Small Arms and Light Weapons
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Task Forces on Strengthening Multilateral Security Capacity

IPI Blue Paper No. 5
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Foreword

We live in difficult times. Rapid socioeconomic changes, demographic bulges, and intertwined security crises are affecting us all, and most especially the poor. Criminal and violent organizations are gaining control over territory, markets, and populations around the world, complicating peacemaking and generating insecurity. States with ineffective and corrupt institutions prove too weak to deal with interlinked threats ranging from transnational organized crime to infectious disease. Meanwhile, the number of actual and aspirant nuclear-armed countries is growing, as is the likelihood that nonstate actors will acquire weapons of mass destruction through illicit global trade.

Global warming and environmental degradation particularly distress already impoverished regions. Fluctuating food and energy prices put people and governments to the test, while the demand for resources—notably water and energy—increases due to unprecedented development and population growth.

To this already gloomy picture, the year 2008 added tectonic shifts in the economic landscape. A devastating financial crisis is producing dramatic consequences with likely long-term impacts on economic development, aid, and emerging markets alike.

Yet, at a time when common efforts are needed more than ever, division and discord can be spotted in many multilateral institutions, from the United Nations to NATO and the European Union. Peace operations are under serious stress, while political disunity undermines the authority and effectiveness of the Security Council. The optimistic embrace of a “flat” world of responsible sovereign states is challenged by those who push for a return to exclusive state sovereignty and jealously guarded territorial integrity.

However, crises provide unparalleled opportunities for change. These moments are transitory, but they need to be seized upon to
put ideas into action, to strengthen the capacity to meet the challenges we face, which in today’s globalizing world means more responsive, effective, and efficient multilateral mechanisms and policies.

In response to these challenges, IPI launched the Task Forces on Strengthening Multilateral Security Capacity in 2008. The purpose of these Task Forces was to suggest ideas for action to strengthen the capacity of the United Nations (UN) and its partners to deal effectively with emerging, multifaceted, and global challenges to peace and security. The Task Forces addressed not only the policy steps that are needed, but also the political and institutional strategies required to implement them. This strategic perspective has too often been the missing link in efforts to strengthen the UN system.

Given the links among security, development, and environmental challenges, the initiative opened with a symposium on Development, Resources, and Environment. The symposium provided a larger context for the work of the subsequent Task Forces, which focused on two core dimensions of the security concerns facing the UN and its partners: (1) Transnational Security Challenges and (2) Inter- and Intra-state Armed Conflict (see Annex 3 for details of the process).

The IPI Blue Papers are the product of this intense process of consultation, which engaged more than sixty UN member states, half of them at ambassadorial level, and seventy experts in a variety of thematic areas. It included the preparation of more than twenty-five background papers and fourteen multiday meetings. Each Blue Paper includes a section on why action to strengthen capacity in a particular area is needed and a section with ideas for action. The content is based on the Task Force discussions, but does not necessarily represent all the views articulated during the entire process. Although the institutional focus of the Task Forces was primarily the UN, this report aims to assist key stakeholders to prioritize and leverage the comparative advantages of the UN
and other multilateral institutions, including their ability to forge productive and sustainable partnerships with other groups and organizations.

While policy discussions on related topics are taking place in other fora, IPI brings to this initiative nearly forty years of constructive collaboration with the United Nations and its membership, as well as a more long-term strategic perspective than in-house and intergovernmental processes can offer. With these Blue Papers, IPI hopes to continue a process that will produce concrete steps toward stronger multilateral capacity in peace and security.

Despite the difficulties ahead, we believe that tomorrow’s world needs more multilateral capacity, not less. It needs a stronger UN, capable of adapting and strengthening its capacity to address the realities of the twenty-first century. It needs a UN able to work with its partners and in particular with member states, which remain the first line of response to many of the threats discussed here.

This is the purpose of the IPI Blue Papers, and I am very pleased to introduce them to you.

Finally, I would like to thank most warmly the co-chairs of the Task Forces, the member-state participants, the experts, and IPI staff, without whose hard work and intellectual contributions the IPI Blue Papers would not have seen the light of day.

**Terje Rød-Larsen**  
President, *International Peace Institute*  
January 2009
## Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ATT</td>
<td>Arms Trade Treaty</td>
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<tr>
<td>BMS</td>
<td>Biennial Meetings of States</td>
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<tr>
<td>CASA</td>
<td>Coordinating Action on Small Arms Mechanism</td>
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<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration</td>
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<tr>
<td>INTERPOL</td>
<td>International Criminal Police Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>ITI</td>
<td>International Tracing Instrument</td>
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<tr>
<td>MANPADS</td>
<td>man-portable air-defense systems</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>nongovernmental organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>PoA</td>
<td><em>Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat, and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in SALW in all its Aspects</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>PoA-ISS</td>
<td>Programme of Action—Implementation Support System</td>
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<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
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<tr>
<td>SALW</td>
<td>small arms and light weapons</td>
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<td>TCI</td>
<td>Transfer Control Initiative</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNIDIR</td>
<td>United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNODA</td>
<td>United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs</td>
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<td>UNODC</td>
<td>United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime</td>
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<tr>
<td>WMD/s</td>
<td>Weapon/s of Mass Destruction</td>
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**Executive Summary**

Small arms and light weapons (SALW) enable and facilitate armed conflict, terrorism, and crime. Today, they remain among the cheapest and most easily accessible instruments for participating in violence. Despite our understanding of the threat posed by SALW to peace and security, development and human rights, deep-rooted differences remain on how to stem their ill effects, in particular the passage of weapons from the licit realm to the illicit. Even the domestic passage of SALW to the illicit realm can, ultimately, have transnational effects, fueling conflict, crime, and terrorism.

Globally effective SALW control is difficult. SALW are easily produced, concealed, and transferred. And they are already abundant and very widely distributed, with at least 875 million SALW currently in circulation.¹

Established multilateral norms and frameworks, such as the *Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat, and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in all its Aspects* and the *International Tracing Instrument*, have provided some compensation for weak regulatory standards at the national level. However, goals related to small-arms control continue to be imprecise and varied across the multilateral system. Patchwork solutions and inconsistent adherence to global standards remain the dominant trend.

Effective reduction of the threat from SALW will require a more strategic approach from multilateral organizations, with the adoption of clearer, better-defined SALW control objectives, and a transition from norm-setting to the facilitation of practical solutions on the local, regional, and global levels, matching SALW control needs with available resources.
IDEAS FOR ACTION

I. **Empower other stakeholders:** Establish a framework for cooperation that allows the UN to work with and empower stakeholders—including civil society, the private sector, and other regional and sectoral international organizations—in SALW control initiatives. Focus should be placed on assisting the development of national SALW control and the fostering of regional cooperation. Needs for assistance should be directly matched with technical expertise through the UN’s CASA Mechanism Programme of Action Implementation Support System and the UN Institute for Disarmament Research.

II. **Identify common goals:** Set more specific measurable goals for SALW control within the UN system. Reaching consensus on targeted objectives will provide a basis for mobilizing resources and improving monitoring mechanisms. Interested states and civil society groups should establish common objectives before the Open Meeting of Experts in 2011.

III. **Improve coherence among existing mechanisms:** Improve collaborative efforts and information sharing across the UN system, and with external bodies, including INTERPOL and national law enforcement agencies. Grant the CASA mechanism the mandate and resources needed to develop and implement a system-wide strategy for SALW control.

IV. **Promote transparency:** Engage private actors and the broader SALW community in discussions to create a more integrated approach in establishing effective control measures and strategies. Ensure regular reporting of SALW transfers with the UN Register of Conventional Arms.

V. **Use the “bully pulpit”:** Use the bully pulpit offered by the UN to advocate for stronger SALW control measures. Empower the High Representative on Disarmament Affairs to play a stronger role in this regard.
VI. **Create an improved evidence base:** Interested states should organize and finance strategic research to improve the evidence base for policymaking, particularly concerning connections between SALW and armed conflict, terrorism, and organized crime.
WHY ACTION IS NEEDED
The Challenge of Small Arms and Light Weapons

1. Small arms and light weapons (SALW) remain cheap and easily accessible instruments for participating in armed conflict, terrorism, and crime. It is now well-documented that the proliferation of SALW poses a threat to peace and security, development, and the enjoyment of human rights. The increasing victimization of civilian populations, in particular children, has been a disconcerting trend in the use of SALW. The long-term and indiscriminate impacts of SALW make them, as Kofi Annan put it, “weapons of mass destruction in slow motion.”

2. The passage of SALW from the licit to the illicit realm poses one of the gravest threats to effective SALW control. While the transfer of weapons to the illicit realm represents only 10 to 20 percent of the total small-arms trade, research by the Small Arms Survey suggests that it is these weapons that are primarily fueling civil conflict and crime. The illicit transfer of weapons to nonstate actors is emerging as one of the more serious present-day challenges in countries as politically, economically, and socially varied as India, Russia, and Afghanistan—each of which have witnessed terrorist attacks involving small weapons in the last year. Weak norms and regulations on production, private ownership, and stockpile management at the international, regional, national—and even local—levels, facilitate the illicit transfer of weapons, exacerbating insecurity. Alarmingly, even the domestic transfer of SALW to the illicit realm can, ultimately, have transnational effects.

3. A large part of the illicit trade occurs as a result of weapons dispersed during or after a major conflict. The end of the Cold War, for instance, flooded the international market with a surplus of small arms which were transferred across porous
borders to rebels, guerrilla groups, and crime syndicates. Indeed, the transfer of government stockpiles has facilitated the continuation of violence in conflict zones and exacerbated crime in regions which have seen the termination of a major conflict, as in East Asia and Latin America after the end of the civil wars in Cambodia and El Salvador, respectively. Moreover, given the systematic relationship between armed conflict and underdevelopment, the unchecked proliferation of SALW in conflict and postconflict environments often hinders concrete efforts directed toward peacebuilding.

4. SALW remain the most frequently used weapons in armed conflicts, making them of critical importance to the conflict-control agenda. The availability, portability, and ease of use—and re-use—of SALW facilitate their indiscriminate use in conflict settings, aggravating human rights abuses and increasing the intensity and duration of armed conflicts. Recent estimates by Small Arms Survey suggest that 60 to 90 percent of direct fatalities in armed conflict are related to the use and misuse of SALW.5

5. Of course, SALW violence is not only confined to zones of formal armed conflict. Its fatal consequences can be traced to other contexts where demographics, social customs, unemployment, and varying levels of development explain motivations for SALW misuse in interpersonal violence, gang warfare, and organized crime. Alarmingly, of the estimated global fatalities resulting from the use of firearms, over two-thirds are attributed to criminal activities and violence in nonconflict settings.6

6. Additionally, the adverse effects of SALW are not limited to physical injury and fatality: the socioeconomic costs of SALW violence are also high. These costs include medical expenses, nonmedical costs (i.e., policing and postconflict reconstruction), and the loss of productivity and private investment. According to a study by the Inter-American...
Development Bank, the direct and indirect costs of violence in Latin America, for instance, amount to 14.2 percent of the region’s aggregate gross domestic product per year.\textsuperscript{7}

7. The challenges for effective SALW control, however, are not insurmountable. In the early- to mid-1990s, the international community made great progress in framing the SALW issue, with particular emphasis on its links to development and human rights. What started out as a plea for action by civil society developed into a broader commitment by states on norm-setting and policymaking. The results of this effort culminated in the UN’s flagship effort for SALW control, the 2001 *Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat, and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in SALW in all its Aspects* (PoA).\textsuperscript{8} This established a broad framework based on agreed norms, especially on capacity building and stricter licensing and transparency systems at the multilateral, regional, and national levels.

8. The PoA provided states with wide-ranging objectives in the hope of fostering agreement and commitment on the fundamental notion that the illicit trade of small arms is an imminent security challenge. The 2001 conference was followed by a review conference in 2006 and several Biennial Meetings of States (BMSs), which had varying degrees of success. While the 2006 BMS ended in acrimonious deadlock, the 2008 BMS, held in July of that year, was viewed as successful, producing an outcome document that outlined “the way forward” on the four distinct areas discussed at the meeting: (1) international cooperation, assistance, and national capacity building; (2) illicit brokering; (3) stockpile management and surplus disposal; and (4) marking and tracing instruments.\textsuperscript{9}

9. Yet, despite strong support for the outcome document (134 in favor, two abstentions), questions remain about its overall effect. Some states, along with participating civil society
members, voiced concerns over the strength of the recommendations produced, and queried how far they would truly move the SALW agenda forward.

10. Globally effective SALW control is naturally difficult, given the high number of SALW producers and owners, the low costs of acquisition, the ease with which they can be concealed and transferred (especially given poor border controls and access to air transport and sea vessels), and the existing massive proliferation (with at least 875 million SALW already in existence of which 74 percent are owned by nonstate actors or civilians).

11. SALW are also a core component of national law enforcement and defense strategy. International law and standards, including Article 51 of the UN Charter, recognizes a state’s right to self-defense, thereby indirectly acknowledging the right to produce and acquire weapons for legitimate purposes. Indeed, the year-on-year increase in global military spending continues to point to a trend of bolstering national security capabilities.

12. Moreover, SALW control is made even more difficult by current political divisions. As the acrimony at the end of the 2006 BMS demonstrated, states are deeply divided on which aspects of SALW proliferation to address and how to address them. Similar to how multilateral efforts to combat transnational organized crime are thought by some to encroach on state sovereignty, international efforts to regulate SALW are perceived as a challenge to the state’s monopoly on legitimate violence. Even given agreement on existing norms and regulatory frameworks, the implementation of small-arms-control measures remains uneven, with states adopting widely differing positions on how far international cooperation is useful in assisting them to exert their monopoly within their sovereign walls.
13. As a result, even as multilateral institutions are forced to deal with the indirect costs of SALW proliferation, they are confronted by two very different attitudes on the part of states. Some states would prefer to limit future action to improved implementation of existing frameworks; others would prefer to see that framework extended to encompass new thematic and geographical areas. The core challenge for the international community is thus to find ways to improve the capacity of the multilateral system to control the ill effects of SALW, even as states hold divergent positions on how comprehensive SALW control measures need to be.

14. This leads to two broad conceptions of where multilateral—and in particular UN—efforts ought to be focused. The more restrictive view suggests that UN efforts should be limited to providing frameworks and capacity to assist states in implementing their own choices in exerting their sovereign right to control SALW domestically. This approach would propose harmonizing SALW control norms by empowering states to build control standards, and stepping in to provide services in areas where state capacity is weak (such as postconflict zones) or where an additional layer of international support is needed to develop control mechanisms (such as through regional information-sharing arrangements or INTERPOL databases).

15. The second, more expansive, approach envisages the UN as a forum for driving up standards of national SALW control, for example, through mandatory review processes, which, in the case of the PoA, would allow for monitoring progress on its implementation, and not simply as a forum for coordination on a lowest-common-denominator basis. States that endorse this view often argue that global SALW control will not be effective until the PoA is more consistently implemented and existing voluntary norms, such as the International Tracing Instrument, become mandatory.
16. This second approach can be broken down into two further strands: one that pursues the ultimate goal of SALW disarmament; and one that simply seeks to control their use. Additional controversies arise over what incentives and forms of authority ought to be engaged in order to enforce national control efforts.

17. This divergence in views is still further exacerbated by the deep divisions over weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) proliferation and disarmament arrangements. Some states resist efforts to encourage SALW disarmament absent effective measures to control WMD proliferation and ensure WMD disarmament, arguing that their possession of, and access to, SALW is a necessary response to WMD proliferation, and a legitimate exercise of their right to self-defense. Others, however, view the efforts to tackle SALW as distinct from that of WMD, noting that the problems related to SALW proliferation are beyond the traditional notions of arms control as they encompass areas of human rights, poverty, gender, and child soldiers, among a host of other issues.

18. These increasingly entrenched differences over the objectives of SALW control have led to recognition that consensus-based diplomacy has reached its limits. While the 2001 Programme of Action seemed to represent a consensus approach to these issues, in reality its nonbinding nature, and the fact that it treated the problem of SALW “in all its aspects,” temporarily papered over the deep divisions among states on these issues.

19. As these divisions have come to light during debates on the implementation of the PoA, the response has been a “turn to voluntarism.” A number of states, international organizations, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have established numerous opt-in control and cooperation frameworks, many of them providing “second-generation” measures to control SALW demand and reduce violence more broadly. States are
also working in regional groupings to implement the PoA (e.g., the Nairobi Protocol, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe [OSCE], the Southern African Development Community [SADC], the Andean Community, and the Pacific Islands Forum). Additionally, a majority of the UN General Assembly voted to begin exploring the possibility of a legally binding Arms Trade Treaty. Encouragingly, voluntary cooperation has been particularly fruitful in promoting a bottom-up approach toward disarmament and nonproliferation, thereby avoiding the lowest-common-denominator problem that had repeatedly surfaced as a concern in multilateral and intergovernmental negotiations. However, voluntary and nonuniversal initiatives can also risk producing patchwork solutions and normative and operational fragmentation in global SALW efforts.

20. Transnational NGOs have played a significant role in both norm-development and norm-implementation in this and previous efforts to control weapons (such as the Mine Ban Treaty [Ottawa Treaty]). Yet, their role—and the role of other private actors, such as SALW producers and brokers—remains limited within the existing PoA framework. While the PoA acknowledges the role of civil society organizations as integral to curbing SALW proliferation, the NGO community, for instance, has been excluded from formal negotiating sessions at the Biennial Meetings of States.

21. Finally, even where there is agreement that the UN should be active in SALW control, the silo nature of the UN does not facilitate effective tackling of such multifaceted issues. For example, SALW control touches on security, development, good governance, human rights, and health issues. In particular, a lack of common goals throughout the UN system makes operational efficiency difficult to achieve, often resulting in a reduced focus on SALW control. Additionally, the limited financial resources devoted to implementation
of the PoA further hinder a comprehensive approach to tackling the ill effects of SALW proliferation. Estimates by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) indicate that financial support to implement the PoA hovered around the $660 million mark in the period between 2003 and 2005—a number which is a fraction of the value of the illicit trade in small arms in that same period. 14

22. Furthermore, the UN Coordinating Action on Small Arms (CASA) Mechanism, established in 1998 to coordinate the work of sixteen UN bodies involved in SALW issues, has no real mandate beyond coordination of existing UN activities, and nor is it designed to set goal-oriented strategies across the UN system. Each participating body seems keen to see coordination, but each has few incentives to compromise its existing institutional priorities.

23. Even where the UN has taken aggressive action to control SALW, for example, through the arms embargoes imposed by the Security Council, the UN still suffers from a “silo” mentality. Arms embargo committees and expert groups are poorly connected, and rarely—and only with difficulty—share information that might help them to identify arms-trafficking networks across different conflict situations. Similarly, the role of peace operations in supporting these groups, and in promoting SALW control more generally in postconflict situations, is often poorly defined, and relies heavily on the personal initiative of leaders within missions, or on particular countries working within the Security Council.
WHAT SHOULD BE DONE
I. ESTABLISH A FRAMEWORK ALLOWING THE UN TO EMPOWER OTHERS

24. **Promote the UN’s role in empowering SALW control measures by other groups:** The UN cannot be the sole locus of effective SALW control efforts, but its universality and legitimacy give it a unique comparative advantage as a platform for helping willing participants to improve their own SALW control efforts. Interested states should help promote the UN’s role in empowering control efforts by civil society, the private sector, and regional, sectoral, and other international organizations.

25. Emphasis should be placed on the UN’s role as it works to do the following:

   a. **Assist countries in developing national SALW control laws, systems, and procedures, and building domestic technical capacity.** In particular, emphasis should be directed toward (1) establishing licensing and registration systems for civilian gun ownership; (2) creating effective end-user-certification mechanisms; and (3) building weapons and ammunition stockpile management capabilities.

   b. **Foster regional arrangements and cooperation to facilitate SALW control and coordination strategies.** In the absence of widespread international agreement on how to proceed, regional arrangements serve as the frontline of international operational efforts to coordinate SALW control efforts. Moreover, established regional architectures often facilitate the process of building national control measures. To this end, efforts by the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) to facilitate regional meetings in 2009-2010...
on strengthening the PoA’s implementation at the regional level are worth supporting.

26. **Match needs for assistance with technical expertise:** The UN’s CASA Mechanism Programme of Action Implementation Support System (POA-ISS) and UNIDIR’s database for matching needs with resources should be formally empowered to play a “switchboard” role matching needs for SALW control assistance with technical expertise, financial resources, and training, even from sources beyond the UN system.

II. IDENTIFY GOALS—AND TRY TO ACHIEVE THEM

27. **Establish common objectives in time for the Open Meeting of Experts in 2011 and the Review Conference expected in 2012:** Interested states and civil society groups should work toward a consensus on a macro-level goal for small-arms control, which considers its links to human rights and development, and allows for commitment and engagement by the broader SALW community. This could be done under the auspices of a more expansive goal on conflict prevention and/or the reduction of armed violence.

28. **Set specific targets similar in purpose to the Millennium Development Goals:** Interested states and civil society groups should set specific, measurable goals as a means to improve SALW control efforts. The focus could be on implementing aspects of the Programme of Action, or CASA’s International Small Arms Standards. These specific goals could play a similar role to the Millennium Development Goals in helping stakeholders to measure their own progress, coordinate action, allocate scarce resources, and mobilize transnational support.\(^{15}\)
29. **Interested states should consider an opt-in review process:** Such a process could be used to measure progress toward SALW goals, and improve SALW control standards. Review processes could include reporting to plenary bodies, or structured peer-review mechanisms like that used by the Financial Action Task Force to improve implementation of anti-money-laundering standards.

### III. IMPROVE COHERENCE AMONG EXISTING MECHANISMS

30. Leadership is needed to mobilize resources and provide direction to—and not simply coordination among—the disparate parts of the UN system that are engaged with SALW control efforts on the ground. This may require developing protocols for sharing information between UN sanctions bodies and other UN bodies, such as peace-support operations, the UN Development Programme (UNDP), the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)—or even external bodies, such as INTERPOL. For instance, states are encouraged to cooperate with INTERPOL to support the effective implementation of the International Tracing Instrument and the Programme of Action.

31. **Grant the CASA mechanism the mandate, leadership, and resources needed to develop and implement a system-wide strategy for SALW control:** One approach would be to give greater power to the High Representative on Disarmament, as the chair of CASA, to work with the CASA member bodies to develop a common action plan, with specific goals and objectives, to implement the PoA within the UN system. While efforts to strengthen the CASA mechanism should be prioritized to make use of synergies within the UN system, continued support needs to be given to other individual and collaborative initiatives within the UN.
32. **Clarify the role of peace operations in supporting the work of sanctions bodies:** Leaders of peace operations often lack clear guidance from the Security Council and other relevant players in UN headquarters on how they should prioritize and trade off law-enforcement activities, such as the monitoring and enforcement of embargoes, against other mission priorities, given limited resources.

33. Enhanced coherence is also required between the UN and existing local, national, subregional, and regional mechanisms. Improving cooperation and information sharing on best practices and lessons learned can help to strengthen both global mechanisms, and those working outside of the multilateral level. Regional arrangements, in particular, are a necessary complement to the Programme of Action, as coordination between law-enforcement agents and border controls is critical to bolstering cross-border control measures for illicit trafficking. Similarly, information sharing on best practices, such as those being formulated and collected on small arms standards and guidelines by CASA (the International Small Arms Control Standards [ISACS]), can provide useful benchmarks for national and regional control policy.  

**IV. PROMOTE TRANSPARENCY IN SALW CONTROL DISCUSSIONS**

34. **Ensure regular reporting of SALW transfers with the UN Register of Conventional Arms:** Promoting transparency in SALW holdings, transfers, and control arrangements would reduce the possibilities of diversion of SALW from the licit to the illicit realm. Since 2003 the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms has provided a mechanism for information-sharing on state holdings of SALW. Ensuring regular reporting of SALW transfers within the framework
of the registry will be helpful to strengthening overall transparency.

35. Short of accountability for SALW control, transparency is itself a worthy goal in international SALW-control discussions. Transparency would allow the broader SALW community to share perspectives and experiences on trade, production, and stockpile management, enabling a more comprehensive dialogue on SALW control. Promotion of formal and informal discussions among groups of interested states on implementing recommendations presented in the Secretary-General’s report on small arms can facilitate efforts to implement initiatives such as the Programme of Action at the regional and international levels.17

36. **Hold intersessional meetings under the PoA in years in which the BMS is not being held:** Off-year meetings of governmental experts on specific SALW topics should be held as outlined by the Geneva Forum18 and the report from the 2008 BMS.19 States should continue to assess the ideas emerging from the Geneva Forum’s working group on how best to organize the PoA’s Biennial Meetings of States so as to ensure productive and valuable debates. Additionally, ensuring that the review conference occurs automatically every five years could also enhance transparency significantly.

37. **Engage governmental organizations and active members of civil society in SALW processes, such as the BMS:** Awareness of SALW issues within the global policy arena has largely been driven by campaigns and civil society action. The participation of 336 accredited nongovernmental organizations at the third BMS in July 2008, including two NGO presentations at the “governments-only” sessions, was a positive step toward greater transparency and collective engagement.20
38. **Engage private actors, including arms manufacturers, in SALW control discussions:** While numerous states have enacted national legislation to enforce the marking and tracing of arms, global progress in this area remains measured; inviting arms manufacturers and brokers to the table will allow for a more transparent discussion to move this agenda item forward and allow for a more integrated approach in creating effective SALW control strategies.

V. **USE THE “BULLY PULPIT”**

39. **Empower the High Representative on Disarmament Affairs to play a stronger role:** The High Representative should be used to spread acceptance of existing norms on small-arms control and to advocate their implementation, both within the UN and beyond. The High Representative could show greater leadership in pressing states to control their own stockpiles of SALW, to promote transparency in SALW possession and transfers, and to confiscate and destroy excess armaments—especially in postconflict situations. He or she could work directly with UN field operations to ensure they adequately implement the PoA, for example, through appropriate arrangements for destruction of excess armaments in postconflict situations.

40. **Build political support for SALW control at the regional and national levels:** Interested states, in cooperation with civil society, should work to gain political support for SALW control at the regional and national levels, particularly in areas where the absence of frameworks and political priorities for SALW control results in soft commitments at the international level.

VI. **CREATE AN IMPROVED EVIDENCE BASE**

41. **Interested states should organize and finance research to improve the evidence base for policymaking to control**
**SALW:** Such research is particularly needed on connections between SALW, armed conflict, terrorism, and organized crime. This would (1) help clarify the relationship between SALW and development, human rights, and good governance; and (2) provide a basis for mobilization around specific risks of SALW passage from the licit to the illicit realm, and around specific effects of that passage including the re-use and retransfer of weapons.

42. Potential areas of research include the following:
   a. the relationship between SALW availability and the onset, intensity, and duration of armed conflict;
   b. the connections between SALW, urban gangs, and transnational organized crime;
   c. the connections between SALW and private security companies; and
   d. the movement of SALW supplies to terrorists and other nonstate actors.

43. Additionally, research clarifying states’, companies’, and individuals’ responsibilities under existing international law for violations committed as a result of SALW transfers (e.g., complicity, aiding and abetting, joint criminal enterprise, etc.) could provide a more cautious and organic approach to advancing dialogue on additional SALW control measures, such as the discussion of an Arms Trade Treaty.

**Conclusion**

44. Reducing the misuse of SALW and the illicit transfer of weapons to combatants, criminals, and terrorists will require a fresh strategic approach with more defined objectives and greater commonality across the multilateral system. While the illicit proliferation of SALW presents one of the gravest
security threats in modern times, norms and frameworks, such as the Programme of Action and the International Tracing Instrument, have been implemented with measured success.

45. While concerted efforts have been made to address the multifaceted problems related to SALW, patchwork solutions and inconsistent adherence to global standards still persist. To address the ill effects of SALW effectively, concerted global action is required, expanding the leadership role of multilateral institutions, not only as norm-setters, but as facilitators, matching needs with resources and enabling the establishment of regional arrangements.

46. Additionally, there is a pressing need to enhance dialogue with external actors, such as INTERPOL, arms manufacturers, brokers, and NGOs. Enhanced communication with private actors and civil society increases understanding of weapons users and the conditions that lead to weapon misuse and abuse.

47. Lastly, the complex set of links that small arms have with various forms of violence (conflict, organized crime, terrorism) calls for additional research and baseline studies that analyze the interactions and systemic relations between small arms and different forms of violence. Improving the evidence base on these interactions can facilitate policymaking and the implementation of mechanisms for effective small-arms control.
Endnotes


10. IANSA, “Gun Violence.”


13. In many ways, regional arrangements, such as the Nairobi Protocol and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Protocol, have done more to formalize small-arms control standards, because they are legally binding instruments. See Elli Kytömäki, “Regional Approaches to Small Arms Control,” UNIDIR, available at www.unidir.org/pdf/articles/pdf-art2431.pdf.


15. See United Nations Secretary-General, *Small Arms: Report of the Secretary-General*, UN Doc. S/2008/258, April 17, 2008, Recommendation 2, which highlights the importance of setting measurable goals for SALW control.


17. See UN Secretary-General, UN Doc. S/2008/258; and UN Doc. A/CONF.192/BMS/2008/3.


Further Reading


Annex 1: Background Non-paper

APRIL 1, 2008

Introduction

The challenge of small arms and light weapons (SALW) proliferation was first recognized on the world stage in the 1990s. Since then, international discussions have progressed through five partly overlapping stages:

1) Defining the problem and awareness raising (mid-1990s);
2) Nascent multilateral negotiations (at the turn of the last decade);
3) Deadlocked process of UN multilateral diplomacy (2006);
4) Multilateralism beyond the UN (post-2006);
5) Issue diversification within a global public policy framework (since 2000).

Research into the scope and nature of the proliferation and misuse of SALW, particularly by NGOs, now describes a range of features of the problem:

- Direct effects: death, injuries, disabilities, intimidation and other psychological effects, particular vulnerabilities of women and children, human rights abuses and violation of international humanitarian law, outbreak of intergroup violence.
- Indirect effects: the negative impact on development and on postconflict reconstruction, governance.
- Technical and descriptive features: weapons supply, availability, transfers, and stocks, the definition of civilian or military-style weapons, the economics of production and trade, the legal aspects of licensing of production and transfers, the importance of the gray and black markets.

Two UN expert groups on SALW reported to the Secretary-General and the General Assembly in 1997 and 1999. These two reports were instrumental in setting some of the parameters of
governmental responsibility for SALW proliferation:

- The distinction between illicit and licit transfers.
- The emphasis on security of state stockpiles and the importance of record keeping.
- The need to destroy surplus or postconflict weapons.
- Marking and tracing of weapons to help identify the route of illicit transfers.

1. What are the current policy and institutional shortcomings in multilateral security capacity in SALW?

Programme of Action and First Generation Control Measures

- The efforts of the two UN reports led to the UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat, and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in SALW in all its Aspects (PoA) agreed by governments in 2001. The PoA consisted of first generation control measures which were designed and oriented toward the supply-side:
  - Export, import, and transfer controls: focused on implementing rigorous controls to regulate the legal (government-sanctioned) transfers and prevent diversion into the illicit market, including adequate licensing and end-use certificates.
  - Stockpile management: focused on (1) security of stockpiles; (2) transparency of official holdings and record keeping; (3) surplus-weapons destruction; and (4) assistance to countries in need of stockpile management.
  - Ammunition: focused on controlling ammunition supply, especially to areas of conflict.
  - Marking and tracing: focused on clearly identifying the origin of a weapon in order to trace it during its entire life cycle.
  - Brokering: focused on controlling the activities of private dealers.
  - The PoA established an international framework that is relatively comprehensive in scope, including almost the full
range of issues related to the illicit trade in SALW. Thus it contains substantial agreed norms, namely on stricter licensing and transparency systems (i.e., included in the UN Firearms Protocol).

- At the operational level, UN sanctions and mandatory weapon embargoes became an important feature. Although the effectiveness of embargoes is often questioned, empirical evidence illustrates that, in the area of SALW, embargoes did have positive effects.

- However some norms presented in the PoA were not put in practice:
  - The International Tracing Instrument has not been seriously tested.
  - The existing 146 national points of contact for the implementation of the PoA are not being used to their full potential.
  - Annual reports are not systematically forwarded to the UN.

- Other areas where norms could have been established were completely unaddressed or covered only in vague terms because these issues were deeply divisive:
  - no mention of the need to regulate small arms in civilian possession;
  - no monitoring system for ammunition;
  - no harmonized international agreement on arms brokering;
  - no agreement on the treatment of armed nonstate actors;
  - no mention of human rights;
  - no mention of the misuse of guns by state officials; and
  - vague definition of “adequate laws and regulation” and “existing responsibilities under relevant international law.”

**Second Generation Control Measures**

- Dissatisfaction with the universal UN process led to an increase in activity by a group of member states, international organizations, and NGOs outside the UN. Many of their
activities were oriented toward the demand side of SALW.

- These second generation control measures take into account the negative human, social, and economic effects and address violence reduction, disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) (in postconflict situations), security-sector reform (in transition countries), regulation of civilian possession of arms, prosecution of transnational crime, and other measures.

- The concept is based on global public policy rather than UN-based diplomatic solutions.

Other Initiatives

- A majority of UN member states voted to begin a process that could lead to a legally binding Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). Preliminary negotiations for this treaty are now under way.
  - The US government was the lone vote against working toward this treaty in the General Assembly.
  - Major arms exporters (China, India, and Russia) abstained, together with many Arab League states.
- The UK initiated a “Transfer Control Initiative” (TCI).
- Minilateralism: A number of member states and regional groupings made worthwhile progress in implementing parts of the PoA, for example, national small-arms plan, updating national legislation and regional cooperation (Nairobi Protocol, OSCE, SADC, Andean Community, Pacific Island Forum).

2. Why have previous attempts to address these shortcomings failed?

- UN consensus-based diplomacy has not been able to bridge the disagreements and contrasting views of member states on a number of important issues.
  - When the PoA was negotiated in 2001, one group of states wanted to discuss not only illicit transfers of SALW but also government-licensed production and transfers—most weapons which end up on the gray and black markets are originally government-authorized weapons. The other group
wanted to restrict the debate only to illicit weapons (among them many Arab countries, China, Pakistan, and Russia).

- The term “in all its aspects” in the title of the PoA allows both groups to stick to their positions—to the detriment of effective norm setting and policy implementation.

- The compartmentalization or “silo” nature of the UN does not facilitate effective tackling of multifaceted problems.

- The control of SALW is more than one problem: it is not just an arms-control issue, but a cluster of related issues affecting a range of public sectors (from security, to health, to economics and development), each dealt with by a different institution inside and outside the UN system.

**Programme of Action (2001) and First Generation Control Measures**

- The ambitious PoA turned out to be a program of limited action—especially at the global level.

- Full implementation of the PoA would have had a fundamental impact on SALW control. However, the UN Review Conference in 2006 failed.

- Reluctant member states blocked any progress. The US government in particular would not accept legal manufacturing or trade controls, prohibitions on civilian possession, restrictions on transfers to governments, legally binding instruments, or a mandatory review process.

- The strict position of the US allowed other countries to hide behind the US position.

- The NGO community which had promoted the issue in the 1990s did not fit into the high-level diplomacy and was marginalized.

- Multilateral efforts to deal with the human, social, and economic costs of SALW and armed violence were controversial during the negotiations.

- The ten actions mentioned for the global level (operative paragraphs 32-41 of the PoA) were of limited relevance in recent years, with the possible exception of embargoes.
Examples include the widespread failures of reintegration within DDR programs and the lack of common understanding on brokering.

This failure to resolve contestation of some norms and to move toward implementation of those already agreed was partly due to the continued existence of unresolved questions on SALW.

The failure of the 2006 Review Conference was also reflected the broader crisis in multilateralism and multilateral arms control.

Second Generation Control Measures

While the UN had for some time been the leading standard setter at the global level, the increase of activity from track I and track II networks (regional and subregional organizations, international organizations, and NGOs) in humanitarian and development concerns came at the expense of unity.

Agreed norms, standards, and measures below the global level carry the risk of inconsistency as well as of neglecting the globally oriented PoA.

At the same time they may have exacerbated opposition from those who disagreed with the PoA from the beginning.

The UN has tried to engage more actively in this process over the last decade with CASA (Coordinating Action on Small Arms Mechanism), involving sixteen UN departments and other organizations.

However, interagency rivalries have emerged with numerous organizations wanting to coordinate under their own terms. Everyone is keen to see coordination, but no one wants to be coordinated.

It is important to also consider the nature of second generation control measures. In contrast to many supply-side measures which can possibly be quickly implemented, demand-side measures are by nature medium term and long term. Health issues, development programs, transformation and reintegration programs in the security sector, and postconflict reconstruction cannot be expected to work as “quick fixes” or “fire brigade”
operations. Their effects will address and remove—if the programs work well—the root causes of armed violence.

3. **What policies and institutional renovations, including legal frameworks and financial arrangements, are needed?**

   - Norms need to be reexamined—they still fall short of what is required (e.g., the distinction between illicit and licit transfers; marking and tracing of weapons to create weapon biographies; civilian possession of arms; brokering).

   - SALW control suffers from the absence of a strong mechanism for norm diffusion and policy implementation at a global scale (e.g., there is little continuing emphasis on security of state stockpiles and the importance of record keeping; there is no international supervision of the destruction of surplus or postconflict weapons).

   - SALW negotiations are stalled at the UN level. Institutional renovations are necessary to overcome this deadlock which has deeper causes than disagreement on SALW control.

   - Although multilateral processes of like-minded states, international and regional organizations, as well as NGOs, are promising alternatives to the UN processes, they bear the risk of fragmentation and selectivity and the loss of a unified program. Therefore they must be balanced with the UN agenda.

   - UN member states must bear responsibility for many of the transfers into the illicit market since states are the primary licensing authority for the bulk of production and transfers.

   - There is a need for improved understanding of SALW and their effects: violence is strikingly heterogeneous and influenced by multiple risks, making it difficult to design and implement action programs for violence reduction which work at the intrastate, interstate, and domestic levels.

   - Control mechanisms must be designed to strengthen state control on private actors to prevent misuse.

   - Civilian ownership is a particular problem in a number of countries which must be directly addressed, for example through efforts to ensure owners of SALW: (1) bear the costs of
use and misuse of SALW (e.g., through changes to liability and insurance arrangements); (2) are educated in the proper use of SALW prior to ownership or licensed possession; and (3) have restricted access to SALW through technological innovation (e.g., through personalization of access to SALW).

4. What strategy is needed to achieve these renovations?

**General Principles**

- Increased understanding, prevention, and reduction must be pursued in parallel.

- Since SALW control and the prevention of violence are complex and multifaceted problems, diversified strategies are required: first and second generation measures (issue diversification of supply-side and demand-side) must be developed and implemented in tandem.

- Accountability for both actions taken and actions not taken can assist in promoting responsible government policy (and would allow for naming and shaming where necessary).

  - So long as no legally enforceable instruments are in place, emphasis should be placed on transparency (monitoring mechanisms could include insistence on annual national reports and NGO reporting similar to Landmine Monitor).

**Institutional Strategies**

- Create a new model for developing global policy which gives a louder voice to civil society.

  - If there is no room for NGOs (as in the PoA review conference) external promotion control might be an effective path.

- Even if multilateral policymaking remains restricted to states, consideration should be given to arrangements that do not rely on consensus-based decision making (the 2006 Review Process was partly stalled by the need to achieve consensus).

- Where the UN negotiation process is stalled, initiatives at the regional, cross-regional, and national levels can help in reducing violence.
• Promote a continued review process during biennial meetings to review the PoA.

• Ensure active high-level coordination of SALW control programs within the UN.

Global Multilateralism: Norms and Implementation

• To implement the PoA effectively, additional norms must be established, important gaps in norms must be closed, existing norms must be implemented, and the vagueness of some norms must be clarified.

• There is a need to implement rigorous controls of state arms holdings given the regular supply to the gray and black markets by the armed forces and the police.

  • This may also necessitate efforts by the international community to encourage states to control and destroy surplus weapons and ammunition.

  • The man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS) control mechanism under the Wassenaar Arrangement could serve as a model for other types of SALW—especially for licensed production.

• The movement toward international analysis, monitoring, and supervision of arms flows (through sanctions and embargoes imposed by the Security Council) in conflict situations could be reinforced.

  • Existing sanctions mechanisms are often poorly resourced, receive little field support, and remain poorly connected to each other and to other relevant international mechanisms.

• Thought should also be given to improving the capacity of the international community to directly intervene in black-market transfers and misuse of SALW, both through economic intervention and through other regulatory mechanisms—such as confiscation of SALW by peace operations.

Herbert Wulf with IPI
Annex 2: Reflections from the Opening Plenary Meeting

APRIL 7, 2008

1. What are the current policy and institutional shortcomings in multilateral security capacity?

- Broader failures on disarmament issues at the UN affect the lack of progress in moving the SALW agenda forward:
  - Impasse on disarmament and nonproliferation of WMDs has led to a general aura of malaise. The 2005 World Summit suffered from disagreements on balancing the need to include proliferation and disarmament of WMDs in the final Outcome Document. The issue was enormously polarizing and the final Outcome Document ended up silent on disarmament, even though there was substantial language on conventional weapons and SALW.

- There is no SALW registry which could facilitate the establishment of a marking-and-tracing mechanism.

- Arms-transfer control is difficult given the high number of providers, low cost of acquisition, porous borders, and existing massive proliferation:
  - The trend in SALW recirculation from postconflict states to transnational organized groups adds another layer of complexity to illicit SALW transfers.

- States continue to reserve the right to transfer licit and illicit weapons to proxies to achieve national security objectives.
  - Key member states resist attempts to close legal loopholes that would enable them to continue such transfers

2. Why have previous attempts to address these shortcomings failed?

- Consensus-based diplomacy has reached its limits:
  - UN consensus-based diplomacy cannot bridge disagreements and contrasting views of member states on a number of important issues. Failure of the 2006 PoA (Programme
of Action) highlighted the contradictory interests of large producing countries and small countries suffering from small-arms casualties or fatalities.

• The 2006 PoA review resulted in an impasse largely because the interpretation of consensus was reaching unanimity on all issues, even those with clear and overwhelming majority in one direction (but no unanimity).

• The silo nature of the UN does not facilitate addressing the multifaceted dimensions of the SALW problem that encroach on a cluster of interlocking security, development, and human rights issues.

• There are obstacles to dealing with SALW in the Security Council, including some states’ reluctance to see it presented as a topic for thematic discussion.

• Politically binding norms and standards are not enough to ensure proper implementation of mechanisms. The International Tracing Instrument stands as an example of poor implementation of such a norm.

• Advocacy of second generation control measures by the international community often involves intrusion behind sovereign walls, and requires long-term commitment that can be lacking in the international community.

• There has been strong opposition from select member states in formulating an arms-control regime:
  • The stalwart position of some states has allowed other states to hide behind them, undermining the call for stricter regulation and enforcement.

3. What policies and institutional renovations, including legal frameworks and financial arrangements, are needed?

• There is a need for more comprehensive normative coverage which considers the multifaceted nature of SALW, including implications for development and security.
  • The Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) is potentially an important step in this direction, though it is still in the embryonic stages.
• There is a real need for regime-promotion architecture, that would seek to extend and integrate existing norms:
  ♦ There may be a separate need for implementation accountability arrangements;
  ♦ Need to clarify the UN’s comparative advantage in setting up an international infrastructure to deal with implementing agreed upon norms on SALW.

• There is a need to mobilize political will among member states to combat the illicit trade in SALW and create an international legally binding agreement with agreed norms for import, export, and transfer of SALW.
  ♦ Also, there is a need for political will among key nonstate actors (producers, suppliers, etc.) to ensure the successful implementation of political and legal processes, such as the PoA, the Geneva Declaration, and the ATT.

• There is also a need for operational definitions to allow for implementation of SALW resolutions.

4. What strategy is needed to achieve these renovations?

• Is PoA the optimal—or even the only feasible—forum for generating forward movement?
  ♦ ATT is still in the conceptual phase. The initiative has many drawbacks, and will take a long time to bridge consensus over the scope and parameters of the agreement.

• Can there be SALW-control conventions developed outside the UN as for other categories of armaments, such as the Ottawa Treaty for landmines?

• The key issue may be one of coverage—minilateralist approaches carry risks, including fragmentation.
  ♦ How does one change the political dynamics and incentives for member states and the private sector? The role of NGOs has been instrumental in putting the SALWs issue on the international platform. However, they were marginalized at the 2006 PoA review—should they be reintegrated in the processes of norm-setting and implementation?
A two-pronged strategy may be effective with the UN creating moral pressure on member states and possibly also private actors such as arms producers and suppliers on the one hand, and NGOs, states, and the media on the other, helping to push for a tough regulatory regime outside the UN.

- UN as bully pulpit to push normative development.
  - Over the medium term this may drive up standards.
- Need to engage nonstate actors in both norm development and norm implementation.
  - Nonstate actors are key players in the production and transfer of small arms. They need to be seen as potential partners of member states, not as mere private actors operating outside the realm of international diplomacy.
- Continued efforts should be made to improve transparency, in lieu of strict regulatory control, as is currently the case for the PoA. Transparency will allow the UN (and the international community more broadly) to better understand answers to the who, what, where, and when of the SALW problem.
Annex 3: Methodology and Timeline

Four questions guided the Task Forces in helping IPI to generate policy and institutional ideas for action:

1. What are the current policy and institutional shortcomings in multilateral security capacity on these issues?
2. Why have previous attempts to address these shortcomings failed?
3. What policies and institutional renovations, including legal frameworks and financial arrangements, are needed?
4. What strategy is needed to achieve these renovations?

The Opening Symposium on Development, Resources, and Environment served as an essential backdrop to the Task Forces. By examining these critical related issues, the symposium provided a larger geopolitical and economic context for the work of the subsequent Task Forces on security challenges. The two Task Forces, convened sequentially, addressed two thematic clusters of issues, each of which were broken down into smaller roundtables, as follows:

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Each Task Force consisted of members drawn from UN member states, academia, and policy-research institutions. The composition of each group ensured a broad range of perspectives regarding multilateral security capacity on the issues in question. Through this intensive work process, the Task Forces constituted core groups of stakeholders with an interest in developing practical strategies for addressing the institutional and policy shortcomings in these areas.

Task Force members met in opening and closing plenary sessions, as indicated below. Experts, in collaboration with IPI, prepared a series of non-papers, serving as a basis for discussion. Smaller groups gathered between the plenary sessions in roundtables, along with invited guest experts, for more in-depth, topic-specific discussions. Following each roundtable IPI produced a summary reflecting the group’s discussions that served as a guide for the closing plenary session. Likewise, IPI drew on the Task Force deliberations to produce the final reports, detailing practical and achievable steps for strengthening multilateral action in the area in question. As noted, the content of these reports is the responsibility of IPI, and does not necessarily represent the positions or opinions of individual Task Force participants.

**TIMELINE**

**Opening Symposium “Development, Resources, and Environment: Defining Challenges for the Security Agenda”**
February 7-8, 2008 [Greentree Estate, Long Island]

**Task Force One: Transnational Security Challenges**

**Opening Plenary Meeting**
April 2-4, 2008 [Greentree Estate, Long Island]

1. Roundtable on Transnational Organized Crime
   April 10-11, 2008 [Millennium UN Plaza Hotel, New York]

2. Roundtable on Weapons of Mass Destruction
   April 24-25, 2008 [IPI, New York]
3. Roundtable on Global Terrorism  
   May 1-2, 2008 [IPI, New York]

4. Roundtable on Small Arms and Light Weapons  
   May 8-9, 2008 [Millennium UN Plaza Hotel, New York]

5. Roundtable on Biosecurity  
   May 21-22, 2008 [IPI, New York]

Closing Plenary Meeting  
May 28-30, 2008 [Greentree Estate, Long Island]

Task Force Two: Inter- and Intra-state Armed Conflict

Opening Plenary Meeting  
June 11-12, 2008 [Greentree Estate, Long Island]

6. Roundtable on Peace Operations  
   June 16-17, 2008 [IPI, New York]

7. Roundtable on Mediation and Peace Processes  
   June 30-July 1, 2008 [IPI, New York]

8. Roundtable on Peacebuilding  
   July 2-3, 2008 [IPI, New York]

9. Roundtable on Conflict Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect  
   July 8-9, 2008 [IPI, New York]

Closing Plenary Meeting  
October 15-16, 2008 [Greentree Estate, Long Island]
Annex 4: Task Force Participants

Co-Chairs

H.E. Mr. Abdullah M. Alsaidi, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Yemen to the United Nations

H.E. Mr. Dumisani Shadrack Kumalo, Permanent Representative of the Republic of South Africa to the United Nations

H.E. Mr. Claude Heller, Permanent Representative of Mexico to the United Nations

H.E. Mr. Peter Maurer, Permanent Representative of Switzerland to the United Nations

H.E. Mr. John McNee, Permanent Representative of Canada to the United Nations

H.E. Mr. Vanu Gopala Menon, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Singapore to the United Nations

H.E. Mr. Heraldo Muñoz, Permanent Representative of Chile to the United Nations

H.E. R.M. Marty M. Natalegawa, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Indonesia to the United Nations

H.E. Mr. Christian Wenaweser, Permanent Representative of the Principality of Liechtenstein to the United Nations
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1. Underdevelopment, Resource Scarcity, and Environmental Degradation
2. Transnational Organized Crime
3. Weapons of Mass Destruction
4. Global Terrorism
5. Small Arms and Light Weapons
6. Biosecurity
7. Conflict Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect
8. Mediation and Peace Processes
9. Peace Operations
10. Peacebuilding
11. Strengthening the United Nations and its Partners