Executive summary

- Participants agreed that peacebuilding strategies need to be comprehensive and include both political and developmental dimensions. It is vital that economic and political policies do not contradict but rather mutually reinforce each other.

- The lack of consensus on the timing of peacebuilding and the absence of clear benchmarks for success have resulted in inadequate, and sometimes counter-productive, entrance and exit strategies. Better informed mandates would involve specific criteria to enter or withdraw from a conflict.

- In order to improve the coordination of peacebuilding activities, actors should identify and define their respective areas of comparative advantage and limitations. Peacebuilding work should be carried out under the leadership of a coordinating agency. Coordination would also be significantly strengthened if member state funding was provided in a timely and predictable manner.

- Although difficulties in finding reliable local interlocutors may arise, the participation of local actors and the inclusion of local knowledge in the decision-making process are key components of a successful peacebuilding operation. Local ownership is essential to leverage and sustain economic development and democratization.
Introduction

Peacebuilding has become a useful, perhaps predominant, tool at the disposal of international institutions to prevent the recurrence of conflict. Large peace operations, such as those in Kosovo and East Timor, involve tasks spanning from building schools and organizing garbage collection, to disarming combatants and reintegrating refugees. This sort of comprehensive programming helps war-torn societies transition into self-sustaining and peaceful polities. However, the manner in which such programs could be planned and implemented requires further analysis, and it is with a view to informing the UN Security Council, UN member states, and NGOs that the International Peace Academy, on May 7 – 10, 2001, held a policy development seminar entitled "Towards Comprehensive Peacebuilding" in West Point, New York. The seminar was generously funded by the governments of Norway and Denmark.

The seminar brought together participants and speakers from permanent missions to the UN, NGOs, the UN Secretariat and Specialized Agencies, and the media. Following an inaugural lunch addressed by Norway’s State Secretary H.E. Mr. Raymond Johansen, participants spent three days analyzing the concept and scope of peacebuilding, focusing on case studies (e.g. Mozambique, Cambodia, El Salvador, Bosnia, and Kosovo) and examining the prospects for more effective peacebuilding strategies. This report reflects some of the main issues raised during discussions and includes the policy goals and recommendations that emerged.

Peacebuilding is an attempt to reduce the sources of present and ongoing antagonisms and build local capacities for conflict resolution in divided societies—often in the face of open hostilities and raw trauma. It encompasses a variety of tasks including institution building, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants, and psychological trauma counseling for war-affected groups. Although peacebuilding processes vary according to local circumstances (i.e. the degree of hostility of the factions, the magnitude of displacement, the level of economic and social devastation) participants were in accord that a number of themes and subtexts recur throughout all peacebuilding operations that merit scrutiny.

Approaches: Peacebuilding as politics vis-à-vis peacebuilding as development

The importance one places on specific peacebuilding activities is in the eye of the beholder. Participants who saw peacebuilding mainly as a process of political development approached it through the creation of political institutions that enable rival individuals and groups to engage in the struggle for power and to settle conflicts in a peaceful manner. Promoting democratization is thus an important element of peacebuilding in that democracy can enable societies to manage conflict non-violently over the long-term. In the more immediate term, the signing of a negotiated agreement between parties to the conflict and determining the timing and implementation of constitutional reforms are crucial. For the more economic minded, social development and market construction were viewed as the primary component of a successful peacebuilding process; they took a more long-term view emphasizing development strategies such as micro-credit projects, job creation, and education.

However, peacebuilding will not succeed through such bifurcated approaches. Seminar participants agreed that successful peacebuilding requires a comprehensive strategy that includes both political and economic dimensions. Furthermore, economic development should be introduced at the earliest stage possible in the rebuilding process, provided security is guaranteed. Yet there are caveats: it is important that economic development policies do not contradict or inadvertently undermine provisions agreed to in the political settlement. Such contradiction was evident in the case of El Salvador in the first year after the signing of the peace agreement. While the International Monetary Fund (IMF) was in charge of the economic reconstruction process, the UN monitored the implementation of the peace agreement. The stringent fiscal targets imposed by the IMF precluded the government from implementing land reform, an essential peacebuilding component in the peace agreement. The example of El Salvador underlines the importance for international actors to coordinate and integrate their strategies. The recent IMF decision to allow for more flexible financial targets for economies in transition and to encourage investment in local social

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1For IPA’s most recent work on peacebuilding, see Peacebuilding as Politics: Cultivating Peace in Fragile Societies, edited by Elizabeth M. Cousens and Chetan Kumar with Karin Wermester (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001)

welfare is a step in right direction, and may increase the potential for sustainable economic development in post-conflict situations.

**Timing: Entrance and exit strategies**

Participants agreed that clear and coherent peacebuilding strategies are vital. Yet, the international community seems unable to achieve consensus on when to enter and exit in a conflict situation. These differences reflect different understandings of “conflict ripeness”. Some participants argued that peacebuilding operations should be initiated at a moment of “natural” ripeness, defined as the turning point in a conflict when warring parties have a stronger interest in ending conflict rather than continuing the dispute. Others questioned the notion of natural ripeness, arguing that such ripeness could be mechanically induced through negative and/or positive incentives aimed at warring parties. Accordingly, the development of entrance strategies would seek to change the course of the conflict and induce a window for conflict resolution instead of reacting to the conflict situation as it evolves on the ground.

The timing of UN peacebuilding entrance and exit strategies will continue to depend on the political willingness of member states to fund costly long-term and multi-dimensional missions. First, the greater the interests involved in the warring country, the more generous funders are likely to be. Second, the more complex a peacebuilding task appears, the less willing funders will be to support the process. Unless policymakers include these considerations in their strategic planning, peacebuilding mandates are unlikely to set realistic objectives.

**The transition challenge**

The difficulty of defining precise entrance and exit strategies often results from the reluctance of UN member states to finance the transition from peacekeeping missions to peacebuilding operations. Seminar participants underlined the disparity between funding available for peacekeeping missions compared to peacebuilding activities. UN member states favor short-term projects such as peacekeeping missions that have a defined end date; they often prove reluctant to finance long-term peacebuilding projects. However, carefully planned transitions are needed, so that the gains made during the peacekeeping phase can be leveraged and expanded to promotion of self-sustaining peace through peacebuilding.

In order to ensure a smooth hand-over from peacekeeping to peacebuilding activities, it is essential to plan the transition in the early stages of a peacekeeping operation. It is also important to delegate more decision-making authority to UN agencies operating at the local level, allowing the UN to respond in a timely and more flexible manner to crises on the ground. Accurate and up-to-date information and intelligence from the field would help the UN Security Council design strategically informed peacebuilding mandates.

**Evaluating success and failure**

Exit strategies are built on the evaluation of success and failure. Depending on the lens used, a peacebuilding mission might look like a semi-failure to some and a success to others. In Cambodia, for instance, the 1998 coup which was followed by the installation of an authoritarian regime could suggest a failure of the peacebuilding efforts of the UN Transitional Authority in 3

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3For a discussion on the role of international actors in peace agreements, see Ending Civil Wars, a forthcoming project of the IPA edited by Stephen John Stedman, Donald Rothchild, and Elizabeth M. Cousens (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002)
Towards Comprehensive Peacebuilding

An International Peace Academy Report

On the basis of Resolution 1244 (S/RES/1244) of June 10, 1999, the mission priorities in Kosovo are grouped in four pillars: the UN is in charge of the civil administration, the UNHCR is responsible for emergency and humanitarian issues, the OSCE monitors democratization and elections, and the EU assumes responsibilities for macro-economic policies and reconstruction.

The importance of coordination cannot be overemphasized, and yet it is an area in which the international community has traditionally fared poorly. In order to improve coordination and generate mutually reinforcing divisions of labor, actors, under the leadership of a selected coordination agency, need to define their respective areas of comparative advantage and limitations. The large number of actors typically involved in peacebuilding — the UN Secretariat and Specialized Agencies, the World Bank, the IMF, regional organizations, ‘coalitions of the willing’, international and local NGOs, national and local leaders, and the local population — has (naturally) led to divergent approaches. This can adversely affect coordination within the UN system. Agencies such as the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the World Food Programme (WFP) often maintain a long-term presence in post-conflict countries whereas the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations’ missions are often short-term and subject to renewal by the UN Security Council. Not surprisingly, strategic coordination among these different actors has proved difficult. There must be greater inter-agency communication and coordination.

Economic agendas

Exit strategies should ensure that established institutions and legal frameworks built during the peacebuilding mission remain able to tackle illegal drug, human, and black market trade that spring in the fecund grounds of unstable polities. While the international community focuses increasingly on the prosecution of political and wartime crimes, economic “white collar” crime has been less addressed. The economic motivations of local and international actors have often been absent from UN analyses. Policy-makers should be aware that the economic policies of a given peacebuilding mission may inadvertently prolong the war — in many cases, international post-conflict economic aid has benefited illegal trade networks, often led by former warlords.

Coordination

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**Footnotes:***

*The Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court adopted on July 17, 1998 illustrates the increased international interest in guaranteeing the prosecution of political and military leaders for these crimes.

*On the basis of Resolution 1244 (S/RES/1244) of June 10, 1999, the mission priorities in Kosovo are grouped in four pillars: the UN is in charge of the civil administration, the UNHCR is responsible for emergency and humanitarian issues, the OSCE monitors democratization and elections, and the EU assumes responsibilities for macro-economic policies and reconstruction.
El Salvador, the UN emerged as the only actor with enough legitimacy to start peace negotiations and monitor the implementation of the resulting peace agreement.

International and local NGOs can play a constructive peacebuilding role in several areas such as providing key local information, operational support, and a vehicle for voicing ideas and bringing issues to the attention of the national government and the international community. In Cambodia, the rapid growth of NGOs during and after UNTAC’s presence increased political space for other civil society actors despite governmental efforts to constrain political and civil freedoms. NGOs can also facilitate negotiations between warring parties. For example, in Mozambique, the Community of Sant’Egidio, an Italian Catholic NGO based in Rome, successfully created the conditions for negotiations between the Mozambican government and the rebel group RENAMO.

Engaging Local Actors

Another challenge of peacebuilding lies in engaging local capacities and progressively transferring the responsibility and accountability for peacebuilding tasks from external actors to local ones. The participation of local actors (political leaders, members of civil society, local communities) is required in order to increase the legitimacy of an externally driven decision-making process. There is little chance of institutionalizing democracy if peacebuilding itself is not democratically organized and accountable to local recipients. Moreover, the involvement of local actors in peacebuilding policy-making is crucial to assist in ensuring a better match between aid and local absorptive capacity.

However, engaging local actors presents a number of challenges. External actors may find it difficult to locate reliable local partners. Sharing strategic decision-making space with local warlords may reduce the confidence of the local population in the broader peacebuilding process. It can also be hard to find reliable interlocutors as post-conflict countries are often characterized by weak civil societies, particularly in the case of intra-state wars where the civilian population has been the target of military attacks.

The persistence of lawlessness and social discrimination in a post-conflict society can delay the transfer of powers and responsibilities from external actors to local counterparts. For instance, given the unstable social and political situation in Kosovo, UNMIK and KFOR are likely to retain authority over certain areas such as the protection of human rights and safe guarding minorities as well as other law and order functions.

Participants discussed several policy tools that may help overcome these challenges. These include the application sanctions and positive incentives discussed below.

Sanctions

Economic sanctions have the potential to convey international disapproval for unacceptable behavior and reduce the military and economic means that sustain fighting. The problem with sanctions is that all main trading partners must support their enforcement. Some of the neighboring countries may not have the capacity to monitor their borders. Moreover, given the military or economic value of some minerals, such as coltan or diamonds, resistance to the implementation of an embargo may develop, especially from impoverished third-party states. In addition, UN mandated sanction regimes have sometimes proved counter-productive. Often sanctions affect the most vulnerable non-combatants. In the case of Angola, sanctions only targeted one of the two parties to the conflict, which may in part help explain why the peace process is stalled. A pro-active engagement with private corporations economically involved in warring countries and concerned about their public image could instead be more efficient than economic sanctions. Participants agreed that without strong international political involvement, economic sanctions, even if they target all parties involved in the conflict, would not bring an end to the fighting.

6Before the UN involvement in El Salvador, the regional Contadora Group had made attempts at mediating peace negotiations.

7For recent IPA work on sanctions see The Sanctions Decade: Assessing UN Strategies in the 1990s by David Cortright and George A. Lopez (Boulder Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000)
Positive incentives
Participants felt that a cooperative approach based on positive incentives might mobilize local actors more efficiently than negative inducements. Some pointed to the success of externally-funded community projects which create much needed jobs while providing a sense of purpose to members of communities divided by protracted conflict. Others noted the importance of supporting civil society early in the post-conflict phase. For example, it was stressed that the reemergence of civil society in Cambodia between 1993 and 1998 and the steps towards political development there would not have been possible without external funding and technical assistance during the UN's engagement in the country. Double-staffing (one international staff and one local staff) in the police and in local administrative bodies, as implemented in East Timor, may be a good way to directly involve the local population in the peacebuilding effort.

Conclusion
Although appropriate resources are essential for any effective peacebuilding mission, they do not necessarily guarantee success. As emphasized in the Brahimi Report, better informed peacebuilding mandates would involve coordinated intelligence and information gathering capabilities, as well as specific criteria regarding the entrance to and withdrawal from a conflict. The purpose of this seminar was to help facilitate the planning of such mandates.

Like much in international relations, this is easier said than done. Throughout the discussions, contradictory viewpoints and skeptical recommendations were posited. If more realistic and effective peacebuilding blueprints are to be created -- and clearly such blueprints are needed -- policy architects must carefully consider which ideas should be abandoned and which are to be supported. That can only be achieved through empirical research, informed disagreement, dialectical thinking, and the eradication of disillusionment.

IPA 2001 New York Seminar

Participants enjoyed the beautiful setting in upstate New York.

Seminar program

Towards Comprehensive Peacebuilding
Hotel Thayer, West Point, 7-10 May 2001

PROGRAM CHAIRS

Dr. David M. Malone
President, International Peace Academy

H.E. Mr. Ole Peter Kolby
Permanent Representative of Norway to the United Nations

H.E. Ms. Ellen Margrethe Løj
Permanent Representative of Denmark to the United Nations

MONDAY, 7 MAY 2001

13:00 - 14:30 Seminar Inaugural Lunch in New York

Inaugural address: H.E. Mr. Raymond Johansen,
State Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Norway

19:00 - 19:30 Reception and introductory remarks by the Co-Chairs

19:30 - 21:30 Dinner presentation:

Mr. Olara Otunnu, Special Representative of the Secretary-General for
Children and Armed Conflict, United Nations.

TUESDAY, 8 MAY 2001

“Peacebuilding Concept and Scope”

9:00 - 9:45 Panel presentation: “Conceptual Approaches to Peacebuilding”

Chair: Dr. David M. Malone, IPA President

Panelists:

Dr. Michael Doyle, Special Adviser, Assistant Secretary
General, Executive Office of the Secretary-General, United
Nations, New York.

Dr. Michael Pugh, Department of Politics, University of
Plymouth, U.K.

Dr. Ramesh Thakur, Vice Rector (Peace and Governance),
United Nations University, Tokyo.
9:45 - 10:30 Discussion
Discussant: Mr. Bjørn Skogmo, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Norway

10:45 - 11:30 Panel presentation: “Peacebuilding Within Peacekeeping Operations”
Chair: Dr. David M. Malone, IPA President
Panelists:
Mr. Chris Coleman, Chief Policy and Analysis Unit, DPKO, United Nations, New York.
Mr. James Lemoyne, Senior Policy Adviser, UNDP, New York
Dr. Robert C. Orr, Senior Fellow CSIS, Washington D.C.

11:30 - 12:15 Discussion
Discussant: Mr. Tamrat Samuel, Department of Political Affairs, United Nations, New York.

“Preparing Future Army Leaders for Peace Operations”
Special guest: Colonel Russ Howard, Professor and Head, Department of Social Sciences, United States Military Academy, West Point.

15:00 - 16:00 Panel presentation: “Overcoming Peacebuilding Difficulties: The Case of Mozambique”
Chair: Dr. Adekeye Adebajo, Director of Africa Program, IPA.
Panelists:
Professor Assis Malaquias, Department of Government, University of St. Lawrence, Canton, New York.
Dr. Astri Suhrke, Christian Michelsen Institute, Bergen, Norway.

16:30 - 17:30 Discussion
Discussant: Dr. Andrea Bartoli, School of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University, New York.

19:30 - 21:30 Dinner presentation: “Norway’s Experience in the Security Council to Date”
Special guest: H.E. Mr. Wegger Christian Strommen, Deputy Permanent Representative of Norway to the United Nations.
WEDNESDAY, 9 MAY 2001

“Civil Society Reconstruction”

9:00 - 9:45 Panel presentation: “Political Reconstruction: The Case of Cambodia”
Chair: H.E. Mr. Ole Peter Kolby, Permanent Representative of Norway to the United Nations, New York.
Panelists: Dr. David Chandler, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C.
Ms. Sue Downie, Department of Politics, Monash University, Victoria, Australia.

9:45 - 10:30 Discussion

10:45 - 11:30 Panel presentation: “Economic Reconstruction: The Case of Bosnia”
Chair: H.E. Ms. Roberta Lajous, Deputy Permanent Representative of Mexico to the United Nations.
Panelists: H.E. Mr. Robert Barry, Head of Mission of the OSCE to Bosnia and Herzegovina
Dr. Susan Woodward, The Graduate and City University Center, The City University of New York, New York.
Dr. Peter Viggo Jakobsen, Associate Professor, Institute of Political Science, University of Copenhagen, Copenhagen.

11:30 - 12:15 Discussion

15:45 - 16:30 Panel presentation: “A Model for Reconciliation: The Case of El Salvador”
Chair: Ambassador John Hirsch, IPA Vice President
Panelists: Mr. Alvaro de Soto, USG and Special Adviser to the UNSG on Cyprus, Department of Political Affairs, UN, New York.
Dr. Graciana del Castillo, Director, Latin America Sovereign Ratings, Standard & Poor’s, New York.

16:45 - 17:30 Discussion
Discussant: Mr. Ian Johnstone, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, Massachusetts.

19:30 - 21:30 Dinner Presentation: “Crises and Opportunities in the Middle East”
Special Guest: Mr. Terje Rød Larsen, Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the Middle East Peace Process.
THURSDAY 10 MAY 2001

9:00 - 10:00  Panel presentation: “Economic Agendas in Civil Wars”
Panelists:
  Dr. David M. Malone, IPA President
  Ms. Virginia Gamba, Deputy Director Strategic Development, Institute for Strategic Studies, Johannesburg.

10:00-11:00  Discussion

11:15 - 12:00 Panel presentation: “Peacebuilding Coordination: The Case of Kosovo”
Chair: H.E. Mr. Jenö Staehelin, Permanent Observer of Switzerland to the United Nations.
Panelists:
  H.E. Mr. Kai Eide, Permanent Representative of Norway to the OSCE, Vienna.
  Mr. Craig Jenness, OSCE Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sarajevo.
  Police Commissioner Svend Frederiksen, Senior Advisor to the Danish National Police Commissioner, Copenhagen.

12:00 - 12:45  Discussion
Discussant: Ms. Bianca Antonini, International Co-Head of Local Administration, UNMIK, Pristina, Kosovo.

Closing session: “Peacebuilding Prospects and Challenges”

14:30 - 15:15 Panel presentation: Peacebuilding Prospects and Challenges
Chair: H.E. Mr. Gelson Fonseca, Jr., Permanent Representative of Brazil to the United Nations.
Panelists:
  Dr. Shepard Forman, Center on International Cooperation, New York
  Mr. Matthias Stiefel, Executive Director, WSP International, Geneva

15:15-16:00  Discussion

16:00-16:15: Closing remarks by the Co-Chairs
Participants

Mr. Gani Are  
Senior Counsellor  
Permanent Mission of Nigeria to the United Nations

Mr. Abdallah Al-Suleiti  
First Secretary  
Permanent Mission of Qatar to the United Nations

Ms. Josiane Ambiehl  
Political Affairs Officer  
Department of Peacekeeping Operations  
United Nations

Mr. Milad Atieh  
Second Secretary  
Permanent Mission of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations

Ms. Luisa Bonilla-Mérida  
Third Secretary  
Permanent Mission of Guatemala to the United Nations

Mr. Mehmet Kemal Bozay  
First Secretary  
Permanent Mission of Turkey to the United Nations

Mr. Michael Braad  
First Secretary  
Permanent Mission of Denmark to the United Nations

Mr. Jean-Claude Brunet  
First Secretary  
Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations

Mr. Marc Charney  
Foreign Editor  
The New York Times United Nations Bureau

Mr. Tam Chung  
Political Affairs Officer  
Department for Disarmament Affairs  
United Nations

Mrs. Carolina A. Constantino  
Attaché  
Permanent Mission of the Republic of the Philippines to the United Nations

Mr. Thalif Deen  
United Nations Bureau Chief  
Inter Press Service News Agency  
United Nations

Mr. Leonardo L. G. Nogueira Fernandes  
Second Secretary  
Permanent Mission of Brazil to the United Nations

Ms. Christine Kapalata  
Minister Counsellor  
Permanent Mission of the United Republic of Tanzania to the United Nations

Ms. Unni Kløvstad  
Assistant Director General  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Norway

Mr. Richard Küehnel  
Counsellor  
Permanent Mission of Austria to the United Nations

Ms. Mirza Cristina Gnecco  
Second Secretary  
Permanent Mission of Colombia to the United Nations

Ms. Maria Fabiana Loguzzo  
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Permanent Mission of Argentina to the United Nations

Ms. Bridget Moix  
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Quaker United Nations Office

Ms. Brontë Nadine Moules  
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Ms. Eleanor O'Gorman  
Policy Advisor  
Emergency Response Division  
United Nations Development Programme
Mr. Mark Ramsden
First Secretary
Permanent Mission of New Zealand to the United Nations

Ms. Gaile A. Ramoutar
First Secretary
Permanent Mission of Trinidad and Tobago to the United Nations

Ms. Emmeline Ravilious
Deputy World News Editor
Financial Times

Mr. Kai Jürgen Sauer
Second Secretary
Permanent Mission of Finland to the United Nations

Ms. Susan Isabel Soux
Political Affairs Officer
Americas Division
Department of Political Affairs
United Nations

Mr. Hansjoerg Strohmeyer
Policy Adviser
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
United Nations

Mr. Jacques Villettaz
Delegate and Spokesman
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)

Mr. Hiroyuki Yamamoto
Counsellor
Permanent Mission of Japan to the United Nations

Mr. Thomas P. Zahneisen
Second Secretary
Permanent Mission Germany to the United Nations

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