The Security-Development Nexus: Conflict, Peace and Development in the 21st Century

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Executive Summary

Most contemporary wars are intra-state conflicts, which often have far-reaching regional as well as international dimensions and ramifications. Such conflicts not only rupture a country's development; they are often the consequence of the failure of a country's developmental efforts. The nexus between development and security is an important one, but it is only beginning to be understood and addressed by the international community.

Drawing upon research undertaken by the International Peace Academy's Security-Development Nexus Program as well as the expertise and experience of a wide range of academics and practitioners working in the field, IPA's 2004 New York Seminar focused on recent conceptual, policy, and programming innovations at the intersection of development and security. The Seminar examined international efforts to respond to the multifaceted socio-economic, political, environmental and security challenges in conflict-prone, conflict-torn, and post-conflict countries, and assessed the effectiveness of new programs in three sectors regarded as essential for building sustainable peace: governance, security sector, and rule of law.

It is readily acknowledged that strengthening state institutions and enhancing their capacity to provide security and development based on principles of good governance are essential for sound conflict management. Similarly, an effective, credible, and accountable security sector provides a safe and secure environment in which to entrench other programming initiatives. In turn, good governance and security sector reform need to be embedded in a predictable legal environment supported by culturally appropriate rule of law programs.

Yet it is not evident that many programs undertaken by international actors in support of good governance, security sector reform, or rule of law are effective, mutually supportive, or contribute to a wider conflict management strategy. The Seminar explored the obstacles to more effective programming in each of these sectors and highlighted the tensions and the contradictions among different, and often conflicting, priorities.
The Seminar underscored the fact that international commitments to integrate security and development interventions as part of a larger conflict management strategy require further programmatic, institutional, and operational efforts that are informed by rigorous policy analysis. The panel discussions, working groups, and informal deliberations among Seminar participants highlighted the opportunities and challenges involved in integrated approaches to conflict prevention, peace-making, and peacebuilding—especially in the post-9/11 environment in which hard security threats risk the securitization of development agenda.

Introduction

Violent conflicts in the post-Cold War era ravage many societies, leading to death and destruction, the crumbling of weak states, local and international insecurity, and a vicious cycle of underdevelopment, instability, and aggression. Cambodia, El Salvador, Mozambique, Haiti, Bosnia, Angola, Liberia, Sierra Leone, East Timor, Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Sudan — the list is long and sobering. The international community is grappling with ways to end violent conflicts where they arise and to address their root causes. But comprehensive knowledge, policy, and practice for effective responses remain disjointed, and intervention by external actors appears to have limited effects.

In May 2004, the International Peace Academy held its annual New York Seminar at West Point, New York, on “The Security-Development Nexus: Conflict, Peace and Development in the 21st Century” reflecting the research agenda of its new program by the same name. The objective of the seminar was to expand the knowledge of participants about critical issues relating to security and development as instruments of conflict management, to compare regional and national experiences, share insights, and instill a broader understanding of peacemaking and peacekeeping, peacebuilding, and development. More than forty-five panelists and participants representing the United Nations (UN), member states, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and the research community, engaged in lively plenary and breakout group sessions throughout the four-day meeting. This report highlights some of the main themes of the discussions.

The seminar began by reviewing the progress that has been made in linking the international security and development communities since the end of the Cold War. It then examined the evolving knowledge and practice in sectoral areas of assistance to failed and failing states: improving governance, encouraging reforms and accountability in the security sector, and strengthening the rule of law. The participants were exposed to a multitude of country-specific, regional, and thematic insights.

While sources of instability range from the global to the local, the analysis focused on intra-state conflicts and civil wars. From a development perspective, risk of social unrest and instability at this level is often associated with diverse factors including human rights violations, violent crime, unemployment, population dislocations, and ethnic rivalries. Through a security prism, insurgencies, mass killings, ethnic and religious conflicts and terrorism are often reflections of structural problems and have a strong correlation with a state’s failure to address these problems.

Key Concepts

Security has traditionally been defined as the protection of the territorial integrity, stability, and vital interests of states through the use of political, legal, or coercive instruments at the state or international level. In the 1990s the definition was broadened to include non-military threats that lead to violent conflict and affect the security of individuals, communities, and states. Such threats range from civil wars and resource conflicts to transnational crime and population movements. ‘Security’ therefore refers to the search to avoid, prevent, reduce, or resolve violent conflicts — whether the threat originates from other states, non-state actors, or structural socio-economic conditions. Within the UN system, security actors include the Security Council, the Department of Political Affairs (DPA), and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). Other security actors include national and regional institutions such as militaries and civilian police forces, and collective security organizations.

Development typically refers to the processes and strategies through which societies and states seek to achieve more prosperous and equitable standards of living. Development activities have usually been confined to socio-economic growth, the provision of health and education, and improvements in infrastructure. International development actors are institutions with mandates to help create favorable conditions for development. They include specialized departments and agencies...
of the UN, international financial institutions (IFIs), bilateral and multilateral donors such as the regional development banks, and international NGOs.

Traditionally, development actors have tried to minimize conflict-related risks to their programming, preferring to work ‘around conflict’ (treating it as a negative externality to be avoided) or shifting from development assistance to humanitarian assistance. Only seldom have they come to work ‘on conflict’ and acknowledged the links between conflict and development. Recently, there has been an increasing convergence in the strategies and activities of security and development actors working in conflict-ridden countries, on the assumption that the challenges facing an unstable country need to be addressed in a holistic and integrated manner to achieve sustainable peace and long-term prosperity.

The concept of peacebuilding, used widely since 1992 when UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali launched the Agenda for Peace, can have different meanings. The UN’s emphasis has been on structural transformation in post-conflict settings, and differentiates post-conflict peacebuilding from the organization’s conflict prevention agenda. In other research and operational circles the concept has evolved to include a full range of approaches, processes, and stages needed to effect more sustainable, peaceful relationships and governance frameworks. In its broader sense, peacebuilding is applicable to all phases of the conflict cycle, and involves the prevention and resolution of armed conflicts, the consolidation of peace once violence has been reduced, and post-conflict reconstruction to avoid a relapse into violence.

Conflict prevention strategies and programming address deteriorating economic and social circumstances, civil disturbance, and growing instability before the outbreak of full-scale violence. Peacemaking & peace implementation assistance occur during armed combat and involve external efforts such as mediation, negotiation, and arbitration. During this conflict stage international actors become a source of positive and negative incentives for the conflict parties to agree upon, and comply with, conflict-ending settlements. Finally, assistance in the post-conflict peacebuilding phase aims at comprehensive and complementary political, socio-cultural, and economic revival.

Managing Internal Conflicts

Contemporary intra-state conflicts cannot be prevented, resolved, or managed exclusively through preventive diplomacy, political negotiations, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and the use of force. They have complex causes (social inequality, state failure, human rights violations, resource predation, etc.) which require correlated international assistance in areas including sustainable economic growth, good governance, human rights protection, and environmental preservation.

Acknowledging that security and development are interdependent in causing as well as addressing conflicts is an important first step in designing effective strategies of assistance by the international community. Nevertheless, international actors need a sophisticated understanding of how their security and development assistance is interconnected conceptually as well as practically in concrete contexts and at particular conflict stages.

The end of the Cold War allowed for an increase in the frequency and scope of the international community’s efforts to reduce conflicts and promote sustainable peace and development. Of the fifty-seven peacekeeping operations authorized by the UN Security Council since 1948, forty-two were mandated since 1990, with fourteen in 2003 alone. Further, the tasks of these missions have significantly expanded from classic peacekeeping – monitoring ceasefires and adherence to peace agreements – to multidimensional peace operations – including making preparations for elections, protecting civilians, reintegrating ex-combatants, and even administering countries and setting up new governing institutions and systems, as in Kosovo and East Timor. However, the 1990s have been alarming, with countless armed conflicts mostly within states, millions of deaths caused by violence, evident failures of weak governing structures, particularly in poorer developing countries, and the repeated collapse of peace agreements intended to end internal conflicts.

Peacebuilding and Security

Assessing the viability of the peacebuilding agenda after 11 September 2001, given the increase of hard-security concerns evident in the Afghanistan and Iraq interventions, has emerged as a key concern. There are divergent
opinions among researchers on whether the window of opportunity for a comprehensive, multilateralist approach to conflict prevention and peacebuilding might be closing in the aftermath of recent, predominantly military approaches to security by the United States (US) and other states, and the breakdown of the broad multilateral consensus in the Security Council.

One panelist offered three potential scenarios for the evolution of peacebuilding and development in the coming years. A highly likely scenario (especially if there is a continuation of the current US administration’s insistence on a narrow approach to security concerns and intervention in weak and failing states) is that peacebuilding will increasingly be underpinned by the hard-security priorities of the great powers, regional hegemons, and, especially, the sole superpower. A second scenario sees a gradual shift back towards the more liberal peacebuilding principles that developed throughout the 1990s. The events of 11 September 2001 cannot be wished away, however, and it is very likely that the US and others will continue to emphasize a primordial need to strengthen homeland security and combat terrorism, and will mainstream other policies to correlate with these fundamental goals. The degree to which this would draw resources away from other priorities and distort broader development agendas is unclear, but the least likely scenario is that the international community will continue to deepen and expand its approaches to peacebuilding. As one panelist put it, “the wind is clearly blowing the other way.”

**Peacebuilding and Development**

Meanwhile, development actors have come to play an increasingly vital role in peacebuilding. As discussed throughout the seminar, major advances have already been made by many development actors. The UN and Northern-based development agencies have increasingly recognized that peacebuilding should be an important development concern; that the focus should move beyond post-war challenges to also addressing the roots and triggers of instability in order to minimize the potential for violent conflict; and that a truly multidimensional approach is required (encompassing ambitious political, security, justice, and socio-economic initiatives), with effective coordination within and between governments, international institutions, and NGOs. The UN Agendas for Peace and Development, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Guidelines on Conflict, Peace, and Development Cooperation, and numerous governmental and intergovernmental statements and documents reflect this change in thinking. Not least, towards the end of the 1990s, the multidimensional peacebuilding agenda converged with an increased willingness, mostly from the OECD and African countries, to use internationally sanctioned force to protect vulnerable populations. The UN-propelled transitional administrations in Kosovo and East Timor are leading reflections of this trend.

Aside from the new security environment, the peacebuilding agenda is also coming under attack from the development side. Three recent studies in particular were discussed at the conference – an Utstein Group study, a Clingendael Institute study, and a study of Collaborative for Development Action — which highlight the major remaining limitations and enduring gaps in thinking, policy, and practice. For example, a major strategic deficit remains. International donors have not come to grips with the difficulties of carrying out solid conflict analysis, connecting programs to that analysis,

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rigorously monitoring outcomes, and coordinating the assistance with other donors and local stakeholders. Democracy assistance efforts have focused excessively on electoral assistance and human rights protection, while lacking sustained engagement with governmental institutions after elections and emphasizing short-term projects at the expense of longer-term, institutional reform approaches. In the case of the NGOs engaged in peacebuilding, while there are many effective stand-alone efforts, these do not “scale up” to significantly impact the conflicts they are meant to address at the national level. The real challenge is not to ask for or do more, but to design better-informed, more comprehensive conflict management strategies to do it differently.

While these findings should inform future reforms in terms of coordination, resources, and related matters, they also raise fundamental questions regarding the validity of the peacebuilding enterprise per se. As demonstrated in the background readings for the seminar, some analysts argue that despite paying lip service to the idea of comprehensive assistance for struggling societies, the long-run convergence of national elites’ and international agencies’ other priorities failed to address important aspects of economic and social policy, all potentially conflict inducing. Some African voices are also posing troubling questions regarding peacebuilding actors’ early exits from the continent, well before they can seriously address the socio-economic dimensions fueling war. Not least, some are troubled by the fact that, while normatively laudable, internationally sanctioned military interventions to protect vulnerable populations from grave human rights violations have opened the door to interventions motivated by other priorities and inadequately authorized at the international level (particularly in Afghanistan and Iraq). Such trends might be less than conducive to sustainable peacebuilding, given the different reasons why internationals may find themselves in a particular environment in the first place.

At a deeper level, some are asking hard systemic questions that go to the heart of the economic rationale for conflict management and peacebuilding. Where should the balance between short-term financial stability and longer-term equitable growth be set in war-torn societies? Despite policy commitments to the long-term picture, donors and particularly IFIs still privilege the easy trophies of artificial, short-term budget balancing at the expense of more immediate domestic needs. Further, how can war-torn countries meaningfully address structural dimensions of violence when debt relief programs fall far short of objective needs, when mechanisms to prevent large-scale international financial instability remain weak, and when World Trade Organization negotiations on Northern agricultural subsidies and free access to developed markets remain rhetorical?

International efforts need to address major systemic disparities more effectively. More than 100 million children worldwide never see the inside of a classroom. The connection between this and the direct involvement of children in conflict is not hard to see. The estimated amount of extra aid needed to ensure that every child has the chance to go to school is only about half the amount of dollars spent on ice cream in the US every year. In most African countries, as in other regions around the world, less is being spent today on primary education than twenty or thirty years ago. In the past ten years, the number of people living in extreme poverty has fallen by 10 percent, but there are still more than one billion people around the world living on less than one dollar a day. Every year 3 million people die unnecessarily from tuberculosis and malaria alone — curable diseases, both — and 40 million suffer from HIV/AIDS, phenomena known to cause socio-economic and security havoc in many parts of the world, particularly in Africa. To reflect briefly on the UN’s Millennium Development Goals, at its present rate of progress, sub-Saharan Africa is likely to reach the hunger eradication goal around 2165 — 150 years off-target. Such discouraging examples symbolize the major international inequities that prolong the marginalization of many societies, undermine the effectiveness of conflict management efforts, and hinder failing states in the developing world.

A wide array of changes in the international system is needed to address problems in the developing world, particularly in those regions troubled by violent conflicts. Along with designing more targeted strategies for conflict management, analysts argue that rich countries must open their markets, curb protectionism, transfer resources, and embrace underdeveloped markets through increased trade. The poorest countries must tackle corruption and build stability, embrace international investment and trade, and capitalize on growth to address health, education, and social problems and institutional reforms. Debt relief, particularly for countries emerging from conflict, must be an essential part of the solution for these already highly overburdened societies.

Internal conflicts are often cyclical in nature and require simultaneous developmental and security responses. Conflicts distort a country’s demands and priorities while disrupting existing decision-making mechanisms at all levels of society, from the macro to the micro. Among multiple and urgent needs, prioritizing and making difficult policy choices is essential for effective international assistance. However, international actors are often diverse in nature, have multiple agendas, and are handicapped by the lack of a common strategic vision.

**Policy and Practice for Effective Conflict Management**

The international community is doing the right thing in attempting to address violent conflicts in a more holistic manner, but is it doing it right? The plethora of international initiatives in conflict-prone, conflict-torn, and post-conflict situations is encouraging. This does not mean, however, that international actors have yet found the most effective ways to use the tools at their disposal to prevent, manage, and overcome violent conflicts. Important questions in designing effective assistance strategies remain unanswered. Does order or justice come first in a post-conflict setting? Are these necessarily complementary or could one undermine the other? What is the place of NGOs and private military companies (PMCs) in peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations? Practice is running ahead of meaningful debates to support it. How does one prepare and implement effective strategies to assure physical security, but also include enough additional peace incentives to induce reluctant local actors to buy into the peace process at the earliest stages of international involvement? As pointed out by a number of speakers, military intervention does not bring peace; it only buys time. The “first one-hundred days on the ground,” as referred to during the discussions, are crucial for the success of international intervention, meaning that international staff should arrive already well prepared and ready to hit the ground running.

As violent conflict is often associated with weak and failing states, the rationale of international assistance should focus on creating what one panelist called “capable states,” able to provide security, well-being, and justice. States unable to provide all three of these functions are prone to instability and violence. Thus, international efforts have to help revamp all these functions simultaneously, with the aim to strike a sustainable security, political, and socio-economic balance beyond the short-run. More pointedly, addressing the violence, improving human rights, creating socio-economic opportunities and comprehensive development goals, and establishing proper, permanent political solutions to address the sources of instability were identified as main priorities.

Although development agencies remain far from mainstreaming conflict-sensitive approaches into their work, they are increasingly working in tandem with their security counterparts to address common concerns. Strategic and programmatic overlap has emerged in three key areas of international assistance: improving governance, reforming the security sector, and establishing the rule of law.
Governance

Governance refers to a society's capacity to reconcile conflicting interests and manage change peacefully, and so, lies at the heart of conflict management. Activities to improve governance range widely and include strengthening electoral and legislative systems, improving access to justice and public administration, supporting decentralization, and developing greater capacity to deliver basic services. International development agencies are giving greater weight to governance issues through democratization projects, civil society support, and transparency and anti-corruption initiatives. The UN is also increasingly aware of the need to integrate governance issues into its diplomatic, peacemaking, and peace-enforcement operations through support for elections, democratization, and political participation.

Yet there is no consensus among policy analysts or practitioners as to the short-term impacts or the longer-term sustainability of these programs. More troublesome, however, may be that definitions of what ‘governance’ entails vary from institution to institution, even though the promotion of ‘good governance’ or ‘democratic governance’ has been reiterated in countless international documents and is regarded as a core element of sustainable development.

As one panelist put it in exploring the essence of governance, in each society there is someone who has the power and legitimacy to give commands everyone else has to follow. Hence, improving governance refers to reshaping coveted positions and fundamental dynamics within a society. This involves a whole range of complex mechanisms, processes, and institutions through which citizens and groups can articulate their interests, mediate their differences, and exercise their rights and obligations. Reforming the governance sector should ultimately achieve participation, transparency, accountability, equity, and respect for the rule of law.

During the discussions on how to improve governance it became clear that the role of gender as it relates to conflict management and peacebuilding in precarious environments remains poorly understood. Women's empowerment, for example, has been highlighted as a primordial deficit in the Arab region, alongside freedom and knowledge. Violent conflicts affect social relations, create demographic imbalances, and alter individual and group characteristics of men and women. Research shows that women provide basic reintegration services at the community and family levels and that domestic violence increases after the end of war, aspects which should be given much more attention in peacebuilding initiatives. Women usually bring different perceptions of needs, more willingness to engage across party and ethnic lines, and a greater openness to government-civil society engagement, and could lead efforts to deal with trauma, reconciliation, child soldiers, transitional justice, and HIV/AIDS crises. As one panelist maintained, they are also perceived as being more trustworthy, less likely to be violent or corrupt, and more conscious overall of maintaining a clean image. Women remain tremendous resources to be tapped into by conflict management efforts in highly unstable transitional contexts. Depending on the magnitude of war, death, and displacement, women may comprise a vast majority of post-war populations. They always represent a critical mass of the local population, but so far have only rarely been equal owners in the reconstruction efforts in their societies.

Security Sector Reform

Tensions and lack of accountability in the security sector disenfranchise communities, contribute to poverty, distort economies, fuel further tensions, and tilt political development. For example, unclear legal frameworks and insecurity in daily life block socio-economic and political development. Without popular trust in the rule of law and the state’s ability to provide security for its citizens, peace cannot be consolidated or sustained. The presence of alternative security providers undermines stability, predictability, and effective government.
Hence, reform of the security sector, particularly in conflict-ridden societies, is a critical element of conflict management, peace, and security efforts. It encourages a departure from repressive traditions and provides a safe and stable environment for political and economic growth, and for socio-cultural reconciliation. Traditionally the purview of security actors, development agencies have increasingly engaged in programming activities in this sector, from the reform of the military to police restructuring and strengthening of civil oversight mechanisms.

Reforming the security sector remains a highly sensitive political undertaking, as it involves the reorganization of entities with the authority to use, order, or threaten the use of force, and the civil structures in charge of their management. This directly affects the power balance between and within states and gets to the core of debates over state sovereignty vs. the international community’s or states’ collective responsibility to protect citizens from abuse. Besides the highly political nature of SSR, other difficulties of international involvement in this area include a lack of clear definitions and international standards in this field, the difficult choices among numerous priorities, and the potentially destabilizing effects of police and military reforms.

Guiding principles and a clear understanding of how to operationalize these principles must inform reforms of the various components of the security sector — military and paramilitary forces, intelligence services, national and local police, border guards and customs services, judicial and penal systems, and the civil authorities overseeing these agencies. The concept of security sector reform has been broadened gradually, and includes: transparency and accountability; local ownership (broad buy-in by society); anti-corruption (enhancing the credibility of the security sector); government legitimacy (to avoid the danger of making unrepresentative regimes more effective at suppression); consent and political commitment from the host government; and a comprehensive approach and coordination (among external actors in the field and headquarters, within each contributing country, and between external and local actors).

The discussions made it clear that serious problems remain in terms of expectations, policy, and practice in this sector. The division of labor between peacekeeping troops, UN administrations, humanitarian organizations, and development actors is often unclear, leading to issues being solved in an ad hoc manner. A lack of adequate resources has also been a weakness. Practical support from development donors has been slow to materialize, putting the advances made at the conceptual and rhetorical levels in stark contrast with the lack of practical implementation.

Rule of Law

Programs to support the rule of law have become increasingly popular among international actors in the last decade. International statements that emphasize the importance of the rule of law in order to address current developmental and security challenges are flourishing. However, there still is a great deal of confusion revolving around the meaning and scope of the concept.

Most would agree that a political and legal system based on the rule of law requires that laws be understood, clear, and applied equally to everyone. Importantly, the government should abide by the law and be embedded in a comprehensive legal framework. Thus, the police, judicial, and penal institutions upholding the legal system are supposed to be reasonably fair, competent, and efficient. In order to function properly, they require well-trained personnel as well as the necessary infrastructure, material, and equipment. A more maximalist approach to the rule of law is one that additionally requires legal systems to be based on fundamental human rights standards. While international actors generally prefer the latter approach, programming outcomes are often far more modest.

Rule of law programming is often undertaken by both development and security actors without a thorough understanding of the longer-term conflict management consequences of the strategies pursued. In conflict contexts, attempts to revive the rule of law may incorporate diverse aspects such as judicial reform, human rights monitoring, and transitional justice. Past human rights abuses have to be addressed, ex-combatants have to be re-educated, and at least some degree of reconciliation has to be achieved. As in other sectors, the interdependencies are complex and often involve considerable tensions.

Local actors have to be meaningfully involved, and their capacity enhanced, for success in strengthening the rule of law in a post-conflict setting to be possible. The responsibility for developing comprehensive strategies and frameworks, and for their implementation and sustainability, ultimately rests with the local partners in the country concerned. Countries emerging from violent
conflict often have to rethink and implement a very different type of norms and regulations, fit to deliver new aspirations and reconcile differences in those particular contexts. As such, ‘standard’ international rule of law blueprints should not simply be imposed; they should be tailored to fit the local context and traditions.

As with governance and security sector strategies, good planning, early intervention, and timely implementation are essential. Given the unstable nature of the environments, valuable opportunities can be lost on the ground and the confidence of the local population may erode if the international community is unable to act in a timely and effective manner.

Challenges and Opportunities for Sustainable Peace and Development

Linking international assistance thematically and operationally does not automatically yield effective conflict management outcomes. Far from being simply a technical exercise in coordination, the agendas for peace and sustainable development are ultimately political in nature. It is essential to understand how the international community interacts with local actors, including governments, communities, NGOs, and others, in designing sound conflict management frameworks. Despite the emphasis on local ownership of conflict management processes, it is not clear that international actors have yet developed credible strategies for effectively assessing local needs, setting priorities, allocating resources, and establishing accountability.

The peace and development agendas gathered much steam throughout the 1990s, but recent assessments, such as the three major peacebuilding evaluation studies cited at the seminar, show that efforts so far may have been only “skin-deep,” as one panelist put it in referring to democratization efforts in Cambodia. Democracy is not the same as democratization, and transitional periods are always extremely difficult and open-ended, as proven by the recent ethnic violence in Kosovo in March 2004, which threatens the core of UNMIK’s raison d’être. Is the window of opportunity for comprehensive peacebuilding closing, given the increased security concerns after 9/11 and the rechanneling of international priorities and resources? Or has the pendulum of comprehensive peacebuilding swung too far in favor of securitization of development, as another speaker suggested?

This last thought was offered for debate early during the seminar and might provide a good starting point for more forward-oriented peacebuilding efforts post 9/11. The threat and wide reach of international terrorism, and the spillover of insecurity regionally and globally, offer a new and clear logic for engaging and helping to reconstruct ‘incapable’ states beyond the short-term, particularly for security actors otherwise reluctant to broaden their agendas. On the development side, commendable initiatives undertaken by the OECD DAC Network on Conflict, Peace, and Development Cooperation are moving from working ‘around conflict’ to working ‘on conflict’, to overcome the shortcomings of their work in the 1990s. Further, the international political impetus for multilateral conflict management efforts might be renewed, given the evident struggles of “doing it alone” in Iraq.
An International Peace Academy Report

The Security-Development Nexus: Conflict, Peace and Development in the 21st Century

It is my great pleasure to address this forum of “young and promising” experts on UN peacekeeping and their tutors from the International Peace Academy in distinguished environment of West Point.

As it happens, a close collaborator of my UNMIK team, Chief of Staff of KFOR, General Stephen Schook and several of his colleagues also serving in Kosovo are part of the “Grey Line” graduated from this institution.

In my presentation today, I intend to outline the situation in Kosovo from as it stands after the events in March, also highlighting some points, which I consider relevant to UN peacekeeping more generally. After this, I am happy to take your questions and comments.

The United Nations Mission in Kosovo that I lead is the largest and probably most ambitious peacekeeping mission ever undertaken. UNMIK with its specific characteristics, such as the pillar structure and close partnership with NATO, is a unique Peacekeeping Operation, a laboratory of multi-institutional and multi-dimensional peacekeeping.

Let me elaborate a bit on the current structure of UNMIK:

The UN itself leads the police and justice system as its first pillar. We have nearly 4,000 international police, along with a team of international prosecutors and judges to tackle the most sensitive cases. In the last years, UNMIK has created a judicial and legal system almost from scratch that reflects international standards of human rights.

Civil administration comprises the second pillar of the mission, overseeing a myriad of tasks to ensure that government services get delivered. At the same time its professionals are building the capacity of the local administration to be functional, transparent and democratic. Whereas UNMIK initially administered all government functions in Kosovo directly, elected local institutions now have the lead in many areas, with a civil service increasingly able to work effectively and impartially.

Democratising Kosovo and monitoring and improving respect for human rights are the principal mandates of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, as the third pillar of the mission. The OSCE has established the framework for the creation of political parties and organized three successful, democratic elections. It also operates the police training facility that ensures that all Kosovo police officers are dedicated to law enforcement that respects international standards of human rights.

The fourth pillar of the mission is led by the European Union, which has invested hundreds of millions of dollars in economic reconstruction and development. The EU is also leading the complex effort to get Kosovo’s formerly government-dominated economy moving again. It is privatising the enterprises it can, and restructuring others to be competitive players in the regional economy.

I assume that the news about the violent turmoil, which shook Kosovo in mid-March, have not escaped your attention.

The rioting and ethnic violence led to 19 people killed, several hundred wounded and 4100 displaced. Houses and patrimonial sites were destroyed. It was the worst setback in the existence of the mission.

Following this blow, UNMIK must take stock of where it has come from, review its achievements and shortcomings, and chart a course for the future. We will not reward violence, and we will not be deterred in pursuing an enduring and just peace for Kosovo. However, we have to analyse to what extent a different approach to our policy could have helped to prevent the upsurge, and how to avoid it from happening again. We must undertake fresh efforts to adapt UNMIK to the changed circumstances.

The riots have shown us that while we have made impressive gains in many areas, we might not have managed to address some of the gravest concerns of the Kosovar citizens. One of the underlying reasons, which spurred the

Annex I: Text of the Concluding Address
by Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Kosovo, Mr. Harri Holkeri

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I assume that the news about the violent turmoil, which shook Kosovo in mid-March, have not escaped your attention.

The rioting and ethnic violence led to 19 people killed, several hundred wounded and 4100 displaced. Houses and patrimonial sites were destroyed. It was the worst setback in the existence of the mission.

Following this blow, UNMIK must take stock of where it has come from, review its achievements and shortcomings, and chart a course for the future. We will not reward violence, and we will not be deterred in pursuing an enduring and just peace for Kosovo. However, we have to analyse to what extent a different approach to our policy could have helped to prevent the upsurge, and how to avoid it from happening again. We must undertake fresh efforts to adapt UNMIK to the changed circumstances.

The riots have shown us that while we have made impressive gains in many areas, we might not have managed to address some of the gravest concerns of the Kosovar citizens. One of the underlying reasons, which spurred the
unrest, was the frustration on the unresolved question of what will ultimately become of Kosovo.

The task given to us by the Security Council is to establish functioning self-government for Kosovo and effectively prepare Kosovo for the day when the status question will be resolved. In order to achieve this objective, we have developed a policy of standards for governance, democracy, human rights and other areas that must be met before discussions will open on future status.

This policy of “Standards before Status” has the advantage of explicitly recognizing the need to deal with the future status of Kosovo, while at the same time keeping the focus on the practical work that needs to be done to create a sustainable society.

UNMIK, together with representatives of the local institutions, has compiled a detailed plan of action on each of the eight Standards, setting out what actions need to be taken, by whom and in what timeframe. The Kosovo Standards Implementation Plan is UNMIK’s quality insurance mechanism, and, more importantly, our exit strategy.

However, the violence showed that not all segments of the Kosovan society are supporting the standards. The challenges for the local government and us is now to bring the message across to all citizens.

Kosovo’s political leaders must also take up their inherent roles as moral leaders. When the riots broke out in mid-March, most of the Kosovo Albanian leaders were at first reluctant to actively condemn the violence, and the attacks on the Serb community in particular.

One important lesson learnt in response to the crisis is that, in order to effectively represent the policy of the international community, UNMIK must deepen its partnership with the local institutions. Without compromising our mandate, we need to engage into working side-by-side with the local government. As in the case of any government and its constituency, can a peacekeeping mission with administrative powers not afford to alienate itself from the population it is supposed to represent.

In the sensitive inter-ethnic setting of Kosovo we have to rely on our local counterparts to sensitise public opinion and promote reconciliation and tolerance. Bridging ethnic divisions has been perhaps the least successful area of our mission’s work over the last five years.

Ultimately, the functioning multiethnic institutions are the most important element of our exit strategy. We have been aware from the outset that to successfully complete our mission we would have to be able to turn over Kosovo’s governance to its people. This year will bring us or second general election in Kosovo, and one step closer to accomplishing our goals.

As with all of the other tasks before us, to do this we continue to require the active commitment of the international community. Most important are the UN member states and the different organizations active in Kosovo – EU, NATO and OSCE.

While coming to the concluding part of my expose, let me provide you with an example on how the Member States can play a crucial role in the success of a peacekeeping operation.

Member States, besides funding our mission, provide us with the personnel whose expertise is crucial to fulfilling our mandate. In the aftermath of the March violence our mission faced an acute need for additional investigators and prosecutors to react to the crimes. Because of the political imperative, the international community had strongly urged UNMIK to take swift action and bring the perpetrators of these ethnic crimes to justice. However, to follow this recommendation, our scarce resources from another priority area, the fight against corruption, had to be diverted.

Rapid responding to the capacity needs of a peacekeeping mission is important but generally slow. This is why the UN, with the support of the Member States, should not spare efforts to design and effective quick-response system to ensure the right human capacities in the right place in a timely manner. This applies especially to experts in the field of Rule of Law and specialists in civilian administrations (for instance aviation).

UNMIK began nearly five years ago as the largest and most far-reaching commitment ever by the United Nations to peacekeeping. Never before had the world body taken on so much responsibility for protecting and governing a place as it did for Kosovo. Our mission has changed shape considerably during the intervening time, adapting to circumstances and the new realities that we ourselves have worked to create. And even as our principles remain ever steadfast, the contours and outlines of the mission will continue to evolve.
Annex II: Agenda

The Security-Development Nexus:
Conflict, Peace and Development in the 21st Century

NEW YORK SEMINAR 2004
3–7 May 2004

Monday, May 3, 2004

16:00 - 16:30  Orientation: Colonel Jussi Saressalo, Military Adviser, International Peace Academy
16:30 - 17:00  Opening Remarks: Dr. Neclâ Tschirgi, Vice President, International Peace Academy
17:00 - 18:00  Keynote Speaker: Ambassador Lena Sundh, Deputy Special Representative for the Secretary-General for the Democratic Republic of the Congo
Discussion
19:00  Welcome Reception and Dinner:
Guest speaker: H.E. Mr. Wegger Christian Strømmen, Deputy Permanent Representative of Norway to the United Nations

Tuesday, May 4, 2004

09:00 - 10:30  Panel 1: The Changing Context for the International Peacebuilding Agenda since the 1990s: the Security Perspective
Chair: Dr. Neclâ Tschirgi, Vice President, International Peace Academy
Panelists: Dr. Roland Paris, Policy Adviser, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, North America Bureau, Ottawa, Canada
Dr. Joanna Spear, Director, The United States Foreign Policy Institute, George Washington University
Discussant: Mr. Tom Leney, Program Officer for Peace, Security and Human Rights, United Nations Foundation
Discussion
10:30 - 11:00  Break
11:00 - 12:30  Panel 2: Review of Development Policy and Practice in the Post-Cold War Global System: Critical Perspectives from a Peacebuilding Angle

Chair: Ms. Nicola Dahrendorf, Chief, Humanitarian Policy and Advocacy, Office of Emergency Programs, United Nations Children’s Fund

Panelists: Dr. Neclâ Tschirgi, Vice President, International Peace Academy
Dr. Stephen Baranyi, Principal Researcher on Conflict Prevention, The North-South Institute, Ottawa, Canada

Discussant: Dr. David Roberts, Lecturer, School of History and International Affairs, University of Ulster, Magee

Discussion

12:30 - 14:00  Lunch

14:00 - 17:00  Breakout Groups 1–3

1. The Security-Development Nexus in Conflict Prevention
   Facilitator: Dr. Agnès Hurwitz, Associate, International Peace Academy

2. The Security-Development Nexus in Peacemaking and Peace Implementation
   Facilitator: Dr. Gordon Peake, Associate, International Peace Academy

3. The Security-Development Nexus in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding
   Facilitator: Ms. Vanessa Hawkins, Program Officer, International Peace Academy

19:00  Reception and Dinner:
Guest Speaker: Mr. Graham M. Day, Deputy High Representative, Head of OHR Banja Luka, Bosnia and Herzegovina

Wednesday, May 5, 2004

09:00 - 10:30  Panel 3: Governance

Chair: H.E. Mr. Johan Ludvig Løvald, Permanent Representative of Norway to the United Nations

Panelists: Ms. Elissar Sarrouh, Senior Policy Advisor, Regional Bureau for Arab States, UNDP
Mr. Ram Manikkalingam, Assistant Director, Global Inclusion Program, The Rockefeller Foundation

Discussant: Ms. Sanam Anderlini, Director, Policy Commission, Women Waging Peace, Washington D.C.

Discussion

10:30 – 11:00  Break

11:00 – 12:30  Panel 4: Security Sector Reform

Chair: H.E. Ms. Ellen Margrethe Løj, Permanent Representative of Denmark to the United Nations
Panelists: Dr. Annika S Hansen, Senior Scientist, Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, Norway  
Dr. Gordon Peake, Associate, International Peace Academy  

Discussant: Mr. Graham M. Day, Deputy High Representative, Head of OHR Banja Luka, Bosnia and Herzegovina  

Discussion  
13:00 - 15:00 Lunch  
15:00 – 16:30 Panel 5: Rule of Law  
Chair: H.E. Mr. Jarmo Sareva, Deputy Permanent Representative of Finland to the United Nations  
Panelists: Professor Luis Aucoin, Associate Research Professor, Institute for Human Security, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy  
Dr. Agnès Hurwitz, Associate, International Peace Academy  
Discussant: Mr. Robert Pulver, Judicial Officer, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations  

Discussion  
19:00 Reception and Dinner  
Guest Speaker: H.E. Mr. Jarmo Sareva, Deputy Permanent Representative of Finland to the United Nations  

Thursday, May 6, 2003  
09:00 - 12:00 Breakout Groups 4-6  
4. Security Sector Reform  
Facilitators: Dr. Gordon Peake, Associate, International Peace Academy and Dr. Annika S. Hansen, Norwegian Defence Research Establishment  
5. Rule of Law  
Facilitator: Dr. Agnès Hurwitz, Associate, International Peace Academy  
6. Governance  
Facilitator: Dr. Neclâ Tschirgi, Vice President, International Peace Academy  

12:00 - 13:30 Tour of United States Military Academy, West Point  
13:30 - 15:00 Lunch  
Guest Speaker: Ms. Kate Marquis, Visiting Professor, United States Military Academy, US Government Analyst  

15:00 - 17:00 Plenary session for reporting back  
19:00 Reception and Farewell Dinner
Friday, May 7, 2003

09:00 - 11:00  Panel 6: The Security-Development Nexus: Challenges and Opportunities

Chair: Dr. Neclà Tschirgi, International Peace Academy

Panelists: Dr. Eva Busza, Policy Advisor, Senior Policy Unit, UNDP
Dr. Ken Menkhaus, Associate Professor of Political Science, Davidson College

Discussion

11:00 - 11:30  Concluding Address by Mr. Harri Holkeri, Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Kosovo

11:30 - 12:00  Break

12:30 - 13:00  Evaluation of the seminar

Chair's concluding remarks

Certificates

13:00  Departure for NYC

14:30  Arrival NYC
Annex III: List of Participants

Mr. Birhanemeskel Abebe  
First Secretary  
Permanent Mission of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia to the United Nations

Ms. Dziunik Aghajanian  
Deputy Permanent Representative  
Permanent Mission of the Republic of Armenia to the United Nations

Mr. Mohamed A. Al-Najar  
Second Secretary  
Permanent Mission of the Republic of Yemen to the United Nations

Ms. Marija Antonijević  
Third Secretary  
Permanent Mission of Serbia & Montenegro to the United Nations

Mr. Federico A. Barttfield  
Secretary  
Permanent Mission of Argentina to the United Nations

Ms. Tanja Bernstein  
Political Affairs Officer  
Department of Peacekeeping Operations  
United Nations

Ms. Laura Bologna  
Political Affairs Officer  
Department of Political Affairs  
United Nations

Mr. Gianluca Buono  
Project Officer  
Landmines and Small Arms Team  
Humanitarian and Advocacy Unit  
UNICEF

Colonel Hector Celarié  
Defense Attaché  
Permanent Mission of El Salvador to the United Nations

Mr. James Choi  
First Secretary  
Permanent Mission of Australia to the United Nations

Ms. Sarah Clarke  
Associate Representative  
Quaker UN Office

Mr. Javier Colomina  
First Secretary  
Permanent Mission of Spain to the United Nations

Ms. Céline Galipeau  
Foreign Correspondent  
Société Radio-Canada

Ms. Mercedes Gómez Garrido  
Political Affairs Officer  
Department of Political Affairs  
United Nations

Ms. Yasoja Gunasekera  
First Secretary  
Permanent Mission of Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka to the United Nations

Mr. Hassan Hamid Hassan  
Second Secretary  
Permanent Mission of the Republic of Sudan to the United Nations

Mr. Alonso Herrera  
Third Secretary  
Permanent Mission of Venezuela to the United Nations

Ms. Kathleen Hunt  
CARE International  
United Nations Representative

Mr. Ikram Mohd. Ibrahim  
First Secretary  
Permanent Mission of Malaysia to the United Nations

Ms. Heli Kanerva  
Counselor  
Permanent Mission of Finland to the United Nations

Mr. Kagyabukama E. Kiliba  
Minister Plenipotentiary  
Permanent Mission of United Republic of Tanzania to the United Nations
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<td>Ms. Bernadett Kollár</td>
<td>Third Secretary</td>
<td>Permanent Mission of Hungary</td>
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<td>Ms. Jessica E. Lapenn</td>
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<td>United States Mission</td>
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<td>Lieutenant Colonel Denis Le Meur</td>
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<td>Mr. Léonidas Nkingyi</td>
<td>First Counselor</td>
<td>Permanent Mission of Burundi</td>
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