International Peace Academy

Centre for Africa's International Relations,
University of the Witwatersrand

Peacemaking in Southern Africa: The Role and Potential of the Southern African Development Community (SADC)

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Acknowledgements

About IPA's Africa Program

The task force meeting on the role of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in managing sub-regional conflicts, organized jointly by the International Peace Academy (IPA) and the University of the Witwatersrand's Centre for Africa's International Relations (CAIR), took place in Johannesburg, South Africa, on 29 March 2002. The meeting involved about thirty diplomats, soldiers, academics, and civil society actors, drawn largely from Southern Africa, and was the first in a series of policy task forces to address ways in which Africa's sub-regional organizations can increase their capacity to manage local conflicts. The task force was also part of the IPA Africa program's current three-year project (2000-2003) on developing regional and sub-regional security mechanisms in Africa. This work follows seven years of collaboration between IPA and the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) between 1992 and 1998. In a bid to enhance African efforts at developing regional and sub-regional security mechanisms, IPA is working with partner institutions in Africa to:

- Assess major challenges faced by sub-regional organizations in Africa in their efforts to prevent and manage conflicts, operationalize their security mechanisms, and complement the African Union's (AU) conflict management efforts;

- Provide a forum for civil society actors to contribute to efforts at developing security mechanisms in their sub-regions;

- Provide training for the staff and accredited officials to sub-regional secretariats;

- Raise awareness of, and increase international support for, sub-regional security mechanisms in Africa;

- Enhance networking and sharing of information among a variety of African actors;

- Publish and disseminate policy-relevant research that will be useful to decision-makers, academics, and the NGO community.

About the Centre for Africa's International Relations

The Centre for Africa's International Relations (CAIR) is an African international relations center based at the University of the Witwatersrand, in Johannesburg, South Africa. The primary mission of CAIR is to build expertise in Africa's international relations on issues of governance, democracy, peace, security, and development. It does this through research and teaching, as well as exchange programs between scholars, activists, and practitioners from the African continent and the Diaspora. CAIR also focuses on critically engaging the governance and democratization challenges faced by Africa, as spelled out by both the African Union and the New Partnership for Africa's Development.

About the Rapporteur

Dorina A. Bekoe, who joined IPA as a research associate in June 2002, recently obtained her doctorate in public policy from Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government.

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Executive Summary

This task force meeting, organized jointly by the International Peace Academy (IPA) and the University of the Witwatersrand's Centre for Africa's International Relations (CAIR), on the role of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in managing sub-regional conflicts, took place in Johannesburg, South Africa, on 29 March 2002. The meeting involved about thirty diplomats, soldiers, academics, and civil society actors, drawn largely from Southern Africa (see Annex III). The members of the IPA/CAIR task force sought to assess the potential of SADC's Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation (OPDSC) to engage in peacemaking and peacebuilding in the sub-region by examining its role in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Angola, Zimbabwe, and Lesotho.

Based on past and current developments in the DRC, Angola, Zimbabwe, and Lesotho (summarized below), the task force felt it important for SADC to consider the following four recommendations: first, developing strategies to strengthen SADC as an institution; second, moving from unanimity to either majority or weighted decision-making; third, developing closer interaction with civil society, in order to promote greater legitimacy, public accountability, and transparency; and fourth, undertaking, as a matter of priority, a close examination of how SADC can contribute to the promotion of democratization and economic development in Southern Africa as envisioned by the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD).

The Democratic Republic of the Congo

The regional and international responses to the crisis in the DRC epitomize the weak institutions, poor decision-making processes, and absence of collective actions within SADC. The conflict in the DRC has split the region and pitted various countries against each other, illustrating SADC's divisions: Angola, Namibia, and Zimbabwe intervened to assist the government of the late Laurent Kabila in 1998 and continued to assist his son and successor, Joseph Kabila; Uganda and Rwanda assisted various rebel movements against their erstwhile ally in Kinshasa; South Africa and Zambia urged a diplomatic solution to the dispute. These divisions have not only exacerbated the conflict, but

made it more difficult for SADC to devise a peace agreement. Furthermore, the unilateral strategies pursued by individual states demonstrate the lack of agreement on the designation of a lead or pivotal country in facilitating the peace process.

Angola

SADC's effectiveness in Angola will depend on its ability to develop strategies for collective action. The killing of UNITA leader, Jonas Savimbi, in February 2002, resulted in the signing of a cease-fire agreement and the best chance in a decade for an end to the 27-year civil war. In the immediate future, the Angolan government must address the crippling humanitarian crisis, make transparent and accountable the payments by foreign oil companies to state revenues, and reform its political institutions to achieve reconciliation, promote democratization, and develop the country. The tendency of SADC members toward unilateral or bilateral actions may hinder its successful facilitation of the peace process and post-conflict peacebuilding in Angola. Moreover, since Angola has often acted independently of SADC in its foreign policy, the acceptance of regional intervention in Angola may prove difficult. SADC also lacks the resources of the UN for post-conflict peacebuilding.

Zimbabwe

Zimbabwe has recently come under severe international criticism both for its management of the land reform process and for its controversial presidential and legislative elections in March 2002. As a result of what they perceived to be an unfair electoral process, the US and the European Union (EU) imposed sanctions on Zimbabwe. Furthermore, following the election of March 2002, the Commonwealth suspended Zimbabwe from its institutions for one year and Western governments ostracized the regime of President Robert Mugabe, cutting off economic assistance to Zimbabwe. According to several task force members, SADC has the potential to act as an intermediary between Mugabe and the wider international community, as well as a facilitator between Zimbabwe's political parties in efforts to resolve the land problem, the food crisis, and constitutional issues. To accomplish this task successfully, SADC must begin to strengthen its ability to take collective, as opposed to bilateral or unilateral, actions.

Lesotho

Lesotho's past electoral crises have involved the mediation efforts of SADC's Troika: South Africa, Botswana, and Zimbabwe. (This Troika was later transformed into the extended Troika to include Namibia and Mozambique). In anticipation of the May 2002 elections, IPA/CAIR task force members suggested that SADC should act as a facilitator for dialogue between Lesotho's political parties to discuss the means through which compromises could be created between the winners and the losers of national elections. The example of the SADC-established Interim Political Authority, which helped to resolve the 1998 crisis in Lesotho by facilitating dialogue, was cited as an example of such a facilitating forum. Despite this success, the military intervention in Lesotho by South Africa and Botswana in 1998 was criticized by SADC members as lacking an explicit mandate from the organization. Furthermore, some task force members viewed the intervention as raising fears of a bullying, hegemonic South African army, which had destabilized the region during the apartheid era.

Policy Recommendations

Four main policy recommendations emerged from the task force meeting: first, strengthening institutional procedures within SADC; second, improving decision-making procedures; third, engaging the SADC secretariat; and fourth, developing a role for SADC within NEPAD. We will assess each recommendation in turn.

i. Stronger Institutionalization of Procedures

While SADC's potential to contribute to peacemaking and peacebuilding efforts in the DRC, Angola, Zimbabwe, and Lesotho is limited by the domestic nature of these situations, SADC's long-standing institutional impasse has severely limited its ability to play a significant role in resolving conflicts in Southern Africa. Although individual member states have worked to resolve or attenuate these conflicts, the sub-region suffers severely from political divisions, which have prevented effective regional initiatives. These problems have been exacerbated by SADC's lack of transparency and the limited availability of public documentation regarding decisions taken at heads of state and ministerial levels, all of which have negatively affected the organization's legitimacy and ability to take collective action in the security field.

In place of an institutionalized system for addressing conflicts, regional responses have tended to take the form of *ad hoc* interventions by several states without an explicit mandate by SADC. The SADC security organ will therefore need to be strengthened so that decisions taken on regional diplomatic and military interventions can enjoy the legitimacy of both member states and sub-regional civil society actors, who should be given a role in monitoring the operation of the SADC organ.

ii. Improving Decision-Making Procedures

While SADC's emphasis on unanimity in decision-making has certain advantages, such as consensus-building, this approach has also hindered SADC's ability to act effectively and authoritatively in conflict situations. Other alternatives must be found to the current insistence on unanimity for SADC's decision-making on security issues. SADC urgently needs to institutionalize its current practices to avoid *ad hoc* decision-making based on the lowest common denominator. The organization must improve its ability to respond quickly, effectively, and in a legal and legitimate manner to conflicts. One recommendation is to move toward majority or weighted decision-making. SADC must also draw lessons from the security mechanisms of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and the African Union (AU). Additionally, to improve its decision-making processes, SADC should develop policies that identify which cases of civil conflict have domestic solutions and which may benefit from regional interventions. In cases of electoral instability, SADC should develop regional standards for the successful conduct and monitoring of elections. Such an approach could help accelerate SADC's reaction to conflicts and improve its decision-making procedures.

iii. Encouraging the Participation of the SADC Secretariat

SADC's ability to become the principal regional peacemaker and peacebuilder in Southern Africa also depends, to a large degree, on the level of its engagement with civil society, academia, and other relevant actors. Although SADC does have an official policy to work with civil society organizations, this policy has not been effectively implemented. While the presence of Mozambique's Foreign Minister, Dr. Leonardo Santos Simão, chair of the SADC Organ, at the IPA/CAIR task force meeting was greatly appreciated, some members of the task force expressed regret at the absence of members of the SADC secretariat in Gaborone at the meeting. They strongly recommended that greater effort be made to engage the secretariat in the future work of the task force. In order for the work and recommendations of the task force to be useful, the participation of the SADC secretariat, and not just senior political officials from member states, is vital. According to several members, the SADC secretariat should follow the lead of the ECOWAS and IGAD secretariats, which were seen to be more open to advice and assistance from independent experts.

iv. Developing a Role for SADC within NEPAD

IPA/CAIR task force members also raised important issues regarding the New Partnership for Africa's Development and the new African Union. NEPAD and the AU form part of a set of new continental initiatives to address security and governance challenges facing Africa. Both initiatives symbolize the challenges of reconciling peace, security, democracy, governance, and development. Both contain provisions for tackling continental conflicts, and highlighting the negative impact of conflicts on economic development and institutional effectiveness. NEPAD also aims to improve political governance and economic accountability through the African Peer Review Mechanism.[1]

Still, the four cases of the DRC, Angola, Zimbabwe, and Lesotho all underscore the domestic dimensions of crises that have limited SADC's ability to intervene effectively in these conflicts. In Angola, the government's relationship with foreign oil companies, which is critical to the transformation of the state and to attracting support from the donor community, will have to be resolved internally. One positive example of external intervention was SADC's electoral monitoring and facilitation of an inter-party dialogue in Lesotho. Yet, most SADC governments, particularly those of Angola and Zimbabwe, remain virulently opposed to any form of external interference in their domestic affairs. In order to ameliorate these problems, the SADC Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation of 2001, will need to be properly articulated and effectively implemented in order to find a balance between the rights of states and the rights of people.

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[1] See The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD); (available from http://www.nepad.org/AA0010101.pdf, 18 July 2002); and the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), *The African Peer Review Mechanism*; (available from http://www.nepad.org/Doc006.pdf, 22 July 2002).

1. How to Operationalize the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation

1.1 Background and Purpose of the IPA/CAIR Task Force

The first task force meeting organized jointly by the International Peace Academy (IPA) and the University of the Witwatersrand's Centre for Africa's International Relations (CAIR) on the role of the Southern African Development Community (SADC)[2] and its Organ for Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation (OPDSC) in managing sub-regional conflicts, took place in Johannesburg, South Africa, on 29 March 2002. The meeting involved about thirty diplomats, soldiers, academics, and civil society actors, drawn largely from Southern Africa (see Annex III). Dr. Leonardo Santos Simão, Foreign Minister of Mozambique, the chair of the SADC Organ, participated in the meeting and delivered the keynote address (see Annex II).

This was the first in a series of policy task force meetings to address ways in which Africa's sub-regional organizations can increase their capacity to manage local conflicts. The task force was also part of the IPA Africa program's current three-year project (2000-2003), which focuses on developing regional and sub-regional security mechanisms in Africa. The first seminar, which took place in December 2000 in Gaborone, Botswana, in partnership with the University of the Witwatersrand, the Southern African Regional Institute for Policy Studies (SARIPS) in Zimbabwe, and the African Renaissance Institute (ARI) in Botswana, assessed security issues in Southern Africa.[3] Following this seminar, the IPA/CAIR task force convened in March 2002 to provide recommendations to SADC for operationalizing its security Organ.

The second of IPA's three security seminars took place in September 2001 in Abuja, Nigeria, and was organized in partnership with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).[4] An IPA/ECOWAS task force meeting held in Dakar, Senegal, in August 2002, examined ways of operationalizing the ECOWAS mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Regional Security, established in 1999, to address security issues in West Africa.

During the task force meeting in South Africa in March 2002, participants considered SADC's role in managing sub-regional conflicts. Specifically, the task force discussed SADC's potential peacemaking role in light of significant developments in Southern Africa. The inter-Congolese dialogue, involving the parties in the DRC conflict and began in February 2002 in Sun City, South Africa, was attempting to draft an agreement on a transitional government as a first step to ending the civil war in the DRC; in Angola, the killing of UNITA's leader, Jonas Savimbi, in February 2002, resulted in a cease-fire agreement that provided the best chance for peace in a decade; the controver-

Panelists at the meeting (from l-r): Dr. Christopher Landsberg, Ambassador John Hirsch, and Dr. Jakkie Cilliers

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[2] The members of SADC are: Angola, Botswana, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

[3] See the report by the International Peace Academy, in partnership with the African Renaissance Institute, the Southern African Regional Institute for Policy Studies and the Department of International Relations, University of the Witwatersrand, *Southern Africa's Evolving Security Architecture: Problems and Prospects,* December 2000, Gaborone.

[4] See the report by the International Peace Academy and the Economic Community of West African States, *Toward a Pax West Africana: Building Peace in a Troubled Sub-region,* September 2001, Abuja.

sial March 2002 elections in Zimbabwe failed to resolve tensions surrounding the country's political and land reform crises; and in Lesotho, the electoral changes enacted after the coup attempt of 1998 were about to be tested by elections in May 2002. The task force made several recommendations on ways through which SADC might overcome the obstacles facing the operationalization of its security organ, stressing, in particular, the necessity for institutional changes within SADC itself.

1.2 Background to the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation

During the 1996 SADC meeting in Blantyre, Malawi, members reached an agreement on the need to establish an Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS). SADC leaders agreed on a protocol for the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation (OPDSC) at their summit in Maputo, Mozambique, in 2001. The OPDSC is intended to serve three distinct purposes: first, to address human security needs in Southern Africa during intra- and inter-state conflicts and general political instability; second, to advance a common regional foreign policy, political cooperation, and democracy; and third, to respond to sub-regional conflicts through peacemaking, peacekeeping, or peacebuilding measures.[5] Additionally, the OPDSC aims to provide a flexible and timely response to conflict situations. Yet, as it stands, these goals remain unrealized due to an absence of coherence and stability in policy. Equally significant, it has been difficult to fit the OPDSC into the SADC framework.[6]

To date, the role and performance of SADC in managing sub-regional conflicts has been ambiguous, subject to criticism, and only of limited effectiveness. Both military and diplomatic interventions in Southern Africa have been plagued by divisions within SADC members over its role in managing conflicts.[7] In effect, the protocol relating to when and how the OPDSC should play a role has not been properly articulated or implemented. Furthermore, within the sub-region, much ambiguity and disagreement surrounds the issue of what operationalizing the OPDSC might entail.

In attempting to unravel some of these problems, the IPA/CAIR task force focused on three important issues: first, building operational capacity; second, building human resource capacity; and third, clarifying the relationship between the OPDSC and SADC. All three issues were discussed with reference to four case studies (the DRC, Angola, Zimbabwe, and Lesotho). The meeting attempted to identify the factors impeding the successful operationalization of the OPDSC, and stressed the need for increased institution-building in SADC as a prerequisite for establishing an effective security Organ.

Three significant changes in Africa's post-cold war security architecture are relevant for discussions around the OPDSC. First, since 1990, members of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), created the ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) as a peacekeeping force to intervene in the civil wars in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Bissau.[8] Second, debates about Nigeria's military role in Liberia and Sierra Leone, and South Africa's military

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[5] SADC Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation, Article 2 [Objectives], 8 October 2001.

[6] Christopher Landsberg and Mwesiga Baregu, "Introduction," in Mwesiga Baregu and Christopher Landsberg (eds.) *From Cape to Congo: Southern Africa's Evolving Security Challenges* (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, forthcoming 2002).

[7] See, for example, Mwesiga Baregu, "Economic and Military Security," in Baregu and Landsberg (eds.), *From Cape to Congo*; Jakkie Cilliers, "Building Security in Southern Africa: An Update on the Evolving Architecture," *ISS Monograph* Series no. 43, November 1999; Cedric de Coning, "Breaking the SADC Organ Impasse: Report of a Seminar on the Operationalization of the SADC Organ," *ACCORD Occasional Paper*, no. 6, 1999; and Agostinho Zacarias, "Redefining Security," in Baregu and Landsberg (eds.), *From Cape to Congo*.

[8] See Colonel Festus Aboagye, *ECOMOG: A Sub-regional Experience in Conflict Resolution, Management and Peacekeeping in Liberia* (Accra: Sedco Enterprise, 1999); Adekeye Adebajo, *Building Peace in West Africa: Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau* (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002); Adekeye Adebajo, *Liberia's Civil War: Nigeria, ECOMOG and Regional Security in West Africa* (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002); Abiodun Alao, John Mackinlay, and Funmi Olonisakin, *Peacekeepers, Politicians, and Warlords: The Liberian Peace Process* (Tokyo, New York, and Paris: United Nations University Press, 1999); Eric G. Berman and Katie E. Sams, *Peacekeeping in Africa: Capabilities and Culpabilities* (Geneva and Pretoria: UN Institute for Disarmament Research and Institute for Security Studies, 2000); Comfort Ero, "The Future of ECOMOG in West Africa," in Jakkie Cilliers and Greg Mills (eds.), *From Peacekeeping to Complex Emergencies: Peace Support Missions in Africa* (Johannesburg and Pretoria: The South African Institute of

and diplomatic actions in Lesotho (1998) and Zimbabwe (1999-2002), led to discussions among task force members about regional leadership and sub-regional hegemony. Finally, the current focus on the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD)[9] – particularly its peace, security, democracy, and governance dimensions, as well as its peer review mechanism – could signify a new spirit of increased regional cooperation in Africa. Of equal importance, the transformation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) into the African Union (AU) in July 2002 and the decision to create a new peace and security council within the AU to intervene in local conflicts in cases of war crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity, and unconstitutional changes of regime,[10] mark a significant departure from the non-interventionist and sovereignty-obsessed practices of Africa's international relations during the era of the cold war.[11]

1.3 Challenges Facing the OPDSC

The challenges facing the OPDSC cannot be resolved without dealing with problems surrounding the legitimacy and accountability of SADC states. In order to operationalize its security Organ, SADC members must first clarify the goals and capacity of the organization in addressing Southern Africa's security challenges. Participants at the IPA/CAIR task force meeting suggested that SADC faced questions of legitimacy and the effectiveness of several military interventions as a

H.E. Dr. Leonardo Santos Simão, Foreign Minister of Mozambique

result of its weak institutions and *ad hoc* decision-making procedures, the lack of transparency of its actions, and its relative detachment from policy makers and civil society organizations.[12] We will next briefly address these issues.

SADC's Weak Institutions and Decision-Making Processes

While some analysts have argued that the very act of creating the OPDSC demonstrates the desire of SADC members for cooperative security, SADC's decision-making processes still lack transparency, predictability, and strong institutionalization. As a result, SADC's conflict management structures have suffered from

International Affairs and the Institute for Security Studies, 1999); John Hirsch, *Sierra Leone: Diamonds and the Struggle for Democracy* (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001); Karl Magyar and Earl Conteh-Morgan (eds.), *Peacekeeping in Africa: ECOMOG in Liberia* (Hampshire, London, and New York: Macmillan and St. Martin's Press, 1998); Robert Mortimer, "From ECOMOG to ECOMOG II: Intervention in Sierra Leone," in John W. Harbeson and Donald Rothchild (eds.), *Africa in World Politics: The African State System in Flux* (Colorado and Oxford: Westview Press, Third Edition, 2000); Klaas Van Walraven, *The Pretence of Peace-keeping: ECOMOG, West Africa and Liberia (1990-1998)* (The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations, 1999); and Margaret A. Vogt (ed.), *The Liberian Crisis and ECOMOG: A Bold Attempt at Regional Peacekeeping* (Lagos: Gabumo Press, 1992).

[9] See New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD); (available from http://www.nepad.org/AA0010101.pdf, 18 July 2002); and the International Peace Academy, *NEPAD: African Initiative, New Partnership?* 16 July 2002, New York.

[10] African Union, *Constitutive Act of the African Union*, Article 4(g,h); (available from http://www.au2002.gov.za/docs/key_oau/au_act.htm, 23 July 2002).

[11] See, for example, Adekeye Adebajo and Christopher Landsberg, "The Heirs of Nkrumah: Africa's New Interventionists," *Pugwash Occasional Paper*, vol. 2 no.1, January 2001; Francis Deng, "Africa and the New World Dis-Order: Rethinking Colonial Borders," *The Brookings Review*, Spring 1993; Richard Joseph, "The International Community and Armed Conflict in Africa - Post-Cold War Dilemmas," in Gunnar Sørbø and Peter Vale (eds.), *Out of Conflict: From War to Peace in Africa* (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 1997); and I. William Zartman, "African Regional Security and Changing Patterns of Relations," in Edmond Keller and Donald Rothchild (eds.), *Africa in The New International Order: Rethinking State Sovereignty and Regional Security* (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996).

[12] Indeed, these issues are not unique to SADC. When ECOMOG first intervened in Liberia, several ECOWAS members also challenged

political divisions, a lack of transparency, and a consequent absence of strong regional and external support. Weak institutionalization may not only undermine SADC's public image, but more seriously, could lead to a failure to bind member states to particular decisions in the future. Equally important, the dearth of information and public records regarding SADC's decisions have contributed to an image of the organization as a secretive and unaccountable body.

In defense of SADC, a member of the IPA/CAIR task force asserted that the organization's decision-making process must be understood within the context of the creation of SADC and the history of Southern Africa's strong emphasis on attaining consensus. This characteristic stems from the history of the Front Line States (FLS) whose decision-making processes were characterized by consensus-building in a bid to rid Southern Africa of the twin scourges of apartheid and colonialism. In addition, the FLS operated outside a formally institutionalized system. This past history largely explains the failure, so far, to institutionalize the OPDSC.

Issues of Legitimacy and Transparency

Issues surrounding the legitimacy and transparency of SADC's actions relate to the organization's lack of moral authority and collective support in taking decisions. So far, interventions by SADC in the security sphere have consisted mainly of actions by several states outside the organization's institutional framework rather than collective actions sanctioned by SADC before they occur. The controversial military interventions by South Africa and Botswana in Lesotho (1998) and Zimbabwe, Angola, and Namibia in the DRC (1998) were justified as "SADC" interventions by the interveners, but questioned on legal grounds by several other SADC member states. Outside Southern Africa, similar problems have also arisen with ECOMOG's interventions in Liberia and Sierra Leone.

SADC's Disengagement

Related to criticisms about SADC's lack of transparency and public accountability, SADC's poor engagement with sub-regional civil society actors has also hampered its ability to lead peacemaking efforts in Southern Africa. Despite the existence of official policies to work with civil society organizations,[13] this policy has not been effectively implemented. Civil society actors have in the past, during the sub-region's liberation struggles, been helpful in galvanizing broad-based support for initiatives – a history that SADC could use to build consensus for its peacemaking and democratization efforts. Not only would similar broad-based support for SADC's activities improve its public image, it could also improve the effectiveness of SADC's peacemaking and democratization efforts.

Unlike its counterparts at ECOWAS and IGAD, the SADC secretariat was considered by several task force members as not being receptive to advice and assistance from independent experts. While members of the task force greatly appreciated the presence of Mozambique's Foreign Minister, Dr. Leonardo Santos Simão, chair of the SADC Organ, at the IPA/CAIR meeting, they recommended that a stronger effort be made to engage the SADC secretariat in the future work of the task force. Indeed, for the task force to provide useful and relevant recommendations for operationalizing the SADC Organ, the involvement of the secretariat, in addition to that of senior political officials from Southern Africa, will be indispensable.

We will next assess the four cases discussed during the task force meeting.

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its legitimacy. For more on ECOWAS/ECOMOG operations and divisions within the region see, for example: Emmanuel Kwesi Aning, "The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict: The Case of Liberia and West Africa," *CDR Working Paper* (Copenhagen, Denmark: Centre for Development Research), vol. 97 no. 4, June 1997; Funmi Olonisakin, *Reinventing Peacekeeping in Africa: Conceptual and Legal Issues in ECOMOG Operations* (The Hague, London, and Boston: Kluwer Law International, 2000); and Margaret A. Vogt. "The Involvement of ECOWAS in Liberia's Peace-Keeping," in M.A. Vogt and L.S. Aminu (eds.), *Peacekeeping as a Security Strategy in Africa: Chad and Liberia as Case Studies*, Volume one, (Enugu, Nigeria: Fourth Dimension Publishing Co. Ltd, 1996).

[13] Southern African Development Community, *Declaration and Treaty of SADC*, Article 23 [Non-Governmental Organisations]; (available from http://www.sadc.int/english/protocols/declaration_and_treaty_of_sadc.html#article23, 13 September 2002).

2. Case Study: The Democratic Republic of the Congo

The civil war that erupted in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 1996 has been termed "Africa's First World War," due to the number of countries that have been drawn into the conflict. In many ways, the regional response to the crisis in the DRC has framed much of the discussion on SADC's potential role in managing this conflict. Specifically, the intervention by the coalition of Angola, Namibia,[14] and Zimbabwe on behalf of the government in Kinshasa, and Rwanda and Uganda on behalf of the rebels, raised the question of competitive multilateral actions superseding collective actions. Moreover, South Africa's opposition to military intervention in the DRC brought into sharp relief some of the regional divisions triggered by the crisis.[15] The differing goals of various states intervening in the DRC underpinned a further categorization of the interests of the external actors.[16] Specifically, one participant suggested that external actors be categorized as **peace makers**, those more likely to compromise during peace processes; **peace opportunists**, who support peace if it advances their interests; and **peace spoilers**, who have a vested interest in continuing the war. Under this model, the key to resolving the conflict rests in properly identifying and working with the various interested parties.[17] The current peace process was criticized for excluding the major external actors involved in the conflict from the Lusaka peace process.

2.1 SADC's Potential Role

One option for resolving the DRC conflict would involve SADC heads of state – the only group that can make effective decisions on regional peace and security

Panel on the Democratic Republic of the Congo (from l-r):
Dr. Musifiky Mwanasali, Ms. Lindiwe Zulu, and Dr. Mwesiga Baregu

issues – in a major mediation effort. However, SADC's weakly institutionalized decision-making processes and poor track record of collective action continue to hamper its ability to identify and work with diverse interests to facilitate a successful peace process. SADC's weakness illustrates the need to distinguish between the "obligation of means" and the "obligation of results." According to this view, the organization is obliged to provide the means by which to facilitate a resolution. However, under SADC's present structure, the obligation of means would require that three conditions be met: first, the attainment of consensus within SADC; second, the success of the informal, peer review process that characterizes SADC's "quiet diplomacy"; and third, the designation of a lead nation to spearhead facilitation efforts.

There are problems with the two conditions of institutional consensus for making decisions and employing a peer review mechanism. Whereas consensus is the cornerstone of all regional organizations in Africa, it

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[14] Namibia withdrew its forces from the DRC in October 2001.

[15] Background on the DRC crisis can be found in the following: Mwesiga Baregu (ed.), *Crisis in the Democratic Republic of Congo* (Harare: SAPES Books, 1999); Filip Reyntjens, "Briefing: The Democratic Republic of Congo, From Kabila to Kabila," *African Affairs*, vol.100 no.399, April 2001, pp. 311-317; and Musifiky Mwanasali, "Peace-building in the Democratic Republic of Congo," *International Peace Academy Policy Briefing Series*, April 1998.

[16] For more on the intervention see: International Crisis Group, *Scramble for the Congo: Anatomy of an Ugly War*, Report no. 26 (Nairobi: ICG Africa, 2000); (available from http://www.crisisweb.org/projects/africa/democraticrepublicofcongo/reports/A400130_20122000.pdf, 24 July 2002).

[17] The notion of "spoilers" in peace processes was fully addressed in Stephen John Stedman "Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes," *International Security*, vol. 22 no.2, fall 1997, pp. 5-53. On the importance of integrated peacebuilding, see Elizabeth M. Cousens and Chetan Kumar, *Peacebuilding as Politics: Cultivating Peace in Fragile Societies* (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001).

is a slow process that often prevents speedy action. A recommendation was made by task force members to replace the requirement for consensus with a two-thirds majority vote, as practiced by the ECOWAS security mechanism.[18] Additionally, while informal, peer review actions could result in greater flexibility of actions, a major disadvantage of this approach is the failure to follow up on meetings and a reluctance to sanction parties that do not adhere to agreements. In this regard, it was suggested that SADC make its meetings more public and transparent, and involve local civil society actors more in its work.

Alternatively, SADC may choose to designate a lead state to facilitate the peace process in the DRC. However, the notion of such a state spearheading peacemaking efforts carries with it concerns about legitimacy, bullying hegemony, and issues about military capacity. While many participants recognized that South Africa had the potential to serve as a lead nation in any peacekeeping or mediating role, they raised questions about its legitimacy to undertake such a task due to the history of the South African army in destabilizing its neighbors during the apartheid era.[19]

In recognition of SADC's limitations in managing the DRC conflict, five options were proposed by one task force member: first, the UN Mission in the Congo (MONUC) should be maintained and expanded; second, the "allied forces" (Zimbabwe and Angola) already in the DRC should be folded into MONUC; third, a regional SADC peacekeeping force should be established consisting of states not currently embroiled in the conflict; fourth, South Africa should be encouraged to act as a lead nation in providing a peacekeeping force in the DRC; and fifth, the Ceasefire Agreement of 1999, signed in Lusaka, Zambia, should be modified to bring in external actors not included in the Agreement. Of these options, the most viable, according to this task force member, were to fold the "allied forces" into the UN peacekeeping operation, promote South Africa as a lead nation, and expand the participants in the Lusaka peace process. One participant, reporting from her experience in the inter-Congolese dialogue that was taking place at Sun City, South Africa, noted that the most powerful parties in the DRC peace process concerned themselves principally with the composition of a transitional government, defense and security issues, and the details of a new constitution. These dominant actors effectively marginalized non-armed civil society groups who attended the talks, reflecting the difficulty of implementing any of these approaches.

Of all the proposed solutions for ending the DRC conflict, the issue of designating South Africa to act as a lead nation generated the most heated debate among participants. This debate highlighted the absence of institutionalized mechanisms as well as the strong opposition to a South African military role. Criticisms were tied to South Africa's military intervention, along with Botswana, in Lesotho in 1998, which several SADC members and many analysts believed lacked international legitimacy and was militarily flawed. Other task force members, however, stressed the importance of lead nations, or pivotal states, in staging effective regional military interventions. They felt that many of the shortcomings created by questions of legitimacy could be overcome through closer consultation within SADC. The examples of Nigeria's interventions in Sierra Leone and Liberia were cited to justify this point.[20] Yet other participants cast doubt on the capacity of any African state to act as a lead nation in undertaking military interventions, due to the domestic political and socio-economic constraints facing these states.

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[18] See the ECOWAS Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping, and Security, Lomé, 10 December 1999.

[19] See Adekeye Adebajo and Christopher Landsberg, "South Africa and Nigeria as Regional Hegemons," in Baregu and Landsberg (eds.), *From Cape to Congo*; Adebayo Adedeji (ed.), *South Africa: Within or Apart?* (London and Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Zed Books, 1996); and James Barber and John Barratt, *South Africa's Foreign Policy: The Search for Status and Security, 1945-1988* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

[20] Nigeria bore at least eighty percent of the financial costs and contributed over seventy percent of the troops for the two ECOMOG missions in Liberia and Sierra Leone.

3. Case Study: Angola

The discussion surrounding the potential role of SADC's peacemaking role in Angola was framed by recent developments in the country's civil war.[21] The killing of Jonas Savimbi, leader of the *União para a Indepêndencia Total de Angola* (UNITA) rebel movement, by government troops on 22 February 2002, led to the signing of a cease-fire agreement and the start of disarmament and demobilization of armed fighters. These events provided the best opportunity in a decade for an end to the 27-year civil war, and led to the resumption of negotiations between the ruling *Movimento Popular para a Libertacão de Angola* (MPLA) and UNITA to implement the Lusaka Protocol of 1994.

Both UNITA and the MPLA find themselves in weakened positions. Through progressively consolidating power in his immediate circle – over the years several top generals in UNITA have defected, disappeared, or been killed on Savimbi's orders – Savimbi destroyed UNITA by weakening its military leadership. The fact that the government and UNITA signed a new cease-fire agreement just six weeks after Savimbi's death underscored UNITA's weakness, which resulted in the willingness among many of its war-weary leadership and cadres to lay down their arms. Equally significant, there are good reasons to believe that the MPLA and UNITA can now create a unified army – an important first step toward peace. Furthermore, there are increasing ties across both parties and mutual respect between the military top brass of the MPLA and UNITA. For the MPLA, the internal divisions within the ruling party will become more visible without Savimbi as the unifying enemy. The MPLA's political support has waned due to the ever-worsening humanitarian and economic crises in Angola. Current estimates indicate that as many as seven million people in Angola have been displaced as a result of the civil war. Several task force members also argued that the MPLA regime could no longer use the war – and the existence of Savimbi – as an excuse

Panel on Angola (from l-r): Professor Gerald Bender, H.E. Dr. Leonardo Santos Simão, and Dr. Vincente Pinto de Andrade

for not employing the country's vast oil resources to develop the country and to address pressing humanitarian needs. It was felt that the government's use of oil resources and the patrimonial relationship between the government and foreign oil companies would now come under closer scrutiny.

In the post-war environment, Angola's government will face pressure to transform itself politically and, in particular, to increase the transparency of its relationship with foreign oil companies in order to address the urgent humanitarian and economic crises. However, SADC cannot adequately assist Angola in addressing these key concerns due to its institutional inability to take collective action and its lack of resources, in contrast to the better-endowed UN, for peacebuilding.

Political Reform in Angola

According to a task force member, Angola's urgent economic and humanitarian problems highlight the need, and provide an opportunity, for a viable opposition to the MPLA. While UNITA offers one possible political alternative, the weakening of both UNITA and the MPLA could eventually result in the creation of a third party composed of dissatisfied members of both parties. Significantly, even Angola's political elite has begun to discuss the need for a third party to provide

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[21] For perspectives on the recent events in Angola, see: Aida Mengistu, "Looking to Angola's Future," *West Africa*, 11- 17 March 2002, pp. 17-18; William Minter, "Angola After Savimbi," *The Nation*, 29 April 2002, p. 7; and Alex Vines, "Beyond Savimbi," *The World Today*, April 2002, p. 14.

political competition to the ruling MPLA. Still, instituting political reform in Angola will not be easy and will require additional changes to the political system. The MPLA currently dominates the political system in Angola. While the 1990 revision of the constitution provided for reforms to broaden political space, the MPLA, as the ruling party, still appoints all government officials, even at the administrative level.[22] Changes to Angola's political structure will require additional reforms to the electoral system.

The Government and Foreign Oil Companies

Oil accounted for seventy-five to ninety percent of the Angolan government's revenues in 1999.[23] Recent research by the UK-based NGO, Global Witness, indicates that ChevronTexaco contributed 44.3 percent of all government oil revenues, while TotalFinaElf contributed 9.7 percent. (Sonangol, the Angolan state oil company, contributed 36 percent).[24] The MPLA government's secrecy and lack of accountability in reporting oil revenues have challenged its probity and commitment to use its oil wealth for the benefit of its population. Indeed, despite its oil wealth, Angola ranked 146th (out of 162) on the UNDP's Human Development Index in 2001.[25] Moreover, according to a member of the IPA/CAIR task force, foreign oil companies in Angola have colluded with the government in Luanda to establish a patrimonial system in which access to oil revenues is handed out to local clients to maintain political support for the government. Already, the Angolan public has begun to press for changes in the government's use of the country's oil resources. Furthermore, several task force members felt that, in order to attract international donor assistance, the MPLA government will have to alter its often unaccountable relationship with foreign oil companies.

Increasing the transparency of the government's relationship with foreign oil companies will not be easy, as revealed by the experience of British Petroleum (BP). In response to a request from Global Witness in January 2001, BP pledged to reveal its production by block, aggregate payments to Sonangol, and revenue contributions to the Angolan government. The company's announcement resulted in threats by the government to cancel its contract with BP. The letter sent to BP was also copied to other foreign oil companies. Foreign oil companies in Angola have provided varying degrees of information on their dealings with the MPLA government, as required by their home countries, but BP's disclosures would have exceeded the standard practice.[26] The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has also frequently requested the Angolan government to increase the transparency of its budget and to publish its receipts from foreign oil companies. However, these requests have not yet been met.[27]

At the same time, it was acknowledged that the oil industry does not hold the key to the long-term future of Angola's economic revival: the oil industry is technology-intensive and only employs about one percent of the Angolan population. Therefore,

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[22] On the political system in Angola, see Christine Messiant, "The Eduardo Dos Santos Foundation: Or, How Angola's Regime is Taking Over Civil Society," *African Affairs*, vol. 100 no.399, April 2001, pp. 287-308.

[23] Duncan Clarke, "Petroleum Prospects and Political Power," in Jakkie Cilliers and Christian Dietrich (eds.), *Angola's War Economy: The Role of Oil and Diamonds* (Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, 2000), p. 196; and Tony Hodges, *Angola: from Afro-Stalinism to Petro-Diamond Capitalism* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001).

[24] Global Witness, *The Devastating Story of Oil and Banking in Angola's Privatised War*, 25 March 2002, p. 49; (available from http://www.globalwitness.org/campaigns/oil/index.html, 10 July 2002).

[25] United Nations Development Program, Human Development Report, 2001; (available from http://www.undp.org/hdr2001/indicator/indic_13_1_1.html, 11 July 2002).

[26] Global Witness, *The Devastating Story of Oil and Banking in Angola's Privatised War*, pp. 41-42.

[27] See, for example, International Monetary Fund, *IMF Concludes Article IV Consultation with Angola*, 10 August 2000; (available from http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pn/2000/pn0062.htm, 10 July 2002); International Monetary Fund, *Angola: Preliminary Conclusions of the IMF Mission*, 14 August 2001; (available from http://www.imf.org/external/np/ms/2001/081401.htm, 10 July 2002); and International Monetary Fund, *Angola - 2002 Article IV Consultation, Angola: Preliminary Conclusions of the IMF Mission*, 19 February 2002; (available from http://www.imf.org/external/np/ms/2002/021902.htm, 10 July 2002).

economic growth will entail more than simply expanding the oil sector, and will require the government to invest in other sectors of the economy.

3.1 SADC's Role in Angola's Transition

SADC's ability to influence the Angolan government is limited by the absence of a tradition of collective action, the reluctance of the Angolan government to allow external intervention in its domestic affairs, and SADC's lack of adequate resources for post-conflict peacebuilding. According to one participant, Angola has traditionally been unwilling to prioritize SADC in its foreign policy,[28] nor has SADC played a major role in addressing the civil conflict in Angola. Important examples of Angola's assertiveness in the sphere of foreign policy include its recent military interventions in the DRC and Congo-Brazzaville, without the explicit sanction of SADC. Furthermore, SADC members have interacted with Angola in bilateral consultations outside of the public view – once again increasing the difficulty of judging the organization's conflict management efforts.

Several task force members noted that the most effective role for SADC could be to use peer pressure on the Angolan government to become more financially transparent, to address humanitarian issues urgently, and to encourage the participation of UNITA in both the political system and in a new, integrated national army.[29] However, due to SADC's lack of resources and dependence on external sources for about eighty percent of its budget, the organization lacks the capacity to contribute significantly to peacebuilding efforts in Angola.[30] Encouragingly, SADC acted multilaterally in imposing economic sanctions on UNITA in 1998 at its annual summit in Mauritius.[31] Angola's election as chair in 2002 offers the organization an opportunity to be more involved in peacebuilding efforts in the country, in co-operation with the UN.

Angola's military power has also limited SADC's peacemaking role. The country clearly sees itself as a potential hegemon and rival to South Africa, particularly following its recent military interventions, and due to its vast oil and diamond wealth. Angola's military power illustrates the difficulty of SADC (and other sub-regional and regional organizations both within and outside Africa) in intervening in large, potentially powerful states. Most recently, SADC also faced this problem in the case of Zimbabwe.

3.2 The Potential Role of the UN

Neither the Bicesse Accords (1991) nor the Lusaka Protocol (1994) has been successfully implemented, despite the UN's involvement in negotiating both agreements. In the course of the implementation of the Bicesse accords, the main complaints and criticisms leveled at the UN revolved around the relative marginalization of the UN and the small number of UN peacekeepers (350 unarmed military and 126 police officers).[32] As a result of the inadequate size of the UN

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[28] See, for example, Gerald Bender, "Peacemaking in Southern Africa: the Luanda-Pretoria Tug of War," *Third World Quarterly*, vol.11, January 1989, pp. 15-30; and Assis Malaquias, "Angola: The Foreign Policy of a Decaying State," in Stephen Wright (ed.), *African Foreign Policies* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1999), pp. 23-42.

[29] On the importance of demobilization generally see, for example, Kees Kingma, "Demobilization of Combatants After Civil Wars in Africa and Their Reintegration Into Civilian Life," *Policy Science*, vol.30 no.3, August 1997, pp.151-165; and Stephen John Stedman, *Implementing Peace Agreements in Civil Wars: Lessons and Recommendations for Policymakers* (New York: International Peace Academy, May 2001).

[30] See Talitha Bertelsmann-Scott, "The European Union," in Baregu and Landsberg (eds.), *From Cape to Congo*.

[31] See the following SADC communiqués: Mauritius - Grand Bay: 13-14 September 1998; (available from http://www.sadc.int/english/archive/communiques/summit98.html, 11 July 2002); 1999 SADC Summit Communiqué, 17 and 18 August 1999, paragraphs15-18; (available from http://www.sadc.int/english/communiques/summit99.html, 11 July 2002); 2000 SADC Summit Final Communiqué, 6 - 7 August 2000, paragraphs 12-13; (available from http://www.sadc.int/english/communiques/summit00.html, 11 July 2002); and 2001 SADC Summit Final Communiqué, 12 - 14 August 2001, paragraphs 12-13; (available from http://www.sadc.int/english/communiques/summit01.html, 11 July 2002).

[32] Margaret Joan Anstee "Background Paper: Angola," in Nassrine Azimi and Chang Li Lin (eds.), *The Nexus Between Peacekeeping and Peace-Building: Debriefing and Lessons*, Report of the 1999 Singapore Conference (Boston: Kluwer Law International, 2000), p.

force and the narrow mandate under which it operated, monitoring of the Bicesse Accords suffered.[33] Following its experience in implementing the Bicesse accord, the UN radically altered its approach during the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol. Rather than the small number of military and police officers deployed to implement the Bicesse accords, the Lusaka Protocol called for seven thousand peacekeepers.[34] Additionally, the UN took a stronger stand against UNITA, the perceived "spoiler"[35] in the peace process. In particular, the UN Security Council adopted several resolutions that imposed travel and commercial sanctions against UNITA's moves to thwart the peace process.[36] Yet, war resumed in 1998.

At present, the UN's role in Angola is still evolving. The UN appointed a Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mussagy Jeichande, to Angola in August 2000. Ibrahim Gambari, the UN Secretary-General's Special Advisor on Africa, has also been deeply involved in peacemaking and peacebuilding efforts in Angola. However, at the time of writing, it remains to be seen in what capacity and how effectively the UN can mobilize resources for post-conflict peacebuilding in Angola.

86; UN Security Council, "Letter dated 17 May 1991 from the Chargé D'Affaires A.I. of the Permanent Mission of Angola to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General," (S/22627), 17 May 1991, (Readex Microfiche), paragraph 15; and UN Security Council, "Letter dated 14 May 1992 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of the Security Council," (S/23985), 20 May 1992 (Readex Microprint).

[33] Anstee, "Background Paper: Angola," p. 89.

[34] UN Security Council, 3499th Meeting, "Resolution 976 (1995) [On the establishment of the UN Angola Verification Mission III]," (S/RES/976). 8 February 1995, paragraph 1; (available from http://www.un.org/Doc/scres/1995/9503841e.htm, 12 October 2001).

[35] On spoilers see: Stedman, "Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes."

[36] See for example, UN Security Council, 3827th meeting, "Resolution 1135 (1997) [On the Situation in Angola]," (S/RES/1135). 29 October 1997 (Readex Microprint), paragraph 6; UN Security Council, 3894th meeting, "Resolution 1176 (1998) [On the Situation in Angola]," (S/RES/1176). 24 June 1998, paragraph 2; (available from http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1998/sres1176.htm, 12 October 2001).

4. Case Study: Zimbabwe

The election in Zimbabwe in March 2002 generated widespread controversy due to differing perceptions about the legitimacy and fairness of the voting process. In reaction to questions surrounding Zimbabwe's electoral process, the Commonwealth, the US, and the European Union (EU) imposed sanctions on the regime of President Robert Mugabe. Washington and Brussels imposed economic and travel sanctions, while the Commonwealth suspended Zimbabwe from participation in its institutions for one year.[37]

Western governments have criticized Mugabe's handling of the land issue and the government's support of the forcible occupation of farms by war veterans. Land reform, undertaken to provide economic opportunities to many of Zimbabwe's black population, began in the 1970s. However, despite various legislative acts, the transfer of land did not occur quickly or on a large scale; the Lancaster House agreement of 1979 that ended the civil war constrained any large-scale transfer of land for a decade. World Bank policies of market-based land reform and the conditions attached to structural adjustment programs further slowed the transfer of land. Land reform also failed due to the inability of the Zimbabwean government to finance its share of the redistribution of land from its limited tax base.[38] Facing an angry constituency - as well as one adversely affected by the structural adjustment program - the government began an aggressive process of land reform in 1997 by designating nearly 1,500 acres of land for forcible acquisition. Following delays in implementing this policy, many Zimbabweans responded by forcibly occupying land.[39]

The forcible seizure of land by war veterans and their supporters resulted in several violent clashes with white farmers – some reports state that the 4,000 white farmers own over fifty percent of the most fertile land[40] – and several deaths on both sides. Western governments and other international actors have criticized Mugabe for what they see as encouraging violence over land rights and the occupation of farms. As the elections of March 2002 approached, Mugabe was accused of stifling dissent to the government's land reform policy. Specifically, the government subjected members of the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) to harassment, restricted election workers to public servants, and disallowed voter education by non-governmental organizations.[41] In addition, the Zimbabwean government barred many Western journalists from entering and reporting in Zimbabwe.

4.1 A Role for SADC in Zimbabwe

In stark contrast to the actions of Britain, the EU, and the US outlined above, SADC and the OAU have not taken any public steps to sanction Mugabe or to criticize him for the violence that has accompanied land occupations. Instead, SADC has employed "quiet diplomacy" where engagement and private criticism are offered in a cooperative spirit.[42] As a result, SADC's actions seem muted compared to those of the EU and the US.

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[37] For an overview of the political crisis facing Zimbabwe, see International Crisis Group, "All Bark and No Bite? The International Response to Zimbabwe's Crisis?" Report 25, January 2002; (available from: http://www.crisisweb.org/projects/showreport. cfm?reportid=531, 24 July 2002); Sam Moyo, *Land and Democracy in Zimbabwe* (Harare: SAPES Books, 1999); and Robert Rotberg, *Ending Autocracy, Enabling Democracy: The Tribulations of Southern Africa, 1960-2000* (Cambridge: World Peace Foundation, 2002), pp. 226-280.

[38] International Peace Academy, *Democracy and Land Reform in Zimbabwe*, 25 February 2002, New York, p. 3.

[39] For a review of the land policy, see Sam Moyo and Prosper Matondi, "The Politics of Land Reform," in Baregu and Landsberg (eds.), *From Cape to Congo*. For commentary on the adverse effects of the structural adjustment program see International Peace Academy, D*emocracy and Land Reform in Zimbabwe*, p. 4.

[40] *New York Times*, 13 September 2002, p. A9.

[41] See, for example, International Peace Academy, *Democracy and Land Reform in Zimbabwe*; and Robert Rotberg, "Saving Zimbabwe: Only Intervention by the Country's Neighbors can Prevent Catastrophe in the Forthcoming Elections," *Financial Times*, 18 January 2002.

[42] International Peace Academy, *Democracy and Land Reform in Zimbabwe*, p. 8.

Some participants at the task force meeting

According to several task force members, SADC could potentially intervene more concretely in Zimbabwe's food crisis and in mitigating the effects of external economic sanctions. In order to convince foreign donors to provide assistance to Zimbabwe, SADC could argue that the country's challenges must be seen within a larger regional context, since many other Southern African states, such as Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, and Zambia, also face food shortages due to a severe drought that is currently afflicting the sub-region.[43] Thus, solutions to the food crisis may benefit not just Zimbabwe, but Southern Africa as a whole. Moreover, issues of land reform plague or have plagued other countries in Southern

Africa, namely, Namibia, Angola, Tanzania, Malawi, and South Africa. A successful approach to these issues would require SADC to take a collective, rather than a bilateral or a competitive, multilateral approach.

Zimbabwe could resolve its land question itself through rewriting the country's constitution to allow for a more peaceful and orderly land reform process. In this case, SADC could act as a facilitator in rewriting Zimbabwe's constitution and convincing the government to find political accommodation with the opposition MDC party. SADC could also play an intermediary role between Zimbabwe and the West by urging the international donor community to provide urgently needed food aid, and convincing donors to separate their acrimonious relations with Mugabe from the suffering of Zimbabwe's masses. A few participants urged SADC leaders to help find an "exit strategy" for Mugabe by convincing him to surrender political power and to oversee an orderly political succession before the end of his current term in office. Under each of these scenarios, SADC must first transform itself institutionally before it can act in a collective manner. Bilateral or competitively multi-lateral actions will weaken efforts to influence external sanctions and could provide foreign actors an opportunity to exacerbate divisions in the region, as has been demonstrated by events in the DRC.

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[43] On the dimensions of the food crisis, see World Food Program, "Southern African Crisis Response (EMPO 10200)," 1 July 2002; (available from http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/vID/2B23D8C2F53ADCCB85256BF000677D98?OpenDocument, 23 July 2002).

5. Case Study: Lesotho

Three recent crises in Lesotho stemmed from the post-electoral violence that followed the 1993 and 1998 elections: the 1993 mutiny, the 1994 "monarchical" coup, and the 1998 attempted coup. In each case, South Africa, along with Botswana and Zimbabwe, were instrumental in efforts to resolve the crises. Given Lesotho's recent history of instability, the question before the task force was SADC's potential role to forestall further electoral crises in Lesotho.[44] The actions of South Africa, Botswana, and Zimbabwe, illustrate the difficulties that SADC faces in the area of peacemaking.

Lesotho's general election of 1993 brought the opposition Basutoland Congress Party (BCP) back to power, replacing the Basutoland National Party (BNP). However, for BNP supporters and members of the army, the rise of the BCP created fears of political irrelevance. The army's commander threatened to overthrow the BCP government if it did not meet its demand for a one hundred percent wage increase. The refusal of the BCP to meet this demand was met by threats by BNP supporters to overthrow the government. An army mutiny followed. Only an agreement, crafted by South Africa, Botswana, and Zimbabwe – known as the Troika – in which the army received a sixty-six percent pay increase, temporarily resolved the crisis.[45]

In August 1994, South Africa, Botswana, and Zimbabwe reversed an attempt by King Letsie III and the BNP to replace the elected BCP government. The King and the BNP staged a "monarchical" coup in reaction to an inquiry conducted by the BCP which questioned the basis for the removal from the throne of King Letsie's father, King Moshoeshoe, by the BNP.

Diplomatic pressure by Zimbabwe, South Africa, and Botswana succeeded in reversing the coup and restoring the government of the BCP to power. The settlement provided for the reinstatement of King Moshoeshoe to the throne.[46]

The third intervention in Lesotho involved South Africa and Botswana intervening militarily following an attempted coup by the army in 1998 against the ruling Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD), a splinter group of the BCP, charging that the May 1998 election had been rigged.[47] Following the military intervention, South Africa's President Thabo Mbeki recommended the creation of a SADC Commission to review the election results. When the situation continued to deteriorate, South Africa created the Interim Political Authority to organize new elections and to restructure the political system.[48] The extended Troika (South Africa, Botswana, Zimbabwe, Namibia, and Mozambique) was critical in ensuring that all stakeholders in Lesotho were engaged in resolving the crises and insisted on the creation of inclusive electoral policies and governance.

5.1 Explaining the Crises

A member of the IPA/CAIR task force advanced two inter-related explanations for the electoral crises in Lesotho, based principally on a theory of economic patronage. According to this view, the post-electoral violence in Lesotho can be traced to the declining resources of the state, which have traditionally provided patronage to buy political support. Declining resources reflect the increasing globalization of the economy and the worsening terms of trade for Lesotho. As a result of the overwhelming importance of the state sector, the competition for ownership of the state has become a zero-sum game. Under these conditions

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[44] For a good overview of the electoral history of Lesotho see, Roger Southall and Roddy Fox, "Lesotho's General Election of 1998: Rigged or De Rigeur?" *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, vol.37 no.4, December 1999, pp. 669-696.

[45] Ibid. p. 674

[46] Ibid. p. 675.

[47] Khabela Matlosa, "The Lesotho Conflict: Major Causes and Management," in Kato Lambrecht (ed.), *Crisis in Lesotho: The Challenge of Managing Conflict in Southern Africa*, Foundation for Global Dialogue, African Dialogue Series No. 2, (Braamfontein, South Africa: Foundation for Global Dialogue, March 1999), pp. 6-11. See also Southall and Fox, "Lesotho's General Election of 1998."

[48] Southall and Fox, "Lesotho's General Election of 1998," p. 670.

in which the ruling party has a monopoly of resources, opposition parties are cut off from access to patronage for their supporters. The electoral system of First-Past-The-Post (FPTP) further exacerbated the winner-take-all nature of politics.[49]

The second explanation for Lesotho's electoral crises focused on rigid voting patterns. According to this view, Lesotho's electors tend to maintain strict allegiance to their parties based on the benefits they have received or expect to receive from the ruling party. The FPTP electoral system also intensifies the rigidity of voting blocs, as loyal political allegiances ensure that political parties obtain a consistent amount of support, thus creating permanent minorities and majorities.

5.2 The role of SADC

While South Africa and Botswana eventually helped to stabilize the 1994 and 1998 crises in Lesotho, their claim to have acted on behalf of SADC in 1998 has been disputed by several member states, weakening the legitimacy of the intervention. In the 1998 post-election crisis, both South Africa and Botswana intervened militarily, though several task force members argued that the contribution of Botswana

amounted to a token presence. This intervention was badly executed and resulted in several civilian deaths. The military intervention also raised the specter of a bullying South African hegemon and revived, in some minds, historical memories of the past destabilization actions of the apartheid regime. Zimbabwe, Angola, and Namibia were critical of the intervention and questioned South Africa's earlier failure to intervene on their side in the DRC.

In anticipation of the May 2002 election in Lesotho, several task force members suggested that SADC could act as a facilitator for dialogue between the country's parties to discuss the means through which compromises could be reached between electoral winners and losers. The example of the SADC-established Interim Political Authority, which helped to resolve the 1998 crisis in Lesotho by facilitating dialogue, serves as a potential model for a facilitating forum. Another possible channel is SADC's extended Troika, which continues to act as a facilitator to help Lesotho's political parties arrive at solutions that encourage compromise and seek alternatives to the present FPTP electoral system. As a result of this process, Lesotho's political parties have now opted for a mixed FPTP and Proportional Representation system.

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[49] This view, espoused by an IPA/CAIR task force participant, is also found in the criticism of Lesotho's first-past-the-post or majoritarian system (see Southall and Fox "Lesotho's General Election of 1998"). Other work has criticized majoritarian, winner-take-all systems in divided societies. See, for example, Arend Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977); Ben Reilly and Andrew Reynolds, *Electoral Systems and Conflict in Divided Societies*, Papers on International Conflict Resolution, no. 2. Committee on International Conflict Resolution, Committee on Behavioral and Social Sciences and Education, (National Research Council, Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1999); and Timothy D. Sisk, *Powersharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflict* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1996).

6. Further Issues for Discussion

The discussion of the four case studies and the opertionalization of the OPDSC revealed a number of issues that require further attention:

- *Race relations in Zimbabwe*: The crisis in Zimbabwe exposed the need for a fuller treatment of the impact of race relations on the issue of land reform, the outcome of the electoral process, and the ramifications of these issues for future sub-regional peace and security. Issues of land and race also exist in other sub-regional countries, such as Namibia and South Africa.

- *Expansion of the definition of security*: This should be further expanded to include food security, civil society, human rights, HIV/AIDS, and other, broader development issues. The broadening of the definition of security beyond strictly military concerns could also provide a larger role for SADC in Southern Africa.

- *Role of the IPA/CAIR task force*: The role of the IPA/CAIR task force, its goals, and its relationship with SADC should continue to be refined. Other SADC-related bodies, such as the SADC parliamentary forum, could be included within the scope of the task force. Members of the SADC secretariat should be encouraged to participate in its future work. Additionally, the task force should focus on the role of powerful external actors who may not be present at the negotiating table. Specifically, it should pay attention to the role of Western governments, foreign commercial firms, multinational oil companies, and other influential actors.

- *Engagement of civil society*: Several civil society actors featured prominently as members of the IPA/CAIR task force. Concerns were raised that the top-down nature of various SADC peace initiatives has failed to garner support from civil society groups in Southern Africa. In fact, civil society organizations (CSOs) have not been consulted or involved in SADC's regional interventions. Partnerships with CSOs could increase support for SADC's peacemaking efforts and make its decisions more transparent.

Civil society groups have been involved in organizing protests or public demonstrations to affect public policy, and have sometimes provided humanitarian assistance during conflicts. Indeed, church groups in Angola sought to act as a pressure group on both parties to negotiate a peaceful end to the conflict.[50] However, policy-makers in Southern Africa have often excluded civil society groups from peace processes. One of the challenges that civil society groups in Southern Africa must overcome is to separate themselves from governments with whom they fought during liberation struggles.[51]

- *Electoral outcomes*: The electoral problems in Lesotho and Zimbabwe have reinforced the need for sub-regional consensus within SADC on acceptable electoral outcomes. Agreeing on acceptable electoral standards could also lead to more effective regional responses to crises. NEPAD's evolving African Peer Review Mechanism may be relevant in this regard. The issue of term limits for sitting presidents is also important, as leaders in Zimbabwe and Namibia have successfully extended their stay in power through constitutional changes. (Unsuccessful efforts were made to do the same in Zambia and, most recently, in Malawi). On a positive note, the leaders of Angola and Mozambique have agreed to step down after their current presidential terms expire.

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[50] Patrick Molutsi, "Civil Society in Southern Africa," in Baregu and Landsberg (eds.), *From Cape to Congo*.

[51] Ibid.

7. Postscript: Events since April 2002

In concluding this report, we will briefly provide a summary of important developments in our four cases since the task force meeting on 29 March 2002.

7.1 The Democratic Republic of the Congo

Since the SADC Task force meeting concluded on 29 March 2002, the DRC has experienced both progress and setbacks. Encouragingly, the Lusaka Peace Accord of 1999, which called for a cease-fire, has continued largely to hold among many of the groups that signed it.[52] On 4 July 2002, talks between the government of the DRC and Rwanda, which backs the *Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie* (RCD), the largest rebel force, were held in South Africa to discuss the conditions under which Rwanda would consider withdrawing from the DRC. Under South African mediation, Rwanda agreed to withdraw from the DRC in return for the government in Kinshasa disarming militias in eastern DRC that have sought to destabilize the regime in Kigali. It is unclear whether this agreement will be implemented.

In May 2002, fighting in Kisangani by dissident RCD-Goma soldiers, who were calling for the departure of Rwandan troops, led to renewed instability. When reinforcements of RCD-Goma soldiers were sent to Kisangani, nearly 150 people perished in the ensuing fighting.[53] The resurgence in violence by the RCD can be traced to the inter-Congolese dialogue, which took place in Sun City, South Africa, between 25 February and 18 April 2002. After the facilitator of the dialogue, Sir Ketumile Masire, former president of Botswana, failed to deliver a comprehensive settlement, South Africa's president, Thabo Mbeki, tried to stitch together an accord between the parties. Neither initiative succeeded.

The results of the inter-Congolese dialogue were mixed. The three main warring parties could not agree on a power-sharing agreement, resulting in the government, the *Mouvement de Libération du Congo* (MLC), and several other delegates signing a power-sharing deal. The agreement envisions a thirty-month transitional period before elections are held. Under the accord, Joseph Kabila is to continue as president, with a prime minister nominated by the MLC. The major dissenter to the government's agreement was the RCD, strongly supported by Rwanda. On 26 April 2002, the RCD-Goma joined with the *Union pour la Démocratie et le Progrès Social* (UDPS) to form an alliance: *Alliance pour la Sauvegarde du Dialogue Inter-Congolais*.[54]

The exclusion of the RCD from the power-sharing agreement resulted in its refusal to abide by the UN Security Council's decision that it should begin disarmament in Goma and Kisangani.[55] The recent antagonism between RCD-Goma and the UN took a more serious turn in June 2002 when RCD-Goma supporters assaulted two UN workers.[56]

The presence in the DRC of foreign troops from Rwanda, Uganda, Zimbabwe, and Angola also continues to complicate peacemaking efforts. (The Namibian forces withdrew in 2001).

7.2 Angola

After three failed peace agreements, the *Memorandum of Understanding Addendum to the Lusaka Protocol for*

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[52] UN Security Council, *Eleventh report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo* (S/2002/621), 5 June 2002, paragraphs 65-66; (available from http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/reports/2002/621e.pdf, 8 July 2002).

[53] Ibid. paragraphs 5-10. For the number of fatalities see: "UN Expert Says More than 150 Killed in DR Congo Mutiny," *Agence France-Presse (AFP)*, 27 June 2002; (available from http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/480fa8736b88bbc3c12564f6004c8ad5/6b2798f2825efd19c1256be500504b92?OpenDocument, 8 July 2002).

[54] UN Security Council, (S/2002/621), paragraphs 2-4.

[55] Ibid. paragraph 11.

[56] United Nations, "Secretary-General Strongly Condemns Acts of Intimidation Against Mission in Democratic Republic of Congo," 18 June 2002, (SG/SM/8275, AFR/421); (available from http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2002/sgsm8275.doc.htm, 24 July 2002).

the Cessation of Hostilities and Resolution of Outstanding Military Issues under Lusaka (MOU) was signed by the Angolan government and UNITA on 4 April 2002. Many analysts view the MOU as marking the end of Angola's 27-year civil war.[57] However, issues of disarmament, demobilization, creating a new army, and addressing the country's humanitarian emergency may still threaten the implementation of the MOU.

The MOU was precipitated by the death of UNITA's leader, Jonas Savimbi, on 22 February 2002 during a battle with government soldiers. UNITA's second-in-command, Antonio Dembo, died shortly after Savimbi, placing the leadership of the party in the hands of UNITA's Secretary-General, Commander Paulo 'Gato' Lukambo. The main task for UNITA, according to the MOU, is to demobilize its troops. For its part, the government has committed itself to permitting UNITA to compete in national elections scheduled for the next 18 months to two years, following a successful cease-fire.[58] (Angola last held elections in September 1992). Additionally, the government has agreed to undertake a reintegration program and to incorporate UNITA troops into the national army and police force. At the end of June 2002, the government reported that the demobilization of UNITA's 80,000 soldiers was complete; however, only 26,700 weapons were surrendered.[59]

Despite recent promising events, Angola still faces a humanitarian crisis that could threaten political stability. In July 2002, the UN's review of the Angolan crisis estimated that an additional $141 million would be needed to fund humanitarian projects in Angola between July and December 2002.[60] Reports from aid agencies continue to focus on food shortages and atrocious and unsanitary conditions at demobilization camps.[61] As a result, some demobilized soldiers have begun to leave their camps in search of food. The government in Luanda has warned that such departures increase the threat of renewed conflict[62] and has urged the international donor community to provide the assistance to take advantage of this window of peace.

The UN has also begun to articulate a role for itself in peacebuilding efforts in Angola. In July 2002, the UN decided to increase its presence in Angola.[63] Ibrahim Gambari, the UN Secretary-General's Special Advisor on Africa, announced that the UN would serve as an observer on the Joint Commission of the MOU and send eleven military observes to serve on the Technical Group of the Joint Military Commission, as well as several observers to serve on civilian commissions. Additionally, the UN has assisted the Angolan government with the quartering of UNITA soldiers.[64] In September 2002, Ibrahim Gambari was appointed as the UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Angola for a period of sixty days.

7.3 Zimbabwe

Criticisms of the March 2002 elections in Zimbabwe have continued. In particular, as part of its post-election strategy, the opposition MDC has lobbied

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[57] UN Security Council, *Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on the Situation in Angola* (S/2002/834), 26 July 2002; paragraphs 7-8; (available from http://daccess-ods.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N02/499/22/PDF/N0249922.pdf?OpenElement, 13 September 2002).

[58] "Angolan President Says Elections After Cease-Fire and UNITA Demilitarization," Lisbon RTP Internacional Television in Portuguese 1300 GMT 25 February 2002 (FBIS Translated Excerpt). Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. *FBIS Daily Report – West Europe, Southern Africa* 26 February 2002 (Accessed online: 26 June 2002; FBIS-WEU-2002-0225).

[59] "Encampment and disarming of Angola's UNITA rebels complete: government" *Agence France Press* 21 June 2002. Online. LEXIS-NEXIS® Academic Universe on 28 June 2002.

[60] UN Security Council, (S/2002/834), paragraph 26.

[61] See "OCHA: 3 Million Angolans in Need of Aid," *OCHA News*, 92, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 21 June 2002, pp. 1-2; (available from http://www.relief.web.int/ocha_ol/pub/ochanews/on210602.pdf, 24 June 2002).

[62] "International Community Pledges to Help Angola's 'Victims' of War," (FBIS Translated Excerpt) Lisbon Diario de Noticias (Internet Version - www) in Portuguese, 22 June 2002. Translation by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. *FBIS - Daily Report - Southern Africa-West Africa - Western Europe*, 24 February 2002; (Accessed online: 27 June 2002; FBIS-AFR-2002-0623).

[63] UN Security Council, (S/2002/834), paragraph 42.

[64] Ibid. paragraph 43.

domestic and international governments to force a re-run of the election.[65] In an effort to stem political instability, Nigeria's president Olusegun Obasanjo and South Africa's Thabo Mbeki sent special representatives to Zimbabwe in a bid to encourage direct talks between the ruling ZANU-PF and MDC to form a government of national unity. These talks, to be facilitated by the ANC Secretary-General Kgalene Mothlante and Nigerian scholar-diplomat, Adebayo Adedeji, were to discuss violence, the economy, constitutional reforms, and the land question. Though the mediators met separately with both parties, the talks, originally scheduled for April 2002, were twice postponed and have yet to take place.[66]

Compounding Zimbabwe's political problems are the chronic food shortages it faces. According to some estimates, up to six million Zimbabweans are in danger of starvation over the next year. Exacerbating the food shortages is a new law that threatens to fine or imprison up to 2,900 white commercial farmers if they continued to work after 25 June 2002.[67]

Western governments continue their efforts to isolate Mugabe and his ZANU-PF government. Zimbabwe's government has come under repeated international criticism for alleged human rights abuses and restrictions on personal freedoms. Several Western governments also threatened to make their support of NEPAD conditional on African diplomatic isolation of Mugabe.[68] The IMF has recently disengaged from Zimbabwe.

7.4 Lesotho

On 25 May 2002, Lesotho held general elections. Responding to the criticism that the previous electoral violence had been due to the use of a First-Past-the-Post (FPTP) system, the electoral rules were changed to allow for Proportional Representation (PR) – essentially creating a mixed system of FPTP and PR. The Interim Political Authority which was established following the 1998 elections, designated eighty parliamentary seats to be decided by the FPTP system, and forty to be allocated by proportional representation.[69]

Seventeen parties contested 118 out of 120 seats[70] (78 through FPTP and 40 through PR). The Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD) won the May 2002 elections, obtaining seventy-seven of the seventy-eight parliamentary seats allocated through the FPTP system, while the Lesotho Peoples' Congress (LPC) won the remaining seat. Of the forty seats available through the PR system, the Basotho National Party (BNP) won twenty-one; the other nineteen seats were distributed among eight other parties: National Independent Party (five), Lesotho Peoples' Congress (four), Basutoland African Congress (three), Basutoland Congress Party (three), Khoeetsa ea Sechaba/Popular Front For Democracy (one), Lesotho Workers Party (one), Marematlou Freedom Party (one), and National Progressive Party (one).[71] The opposition BNP and the LPC at first rejected the election results, but international observers deemed the poll free and

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[65] "Zimbabwe: Opposition still fighting for election re-run," UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 30 May 2002; (available from http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=28052&SelectRegion=Southern_Africa&SelectCountry=ZIMBABWE, 8 July 2002).

[66] "Zimbabwe: Inter-party talks postponed again," UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 14 May 2002; (available from http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=27772&SelectRegion=Southern_Africa&SelectCountry=ZIMBABWE, 8 July 2002).

[67] "Zimbabwe: Almost 3,000 farmers to stop work," UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 24 June 2002; (available from http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=28482&SelectRegion=Southern_Africa&SelectCountry=ZIMBABWE, 8 July 2002).

[68] "Zimbabwe: NGOs under threat, EU on Mbeki's role," UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 20 May 2002; (available from www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=27852&SelectRegion=Southern_Africa&SelectCountry=ZIMBABWE, 8 July 2002).

[69] "Lesotho: IRIN Focus on the May Election," UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 24 April 2002; (available from www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=27457&SelectRegion=Southern_Africa, 8 July 2002).

[70] Elections were not conducted in the constituencies of Hlotse and Mount Moorosi due to the deaths of the candidates; see Independent Electoral Commission of Lesotho, "Election Results 2002"; (available from http://www.iec.org.ls/results/constituency_level.htm, 12 September 2002).

[71] Independent Electoral Commission of Lesotho, "Election Results 2002"; (available from http://www.iec.org.ls/results/results-summary.htm, 23 July 2002).

fair.[72] Mozambique, the chair of the SADC Organ, impressed upon Lesotho's opposition parties the need to accept the results and to date, due largely to the inclusive nature of the process, violence has not erupted in the country. Despite the peaceful outcome of the election, democracy in Lesotho still remains fragile and in need of support by its regional neighbors and other external actors.[73]

Notwithstanding the apparent success of the election, the food crisis that currently afflicts much of Southern Africa also threatens Lesotho's security. Reports by the International Federation of the Red Cross/Red Crescent predict that as many as twenty-two percent of the population faces a humanitarian crisis due to the impending famine.[74]

IPA/CAIR task force members

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[72] "Lesotho: Slim Chance of repeat of 1998 unrest, NGOs," UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 30 May 2002; (available from http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=28051&SelectRegion=Southern_Africa, 8 July 2002).

[73] Christopher Landsberg, "The 2002 Lesotho Elections: Challenges of a Developing Democracy," (*The Electoral Institute of Southern Africa*, June 2002); (available from http://www.eisa.org.za/WEP/lesotho2a.htm, 23 July 2002).

[74] "Lesotho: Food Insecurity Information Bulletin No. 1/2002," *International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies*, 26 June 2002; (available from http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/6686f45896f15dbc852567ae00530132/7ea572134e16a792c1256be40059032f?OpenDocument, 8 July 2002).

ANNEX I: Keynote Address

H.E. Dr. Leonardo Santos Simão, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mozambique

"The Relationship between Peace and Stability and Sustainable Development:
The Case of the SADC Organ and NEPAD"

Introduction

Allow me, first of all, to extend my warmest greetings from Mozambique and my wish that this meeting achieves the objectives it has set out for itself, particularly a better understanding of the processes of peace, stability, and democratization we are all committed to and engaged in within the SADC region.

I would also like to express my sincere appreciation to the Centre for Africa's International Relations (CAIR) and the International Peace Academy (IPA) for having afforded me the opportunity to participate and, in particular, for having invited me to address this august and distinguished forum which brings together a cross section of government officials, representatives of international organizations and non-governmental organizations, individuals, and academics from many parts of the world. This is, in itself, a testimony of our resolve to strengthen channels of dialogue among ourselves, as a region, and with the rest of the world. It is also a testimony that we are all committed to the ideals of building a strong and stable SADC.

I have been requested to deliver a paper on the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security. There is a growing tendency to look at 1996, the year the Organ was established, or 2001, the year the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security was signed, in isolation of the rest of the dynamics that took place in the region. This should not be the case.

In this presentation, I will provide a brief review of the historical foundations on which the Organ has been established and the way it has been managed. Then the paper will discuss the linkages between the Organ and NEPAD. The thrust of this paper is to demonstrate the relationship between peace and security, on the one hand, and development, on the other.

Peace and Stability in the Region: A Historical Overview

Political and diplomatic cooperation among the countries of the region dates back to the days of the liberation struggle in Southern Africa. Since then, it has become clear to all of us that concerted and coordinated political, diplomatic, and military pressure would be the only way to fight the twin scourges of colonialism and apartheid. This coordination was greatly facilitated by the decision taken by the late Tanzanian president, Mwalimu Juluis Nyerere, to place his country's development second to offering its territory to liberation movements and prominent intellectuals committed to the liberation of the continent. Indeed, addressing his country's legislative assembly on 22 October 1959, two years before Tanganyika's independence, Nyerere noted: "We, the people of Tanganyika, would like to light a candle and put it on top of Mount Kilimanjaro which would shine beyond our borders giving hope where there was despair, love where there was hate, and dignity where before there was only humiliation."

Mwalimu was also central in inspiring these liberation movements to unity and to perceiving the independence of their own countries as incomplete until the region had ridded itself of all forces of oppression. Peace, stability, and democratization were at the heart of all these efforts, as these ideas cannot thrive in lands occupied by foreign forces.

The need to strengthen our coordination efforts, which greatly profited from the presence in Dar-es-Salaam of the OAU Liberation Committee, led to the birth of the Front Line States in the 1970s which brought together not only the independent states of the region, but also the liberation movements fighting for the independence of their countries.

The political independence achieved by the majority of the countries of the region opened new opportunities for them to focus on development issues in the same coordinated and concerted fashion. The Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) was born in April 1980, determined to reduce the dependence of its members on apartheid South Africa and to launch the foundations for regional development to take place. However, the change in both the regional and international political and economic environments dictated the need for the transformation of SADCC into the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in 1992 and the re-alignment of objectives to meet the challenges of an emerging new post-cold war order.

The signing of the SADC treaty on 17 August 1992, became in itself a statement by member states to forge ahead with new strategies responsive to the new challenges posed by the changing economic and political realities shaping Southern Africa, the African continent, and the rest of the world. The SADC treaty is anchored and inspired by a vision of regional development rooted on the principles of solidarity, peace and security and, above all, the peaceful settlement of disputes. It ushers in a new era that entails the deeper regional integration of Southern Africa.

These were the foundations on which the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security was born in Gaborone in 1996. Perhaps now, much more clearly, the objectives of the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security, signed in Blantyre, in August 2001 to operationalize the SADC Organ, can be understood. From this Protocol the following objectives are highlighted:

a) Promote political co-operation among state parties in the evolution of common values and institutions;
b) Promote regional co-ordination and co-operation on matters related to security and defense and establish appropriate mechanisms to this end;
c) Develop common foreign policy approaches on issues of mutual concern and advance such policies collectively in international fora;

d) Protect the people and safeguard the development of the region against instability arising from the breakdown of law and order, intra- and inter-state conflicts, and aggression;
e) Prevent, contain, and resolve inter and intra-state conflicts by peaceful means;
f) Consider the development of a collective security capacity and conclude a Mutual Defense Pact to respond to external military threats.

The Management of the SADC Organ

I now come to the issue of the management of the SADC Organ. The Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security establishes that the Organ will be run on a Troika basis. Members of this Troika are the current SADC chair, the previous chair and the incoming chair. The amended Treaty also makes it mandatory that the Chair of the Organ cannot simultaneously hold the chairmanship of SADC. Mozambique was elected to chair the Organ in Blantyre in 2001. The first step taken by Mozambique was to draft a program that focuses on the following issues:

- Promotion of greater co-ordination in conflict prevention and resolution in the SADC region;
- Deployment of actions aimed at better operational-ization of the SADC Organ;
- Promotion of activities towards the adoption of a common plan of action by SADC against terrorism in the framework of ongoing international efforts.

This program was submitted to the SADC Troika before being tabled for approval by the Ministerial Committee of the Organ. This is the body that brings together the Inter-State Politics and Diplomacy Committee (ISPDC) and the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) under one umbrella.

Mozambique, the current chair of the SADC Organ, is concentrating particular attention on Angola, Zimbabwe, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Swaziland and Lesotho. The political situations in these five countries are quite different. However, all of these countries have one thing in common: the need to achieve or consolidate peace and democracy. Therefore, the Organ is in constant interaction with the

leaders of these countries and other stakeholders to encourage them to achieve tangible results.

In the meantime, the Inter-State Politics and Diplomacy Committee is busy drafting its rules of procedure and program of action. Cooperation between SADC and its external partners in matters of politics, defense and security is regarded as essential. However, given the sensitivity of these issues, the modalities of such cooperation are being carefully examined.

The SADC secretariat was not equipped to handle political matters. Thus, this executive body is in the process of acquiring additional skills to deal with its new responsibilities.

Linking the Organ to NEPAD

It is clear from what has been said that the leaders of this region have always attached great importance to peace, stability, and democratization not as an end in itself, but as a means to achieve development. Peace, stability, and democratization are conditions *sine qua non* for the development of the region.

A wide body of experiences has been accumulated by the continent and these point in the same direction. In the main, these experiences stress that it is up to Africa's leaders to work creatively towards the development of the continent by removing all obstacles to achieving peace, stability, and democrati-zation. This is a long, hard, and winding road which demands encouragement, patience, and perseverance.

Cognizant of the need to revitalize a co-ordinated development of the continent, African leaders adopted the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) at the OAU summit in Lusaka in 2001. NEPAD is a new initiative that builds on and learns from previous attempts of the past to rid the continent of its governance and development malaise.

It has now dawned on Africa's leaders that issues of ownership and partnership are vital. It is no surprise, therefore, that one of the most innovative aspects of NEPAD is that it is being gradually built on consulta-tions among the various stakeholders: government officials, NGOs, academics, the private sector, and co-operating partners, to mention but a few. This is a process that will enrich the NEPAD project and, above all, create conditions for its ownership by all of Africa's stakeholders. I need to stress that we are talking here about partnership. This means that all participants in these consultations should stand on an equal footing inspired and guided by the ideals of bringing peace, stability, democracy and development to the continent. The true partnership will only evolve and gain root when all the participants in these consultations realize that their contributions towards the finalization of NEPAD may be different in size, shape or strength, and that they are all, and should be seen to be, the building blocks towards the goal set by Africans themselves, on African soil, of their own volition. Partnership entails a sense of sharing, belonging, and owning. Partnership entails a sense of working together and learning from one another in the pursuit of a common vision.

Like SADC, NEPAD attaches great importance to matters of peace and security as key ingredients for the long sought-after goal of sustainable development. In this regard, enhancing regional institutional mechanisms for early warning on conflicts as well as their prevention, management, and resolution stands high on the NEPAD agenda. From the political point of view, a great deal of confidence-building measures will have to be undertaken, as well as other steps, such as the accountability of sitting governments, the upholding of the rule of law, and the continued improvement of democratic institutions and practices.

Conclusion

In conclusion, I would like to stress that I have argued throughout this paper about the importance that the SADC region and the African continent must attach to peace, stability, and democracy as a major requisite for sustainable development. It will take a lot of effort, tolerance, and better understanding of one another to achieve these ideals. Some of the conflicts on our continent are so deep-rooted in history and social and economic factors that only together, with our different experiences, will we be able to overcome the stereo-types, chauvinistic ideas, and parochial interests on which these conflicts feed.

SADC and its external partners do agree that the political values of good governance, democracy, rule of law, and respect for human rights are a necessity. There is no doubt about that. But our perception in SADC, particularly in governmental quarters, is that our friends seem to believe that we should have reached this stage yesterday. They seem to ignore that Southern Africa was a region of political violence of very cruel proportions in some cases; they seem to ignore that peace and stability are gaining ground across the region; they seem to ignore that the adoption of the above-mentioned values only became possible after the elimination of colonialism and racist regimes. Our friends seem to ignore that new political values and institutions need time to evolve and to be absorbed by societies which, for many centuries, were denied the right to walk by themselves.

In SADC, we are deeply committed to the new values that should guide the relationships between our states and our peoples. But we believe that it is not wise to push us to implement such values using undemocratic means, with constant interference.

In this region, we know very well the values of peace, security, and stability. In other parts of the world, peace was acquired over 50 years ago and, therefore, their citizens and institutions take that peace for granted and do not see any threat to it. Unfortunately this is not the case in the SADC region. We do understand, from our collective, painful, and recent experience, that political, economic, and social progress can only be achieved if we succeed in securing peace and making it part of our culture. Please, help us to secure peace first and then to expand it.

In this presentation, I have also argued for a true partnership among the various stakeholders who should come together, with open minds and hearts and, above all, ready to share and learn from one another. We have come to realize that however resourceful a country and a state security machine may be, it cannot, alone, stop instability from shaking it. The SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security is just one initiative that Africa is trying to use to contribute to world peace, stability, and development.

Before I conclude my remarks, I would like to pay a glowing homage to our leaders, our academics, intellectuals, businessmen and women, to our civil society, and to our co-operating partners worldwide, who have been concerned with the development of Africa and who see SADC and its Organ as a viable initiative to achieve this lofty goal.

ANNEX II: Agenda

9:00 am – 9:15 am	**INTRODUCTORY REMARKS**

Ambassador John Hirsch, International Peace Academy and
Dr. Christopher Landsberg, Centre for Africa's International Relations, South Africa

9:15 am – 10:15 am   **HOW TO OPERATIONALIZE THE SADC ORGAN**

Chairs: **Ambassador John Hirsch**, International Peace Academy and
Dr. Christopher Landsberg, Centre for Africa's International Relations, South Africa

Presenter: **Dr. Jakkie Cilliers**, Institute for Security Studies, South Africa

CASE STUDIES

10:15 am – 11:45 am   **Angola**
Chair: **H.E. Dr. Leonardo Santos Simão**, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mozambique

Presenters: **Dr. Vicente Pinto de Andrade**, Catholic University of Angola and
Professor Gerald Bender, University of Southern California

11:45 am – 12:00 pm   COFFEE BREAK

12:00 pm –1:00 pm   **Lesotho**
Chair: **Professor Mpho Molomo**, University of Botswana

Presenters: **Professor Rok Ajulu**, Rhodes University, South Africa and
Dr. Francis Makoa, National University of Lesotho

1: 00 pm – 2:00 pm   **LUNCH KEYNOTE ADDRESS**

Chair: **Ambassador John Hirsch**, International Peace Academy

Keynote Speaker:
H.E. Dr. Leonardo Santos Simão, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mozambique, "The Relationship between Peace and Stability and Sustainable Development: The Case of the SADC Organ and NEPAD"

2:00 pm – 3:30 pm   **The Democratic Republic of the Congo**
Chair: **Ms. Lindiwe Zulu**, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, South Africa

Presenters: **Dr. Mwesiga Baregu**, Independent Expert and
Dr. Musifiky Mwanasali, Organisation of African Unity, Ethiopia

3:30 pm – 5:00 pm	**Zimbabwe**
	Chair: **Professor Mwesiga Baregu**, Independent Expert
	Presenters: **Professor Maxi Schoeman**, University of Pretoria, South Africa and **Dr. Martin Rupiya**, Centre for Defence Studies, Zimbabwe
5:00 pm - 5:15 pm	COFFEE BREAK
5:15 pm – 6:15 pm	**WRAP-UP SESSION**
	Chairs: **Dr. Adekeye Adebajo**, International Peace Academy and **Dr. Christopher Landsberg**, Centre for Africa's International Relations, South Africa
	Presenter: **Ms. Dorina Bekoe**, Harvard University

ANNEX III: IPA/CAIR Task Force Participants

1. Professor Rok Ajulu
   Rhodes University
   Grahamstown, South Africa

2. Professor Vicente Pinto de Andrade
   Catholic University of Angola (UCAN)
   Luanda, Angola

3. Professor Mwesiga Baregu
   Independent Expert
   Dar es Salaam, Tanzania

4. Ms. Dorina Bekoe
   Harvard University
   Cambridge, Massachusetts

5. Professor Gerald Bender
   University of Southern California
   Los Angeles, California

6. Dr. Jakkie Cilliers
   Institute for Security Studies
   Pretoria, South Africa

7. Lt. Colonel Robert Ernesta
   Ministry of Defence
   Victoria, Seychelles

8. Ms. Ruth Hall
   St. Anthony's College, Oxford University
   Oxford, United Kingdom

9. Mr. David Hamadziripi
   Embassy of the Republic of Zimbabwe
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