

Towards Comprehensive Peacebuilding

Hotel Thayer
West Point, New York
May 7-10, 2001

The International Peace Academy wishes to thank the governments of Norway and Denmark for their generous funding of this seminar.

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Executive summary

- Participants agreed that peacebuilding strategies need to be comprehensive and include both political and developmental dimensions. It is vital that economic and political policies do not contradict but rather mutually reinforce each other.
- The lack of consensus on the timing of peacebuilding and the absence of clear benchmarks for success have resulted in inadequate, and sometimes counter-productive, entrance and exit strategies. Better informed mandates would involve specific criteria to enter or withdraw from a conflict.
- In order to improve the coordination of peacebuilding activities, actors should identify and define their respective areas of comparative advantage and limitations. peacebuilding work should be carried out under the leadership of a coordinating agency. Coordination would also be significantly strengthened if member state funding was provided in a timely and predictable manner.
- Although difficulties in finding reliable local interlocutors may arise, the participation of local actors and the inclusion of local knowledge in the decision-making process are key components of a successful peacebuilding operation. Local ownership is essential to leverage and sustain economic development and democratization.

Introduction

Peacebuilding has become a useful, perhaps predominant, tool at the disposal of international institutions to prevent the recurrence of conflict. Large peace operations, such as those in Kosovo and East Timor, involve tasks spanning from building schools and organizing garbage collection, to disarming combatants and reintegrating refugees. This sort of comprehensive programming helps war-torn societies transition into self-sustaining and peaceful polities. However, the manner in which such programs could be planned and implemented requires further analysis, and it is with a view to informing the UN Security Council, UN member states, and NGOs that the International Peace Academy, on May 7 – 10, 2001, held a policy development seminar entitled "Towards Comprehensive Peacebuilding" in West Point, New York.¹ The seminar was generously funded by the governments of Norway and Denmark.

The seminar brought together participants and speakers from permanent missions to the UN, NGOs, the UN Secretariat and Specialized Agencies, and the media. Following an inaugural lunch addressed by Norway's State Secretary H.E. Mr. Raymond Johansen, participants spent three days analyzing the concept and scope of peacebuilding, focusing on case studies (e.g. Mozambique, Cambodia, El Salvador, Bosnia, and Kosovo) and examining the prospects for more effective peacebuilding strategies. This report reflects some of the main issues raised during discussions and includes the policy goals and recommendations that emerged.

Peacebuilding is an attempt to reduce the sources of present and ongoing antagonisms and build local capacities for conflict resolution in divided societies² – often in the face of open hostilities and raw trauma. It encompasses a variety of tasks including institution building, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants, and psychological trauma counseling for war-affected groups. Although peacebuilding processes vary according to local circumstances (i.e. the degree of hostility of the factions, the magnitude of displacement, the level of economic and social devastation) participants were in accord that a number of themes and subtexts recur throughout all peacebuilding operations that merit scrutiny.

Approaches: Peacebuilding as politics vis-à-vis peacebuilding as development

The importance one places on specific peacebuilding activities is in the eye of the beholder. Participants who saw peacebuilding mainly as a process of political development approached it through the creation of political institutions that enable rival individuals and groups to engage in the struggle for power and to settle conflicts in a peaceful manner. Promoting democratization is thus an important element of peacebuilding in that democracy can enable societies to manage conflict non-violently over the long-term. In the more immediate term, the signing of a negotiated agreement between parties to the conflict and determining the timing and implementation of constitutional reforms are crucial. For the more economic minded, social development and market construction were viewed as the primary component of a successful peacebuilding process; they took a more long-term view emphasizing development strategies such as micro-credit projects, job creation, and education.

However, peacebuilding will not succeed through such bifurcated approaches. Seminar participants agreed that successful peacebuilding requires a comprehensive strategy that includes both political and economic dimensions. Furthermore, economic development should be introduced at the earliest stage possible in the rebuilding process, provided security is guaranteed. Yet there are caveats: it is important that economic development policies do not contradict or inadvertently undermine provisions agreed to in the political settlement. Such contradiction was evident in the case of El Salvador in the first year after the signing of the peace agreement. While the International Monetary Fund (IMF) was in charge of the economic reconstruction process, the UN monitored the implementation of the peace agreement. The stringent fiscal targets imposed by the IMF precluded the government from implementing land reform, an essential peacebuilding component in the peace agreement. The example of El Salvador underlines the importance for international actors to coordinate and integrate their strategies. The recent IMF decision to allow for more flexible financial targets for economies in transition and to encourage investment in local social

¹For IPA's most recent work on peacebuilding, see *Peacebuilding as Politics: Cultivating Peace in Fragile Societies*, edited by Elizabeth M. Cousens and Chetan Kumar with Karin Wermester (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001)

²See for example S/2001/394, No exit without strategy: Security Council decision-making and the closure or transition of UN peacekeeping operations – Report of the Secretary-General, April 20, 2001.

welfare is a step in right direction, and may increase the potential for sustainable economic development in post-conflict situations.

Timing: Entrance and exit strategies

Participants agreed that clear and coherent peacebuilding strategies are vital. Yet, the international community seems unable to achieve consensus on when to enter and exit in a conflict situation. These differences reflect different understandings of "conflict ripeness". Some participants argued that peacebuilding operations should be initiated at a moment of "natural" ripeness, defined as the turning point in a conflict when warring parties have a stronger interest in ending conflict rather than continuing the dispute. Others questioned the notion of natural ripeness, arguing that such ripeness could be mechanically induced through negative and/or positive incentives aimed at warring parties. Accordingly, the development of entrance strategies would seek to change the course of the conflict and induce a window for conflict resolution instead of reacting to the conflict situation as it evolves on the ground.

The timing of UN peacebuilding entrance and exit strategies will continue to depend on the political willingness of member states to fund costly long-term and multi-dimensional missions. First, the greater the interests involved in the warring country, the more generous funders are likely to be. Second, the more complex a peacebuilding task appears, the less willing funders will be to support the process.³ Unless policy-makers include these considerations in their strategic planning, peacebuilding mandates are unlikely to set realistic objectives.



United Nations Deputy Secretary-General Louise Fréchette speaks at the seminar inaugural lunch.



Mr. Raymond Johansen, State Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Norway delivers the inaugural address.

The transition challenge

The difficulty of defining precise entrance and exit strategies often results from the reluctance of UN member states to finance the transition from peacekeeping missions to peacebuilding operations. Seminar participants underlined the disparity between funding available for peacekeeping missions compared to peacebuilding activities. UN member states favor short-term projects such as peacekeeping missions that have a defined end date; they often prove reluctant to finance long-term peacebuilding projects. However, carefully planned transitions are needed, so that the gains made during the peacekeeping phase can be leveraged and expanded to promotion of self-sustaining peace through peacebuilding.

In order to ensure a smooth hand-over from peacekeeping to peacebuilding activities, it is essential to plan the transition in the early stages of a peacekeeping operation. It is also important to delegate more decision-making authority to UN agencies operating at the local level, allowing the UN to respond in a timely and more flexible manner to crises on the ground. Accurate and up-to-date information and intelligence from the field would help the UN Security Council design strategically informed peacebuilding mandates.

Evaluating success and failure

Exit strategies are built on the evaluation of success and failure. Depending on the lens used, a peacebuilding mission might look like a semi-failure to some and a success to others. In Cambodia, for instance, the 1998 coup which was followed by the installation of an authoritarian regime could suggest a failure of the peacebuilding efforts of the UN Transitional Authority in

³For a discussion on the role of international actors in peace agreements, see *Ending Civil Wars*, a forthcoming project of the IPA edited by Stephen John Stedman, Donald Rothchild, and Elizabeth M. Cousens (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002)

Cambodia (UNTAC). On the other hand, the growth of civil society, persevering under the current regime and impossible without UNTAC's presence, can be viewed as an example of a successful political development. Is the glass half full or half empty?

Pre-determining benchmarks for success and failure would help UN policy-makers design more accurate and realistic mandates. Before deploying in a country at war, policy-makers should analyze the characteristics of the conflict. If, for example, a conflict is marked by numerous combatants, massive displacements of vulnerable populations, and extended social and economic devastation, the UN may need to deploy a multi-dimensional and long-term stabilizing mission in coordination with other international and regional actors.

Before withdrawing an established peacebuilding mission, UN policy-makers should seek the views of the affected parties, assess whether the mission has fulfilled its mandate, and evaluate the financial and political feasibility of a follow-up mission.

Economic agendas

Exit strategies should ensure that established institutions and legal frameworks built during the peacebuilding mission remain able to tackle illegal drug, human, and black market trade that spring in the fecund grounds of unstable polities. While the international community focuses increasingly on the prosecution of political and wartime crimes⁴, economic "white collar" crime has been addressed less. The economic motivations of local and international actors have often been absent from UN analyses. Policy-makers should be aware that the economic policies of a given peacebuilding mission may inadvertently prolong the war— in many cases, international post-conflict economic aid has benefited illegal trade networks, often led by former warlords.

Coordination

The importance of coordination cannot be over-emphasized, and yet it is an area in which the international community has traditionally fared poorly. In order to improve coordination and generate mutually reinforcing divisions of labor, actors, under the leadership of a selected coordination agency, need to define

their respective areas of comparative advantage and limitations. The large number of actors typically involved in peacebuilding — the UN Secretariat and Specialized Agencies, the World Bank, the IMF, regional organizations, 'coalitions of the willing', international and local NGOs, national and local leaders, and the local population — has (naturally) led to divergent approaches. This can adversely affect coordination within the UN system. Agencies such as the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the World Food Programme (WFP) often maintain a long-term presence in post-conflict countries whereas the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations' missions are often short-term and subject to renewal by the UN Security Council. Not surprisingly, strategic coordination among these different actors has proved difficult. There must be greater inter-agency communication and coordination.

The peacebuilding capacities of regional organizations largely determine the breadth and depth of cooperation with the UN. In Kosovo, the existence of able and solvent regional capacities for peacebuilding has led to the creation of an inter-pillar relationship where the UN, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the Organizations for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and the European Union (EU) perform specific tasks according to their respective capacities.⁵ A rapprochement has also taken place between the UN and the OSCE at the operational level in Kosovo. The OSCE's Department of Police Education and Development works jointly with the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) to train a local police force that will ultimately take over the duties of the UN Civilian Police. While the OSCE is in charge of classroom training at the Kosovo Police Service School, UNMIK police is mandated to perform field-training. In order to forge closer institutional links and bring local actors into the peacebuilding decision-making process, it is important to maximize areas of comparative advantages.

Most participants agreed that the UN should continue playing the role of a "legitimize" or "facilitator" in peace negotiations. Universal membership, the Secretary-General's good offices, and a consensual approach to parties in a conflict constitute important peace-making assets. For instance, after the failure of regional efforts in

⁴The Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court adopted on July 17, 1998 illustrates the increased international interest in guaranteeing the prosecution of political and military leaders for these crimes.

⁵On the basis of Resolution 1244 (S/RES/1244) of June 10, 1999, the mission priorities in Kosovo are grouped in four pillars: the UN is in charge of the civil administration, the UNHCR is responsible for emergency and humanitarian issues, the OSCE monitors democratization and elections, and the EU assumes responsibilities for macro-economic policies and reconstruction.

El Salvador⁶, the UN emerged as the only actor with enough legitimacy to start peace negotiations and monitor the implementation of the resulting peace agreement.

International and local NGOs can play a constructive peacebuilding role in several areas such as providing key local information, operational support, and a vehicle for voicing ideas and bringing issues to the attention of the national government and the international community. In Cambodia, the rapid growth of NGOs during and after UNTAC's presence increased political space for other civil society actors despite governmental efforts to constrain political and civil freedoms. NGOs can also facilitate negotiations between warring parties. For example, in Mozambique, the Community of Sant'Egidio, an Italian Catholic NGO based in Rome, successfully created the conditions for negotiations between the Mozambican government and the rebel group RENAMO.

Engaging Local Actors

Another challenge of peacebuilding lies in engaging local capacities and progressively transferring the responsibility and accountability for peacebuilding tasks from external actors to local ones. The participation of local actors (political leaders, members of civil society, local communities) is required in order to increase the legitimacy of an externally driven decision-making process. There is little chance of institutionalizing democracy if peacebuilding itself is not democratically organized and accountable to local recipients. Moreover, the involvement of local actors in peacebuilding policy-making is crucial to assist in ensuring a better match between aid and local absorptive capacity.

However, engaging local actors presents a number of challenges. External actors may find it difficult to locate reliable local partners. Sharing strategic decision-making space with local warlords may reduce the confidence of the local population in the broader peacebuilding process. It can also be hard to find reliable interlocutors as post-conflict countries are often characterized by weak civil societies, particularly in the case of intra-state wars where the civilian population has been the target of military attacks.

The persistence of lawlessness and social discrimination in a post-conflict society can delay the transfer of powers and responsibilities from external actors to local counterparts. For instance, given the unstable social and



Participants reflect on the case of El Salvador as “a model for reconciliation”.

political situation in Kosovo, UNMIK and KFOR are likely to retain authority over certain areas such as the protection of human rights and safe guarding minorities as well as other law and order functions.

Participants discussed several policy tools that may help overcome these challenges. These include the application of sanctions and positive incentives discussed below.

Sanctions

Economic sanctions have the potential to convey international disapproval for unacceptable behavior and reduce the military and economic means that sustain fighting. The problem with sanctions is that all main trading partners must support their enforcement. Some of the neighboring countries may not have the capacity to monitor their borders. Moreover, given the military or economic value of some minerals, such as coltan or diamonds, resistance to the implementation of an embargo may develop, especially from impoverished third-party states. In addition, UN mandated sanction regimes have sometimes proved counter-productive. Often sanctions affect the most vulnerable non-combatants. In the case of Angola, sanctions only targeted one of the two parties to the conflict, which may in part help explain why the peace process is stalled. A pro-active engagement with private corporations economically involved in warring countries and concerned about their public image could instead be more efficient than economic sanctions. Participants agreed that without strong international political involvement, economic sanctions, even if they target all parties involved in the conflict, would not bring an end to the fighting.⁷

⁶Before the UN involvement in El Salvador, the regional Contadora Group had made attempts at mediating peace negotiations.

⁷For recent IPA work on sanctions see *The Sanctions Decade: Assessing UN Strategies in the 1990s* by David Cortright and George A. Lopez (Boulder Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000)

Positive incentives

Participants felt that a cooperative approach based on positive incentives might mobilize local actors more efficiently than negative inducements. Some pointed to the success of externally-funded community projects which create much needed jobs while providing a sense of purpose to members of communities divided by protracted conflict. Others noted the importance of supporting civil society early in the post-conflict phase. For example, it was stressed that the reemergence of civil society in Cambodia between 1993 and 1998 and the steps towards political development there would not have been possible without external funding and technical assistance during the UN's engagement in the country. Double-staffing (one international staff and one local staff) in the police and in local administrative bodies, as implemented in East Timor, may be a good way to directly involve the local population in the peacebuilding effort.

Conclusion

Although appropriate resources are essential for any effective peacebuilding mission, they do not necessarily guarantee success. As emphasized in the Brahimi Report⁸, better informed peacebuilding mandates would involve coordinated intelligence and information gathering capabilities, as well as specific criteria regarding the entrance to and withdrawal from a conflict. The purpose of this seminar was to help facilitate the planning of such mandates.

Like much in international relations, this is easier said than done. Throughout the discussions, contradictory viewpoints and skeptical recommendations were posited. If more realistic and effective peacebuilding blueprints are to be created -- and clearly such blueprints are needed -- policy architects must carefully consider which ideas should be abandoned and which are to be supported. That can only be achieved through empirical research, informed disagreement, dialectical thinking, and the eradication of disillusionment.



Participants enjoyed the beautiful setting in upstate New York.

⁸A/55/305/S/2000/809 Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (Brahimi Report), August 21, 2000.

Seminar program

Towards Comprehensive Peacebuilding

Hotel Thayer, West Point, 7-10 May 2001

PROGRAM CHAIRS

Dr. David M. Malone

President, International Peace Academy

H.E. Mr. Ole Peter Kolby

Permanent Representative of Norway to the United Nations

H.E. Ms. Ellen Margrethe Løj

Permanent Representative of Denmark to the United Nations

MONDAY, 7 MAY 2001

13:00 - 14:30 Seminar Inaugural Lunch in New York

Inaugural address: **H.E. Mr. Raymond Johansen**,
State Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Norway

19:00 - 19:30 Reception and introductory remarks by the Co-Chairs

19:30 - 21:30 Dinner presentation:

Mr. Olara Otunnu, Special Representative of the Secretary-General for
Children and Armed Conflict, United Nations.

TUESDAY, 8 MAY 2001

“Peacebuilding Concept and Scope”

9:00 - 9:45 Panel presentation: “Conceptual Approaches to Peacebuilding”

Chair: **Dr. David M. Malone**, IPA President

Panelists:

Dr. Michael Doyle, Special Adviser, Assistant Secretary
General, Executive Office of the Secretary-General, United
Nations, New York.

Dr. Michael Pugh, Department of Politics, University of
Plymouth, U.K.

Dr. Ramesh Thakur, Vice Rector (Peace and Governance),
United Nations University, Tokyo.

9:45 - 10:30	Discussion Discussant: Mr. Bjørn Skogmo , Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Norway
10:45 - 11:30	Panel presentation: “Peacebuilding Within Peacekeeping Operations” Chair: Dr. David M. Malone , IPA President Panelists: Mr. Chris Coleman , Chief Policy and Analysis Unit, DPKO, United Nations, New York. Mr. James Lemoyne , Senior Policy Adviser, UNDP, New York Dr. Robert C. Orr , Senior Fellow CSIS, Washington D.C.
11:30 - 12:15	Discussion Discussant: Mr. Tamrat Samuel , Department of Political Affairs, United Nations, New York.
	“Preparing Future Army Leaders for Peace Operations” Special guest: Colonel Russ Howard , Professor and Head, Department of Social Sciences, United States Military Academy, West Point.
15:00 - 16:00	Panel presentation: “Overcoming Peacebuilding Difficulties: The Case of Mozambique” Chair: Dr. Adekeye Adebajo , Director of Africa Program, IPA. Panelists: Professor Assis Malaquias , Department of Government, University of St. Lawrence, Canton, New York. Dr. Astri Suhrke , Christian Michelsen Institute, Bergen, Norway.
16:30 - 17:30	Discussion Discussant: Dr. Andrea Bartoli , School of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University, New York.
19:30 - 21:30	Dinner presentation: “Norway’s Experience in the Security Council to Date” Special guest: H.E. Mr. Wegger Christian Strommen , Deputy Permanent Representative of Norway to the United Nations.

WEDNESDAY, 9 MAY 2001

“Civil Society Reconstruction”

- 9:00 - 9:45 Panel presentation: “Political Reconstruction: The Case of Cambodia”
- Chair: **H.E. Mr. Ole Peter Kolby**, Permanent Representative of Norway to the United Nations, New York.
- Panelists:
- Dr. David Chandler**, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C.
 Ms. Sue Downie, Department of Politics,
 Monash University, Victoria, Australia.
- 9:45 - 10:30 Discussion
- 10:45 - 11:30 Panel presentation: “Economic Reconstruction: The Case of Bosnia”
- Chair: **H.E. Ms. Roberta Lajous**, Deputy Permanent Representative of Mexico to the United Nations.
- Panelists:
- H.E. Mr. Robert Barry**, Head of Mission of the OSCE to Bosnia and Herzegovina
 Dr. Susan Woodward, The Graduate and City University Center, The City University of New York, New York.
 Dr. Peter Viggo Jakobsen, Associate Professor, Institute of Political Science, University of Copenhagen, Copenhagen.
- 11:30 - 12:15 Discussion
- 15:45 - 16:30 Panel presentation: “A Model for Reconciliation: The Case of El Salvador”
- Chair: **Ambassador John Hirsch**, IPA Vice President
- Panelists:
- Mr. Alvaro de Soto**, USG and Special Adviser to the UNSG on Cyprus, Department of Political Affairs, UN, New York.
 Dr. Graciana del Castillo, Director, Latin America Sovereign Ratings, Standard & Poor’s, New York.
- 16:45 - 17:30 Discussion
- Discussant: **Mr. Ian Johnstone**, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, Massachusetts.
- 19:30 - 21:30 Dinner Presentation: “Crises and Opportunities in the Middle East”
- Special Guest: **Mr. Terje Rød Larsen**, Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the Middle East Peace Process.

THURSDAY 10 MAY 2001

- 9:00 - 10:00 Panel presentation: “Economic Agendas in Civil Wars”
 Panelists:
 Dr. David M. Malone, IPA President
 Ms. Virginia Gamba, Deputy Director Strategic
 Development, Institute for Strategic Studies, Johannesburg.
- 10:00-11:00 Discussion
- 11:15 - 12:00 Panel presentation: “Peacebuilding Coordination: The Case of Kosovo”
 Chair: **H.E. Mr. Jenö Staehelin**, Permanent Observer of Switzerland
 to the United Nations.
 Panelists:
 H.E. Mr. Kai Eide, Permanent Representative of Norway to the
 OSCE, Vienna.
 Mr. Craig Jenness, OSCE Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
 Sarajevo.
 Police Commissioner Svend Frederiksen, Senior Advisor to
 the Danish National Police Commissioner, Copenhagen.
- 12:00 - 12: 45 Discussion
 Discussant: **Ms. Bianca Antonini**, International Co-Head of Local
 Administration, UNMIK, Pristina, Kosovo.
- Closing session: “Peacebuilding Prospects and Challenges”
- 14:30 - 15:15 Panel presentation: Peacebuilding Prospects and Challenges
 Chair: **H.E. Mr. Gelson Fonseca, Jr.**, Permanent Representative of
 Brazil to the United Nations.
 Panelists:
 Dr. Shepard Forman, Center on International Cooperation,
 New York
 Mr. Matthias Stiefel, Executive Director, WSP International,
 Geneva
- 15:15-16:00 Discussion
- 16:00-16:15: Closing remarks by the Co-Chairs

Participants

Mr. Gani Are
Senior Counsellor
Permanent Mission of Nigeria to the United Nations

Mr. Abdullah Al-Suleiti
First Secretary
Permanent Mission of Qatar to the United Nations

Ms. Josiane Ambiehl
Political Affairs Officer
Department of Peacekeeping Operations
United Nations

Mr. Milad Atieh
Second Secretary
Permanent Mission of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations

Ms. Luisa Bonilla-Mérida
Third Secretary
Permanent Mission of Guatemala to the United Nations

Mr. Mehmet Kemal Bozay
First Secretary
Permanent Mission of Turkey to the United Nations

Mr. Michael Braad
First Secretary
Permanent Mission of Denmark to the United Nations

Mr. Jean-Claude Brunet
First Secretary
Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations

Mr. Marc Charney
Foreign Editor
The New York Times United Nations Bureau

Mr. Tam Chung
Political Affairs Officer
Department for Disarmament Affairs
United Nations

Mrs. Carolina A. Constantino
Attaché
Permanent Mission of the Republic of the Philippines to the United Nations

Mr. Thalif Deen
United Nations Bureau Chief
Inter Press Service News Agency
United Nations

Mr. Leonardo L. G. Nogueira Fernandes
Second Secretary
Permanent Mission of Brazil to the United Nations

Ms. Christine Kapalata
Minister Counsellor
Permanent Mission of the United Republic of Tanzania to the United Nations

Ms. Unni Kløvstad
Assistant Director General
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Norway

Mr. Richard Kühnel
Counsellor
Permanent Mission of Austria to the United Nations

Ms. Mirza Cristina Gnecco
Second Secretary
Permanent Mission of Colombia to the United Nations

Ms. Maria Fabiana Loguzzo
First Secretary
Permanent Mission of Argentina to the United Nations

Ms. Bridget Moix
Project Coordinator
Quaker United Nations Office

Ms. Brontë Nadine Moules
Counsellor
Permanent Mission of Australia to the United Nations

Colonel Noel Farai Francis Mutisi
Military Advisor
Permanent Mission of Republic of Zimbabwe to the United Nations

Ms. Eleanor O'Gorman
Policy Advisor
Emergency Response Division
United Nations Development Programme

Mr. Mark Ramsden
First Secretary
Permanent Mission of New Zealand to the
United Nations

Ms. Gaile A. Ramoutar
First Secretary
Permanent Mission of Trinidad and Tobago to the
United Nations

Ms. Emmeline Ravilious
Deputy World News Editor
Financial Times

Mr. Kai Jürgen Sauer
Second Secretary
Permanent Mission of Finland to the United Nations

Ms. Susan Isabel Soux
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Department of Political Affairs
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Mr. Hansjoerg Strohmeier
Policy Adviser
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
United Nations

Mr. Jacques Villettaz
Delegate and Spokesman
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)

Mr. Hiroyuki Yamamoto
Counsellor
Permanent Mission of Japan to the United Nations

Mr. Thomas P. Zahneisen
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Permanent Mission Germany to the United Nations

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