33rd IPA Vienna Seminar on Peacemaking and Peacekeeping

COOPERATION IN PEACE OPERATIONS: THE UNITED NATIONS AND EUROPE

FINAL REPORT

Rapporteurs: Clara Lee and Dr. Alexandra Novosseloff
Executive Summary: David M. Malone
International Peace Academy, New York
The 2003 International Peace Academy Vienna Seminar, co-organized with the Diplomatic Academy of Vienna and the Austrian National Defense Academy, was held 4-6 July 2003. Roughly seventy participants from the political, diplomatic, and military arenas, as well as members of academia and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), met to discuss how cooperation in peace operations conducted by the United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and other international actors might be improved in the future. This discussion was conducted with a view towards further implementing the recommendations of the Report of the Panel on the United Nations Peace Operations, also known as the Brahimi Report.

This conference report presents an overview of the discussion and debate among conference participants during the seminar’s plenary sessions and concludes with brief summaries of the smaller breakout groups’ findings on specific issues.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:

The discussion at the seminar suggested that the UN needs to move beyond implementation of the Brahimi Report to anticipate challenges arising from the changing nature of the conflicts the Security Council has been addressing in Africa and elsewhere. With the larger number of staff in the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), it will be expected to do better in a number of areas, on which a reasonable start has been made under strong leadership from Under-Secretary General Jean-Marie Guéhenno and with committed, high quality military advice from Major General Patrick Cammaert and others. Because the shape and content of peacekeeping in the post-Cold War era has been evolving very fast, with new and difficult challenges—such as the protection of civilians in zones of often very violent conflict, sometimes tacked on to mandates nearly as an afterthought by the Council—the multiple difficulties the UN faces in discharging its diverse peacekeeping responsibilities should not be underestimated. At the same time, participants agreed that cooperation between the UN and regional organizations, the EU in particular, although difficult in view of the differences in organizational structures, traditions, and decision-making procedures, has improved markedly in recent years, with lessons learned on both sides and real prospects of further improvements in the future.
INTRODUCTION:


Based on their experiences over the past decade, the United Nations, European regional organizations, and other relevant actors have increasingly recognized the need for cooperation in carrying out peace operations, both in Europe and beyond. Though they have worked together with reasonable effectiveness in peace operations in Bosnia and Kosovo in the last four years, there is an awareness of the need for further improvement in planning and implementation of United Nations peace operations. That the European Union is developing as a significant actor in this field lends greater complexity to this cooperation.

The EU is not a regional organization in the same vein as NATO, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), or other regional arrangements outside Europe. Rather, it is an integrating process aimed at avoiding new crises between European states, and as such, is a conflict prevention mechanism of its own. In the 1990s, the EU staked out a larger role in international politics, developing structures and capabilities for a common foreign and security policy (CFSP) sustained by a common security and defense policy (European security and defense policy, ESDP).
THE CHANGING NATURE OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS:

From Peacekeeping to Peacebuilding: New Dimensions

The UN and the international community face new challenges in conflict management now and into the future, as classical peacekeeping has evolved into the more comprehensive approach of peacebuilding, reflecting current political realities. The most significant catalysts for change in peacekeeping approaches over the past decade and in the present are interlinked: the changing nature of war—increasingly, conflict of the sort that one speaker referred to as the war of the “have nots” vs. other “have nots” rather than inter-state or “conventional” civil wars—and the erosion of the state. The larger role for peacekeeping is in weak or failing states and the United Nations is involved in areas where conflict has not yet ended. Such situations demand more multidimensional operations with the capacity not only to intervene between parties to a conflict but, increasingly, to bring and enforce order and to facilitate humanitarian and development programs as well.

Concurrent with these developments are the trend toward regionalization and the overall expansion of actors in the field of peacekeeping operations, from regional/security organizations to NGOs and even private businesses. This diversification offers obvious benefits for the success of multi-faceted peace operations, as well as benefits specific to involved regional organizations, but simultaneously introduces a host of complications. Key among these are the differing aims and agendas of regional organizations involved and the possibility of competition between these organizations; the impact such competition (and even collaboration) could have on the international security architecture; and the political and practical difficulties of coordination and collaboration.

One of the larger dilemmas is the regional disparity of capacity and resources for conflict management. As one speaker put it, the “good face” of regionalization can be seen in Europe, as the EU and NATO take on growing
roles in the European periphery, or in the involvement of Australia, New Zealand, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries in East Timor. On the other hand, increasingly regional approaches to peacebuilding threaten areas lacking a strong regional actor like the EU or NATO. And as EU and NATO countries’ contributions to UN peacekeeping shrink—though the EU member states contribute 40% of the UN peacekeeping operations budget, EU member states collectively contribute about 13.5% of total UN troops and police deployed—regions like Africa bear the brunt of this double blow.

Rich Peacekeeping vs. Poor Peacekeeping

The UN continues to struggle with the discrepancy between Western member states’ support in the Security Council (SC) for peacekeeping operations, and the comparative lack of Western (or ‘Northern’) contribution to actual operations, particularly in regions where major powers have little vested interest nor the political will to send troops. The perception of a North-South divide in UN peacekeeping persists, with “poor peacekeeping” carried out in Africa primarily by Southern countries, and “rich peacekeeping,” mainly in the Balkans, conducted by Northern countries and regional organizations such as NATO and now the EU. Northern involvement in African peacekeeping is marked by hesitation and limited commitment, both in terms of the scope of the operation and the timeframe of involvement, as with the Standby High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG) deployment in Ethiopia and Eritrea in 2000—6 months—and the EU’s Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)—4 months. In the latter case, at the time of the seminar, the UNSC had put off for another month the decision whether to authorize a new mandate for the UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), threatening a gap between the scheduled end of Artemis and the UN takeover.
Implementation of the Brahimi Report

Recognizing past failures in Somalia, Bosnia, and Rwanda, the UN has attempted considerable reform in peace operations, following the recommendations of the Brahimi Report. Of its four main areas of concern, progress has been made in the areas of rapid deployment capacity; headquarters structure and its planning and support capacities; and information technology. Implementation of the report’s recommendations has been weakest in the area of doctrine, strategy, and decision-making.

As David Harland, Head of the Best Practices Unit at the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, pointed out, improvements in the rapid deployment capacity can be seen in the establishment of a Strategic Deployment Stocks facility in Brindisi that enables quick deployment of transport and communications assets; standby arrangements with governments; and the development of extensive on-call rosters for civilian specialists. However, this improvement has so far been largely untested; missions in Côte d’Ivoire and Iraq were deployed within a week of the Security Council mandate, but participants protested that such small operations—26 people for the UN Mission in Côte D’Ivoire (MINUCI) and 25 for Iraq—could hardly be regarded as triumphs in rapid deployment. A potential UN operation in Sudan, should a peace agreement be reached, would be a more serious test of this capability.

In the area of headquarters reform, an increase in DPKO headquarters personnel from 400 to about 600 people has strengthened planning capability, though weaknesses still exist in early warning and strategic assessment capabilities. A number of participants argued that the UN must rethink capacity rather than simply adding bureaucracy, however, and that accountability is sadly lacking in the UN system (and was not addressed by the Brahimi Report). Participants generally agreed that both member states and the UN are responsible for breaking down bureaucratic barriers and moving beyond rationalization or explanation toward improving capacities.
The final area of progress was that of dealing with peace operations in the information age. Communications and information technology systems have been much improved despite weak expenditure. Harland pointed out that implementation of the Brahimi Report overall was strong on technocratic concerns but weak on doctrine, strategy, and mandate. The establishment of the Information and Strategic Analysis Secretariat (EISAS) was not approved, nor was the recommendation that Security Council resolutions remain in draft form until firm commitments of troops and mission support elements were in place.

Despite the progress that has been made, the United Nations must move beyond the implementation of the Brahimi Report. A more forward-looking vision is necessary for the UN to adapt to changes in the peacekeeping environment, regionalization in particular; even while seeking European contributions to UN missions, the UN cannot ignore the reality of EU and NATO interests and constraints that stand independent of UN aims. As the United Kingdom’s (UK) involvement in Sierra Leone and France’s participation as the framework nation in Bunia demonstrate, the UN can benefit from even limited European participation and collaboration, and it was argued that both examples could serve as models for the future. Though participants voiced concerns about imbalanced collaborations of this sort—“peacekeeping apartheid” or “two-speed crisis management,” with the potential to widen the North-South divide in peace operations—there was no question that collaborative partnerships and interoperability must be built within the field of actors.

The UN-EU Relationship

UN-EU cooperation, in particular, is grounded in shared values and a commitment to multilateral approaches to peace operations. Even as compared to recent years, the dialogue between the two organizations is more consistent and open, and cooperation exists on a wide range of issues. Certainly, the EU take-over of the UN police mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina gave a boost to UN-EU relations. Recent high-level meetings
between the two organizations have consistently considered possibilities for cooperation in peacekeeping and crisis management. For example, the Office of the Military Adviser to DPKO now works closely with its EU Military Staff counterparts in retaining EU forces in UN-commanded missions whenever possible, to avoid competition for resources and to build consistent channels of information. General Cammaert pointed out that now “all relevant DPKO units enjoy regular and productive relations with their EU counterparts.” And as Johannes Wimmer points out in his background paper to the seminar, both the EU’s high level of organizational coherence in decision-making processes in the UN General Assembly and the improving coordination and information among EU member states in regard to Security Council matters make the possibilities for coordination between the two organizations more promising yet.

UN Demand and EU Supply?

In the optimistic view, what Thierry Tardy termed the “theoretical convergence of UN demand and EU supply,” the UN can benefit from the resources and capacities of the European Union, especially with progress in the ESDP process and the development of an EU rapid reaction force capacity. It can, in particular, benefit from the ability of the EU to rapidly deploy troops in force in a non-permissive environment. As for the EU, its involvement in UN peacekeeping operations accords with its declared interest in projecting peace and stability outside Europe, and provides a testing grounds for the ongoing development of ESDP capabilities. The strong political momentum backing the development of ESDP and the past and present involvement of the EU and EU member states in UN peacekeeping operations stands as a backdrop to future cooperation. In this view, increased EU involvement and strengthening suits the interests of both parties, with the EU, a philosophically closer partner to the UN, standing as a counterbalance to the United States (US).

There are serious overarching concerns in regard to this relationship, however. Neither the UN nor the EU can properly be regarded as monolithic,
of course: each is very much the sum of its parts and shaped by member states’ positions and contributions. Tardy argued that in the field of crisis management, despite the Brahimi Report reforms conducted by the UN, EU member states’ perceptions of the UN are less than favorable, as demonstrated by their waning troop and police contributions to UN peace operations. Furthermore, though on the one hand, participation in peace operations provides the opportunity to measure or test ESDP operationality, on the other, there is great pressure on the EU to deliver. Given this pressure, the question is not whether the EU will pursue crisis management capacities and activities, but whether EU crisis management will take place with or without the UN.

Because of the organizations’ overlapping membership, the concern persists that enhanced EU capabilities could come at the expense of UN peacekeeping. As one participant questioned, to what degree are EU member states available to the UN rather than, or in addition to, the EU? A number of participants argued that current EU operations in Bunia and FYROM laid to rest the worries about EU capacity-building at the expense of UN peacekeeping. In general, however, participants were divided about the significance of Operation Artemis; while some regarded it as positive indication of ESDP development, EU rapid reaction capability, and potentials for EU-UN collaboration, others were considerably more skeptical. Small-scale and ad hoc, it was argued that Artemis could serve neither as a litmus test nor as a model for future operations, and that it was little more than an example of an operation conducted in extremis, with tentative and hesitant EU involvement at best. The three major factors for success for Artemis were identified as timely handover to MONUC, non-interference by neighboring states, and further progress in the inter-Congolese dialogue. The likelihood of a gap in the transition between Artemis and MONUC, while a failure by this calculus, need not preclude further operations on this model, however.

In contrast, participants had little but good to say of the EU Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The success of the EUPM in BiH, a follow-on to the International Police Task Force (IPTF), attests to the
possibilities for cooperation between the EU and UN in the area of civilian crisis management in particular. Indeed, the EU appears less ambivalent about its involvement in UN-led civilian operations and activities than in military operations. From the EU perspective, though the EUPM includes non-member-state participants, it is nonetheless an EU operation supported structurally by the Commission, and as EUPM Chief Sven Frederiksen pointed out, it demonstrates the crisis management and civilian police capacity of ESDP.

A potentially more troublesome matter lies in the possibility of ceding a measure of EU autonomy to the UN in cooperative peace operations. While the EU continues to seek UN authorization for involvement in peace operations, particularly those outside of Europe, and respects the international legitimacy that a UN mandate or authorization provide, there are political complications. As both Tardy and General Bernd Lubenik, Chairman of the EU Military Committee Working Group, emphasized, the hallmark of EU-led operations is the involvement of the political-military structure of the EU. Accordingly, it is a key concern of EU member states that such operations remain under the political control and strategic direction of the EU Political and Security Council (PSC). By implication, EU reluctance to subordinate control of an EU operation to UN authority (control and command) makes the subcontracting model more attractive.

Complementarity vs. Competition?

Such questions about EU-UN cooperation echo issues more commonly brought up in the context of the EU-NATO relationship, particularly the question of complementarity vs. competition, and concerns about the possible erosion of EU autonomy. The structure of ESDP is arguably the crux of the EU-NATO relationship—whether ESDP would be built independent of NATO structures, the path favored by France, or within NATO structures, the European Security and Defense Initiative (ESDI) path preferred by the UK. The French-British Summit of Saint-Malo in 1998 laid the groundwork that ESDP structures should not duplicate NATO’s structures, capabilities, or
procedures. Then in December 2003, the so-called “Berlin Plus” agreement was signed between the EU and NATO, granting the EU access to NATO’s planning and command capabilities (in short, the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, or SHAPE), and thereby enabling the EU to formally launch its first military operation in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (fYROM).

Operation Concordia in fYROM is the first example of the EU’s vision of global crisis management. Indeed, the EU, along with NATO, was first involved in the diplomatic process that led to the Ohrid Framework Agreement of 2001, and the Stability Pact and the prospect of EU membership are added economic and political incentives for fYROM. In April 2003, the EU took over from NATO Operation Amber Fox with its own military operation, Concordia, aimed at easing relations between the Albanians and the Macedonians. Despite continued challenges on the ground—the state of corruption and mistrust continues, for example, and institutional reforms progress is slower than expected—there have been no problems of coordination with NATO, and relations between the international security organizations and Macedonian security structures are becoming more constructive, as attested to by Major General Pierre Maral, then Commander of EUFOR, fYROM.

Clearly, the consensus among conference participants was that, in the words of General Cammaert, “complementary arrangements and partnership between relevant organizations should be preferred to competition.”

Scenarios for EU-UN Cooperation in Peace Operations

Participants identified three main scenarios for EU-UN cooperation in UN peace operations:

- Individual participation of EU member states in UN-led operations, in which the EU would play the role of a clearinghouse;
• an EU-led operation, under a UN mandate, opening the way for a UN operation; or
• an EU-led operation, under a UN mandate, existing alongside a UN operation.

For reasons discussed above, the first scenario is unlikely to occur because of the reluctance of EU member states since the mid-1990s to become involved in UN-led operations. In the latter two scenarios, the EU—or rather, the EU PSC—would retain political and strategic control over its operations. Operation Artemis, of course, illustrates Tardy’s observation that the EU is “very much in favor of the sub-contracting model, by which the UN creates an operation, but subcontracts its implementation to the EU. In such a scenario, there is no formal link between the two institutions and the autonomy of decision of the EU is preserved.” Alternatively, the EU might possibly lead a pillar within a UN complex peace operation, as in the case of Kosovo. These scenarios would be slightly different for the civilian aspects of crisis management.

Recommendations

Following plenary presentations and discussions, participants divided into smaller breakout groups to discuss specific topics in-depth and to come up with concrete recommendations. The findings of each group are presented below:

Rapid Deployment

Rapid deployment is specific to each operation, dependent on time, size, and aim, and is only one factor in shortening response time. It is not a strictly military question, and therefore requires political and military coordination. On the UN side, its rapid deployment target was defined by the Brahimi report (90 days for a complex peace operation, 30 days for a traditional peacekeeping operation). Early commitment depends on the
political will of contributing countries, and therefore, information regarding risk and threat analysis must be made available in appropriate time. Though the force generation process can start before a UNSC resolution is adopted, countries generally wait, thereby losing time. Unlike the EU, for whom the framework nation concept is particularly valuable, in the UN context, the framework nation process is difficult to implement. On the EU side, deployment can begin only after Council decision, but if the operation is deemed appropriate, troops generally are available. For the EU, then, generic scenarios might save time. The EU has limited forces available to the UN as major countries are overstretched in current operations and restructuring.

Recommendations:

- Overcome barriers between organizations through measures such as temporary liaison officer exchanges.
- Make use of existing resources.
- Better processing of information relevant to UN operations. Information exchange and a security agreement would be first steps towards this goal.
- Rethink EU Article 19; clarify use of NATO assets; and engage in strategic dialogue to build confidence and possibly further cooperation.

Early Involvement of Contributing Countries

Participants raised the issues of the disparity between the contribution from Western/Northern countries and Southern countries, the problem of availability of troops, and the sustainability of commitment. Three concerns were examined: the reforms that need to be further implemented by the UN for early involvement of contributing countries (in the drafting process of Security Council resolutions and the preparation process of member states); how to assess the effectiveness of stand-by arrangements; and the specific needs of peacekeeping operations.
Recommendations:

- Some operational link between regional organizations and the UN could bridge the gap in competencies through common training.
- The EU could help the UN in lessons learned. It could study the case of SHIRBRIG in the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE), especially for the transition period and the question of standard compatibility.
- The EU could provide officers in planning structures, help transport troops (for example, through an agreement between the Russian Federation and the EU), and train through peacekeeping courses. Programs such as the French RECAMP (Reinforcement of African Peacekeeping Capacities) could be developed at the EU level.
- The EU could help the UN Secretariat before any resolution is adopted in providing planning, assessing military equipment on the ground, and in providing access to information.
- The EU could assist member states in preparing papers on emerging crises, so that these states could prepare the ground in domestic matters.

Governance Building

Tensions in governance operations include the inconsistency of means and ends (i.e., achieving democracy and rule of law through benevolent autocracy); the inadequacy of means for the ends (limited time, resources, and attention because of donor timetables); and the irrelevance of the means to the ends (balancing the demand for high international standards against the need for locally sustainable goals). There is a lack of understanding among international actors about what governance means, with an overemphasis on process, statistics, and organization processes. Perpetuating dependency is another danger for international organizations that may use the rhetoric of local ownership but carry out the work themselves, allowing little substantive input and no local control.
Recommendations in three key areas:

Learning:
- Clearer analysis of past operations and knowledge transfer between organizations.
- Better analysis of country situations to contextualize operations, drawing on academic expertise.

Staff:
- Better quality of staff, especially at the leadership level.
- Better staff at other levels as well, local if possible.

Clarity:
- Clarify strategic objectives, timeframes, and commitment.
- Clarify relationship with local population, being transparent about local powers in the present and future.

**UN-European Cooperation in the Period of Transition from the IPTF to the EUPM**

A major challenge in this transition was making the change in mandate known to the police forces, the public, and political authorities of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The EUPM also faced the possibility of destabilization of the security situation once the UN field presence was withdrawn. On the logistical side, there were few difficulties in handover of buildings and equipment, though inadequate handover of files. Personnel carry-over brought valuable institutional memory but difficulties in adjustment to the new mandate and new roles. And though EUPM Chief Sven Frederiksen was himself double-hatted as the head of the outgoing IPTF and incoming EUPM, he argued for retaining different heads of operations through the transition period.

Problems in handover included inadequate or non-existent files/equipment sharing, nor were lessons learned adequately conveyed. In
the area of media relations, no information was passed on to the press and there was no press monitoring.

Recommendations:

- A press/public information strategy needs to be articulated.
- Improved mechanisms for information transfer.
- Improved logistics and procurement; consider equipment transfer in the future.
- Recruit qualified police officers.
- Allow for an overlapping period between the heads of the exiting and incoming missions.

Civil-Military Cooperation in Peace Operations

The background paper on this topic made a distinction between civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) as a mechanism to assist a military structure cope with taking on the role of a political organization, and the larger sphere of civil-military cooperation and coordination. Group participants suggested that CIMIC could more realistically or conservatively be regarded as 'military measures to military ends.' Challenges include the practical and legal difficulties of undertaking military activities in the humanitarian field; the ever-changing staff and UN Special Representatives to the Secretary-General in a constant situation; and human security and gender considerations. The UN, NATO, and the EU have different visions of CIMIC, as reflected in their respective guidelines, making the direction of CIMIC in peace operations led by regional organizations under UN-mandate unclear.

Recommendations:

- Greater clarity on the strategic level before embarking on operations; identify specific needs.
- Greater clarity and coordination on the operational level, in theatre.
• Present a recognizable face for operations and actions, pursuing either a joint or single public information strategy.
• Develop guiding principles rather than strict regulations.

**Challenges and Potentials for EU-UN Cooperation**

General conversational topics included the impact of globalization on the UN constituency; the US role in the shaping of the EU; and the US vis-à-vis international organizations (multilateralism). The UN regards the EU favorably because of the capacity and resources the EU could potentially provide and because it views the EU as a counterbalance to the US, philosophically closer to UN than is the United States. On the other side, the EU’s view of the state of its relations with the UN is mixed: despite the fallout over Iraq, the relationship is strong in peace and security, development, high-level contacts, and humanitarian action. However, there are limits on the relationship as well. The UN makes significant demands on the EU, whose capacity to supply is in question. To EU coherence, which can be seen in the common positions of CFSP and ESDP, the UN represents the threat of a possible splintering of positions or shifting of positions.

**Recommendations:**

• Both organizations need to build on practice rather than theory.
• The EU should seek out areas where it has capacity or comparative advantage and act.
• The UN should be open to various forms of cooperation.
• Aim for progress of action, not improvisation, in future.
• The experience in the Balkans has demonstrated that while an organization – regional or global – could benefit from additional resources to conduct peace operations, resources alone cannot compensate for lack of planning, vision or will.¹

¹ Although the focus of the seminar was on 'peacemaking' (which primarily involves "negotiated, facilitated or mediated conflict resolution"), the discussion covered activities, such as electoral assistance, civilian policing, humanitarian assistance and human rights monitoring, etc, which come
• Organizations reflect similar traits in peace operations, including a tendency to focus on tactical issues rather than strategic ones; a reluctance both to conduct forward planning and also to undertake preventive action; and a propensity to ascribe their inaction to the "lack of political will" on the part of their constituent members.

• Member states are equally responsible for their inability to task the organizations to conduct formal contingency planning or to work towards the desired "end state". This was often, and perhaps conveniently, attributed to the lack of domestic political support or national interest.

• An effective peace operation was contingent on the "alignment" of key countries in the region. This group of key countries would differ from region to region. In the Balkans an alignment between the United States, Russia and key European Union (EU) members was imperative for the "stability pact" to emerge. A Russia isolated in the process was not productive.

• Although peace operations should encourage states to become economically, socially and politically viable, they tend to be more successful at "mechanistic reconstruction" than "social reconstruction and nation building". The peace mission must also guard against the state's leaders becoming dependent on external actors for their survival.

• If peace operations have worked at all in the Balkans, it was to the credit of the leadership of the international missions. The role of key personalities was critical in providing not only normative and operational leadership but also in generating strategies of co-operation when the effort involved more than one organization.

• One incentive for states in Europe to alter their behavior may be the promise of joining an organization like the Council of Europe, NATO and/or the EU. Although tools for peace operations often tend to be region- and time-specific, this incentive, of offering membership of regional bodies, could be applied in other regions as well.

under the broad ambit of 'peace operations'. Hence the more inclusive term of 'peace operations’ has been used in this report.
While the legitimacy of non-UN endorsed military action remained moot, the consensus was that if intervention was inevitable then it was "optimal for the UN to be the authoriser of force". In the absence of a single chain of command, improved co-ordination between the different organizations was vital.