its funds properly. Indeed, fieldwork has indicated that the former militants, who now form part of the transitional government, have attempted to take through corruption what they could not take militarily.<sup>31</sup> The concern about corruption prompted some to suggest that ECOWAS advise post-conflict states in general to hire independent agencies to manage public funds. While almost half of the

panelists supported the idea of the removal of sanctions on Liberia, others objected that any lifting of sanctions, without specific guidelines, would result in increased opportunity for corruption.

More positively, some modest gains have been made regarding Liberia's commitment to human rights and other institutional reforms. The NTGL has shown commitment to the "protection of civilians" by signing and ratifying UN conventions on human rights, economic transactions, and environmental protection.<sup>32</sup> Additionally, according to UNMIL Special Representative, some progress had been made toward security sector reform. The government is extending its authority beyond Monrovia by building local government capacity, increasing border patrols, improving the collection of internal revenue and collaborating in the 24-hour joint patrolling exercises carried out by the United Nations Civilian Police established in the capital and other towns.<sup>33</sup>

#### *Côte d'Ivoire*

Of the cases discussed at the Accra seminar, Côte d'Ivoire remains the most fragile. Côte d'Ivoire's political environment remains tense and the economy continues to decline.

Unresolved political challenges. Participants concurred that the current political divide results in part from the failure to address issues of citizenship and the distribution of political and economic wealth, characteristic features of the country's political culture. To date, the three peace agreements – the *Linas Marcoussis Agreement* (2002), the *Accra III Peace Accord* (2003), and the *Pretoria Agreement* (2005) – remain unimplemented, and the government of Laurent Gbagbo and

<sup>29</sup> "World Bank Says Tougher Action Needed to Tackle Corruption," *IRINNews.org*, February 21, 2005.

<sup>30</sup> "Ex-fighters making money from latex refuse to leave rubber plantation," *IRINNews.org*, April 19, 2005.

<sup>31</sup> See report by International Crisis Group, *Rebuilding Liberia: Prospects and Perils*, 30 January 2004 (available at: <http://www.crisis-group.org/home/index.cfm?id=2496&tl=1>).

<sup>32</sup> UN Security Council, "Fifth Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Liberia," S/2004/972, 17 December 2004 (electronic version), paragraph 46.

<sup>33</sup> There are now 1,090 UN Civilian Police (CIVPOL) personnel deployed to twenty-two sites throughout Liberia. The Liberian National Police Academy hopes to have trained 1,800 recruits by the time the elections take place in October 2005 (UN Security Council, "Fourth Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the UN Mission in Liberia," S/2004/725, 10 September 2004 (electronic version), paragraphs 4, 5, and 20.

the insurgency, the *Forces Nouvelles*, continue in a dangerous standoff.<sup>34</sup> Regional mediators from ECOWAS and the intervention of South Africa's president, Thabo Mbeki, have been unable to move the peace process forward. In fact, although the parties reiterated their commitment to the cease-fire in October 2004 and have clearly expressed the need to address a number of issues, there is little evidence that the parties have put forth a credible effort to seriously address continuing disagreements.<sup>35</sup>

Particularly contentious is the absence of a comprehensive legal framework on the question of "*Ivoirité*" (the notion that candidates for office must prove that their grandparents were born in Côte d'Ivoire) in advance of the elections planned for October 2005. Observers are also concerned that the elections may create another crisis, regardless of the outcome, due to the determination of each faction not to make concessions. For these reasons, participants viewed the rush to elections as ill-considered, given the country's political instability and the unwillingness of political leaders to compromise or honor repeated cease-fire agreements and promises of disarmament.<sup>36</sup>

Continued economic stagnation. A re-energized economy is as important a key to peace as political stability. Civil servants' salaries are being paid and social services are also slowly being re-established. However, the fabric and future prospects of economic development remain a concern in spite of the slow return to Abidjan of associations, organizations, and companies that had fled the conflict. Economic prospects are even less encouraging in northern Côte d'Ivoire; administrative functions, banking, and health

services continue to be paralyzed due to the lack of cash flow.<sup>37</sup>

### Civil Society's Role in the Promotion of Democracy in West Africa

Although not generalizable, it is nonetheless instructive to examine the growing influence of organized civil society groups and movements promoting democracy at the national and regional levels. The following section does so through the lens of civil society's role in Ghana, the MRU, and in terms of the African Union's *Protocol on Gender*,<sup>38</sup> respectively. The experiences narrated by the participants indicated that civil society can be most effective at the national and regional level and least effective at the continental level.

#### *Civil Society and National-Level Reforms*

The civil society landscape in Ghana today includes many independent policy research, advocacy, and training institutions. They promote in various ways the rule of law, respect for human rights, protection of democratic freedoms, democratic consolidation, fiscal liberalism, gender and children's rights issues, corporate governance, electoral conduct, and security sector reforms – all important elements of good governance. Civil society accomplishes these goals through research, publications, advocacy, sponsorship of capacity-building activities for parliament, and facilitation of stakeholders' participation in the legislative process by subjecting bills to critical review before they are passed into law. There are strong indications that civil society is making significant headway in influencing Ghana's legislative outcomes. A recent

<sup>34</sup> *Linah-Marcoussis Agreement*, January 2003 (available at: [http://www.usip.org/library/pa/cote\\_divoire/cote\\_divoire\\_01242003en.html](http://www.usip.org/library/pa/cote_divoire/cote_divoire_01242003en.html) February 2005); *Accra III Agreement*, July 2004 (available at: <http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900SID/EVIU-63HH2M?OpenDocument>); and *Pretoria Agreement on the Peace Process in the Côte d'Ivoire*, April 2005 (available at: <http://www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/2005/pre-cot-06apr.pdf>).

<sup>35</sup> See International Crisis Group, *Côte d'Ivoire: No peace in sight*, July 12, 2004, pp. 25- 26.

<sup>36</sup> In spite of the objections of his party, President Gbagbo is reported to have used his executive powers to pass a new law on the issue of *Ivoirité* on July 15, 2005, which was part of the rebels' demands. This new development may allow disarmament and elections to take place. (See: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4694265.stm>.)

<sup>37</sup> For information on the poor economic conditions in northern Cote d'Ivoire, see "End of Free Water, Power in Rebel North as Peace Inches Closer," *IRINNews.org*, May 11, 2005; "Crime and Corruption Flourish Amid Political Crisis," *IRINNews.org*, March 31, 2005.

<sup>38</sup> Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa, July 2003 (available at: <http://www.africa-union.org/home/Welcome.htm>).



From left to right: Mr. Daudi Ngelautwa Mwakawago, SRS for Sierra Leone; Amb. Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, SRS for West Africa; Mr. Derek Warby, Resource Director, KAIPTC; General Cheick Oumar Diarra, Deputy Executive Secretary of Political Affairs, ECOWAS; and Mr. Mark Malan, Director, Conflict Prevention and Management Program, KAIPTC.

study of parliamentary performance shows that of the twenty-four bills passed into law in 2002, 29% passed with documented civic input; the rate of input jumped to 41% in 2003.<sup>39</sup>

Ghana's civil society has internal limitations that hinder efforts to monitor good governance effectively, influence public policy, and inform or educate the public. Most of the institutions lack adequate resources, particularly skills in research and advocacy, funding and access to information. These constraints may ease when the pending Freedom of Information and Whistleblower bills are passed into law. Another challenge for the Ghanaian civil society institutions is broadening their social base. Nearly all the institutions are Accra-based, focused on governance at the national level, and elitist in approach. District and local governance practices escape monitoring by civil society groups, despite the massive governance

responsibilities and resources that are channeled to these areas as a result of the policy of decentralization.<sup>40</sup>

#### *Civil Society and Sub-regional/Continental-Level Reforms*

Civil society organizations with a regional focus, such as the Mano River Union – which comprises Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, and Sierra Leone – help to address the regionalization of conflict and to assist ECOWAS to respond to early signs of conflict. To do so more effectively, however, participants argued for an increase in training and information-sharing with youth and women's groups, journalists, traditional communicators, and religious leaders. This would enhance their ability to reach large groups of people in order to publicize ECOWAS's initiatives such as the Moratorium on Small Arms. To this end, the West Africa Civil Society Forum (WACSOF), which comprises civil society organizations from the sub-region, was established to identify issues for consideration at the ECOWAS annual summit of heads of state and government.<sup>41</sup>

The experience of civil society at the continental level has not been as successful as at the sub-regional or national levels. A good example is the African Union's *Protocol on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa*,<sup>42</sup> which was adopted in July 2003. The *Protocol*, which reaffirms the importance of gender equality and the elimination of discrimination against women, is intended to provide a framework for greater integration of women's issues and perspectives in legislative and political actions at the national level. The problems are profound: while women constitute up to 80% of the agricultural work force and 60% of the informal sector, they also constitute at least 70% of the poorest people in the region, and lack the resources to utilize judicial services to obtain adequate compensa-

<sup>39</sup> Baffour Agyeman-Duah, "Role of Ghanaian Civil Society as Watchdogs for Good Governance," paper presented at the joint IPA/ECOWAS/KAIPTC seminar in Accra, Ghana, 17–19 October 2004.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid.

<sup>41</sup> For more on WACSOF, see: West Africa Civil Society Forum (available at: <http://www.wacsof.org/html/english/index.htm>).

<sup>42</sup> *Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa*.

<sup>43</sup> "Conditions pour une habilitation économique des femmes en Afrique," *African Union Ministerial Summit for Trade, Customs and Immigration*, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 24–28 May 2004, p. 5.

tion.<sup>43</sup> Yet, among the fifty-three member states of the African Union, thirty-six nations have signed the instrument, but only nine have actually ratified and deposited the *Protocol*, making it non-operational until fifteen ratifications are deposited. Participants recommended that an international forum be convened to provide an opportunity for ECOWAS and African governments to rectify the protocol's implementation strategy.

## 4. Policy Recommendations and the Way Forward

Key recommendations addressed the need to further strengthen ECOWAS's capacity and develop the means for consolidating peace in the sub-region. To this end, participants urged ECOWAS to: a) strengthen collaboration with international organizations, other sub-regional organizations, and civil society; b) undertake periodic reviews of the region's political situation; c) invest in conflict prevention by addressing the proliferation of firearms and the presence of mercenaries, which continue to threaten the security in the region; d) improve ECOWAS's ability to address the roots of conflicts by working more closely with civil society organizations and think tanks; and e) reinforce its original mandate, to work toward economic integration and development and to appeal to the region's governments to manage public assets transparently.

### ECOWAS must increase collaboration with international organizations

Panelists urged greater collaboration between the UN, including the UN Office for West Africa, and ECOWAS – especially in operationalizing its *Protocol for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security*<sup>1</sup> and the supplementary *Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance*.<sup>2</sup> In particular, the UN and ECOWAS should establish a stronger framework for cooperation and coordination, including a mechanism for coordinated deployment of forces in the sub-region.

### ECOWAS must increase collaboration with civil society organizations

Participants pointed to the need to increase the integration of civil society groups through ECOWAS's Civil Society Focal Point. The rationale behind empowering civil society organizations as a conduit for change lies in their familiarity with the communities and the issues they face. Moreover, their participation in peacekeeping and demilitarization efforts is even more important since oftentimes they are in the best position to determine the spoilers in a peace process. Additionally, ECOWAS can increase civil society's stake in its peacebuilding efforts by engaging and educating the public on important agreements such as the protocols on conflict management and the moratorium on small arms.

### ECOWAS must invest in conflict prevention

ECOWAS remains unable to reduce incipient crises and effectively prevent conflict. Participants recommended that ECOWAS undertake periodic reviews of the sub-region's political developments to feed into the Chief of Defense Staffs' general assessments of West Africa's political climate. Additionally, ECOWAS was urged to address the proliferation of firearms and the presence of mercenaries.

### ECOWAS must focus on the root causes of conflict

Understanding the root causes of conflict is fundamental for prevention. Participants advised ECOWAS to develop such analytical capacities by collaborating with independent agencies, think tanks, and research organizations. Essentially, such agencies should be encouraged to dedicate resources and personnel to deepen understanding about critical prevention issues.

### ECOWAS must renew its focus on development and reconstruction

Participants advocated a greater focus on development

<sup>44</sup> ECOWAS, *Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention*.

<sup>45</sup> ECOWAS, *Protocol A/SP1/12/01 On Democracy and Good Governance*.

and reconstruction, reasoning that economic growth increases the chance of sustainable peace. ECOWAS should address the structural and societal problems caused by political violence, and focus on rebuilding infrastructure and addressing the social and psycho-

logical needs of war victims. Furthermore, as a way to accelerate the resolution of conflicts, the peacekeeping and peacebuilding phases, whenever possible, should take place concurrently.



Conference participants.



## ANNEX 1: Conference Agenda

### 17 October 2004

6:30 pm - 8:00 pm Reception, Labadi Beach Hotel, Accra

### 18 October 2004

9:00 am - 10:00 am Welcoming Remarks

Brig. General Charles Mankatah, Commandant, Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre (KAIPTC)

Ambassador John L. Hirsch, International Peace Academy

#### Opening Address

Honorable Kwame Addo-Kufuor, MP, Minister of Defense, Ghana

10:00 am - 11:00 am Session I: Conflict Management in West Africa

Chair: Ambassador John Hirsch, International Peace Academy

Dr. Mohammed Ibn Chambas, Executive Secretary, Economic Community of West African States

*“Implementation of the ECOWAS Security Mechanism”*

Ambassador Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for West Africa

*“Recent Developments in UNOWA/ECOWAS Cooperation”*

11:00 am - 11:15 am Coffee Break

11:15 am - 12:45 pm Session II: Peacebuilding in West Africa: Challenges and Opportunities

Chair: Brig. General Charles Mankatah, Commandant, KAIPTC

Mr. Abou Moussa, Deputy Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Liberia

*“Liberia”*

Mr. Daudi Ngelautwa Mwakawago, Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Sierra Leone

*“Sierra Leone”*

Mr. Albert Tevoedjre, Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General in Côte d'Ivoire  
"Côte d'Ivoire"

12:45 pm - 2:15 pm

**Lunch**

**Keynote Speaker**

Honorable Nana Akufo-Addo, MP, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ghana  
"Ghana's Peacemaking Role in West Africa"

2:15 pm - 3:45 pm

**Session III: Sharing Experiences: Facilitating Closer Interactions Between the Sub-regional Organizations and the UN**

Chair: Mr. Mark Malan, Director, Conflict Prevention and Management Program, KAIPTC

General Cheick Oumar Diarra, Deputy Executive Secretary for Political Affairs, Economic Community of West African States  
"Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)"

Dr. Musifiky Mwanasali, Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary-General, Department of Political Affairs, United Nations  
"Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS)"

Mr. Charles Mwaura, Coordinator, Conflict Early Warning and Response (CEWARN) Mechanism  
"CEWARN / Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD)"

Dr. Christopher Landsberg, Director, Centre for Policy Studies, South Africa  
"Southern Africa Development Community (SADC)"

3:45 pm - 4:00 pm

**Coffee Break**

4:00 pm - 5:30 pm

**Session IV: Evaluating Progress Toward Conflict Prevention and Resolution in West Africa**

Chair: Dr. Adekeye Adebajo, Executive Director, Center for Conflict Resolution (CCR), South Africa

Lt. General Martin Luther Agwai, Chief of Army Staff, Nigerian Army  
"United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL)"

Ms. Afi Yakubu, Director, Foundation for Security and Development in Africa, Ghana  
"Reducing the Threat of Small Arms in West Africa"

Dr. Emmanuel K. Aning, Senior Research Fellow, African Security Dialogue and Research, Ghana  
"Increasing the Role and Building the Capacity of Civil Society in West Africa"

Dr. Toga McIntosh, Executive Director, Governance Reform Commission, Liberia  
*“Improving Governance in Peacebuilding Efforts in West Africa”*

6:30 pm – 7:30 pm

Chair: Dr. Musifiky Mwanasali, Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary-General,  
Department of Political Affairs, United Nations

**Book Launch & Reception, Labadi Beach Hotel**

*“West Africa’s Security Challenges: Building Peace in a Troubled Region”*  
Edited by: Dr. Adekeye Adebajo and Dr. Ismail Rashid

7:30 pm

Dinner, Labadi Beach Hotel

**19 October 2004**

8:30 am – 9:30 am

**Special Address**

Professor Adebayo Adedeji, Executive Director, African Centre for Development  
and Strategic Studies (ACDESS)  
*“From Abuja to Dakar to Accra: Building Momentum”*

9:30 am – 10:30 am

**Session I: Civil Society’s Role in the Promotion of Democracy in West Africa**

Chair: Professor Adebayo Adedeji, Executive Director, African Centre for  
Development and Strategic Studies (ACDESS)

Dr. Baffuor Agyeman-Duah, Associate Executive Director, Centre for  
Democratic Development, Ghana  
*“Civil Society as Good Governance Watch Dogs”*

Mrs. Goumou Fatoumata Morgane, National Coordinator, Réseaux des Femmes  
du Fleuve Mano pour la Paix, Guinea  
*“Implementing a Human Rights Agenda in the Mano River Union”*

Ms. Afiwa Kafui Kuwonu, Director, Women in Law and Development in Africa, Togo  
*“Implementing the Africa Union’s Protocol on Gender”*

10:30 am – 11:00 am

**Coffee Break**

11:00 am – 12:30 pm

**Session II: Forging New Relationships for Post-Conflict Peacebuilding and  
Development**

Chair: Dr. Christopher Landsberg, Director, Centre for Policy Studies, South Africa

Ms. Thelma Ekiyor, Program Director, West Africa Network for Peacebuilding, Ghana  
*“Reconciliation Efforts in Sierra Leone”*

Ms. Etweeda Cooper, President, Liberia Women Initiative, Liberia  
*“Peacebuilding in Liberia”*

Dr. Toga McIntosh, Executive Director, Governance Reform Commission, Liberia  
*“Prospects for Post-conflict Development in West Africa”*

12:30 pm - 1:00 pm

**Rapporteur’s Report:** Ms. Kapinga Ngandu and Ms. Marilyn Aniwa

1:00 pm - 2:00 pm

**Lunch**

2:00 pm - 3:00 pm

**Way Forward**

Co-Chairs: Brig. General Charles Mankatah, Commandant, Kofi Annan International  
Peacekeeping Training Centre

Ambassador John L. Hirsch, International Peace Academy

General Cheick Oumar Diarra, Deputy Executive Secretary for Political Affairs,  
Economic Community of West African States

## ANNEX II: List of Participants

### GOVERNMENT OF GHANA

Honorable Kwame Addo-Kufuor, MP  
Minister of Defense  
Republic of Ghana  
Accra, Ghana

Ms. Akua Sekyiwa Ahenkora  
Assistant Director I  
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Accra, Ghana

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Dr. Mohammed Ibn Chambas  
Executive Secretary

General Cheick Oumar Diarra  
Deputy Executive Secretary of Political Affairs

Mr. Rémi Gbaguidi  
Protocol Officer to the Executive Secretary

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H.E. Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah  
Special Representative of the Secretary-General for  
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H.E. Albert Tevoedjre  
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Secretary-General for Côte d'Ivoire  
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Secretary-General for Liberia  
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Political, Policy & Planning Section  
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Brig. General Charles Mankatah  
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Brig. General Robert Sackey  
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Mr. John Kane  
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Mr. Mark Malan  
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Mr. Derek Warby  
Resource Director

Mr. Lansana Gberie  
Senior Research Fellow

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